Webb v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM J. WEBB, JR., §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 467, 2022
Appellant, §
§ Court Below – Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. Id Nos. 1902015015, 1904001943,
§ & 1906000296 (N)
Appellee. §
Submitted: May 22, 2024
Decided: July 10, 2024
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
This 10th day of July, 2024, after consideration of the parties’ briefs and the
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) William J. Webb, Jr. has appealed his convictions in the Superior Court
of one count each of stalking, act of intimidation, and criminal contempt, and
forty-seven counts of breach of conditions of bond. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(2) Webb was arrested on three separate occasions in 2019. Webb’s first
arrest, on February 14, 2019, resulted from an incident reported by Patricia Burgess,
the mother of Webb’s child. Burgess, who had a no-contact order in place against
Webb, told officers that Webb had grabbed her by her hair and taken her car keys
and car. Webb was arrested again—once more in February and again in April—
after contacting Burgess in violation of the no-contact order.
(3) In June 2019, Webb was indicted on charges stemming from the three
arrests plus additional charges resulting from Webb’s breach of the no-contact order.
The charges included robbery first and second degree, theft of a motor vehicle,
offensive touching, non-compliance with bond, act of intimidation, stalking,
harassment, breach of conditions of bond, criminal contempt, and misuse of the mail.
The State entered a nolle prosequi on, and the Superior Court dismissed, certain
charges;1 the remaining charges were scheduled for a single trial.
(4) Webb was provided with court-appointed counsel from the Office of
Defense Services (“ODS”). At a February 25, 2019 preliminary hearing in the Court
of Common Pleas, Webb complained that his counsel, then Andrew J. Meyer, was
not providing effective representation. The court advised Webb he could “discuss
any issues [he] had with [his] attorney,”2 after the hearing, but Webb demanded that
the court “give [him] a counsel waiver form right now”3 so that he could represent
himself. Because Webb continued to interrupt the hearing, he was removed from
the courtroom but continued to be represented by Meyer at the hearing. After Meyer
1
App. to Opening Br. at A1–85.
2
Id. at A101.
3
Id. at A102.
2
withdrew as Webb’s counsel, Brian J. Chapman, also from the ODS, was appointed.
Chapman represented Webb at an April 2019 preliminary hearing. Following that
hearing, Chapman withdrew and Jonathan Layton from the Office of Conflicts
Counsel was appointed.
(5) In July 2019 the court ordered a psychological evaluation to determine
whether Webb was competent to stand trial. While the results of that evaluation
were pending, Webb filed a pro se “motion for self-representation.” After Webb
was deemed competent to stand trial, the Superior Court held a case review and
addressed Webb’s motion. At that hearing Dade Werb from the Office of Conflicts
Counsel replaced Layton as Webb’s appointed attorney. After speaking with Webb,
the court determined that he wished to remain represented and considered the motion
withdrawn.4
(6) Two months later, however, Webb filed a motion to disqualify Werb.
The motion requested Werb’s disqualification, in part, on the grounds that “Mr.
Werb worked at the Public Defender’s office when [d]efendant threatened an
[a]ssociate friend of Mr. Werb’s” and that “[Webb] ha[d] filed a lawsuit against Mr.
4
Id. at A169 (The Court: “So you prefer to have an attorney? Am I correct? The Defendant:
“Yes.” . . . The Court: “I will consider the request to represent yourself withdrawn based upon the
kind of communication that you’ve have with the Court.”).
3
Werb and [h]is [l]aw [f]irm.”5 Webb did not request new counsel in the motion nor
did he request to represent himself pro se.6
(7) Werb also filed a motion to withdraw as Webb’s counsel. In the motion
Werb averred that the “appointment arose because Mr. Webb had previously
threatened physical harm and/or civil lawsuits upon his prior three attorneys[.]”7
The motion stated that Webb had threatened Werb: by telephone message, including
a voicemail telling Werb to “go kill himself before I catch his f…cking a[...]s”; in
multiple letters, that stated: “keep up your n…..d ways g[…]p and you aren’t going
to be breathing”; and with civil lawsuits against Werb and his law firm.8 Werb also
testified that Webb told him that he was fired and refused to cooperate with his
efforts to represent him in any way.9 In the motion to withdraw, Werb argued that
Webb had forfeited his right to appointed counsel under Bultron v. State, a case in
which this Court held that a criminal defendant’s right to appointed counsel may be
forfeited by “extremely serious misconduct.”10
(8) The Superior Court denied Webb’s motion to disqualify and granted
counsel’s motion to withdraw. In so doing, the court told Webb that it had “probably
5
Motion to Disqualify Counsel at 1–2, State v. Webb, Docket No. 29, C.A. No. 1906000296 (Del.
Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2020).
6
Id.
7
App. to Opening Br. at A171.
8
Id. at A172.
9
Id. at A173, A178.
10
Id. at A173 (citing Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 761 (Del. 2006)).
4
appointed all the attorneys that anyone is going to appoint for you. You’ve gone
through at least three, maybe four different attorneys who have all had to withdraw
from your representation, so it looks like you’re going to have to represent yourself
in regards to the matter.”11 The court also declined to appoint standby counsel.
(9) Webb represented himself at trial and was convicted on all charges.
Because Webb was convicted of felony stalking—a violent felony—and he had prior
violent felony convictions, the State moved to declare Webb a habitual offender
under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d). The motion was granted, and Webb was sentenced as
a habitual offender to 25 years at Level V.
(10) On appeal, Webb argues that the Superior Court erred by “forcing
Webb to proceed pro se without first engaging in a proper colloquy to determine that
Webb was knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Article I,
§ 7 of the Delaware Constitution.”12 The State responds that Webb did not waive,
but forfeited, his right to court-appointed counsel based on his “extremely serious
misconduct” toward counsel.13
(11) We agree that the question is whether Webb forfeited his right to
counsel. “If a defendant’s behavior is sufficiently egregious, it will constitute
11
Id. at A178.
12
Opening Br. at 21.
13
Answering Br. at 18.
5
forfeiture. Forfeiture, unlike waiver, does not require [pro se] warnings or a warning
to discontinue bad conduct.”14 Accordingly, we do not address the parties’
arguments as to whether a proper pro se colloquy occurred; we consider only
whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by refusing to appoint new counsel
and “forcing Webb to proceed pro se[.]”
(12) The Superior Court’s decision not to appoint new counsel is reviewed
by this Court for an abuse of discretion.15 An abuse of discretion occurs only if the
trial court’s decision is based on “clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds.”16
(13) In Bultron v. State, this Court held that the defendant engaged in
“extremely serious misconduct” by displaying “insulting and unacceptable
behavior” toward appointed counsel that was intended to “prevent the trial from
going forward.”17 The defendant’s conduct was sufficient to warrant a forfeiture
even though it “fell short of violence or threats.”18
(14) The record here shows, and Webb does not deny, that he threatened to
kill his court-appointed counsel. Webb also harassed, refused to cooperate with, and
filed civil lawsuits against, his counsel. Webb’s conduct was more than sufficient
14
See Bultron, 897 A.2d at 765 (“Forfeiture can be found regardless of whether the defendant has
been warned about engaging in misconduct, and regardless of whether the defendant has been
advised of the risks of proceeding pro se.’”) (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092,
1100 (3d Cir. 1995)).
15
Bultron, 897 A.2d at 765.
16
Id. at 762.
17
Id. at 766.
18
Id.
6
to support a finding of “extremely serious misconduct” warranting forfeiture under
Bultron.19 Accordingly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to appoint Webb additional or standby counsel and directing Webb to proceed pro
se. Although the court did not use the words “forfeit” or “forfeiture,” the court’s
statement was the functional equivalent of a forfeiture finding, one that is amply
supported by the record.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court be AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice
19
In addition to Werb’s testimony and the affidavit accompanying his Motion to Withdraw, the
Superior Court was in possession of a letter from Webb to the prothonotary dated March 10, 2019,
in which Webb, using both profanity and racial slurs, threated to “kill [Meyer] and put his head in
front of the court house.” App. to Answering Br. at B1–B3.
7