BTG International, Inc. v. Wellstat Therapeutics Corporation

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BTG INTERNATIONAL, INC., )
)
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 12562-VCL
)
WELLSTAT THERAPEUTICS )
CORPORATION, )
)
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Date Submitted: June 26, 2017
Date Decided: September 19, 2017
Lisa Zwally Brown, MONTGOMERY, McCRACKEN, WALKER & RHOADS, LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Richard L. Scheff, Lanthrop B. Nelson, III, MONTGOMERY,
McCRACKEN, WALKER & RHOADS, LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Attorneys for
BTG International, Inc.
Kelly E. Farnan, Blake Rohrbacher, Nicole K. Pedi, RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Stephen D. Susman, Harry P. Susman, SUSMAN
GODFREY L.L.P., Houston, Texas; Cory Buland, Mark Musico, Trinity Brown,
SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P., New York, New York; Attorneys for Wellstat Therapeutics
Corporation.
LASTER, Vice Chancellor.
Pursuant to an Exclusive Distribution Agreement dated July 1, 2011 (the
“Distribution Agreement”), BTG International, Inc. (“BTG”) agreed to promote, distribute,
and sell Vistogard,1 a drug owned by Wellstat Therapeutics Corporation (“Wellstat”). At
trial, Wellstat proved that BTG breached the Distribution Agreement, and BTG did not
prove a prior breach by Wellstat that would have excused BTG’s breach. Wellstat is
entitled to damages of $55.8 million, pre- and post-judgment interest at the rate specified
in the Distribution Agreement, costs, and a limited award of attorneys’ fees.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial lasted five days. The parties introduced over 1,300 exhibits and lodged twenty-
nine depositions. Nine fact witnesses and seven experts testified live. The two sides
presented starkly different stories, and it was not possible to reconcile all of the witness
testimony and documentary evidence. This decision has relied most heavily on the
contemporaneous documents. Having weighed the evidence and evaluated the credibility
of the witnesses, this decision finds that the following facts were proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1
The parties used several different names for the drug before its commercial launch.
For simplicity, this decision consistently refers to the drug as “Vistogard.”
1
A. Vistogard
Vistogard is an orally administered antidote for 5-fluorouracil (“5-FU”), a
commonly used chemotherapy drug. 5-FU toxicity can be severe, even fatal. Vistogard was
the first commercially available drug to address 5-FU toxicity.
Wellstat developed Vistogard, but Wellstat lacked a sales team. Wellstat needed a
partner to launch Vistogard commercially and to market and distribute the drug.
In fall 2009, Wellstat began discussions with BTG. On paper, the fit seemed strong.
BTG’s corporate objective at the time was to “become a significant player in the field of
specialty pharmaceuticals,”2 a category that includes Vistogard. BTG had a dedicated
specialty pharmaceuticals business unit (the “Pharmaceuticals Division”), which already
marketed antidotes. BTG’s portfolio included Voraxaze, a drug that treats toxicity from
another chemotherapy agent.
BTG was eager to secure the rights to Vistogard. BTG’s CEO, Louise Makin, called
Vistogard “a great opportunity” for BTG and wanted to add the drug to BTG’s portfolio.3
B. The Distribution Agreement
After several years of negotiations, Wellstat and BTG entered into the Distribution
Agreement.4 Wellstat granted BTG “the exclusive right and license . . . to promote,
2
JX 100 at 1.
3
JX 126.
4
JX 152.
2
distribute and sell” Vistogard for ten years following FDA approval.5 BTG paid Wellstat a
distribution rights fee of $7.5 million and agreed to pay two milestone payments of $1
million.6 BTG also agreed to pay royalties on the sales of Vistogard at rates ranging from
20-40% of the revenue attributable to the drug.7
The Distribution Agreement divided responsibility for commercializing Vistogard
between Wellstat and BTG. Wellstat was required to “use Diligent Efforts, at Wellstat’s
sole cost and expense, to develop [Vistogard] in order to obtain, and subsequently maintain,
FDA Approval for [Vistogard] . . . , including to conduct pre- and post-FDA Approval
studies necessary to obtain and maintain FDA Approval.”8 BTG was required to “use its
Diligent Efforts to and be responsible for, at BTG’s sole cost and expense, all promotion,
distribution and sales activities with respect to [Vistogard] . . . .”9 The Distribution
Agreement defined “Diligent Efforts” as follows:
Diligent Efforts means, with respect to a Party, the carrying out of obligations
specified in this Agreement in a diligent, expeditious and sustained manner
using efforts and resources, including reasonably necessary personnel and
financial resources, that specialty pharmaceutical companies typically devote
to their own internally discovered compounds or products of most closely
comparable market potential at a most closely comparable stage in their
development or product life, taking into account the following factors to the
5
Id. § 3.1(a).
