Johnson v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ROGER L. JOHNSON, §
§ No. 187, 2023
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 9908000065 (K)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §
Submitted: June 22, 2023
Decided: August 17, 2023
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to
affirm, and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Roger L. Johnson appeals the Superior Court’s May 8, 2023 order
denying his motion for correction of illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion
to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of
Johnson’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) The record reflects that in May 2000, a Superior Court jury convicted
Johnson of two counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, and one count of second-degree conspiracy. The
Superior Court deferred sentencing pending a presentence investigation. On June
23, 2000, the State filed a motion to declare Johnson a habitual offender. On
November 15, 2000, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion and sentenced
Johnson as a habitual offender to a minimum-mandatory term of eighty years of
Level V incarceration, followed by two years of probation. We affirmed Johnson’s
convictions and sentence on appeal.1 Since that time, Johnson has filed various
unsuccessful motions, including three motions for postconviction relief and a motion
for sentence modification.2 Most recently, Johnson filed a motion for correction of
illegal sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a), arguing that his sentence
was illegal because the State had not filed its motion to declare Johnson a habitual
offender before sentencing. The Superior Court denied the motion, and we affirmed
its denial on appeal.3
(3) In March 2023, Johnson filed another motion for correction of illegal
sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge’s reference at sentencing to 11 Del. C. §
4215(a) (which requires the court to call upon a defendant subject to enhanced
sentencing to admit or deny the previous conviction or convictions that form the
basis of an enhanced sentence), as opposed to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (the then-extant
1
Johnson v. State, 2002 WL 1343761 (Del. June 18, 2002).
2
See Johnson v. State, 2008 WL 1778241 (Del. Apr. 21, 2008) (affirming the denial of Johnson’s
first motion for postconviction relief); Johnson v. State, 2012 WL 252394 (Del. Jan. 25, 2012)
(affirming the denial of Johnson’s second motion for postconviction relief); Johnson v. State, 2018
WL 6822346 (Del. Dec. 27, 2018) (affirming the denial of Johnson’s third motion for
postconviction relief).
3
Johnson v. State, 2022 WL 121315 (Del. Jan. 12, 2022).
2
habitual-offender statute detailing sentencing ranges for a defendant convicted of a
fourth or subsequent felony), renders his habitual-offender sentence illegal. The
Superior Court denied the motion, finding that the sentencing judge’s intent was to
sentence Johnson under Section 4214(a). This appeal followed.
(4) We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for
abuse of discretion.4 To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the
claim de novo.5 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which
it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by
statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of
conviction did not authorize.6
(5) On appeal, Johnson argues, as he did below, that the sentencing judge
sentenced Johnson under Section 4215(a) and that his sentence is internally
contradictory as a result. Johnson’s argument is unavailing.
(6) The record reflects that, prior to sentencing, the State moved to have
Johnson declared a habitual offender under the habitual-offender statute, specifically
Section 4214(a). In response, defense counsel filed a motion to declare Section
4214(a) unconstitutional or, in the alternative, inapplicable to Johnson. The State
4
Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).
5
Id.6
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
3
filed an opposition to the motion. It is unequivocally clear that the subject of the
motion and the State’s opposition was the potential minimum-mandatory sentence
Johnson faced if sentenced under Section 4214(a) as requested by the State. At
sentencing, the parties and the sentencing judge engaged in a lively discussion about
the statutory interpretation of Section 4214(a). Following that discussion, the
sentencing judge denied defense counsel’s motion and noted, “I am signing the form
of order that is attached to the State’s motion.”7 That order declared Johnson to be
a habitual offender and provided that he would be sentenced under Section 4214(a).8
Moreover, the sentencing order correctly refers to Section 4214(a), and Johnson
challenged the constitutionality of the habitual-offender statute on direct appeal. In
light of the foregoing, it is clear that the sentencing judge simply misspoke by citing
Section 4215(a) instead of Section 4214(a) when he declared Johnson to be a
habitual offender and sentenced him.9 Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s
judgment that Johnson’s habitual-offender sentence is not internally contradictory
or otherwise illegal.
7
App. to Opening Br. at A029.
8
Id. at A016.
9
Specifically, the sentencing judge misspoke when he stated, “You are declared an habitual
offender pursuant to 11 Delaware Code Section 4215(a).” Id. at A038.
4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to affirm
be GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice
5