6
Id. §§ 4.1, 4.2.
7
Id. § 4.3.
8
Id. § 6.3(a).
9
Id. § 8.1.
3
extent reasonable and relevant: issues of safety and efficacy, product profile,
competitiveness of alternative products in the marketplace, the patent or
other proprietary position of the Subject Product, and the potential
profitability of the Subject Product. Diligent Efforts shall be determined
without regard to any payments owed by a Party to the other Party (excluding
the transfer price for supply of such Subject Product).10
As part of its responsibilities under the Distribution Agreement, BTG was required
to “prepare in good faith the initial commercial plan and budget” for Vistogard (the
“Commercial Plan”).11 The Commercial Plan had to “include minimum commitments of
resources, personnel and financing for pre-launch and launch activities with respect to, and
subsequent promotion and distribution of” Vistogard.12 The Commercial Plan was “subject
to good faith discussions between the Parties” and was to be “mutually agreed upon by the
parties . . . .”13 Once the parties reached agreement, BTG was required to “promote and
distribute [Vistogard] . . . in material compliance with such Commercial Plan.”14
The Distribution Agreement further called for the establishment of a joint
development and commercialization committee (the “Committee”) to “manage and
oversee the development and commercialization” of Vistogard.15 The Committee consisted
10
Id. § 2.11.
11
Id. § 8.1.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. § 5.1(a).
4
of four Wellstat representatives and four BTG representatives. The Committee’s
responsibilities included to
review and recommend amendments to the Commercial Plan, provided that
no amendment to the Commercial Plan shall materially reduce the level of
efforts required under the initial Commercial Plan agreed by the parties
pursuant to Section 8.1 unless reasonably justified by changes in
[Vistogard’s] product lifecycle stage or changes in the market . . . .16
C. BTG’s New Strategic Plan
When BTG signed the Distribution Agreement, it had high hopes for Vistogard.
Makin touted Vistogard as “an excellent fit” with BTG’s existing business that would
“enable [BTG] to leverage the sales team and back office support infrastructure which [it]
already [had] in place.”17 BTG executives prepared an investor Q&A announcing that
Vistogard “could generate up to $60 m[illion] peak sales per annum.”18
But after BTG executed the Distribution Agreement, Makin shifted BTG’s
corporate strategy away from specialty pharmaceuticals and towards interventional
medicine.19 In 2013, BTG adopted a new strategic plan called the “BTG – 2020/2021
Vision.” It called for BTG to become “a leader in interventional medicine in oncology and
16
Id.
17
JX 155.
18
JX 153.
19
“Interventional medicine is the use of minimally invasive image guided
techniques to diagnose and treat diseases.” JX 295 at 12.
5
vascular . . . .”20 Between 2011 and 2014, BTG built a portfolio of interventional medicine
products, primarily through acquisitions.21 BTG’s revenue from interventional medicine
grew astronomically, increasing from £5.6 million in 2011 to £79.1 million in 2014.22 BTG
expected that its revenue from interventional medicine would continue to increase,
reaching £642.6 million by 2021 and comprising 75% of BTG’s total revenue.23
BTG’s strategic shift towards interventional medicine came at the expense of the
Pharmaceuticals Division. Specialty pharmaceuticals could not generate the same rate of
growth as interventional medicine, and BTG chose to allocate capital to the areas that
promised the fastest growth. Between 2011 and 2014, BTG made no acquisitions in the
specialty pharmaceuticals space.24 The new role of the Pharmaceuticals Division was to
generate cash to fund BTG’s investments in higher-growth areas.25
Makin emphasized the implications of BTG’s new strategic plan in her
communications with BTG’s senior management team. In February 2015, Makin emailed
the heads of BTG’s business units with guidance on preparing their annual budgets for the
20
Id. at 6.
21
Id. at 3-6; see also Tr. (Higham) 661:9-14.
22
JX 295 at 14.
23
Id. at 7.
24
Tr. (Makin) 943:8-12.
25
See, e.g., JX 543 at 4 (describing Pharmaceuticals Division’s goal as “[o]ptimising
cash . . . and investing proceeds in high-growth areas of Interventional Medicine.”).
6
coming fiscal year. Makin explained that, although BTG previously had maintained “a
nurturing/experimental mindset where we have been able to invest in most of the
opportunities we thought worthwhile,” the company now had “a portfolio” of opportunities
and therefore had “choices to make about where we invest.”26 In her email, Makin ranked
BTG’s five business units in order of priority for further investment. At the top was
interventional vascular medicine, which was “the highest priority for investment.”27 Last
was the Pharmaceuticals Division, which “[n]eed[ed] to continue to execute smarter and
smarter.”28 Makin wrote that the “[c]hallenge is to run at constant cost base whilst keeping
people motivated and deliver sustained mid to high single digit revenue growth. Ensure
[Vistogard] launch is in line with our risk appetite and delivered cost neutrally. Low
priority for additional investment.”29
At trial, Makin and other senior BTG representatives claimed that Makin’s
challenge was not a directive, but rather an aspirational goal that the Pharmaceuticals
Division could push back on and did not have to follow.30 That testimony was not credible.
26
JX 361 at 1.
27
Id. at 2.
28
Id. at 3.
29
Id.
30
See, e.g., Tr. (Lewis) 309:3-311:16; Tr. (Makin) 958:8-959:23.
7
In reality, the Pharmaceuticals Division heard Makin’s message loud and clear. Its
leadership promptly reduced the budget for the commercial group by $825,000.31
D. The Sales Force For Vistogard
In early 2015, Wellstat began a rolling submission of a New Drug Application for
Vistogard to the FDA. The submission started the countdown to the commercial launch.
Internally, BTG began considering the sales force it would need. At the time, the
Pharmaceuticals Division had nineteen full-time sales representatives. All of them sold
both oncology products and snake venom antidotes. Facing Makin’s directive to run at
constant cost, the Pharmaceuticals Division considered whether the same number of
employees could market the oncology products better if the sales force split into two teams,
one dedicated to oncology products and the other dedicated to snake venom antidotes.
TGaS Advisors (“TGaS”), a consulting firm that the Pharmaceuticals Division had
retained, recommended against splitting the existing team. TGaS advised that the “creation
of a new sales force should only [be] considered with a significant . . . expansion” in the
number of full-time sales representatives.32 TGaS also told the Pharmaceuticals Division
that BTG needed “to ‘invest’ to generate revenues and prepare for [Vistogard’s] launch.”33
31
JX 368.
32
JX 353 at 7.
33
JX 382.
8
In other words, BTG needed to add more sales representatives. TGaS recommended a
substantial increase: “[A]t a minimum, you need to double your sales organization . . . .”34
Makin’s directive about the role of the Pharmaceuticals Division and the need for it
to be “cost neutral” and run at a “constant cost base” meant that the TGaS recommendations
were nonstarters. In March 2015, the constraints on the Pharmaceuticals Division tightened
further when Anthony Higham took over. He was a Makin disciple who sought to impress
his boss by exceeding her cost-control mandate. He immediately initiated “Project DJ,”
which called for across-the-board cost reductions of 5%.35 Higham told his staff: “I request
all established products are prioritized ahead of [Vistogard], we cannot afford to be
distracted from achieving the budget through ongoing [Vistogard] dialogue and activity.”36
In April 2015, BTG engaged a new consultant, ZS Associates, for advice on its sales
team. BTG did not permit ZS Associates to do an independent assessment. Instead, BTG
instructed ZS Associates to assume as an “immutable factor” for its analysis that the entire
Pharmaceuticals Division sales force would remain fixed at nineteen.37 Even with this
34
Id.
35
Tr. (Higham) 634:1-635:12. DJ stood for “donkey jacket,” an English term that
refers to “a type of coverall that you would wear if you’re cleaning up outside.” Id. This
suggests Higham believed his job was to “clean up” excessive spending in the
Pharmaceuticals Division.
36
JX 424.
37
A draft of BTG’s request for proposal set the “immutable factor” at seventeen. JX
387 (Carolyn Lewis, General Manager of the Pharmaceuticals Division, advising her team
that the request for proposal “should call out that we want to increase [Vistogard] and
9
direct instruction, ZS Associates signaled that the Pharmaceuticals Division needed to hire
more full-time sales representatives to launch Vistogard successfully. ZS Associates wrote,
“If sales force is expected . . . to achieve the [Vistogard] forecast of $9.5M net sales in FY
2017, we estimate that BTG will need 19-20 Oncology focused [full-time equivalents].”38
Because the Pharmaceuticals Division had only nineteen sales representatives devoted to
all of its products, the ZS Associates report necessarily contemplated more staff. Moreover,
ZS Associates explained that adding more sales representatives would be highly profitable
for BTG. According to ZS Associates, “[u]p to 22 Oncology [full-time equivalents] would
still provide a marginal [return on investment] over 100% for Voraxaze and [Vistogard].”39
ZS Associates noted that the estimated returns were “higher than [the] industry average.”40
But Higham was not interested in expanding the sales team. He was focused on
cutting costs through Project DJ.
Constrained by Makin’s directives and Higham’s impassioned implementation of
her strategy, the Pharmaceuticals Division went against the recommendations from TGaS
and ZS Associates. In July 2015, BTG split the Pharmaceuticals Division sales force into
Voraxaze sales without expanding the footprint in any way and the same applied to rolling
in [Vistogard]”). The final request for proposal increased the cap to nineteen. JX 388; see
also Tr. (Lewis) 335:19-337:1 (clarifying the change).
38
JX 462 at 6.
39
Id.
40
Id.
10
two teams, creating an oncology sales force with just seven representatives.41 BTG planned
for these representatives to split their time equally between Vistogard and Voraxaze.
E. The Commercial Plan For Vistogard
Under the Distribution Agreement, BTG was obligated to prepare the Commercial
Plan so it could be implemented once the FDA approved Vistogard for launch. On July 10,
2015, Wellstat formally completed the filing of its New Drug Application with the FDA.
BTG understood that the FDA could approve the application as soon as January 2016,
which meant that BTG needed to be ready to launch Vistogard as early as April 2, 2016.42
Despite its obligation to prepare the Commercial Plan, BTG did nothing. Not until
September 10, 2015, after Wellstat asked BTG to present the Commercial Plan at the next
Committee meeting, did BTG spring into action.43 BTG employees hastily assembled a
PowerPoint presentation, which they dubbed the “Initial Commercialization Plan.”
On September 17, 2015, BTG presented the plan to the Committee. It was woefully
inadequate. The bulk of the sixty-one slides consisted of generic information about how
BTG would market Vistogard.44 Only the last three slides addressed BTG’s obligation
41
JX 465 at 5.
42
JX 478 at 4.
43
JX 514. It appears that BTG forgot about its obligation to create the Commercial
Plan. See JX 519 (BTG employee forwarding Higham relevant language of the Distribution
Agreement).
44
JX 523; see also Tr. (Schneider) 33:9-34:3 (acknowledging slides “look[] simple
and . . . obvious”).
11
under the Distribution Agreement to provide “minimum commitments of resources,
personnel and financing for pre-launch and launch activities.”45 The content of these slides
shows that BTG’s hastily constructed presentation did not offer a viable marketing strategy
and did not meet the requirements for a Commercial Plan.
To address its obligation to provide a minimum commitment of resources, BTG
claimed it would spend $4.7 million on Vistogard in the coming year.46 BTG represented
that $2.1 million of that total would be spent on advertising and promotion. BTG allocated
the money among eight high-level categories, such as “market research,” “print and
production,” and “industry events and seminars.”47 BTG did not allocate the money based
on any study of Vistogard’s specific marketing needs. Rather, BTG took the percentage
allocated to each category in the Pharmaceuticals Division’s budget from the prior year,
multiplied that percentage by $2.1 million, and used the resulting figure for each category.48
To address its obligation to provide a minimum commitment of personnel, BTG
represented that it would use its existing oncology sales force of seven representatives for
pre-launch activities. BTG did not say definitively how many representatives it would use
for launch. BTG suggested it could assign up to forty representatives from its Interventional
45
JX 152 § 8.1.
46
JX 523 at 61.
47
Id. at 60.
48
JX 942 at 5-6; Tr. (Lewis) 373:2-375:15.
12
Oncology business unit,49 but BTG had rejected that idea internally two months earlier.50
In reality, BTG did not have a plan for its sales force or for a commercial launch. The most
candid aspect of the presentation admitted that BTG’s plans were still “[u]nder
development.”51
The Wellstat representatives were unimpressed. They began to suspect that BTG
was not making the commitment required by the Distribution Agreement. Wellstat told
BTG that it wanted “a more detailed commercialization plan . . . .” 52 The next month,
Wellstat hired a consultant to assess whether BTG’s efforts were adequate.53
F. The Pharmaceuticals Division Pleads For Resources.
In October 2015, the Pharmaceuticals Division again engaged ZS Associates, this
time to develop a plan for Vistogard’s post-launch sales force. BTG again imposed
constraints on the analysis.54 BTG told ZS Associates to build a model that would show
the return on investment from placing representatives in thirty territories, splitting their
49
JX 523 at 61.
50
See JX 472 at 5.
51
JX 527 at 3; see also Tr. (Bamat) 907:5-16 (“[BTG] told us, ‘The seven sales reps
is just a start. Don’t worry, there’s going to be more.’”).
52
JX 527 at 3.
53
JX 551.
54
See Tr. (Lewis) 326:17-327:3.
13
time equally between Voraxaze and Vistogard.55 BTG instructed ZS Associates to use a
profit margin that was net of the royalty owed to Wellstat when calculating return on
investment.56 This instruction ran flatly contrary to the terms of the Distribution
Agreement, which obligated each party to fulfill its duties “without regard to any payments
owed by a Party to the other Party . . . .”57
Even with BTG’s revenues improperly depressed by the inclusion of the royalty, ZS
Associates still concluded that putting one sales representative in each of the thirty
territories would render all thirty territories immediately profitable.58 ZS Associates further
concluded that twenty-two of the territories would produce a 100% return on investment
in the first year and twenty-seven would produce a 100% return on investment by the
second year.59
But the Pharmaceuticals Division knew that Makin would reject any request to add
twenty-three new employees to a division she had designated as a “[l]ow priority for
additional investment.”60 The Pharmaceuticals Division decided that the most it could ask
55
JX 828; Tr. (Lewis) 354:6-356:6.
56
JX 555; Tr. (Lewis) 350:4-351:10.
57
JX 152 § 2.11.
58
JX 828.
59
Id.
60
JX 361 at 3.
14
for was nine additional sales representatives, resulting in an oncology sales team of sixteen
representatives. The Pharmaceuticals Division planned to place the representatives in the
markets that would generate a 300% return on investment for BTG. ZS Associates had
previously told BTG a 300% return was many times the average return on investment in
the industry.61
On November 5, 2015, Phil Moody, the Pharmaceuticals Division’s Vice President
of Finance for the United States, approached Rolf Soderstrom, BTG’s CFO, about
expanding the oncology sales team. Moody tried to frame the request softly, stressing that
the Pharmaceuticals Division “ha[d] heard you and [Makin] loud and clear that we need to
drive efficiency to allow for investment.”62 But Moody emphasized that adding the sales
representatives “will strongly bolster the launch of Vistogard and will be crucial to achieve
optimal top line revenues. The return on investment here is significant.”63
On November 18, 2015, the Pharmaceuticals Division presented its proposal for
additional sales representatives to Makin. The presentation emphasized the need to have
additional sales representatives for Vistogard at the outset: “Long term performance will
be set in the first 6 months[.] Must Get It Right . . . Early!”64 The presentation also stressed
61
See JX 462 at 6.
62
JX 594 at 1.
63
Id.
64
JX 607 at 18.
15
that having more sales representatives in more local markets “generates incremental
national lift due to robust, dynamic oncology networks.”65
Makin was skeptical and asked for more details. Higham read between the lines and
received her message. The next day, November 19, 2015, he told his subordinates that he
was “very disappointed” in the presentation.66 He instructed his staff to prepare a new plan
that would phase in the nine additional representatives over an extended period of time.67
The Pharmaceuticals Division had previously considered and rejected this idea because it
would provide lower returns to BTG in the long-run than hiring them immediately.68
Meanwhile, Makin’s corporate team put more pressure on the Pharmaceuticals
Division to reduce costs. On November 22, 2015, Soderstrom instructed Moody that “[o]n
costs other than salary costs we are pushing to keep all selling costs flat except for specific
investments. Any other investment will need to be self funding.”69 Moody forwarded the
email to Higham and commented, “I’m working hard to keep the team together, but this is
very discouraging.”70
65
Id.
66
JX 611.
67
Id.
68
JX 594.
69
JX 620 at 2.
70
Id. at 1.
16
On November 25, 2015, the Pharmaceuticals Division submitted a formal white
paper to Higham which asked for authority to hire an inside sales force of three telephone
representatives to supplement the work of the field sales representatives. The white paper
noted that the current seven-member sales force left “~60% of the market opportunity and
oncology centers uncovered,” and that “[e]ven if direct team expanded to 16 [people],
~30% of the market [is] still left completely uncovered.”71
On December 10, 2015, the Pharmaceuticals Division submitted a second white
paper to Higham that proposed immediately hiring nine additional representatives. The
white paper again emphasized the importance of additional representatives to Vistogard’s
success. “Vistogard will require promotional efforts to raise disease awareness; early
investment will be critical to achieve potential of product . . . . Various case studies suggest
that inadequate investment at launch significantly impacts peak revenue potential of the
product. Early underinvestment would likely decrease peak sales.”72 The white paper noted
that Vistogard and Voraxaze warranted at least twenty-two sales representatives. The
Pharmaceuticals Division nonetheless “trimmed the proposal down to 16” because a higher
number of representatives “would likely be dilutive to earnings in FY17.”73
71
JX 625 at 2.
72
JX 645 at 2.
73
Id.
17
In accordance with the instruction that Higham had given to phase in the
representatives over time, the white paper included an alternative which had BTG phase in
the additional sales representatives over six months. This proposal contemplated BTG
immediately hiring four representatives, then hiring five more in mid-2016 if the four initial
sales representatives were effective.74 The evidence as a whole demonstrates that the
Pharmaceuticals Division only included this alternative because Higham insisted on it. The
Pharmaceuticals Division similarly only proposed sixteen sales representatives because of
the directives from senior management.
G. The Makin-Approved Plan
On December 9, 2015, Nadine Wohlstadter, Wellstat’s CEO, asked Higham to
provide the Vistogard “sales force design study indicating the number and geographic
spread” as well as the “[s]ales forecast or sales projections for launch and years
thereafter.”75 Higham forwarded the email to Dan Schneider, BTG’s Senior Vice President
for United States Commercial Operations. Schneider was concerned that Wellstat was
“setting [up a] base case for breach.”76 Schneider told Moody that BTG did not “need or
have to give all info to her.”77 This unwarranted reaction evidenced a guilty conscience.
74
Id. at 4.
75
JX 641 at 1-2.
76
Id. at 1.
77
Id.
18
Had BTG been doing what it was contractually obligated to do, Schneider would not have
jumped to the conclusion that Wellstat was preparing to sue.
On December 10, 2015, the FDA approved Vistogard for commercial launch. On
December 15, Wohlstadter followed up on her December 9 request. Higham again declined
to give her the information.78
Even after the white papers and Wellstat’s inquiries, Higham believed that Makin
would not support immediately hiring nine additional sales representatives, so his staff did
not present that plan.79 On December 16, 2015, the Pharmaceuticals Division presented
only the proposal that called for BTG to phase in the nine additional representatives over
six months. The division again emphasized that Vistogard was “promotionally sensitive,”
and thus “aggressive investment in Vistogard, now will pay dividends to achievement of
peak sales potential.”80
Makin approved the request and authorized the Pharmaceuticals Division to
immediately hire four additional sales representatives.81 This number was later increased
to five representatives. These new representatives, once hired, would increase BTG’s
oncology sales team to a total of twelve representatives. But BTG did not actually hire any
of the new representatives for another three months.
78
JX 661.
79
JX 662 at 14.
80
Id.
81
See JX 663.
19
H. The Relationship Deteriorates.
At BTG, key employees in the Pharmaceuticals Division believed that the oncology
sales force was too small to provide adequate support for Vistogard’s impending launch.
On January 7, 2016, Christine Coyne, a marketing executive, asked Higham and Schneider
to move up the hiring schedule and bring on four additional sales representatives in
February.82 Schneider was sympathetic, but felt there was nothing he could do. He told
Coyne, “I know this is painful at times . . . but it is the reality we currently live in.” 83 Shortly
after sending this email, Schneider received data indicating that the existing twelve-person
sales team only covered 61% of Vistogard’s market and that a sixteen-person sales team
would only cover 73% of the market. Schneider candidly and correctly responded that this
was “[p]ainfully low coverage.”84
Moody also understood that the oncology sales force was too small, and he
continued to advocate for more support for Vistogard. In January 2016, BTG fired him.
When he ran into some Wellstat executives, Moody confided that he had been fired for
“pushing too hard for Vistogard internally.”85 He also told them that “BTG’s focus had
82
JX 698.
83
Id. at 1.
84
JX 697.
85
Tr. (Bamat) 908:13-909:7; see also JX 704 (Higham to Makin: “[T]he sooner we
can get [Moody] out of the business the better!!”).
20
shifted to interventional medicine, and away from specialty pharma.”86 The evidence at
trial demonstrated that Moody’s assessments were accurate.
Moody’s termination caused Wellstat to become more suspicious about BTG’s
efforts. Wellstat pressed BTG for its internal sales forecasts and its plan for Vistogard’s
sales team. BTG continued to resist providing Wellstat with this information. Both sides
began preparing for litigation.87
On February 17, 2016, the Committee met for the first time since September 2015.
The meeting was contentious, and the exact nature of the discussions is disputed. In the
weeks following the meeting, BTG and Wellstat exchanged differing versions of the
minutes.88 They ultimately could not agree on a set of minutes. 89 Having reviewed the
evidence and considered the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, I regard Wellstat’s
account as more accurate and reliable.
Regardless, both sides agree that, during the meeting, BTG described its plan for
the oncology sales team. The plan contemplated five new sales representatives by the end
of March, which would bring the total number of sales representatives to twelve. BTG also
said that it would consider hiring four additional sales representatives “[p]ending
86
Tr. (Bamat) 909:9-15.
87
See, e.g., JX 754.
88
See JX 826; JX 869.
89
JX 888.
21
evaluation of initial launch performance.”90 Wellstat argued strongly that these staffing
levels were not sufficient and asked to see the ZS Associates report analyzing staffing
levels.91 BTG knew that the ZS Associates report supported Wellstat’s position, so BTG
refused to provide it.
During the Committee meeting, BTG also provided Wellstat with a sales forecast
for Vistogard that contemplated $9.8 million in sales during the first year and $28 million
in the third year.92 Wellstat thought that these numbers were too low and demanded to see
the underlying model. BTG promised to provide the information to Wellstat.93
I. BTG Manipulates Its Model.
On February 23, 2016, BTG sent Wellstat a presentation which purported to show
how BTG calculated its estimate of $9.8 million in sales for Vistogard during the first year.
BTG did not provide any estimates beyond the first year, stating only that that the model
assumed “a smooth [month-over-month] growth rate, which diminishes through year 3 and
90
JX 759 at 84.
91
See JX 823; 869.
92
JX 759 at 90; see also JX 779 at 7 (noting a price per packet of $3,750).
93
JX 760 at 14.
22
flattens at 1% thereafter,” and that “[y]ears 2-7 do not assume any additional resources . .
. .”94 Wellstat insisted on seeing a full seven-year forecast.95
When BTG’s personnel tried to prepare the full seven-year forecast for Wellstat,
they discovered that BTG’s model did not support the sales figures that BTG had
provided.96 The model showed that a sales force of sixteen representatives would generate
only $24 million in gross sales in the third year. This was less than the $28 million figure
that BTG had given Wellstat and significantly lower than the $39.8 million figure BTG
had used in its long-term budget. And that was only the begining of the problems. Because
BTG’s model assumed a regular month-over-month growth rate, the revenue forecasts for
all subsequent periods fell short of BTG’s projections. The model supported peak annual
sales of $39 million,97 well below BTG’s earlier projections of $50-55 million.98
To solve this problem, BTG falsified the data. Between February 25 and March 2,
2016, someone at BTG hard-coded the data in the spreadsheet so that the model purportedly
generated an output of $39.8 million for the third year. To accomplish this, BTG replaced
94
JX 779 at 9.
95
JX 805.
96
JX 788 (noting “a fairly significant disconnect”).
97
Tr. (Lewis) 402:3-13; see also JX 295 at 3.
98
JX 823 at 35.
23
the 1.5% month-over-month growth rate used in the model with an artificial 30% increase
between March and April 2018. The result is depicted graphically as follows:99
At trial, none of BTG’s witnesses could recall how the change came about.100 Nor
could BTG’s witnesses offer any benign explanation for why the model was hard-coded in
this manner. In its post-trial brief, BTG suggested that the change might have resulted from
“curve smoothing when annual projections are converted into monthly ones” and that the
99
JX 829.
100
See, e.g., Tr. (Lewis) 400:12-21. The evidence indicates that high-level
executives in the Pharmaceuticals Division were involved in the decision to alter the model.
See, e.g., JX 809 (invitation for March 1, 2016 meeting among executives in
Pharmaceuticals Division with subject: “Vistogard 3 year forecast discussion”); JX 824
(BTG executive: “Can you send me the model (ugly as it may be) that populated the graph
to [W]ellstat?”).
24
modification was just a “blip.”101 The graphic reveals otherwise. I find that BTG falsified
its model to conceal that its sixteen-person sales force could not provide adequate support
for Vistogard.
On March 2, 2016, BTG sent Wellstat a seven-year sales forecast. To hide its
manipulation of the data, BTG did not send the underlying spreadsheets. BTG only
disclosed the annual revenue numbers. BTG claimed that its model forecasted $39.8
million in revenue in the third year and $56 million in revenue in the seventh year.102 These
statements were knowingly and intentionally false.
J. Vistogard Launches With Three Full-Time-Equivalent Sales Representatives.
On March 2, 2016, BTG began selling Vistogard commercially. Although Makin
had authorized the Pharmaceuticals Division to hire five additional oncology sales
representatives three months earlier, BTG had not yet hired any of them. On top of that,
one of BTG’s existing sales representatives had left before Vistogard’s launch.
Consequently, BTG launched Vistogard with a sales force of six oncology representatives
who split their time equally between Vistogard and Voraxaze. That translated into three
full-time equivalent sales representatives.
101
Dkt. 266 at 57.
102
JX 823 at 35.
25
BTG scrambled to hire more sales representatives.103 By April 5, 2016, BTG had
filled the vacant position and added five more representatives.104 This brought BTG’s sales
team up to the twelve representatives that BTG had planned to have ready when Vistogard
launched. BTG knew from the TGaS report, the ZS Associates report, and its own internal
analyses that having twelve representatives was inadequate for a full launch. Moreover, an
analysis by ZS Associates concluded that the new sales representatives would not be fully
effective for six or seven months.105
K. BTG Disregards The Commercial Plan.
In April 2016, BTG developed a budget for Vistogard for the coming fiscal year.106
The budget disregarded the numbers in the Commercial Plan that BTG had presented to
the Committee in September 2015.
Overall, BTG budgeted approximately 10% less for Vistogard than it had in the
Commercial Plan, a shortfall of $4.31 million. These reductions included a cut of $1.24
million from advertising and promotions, which slashed that category by approximately
50%. Within that category, BTG gutted the line item for “Commercial Operations,” which
See JX 835 (Schneider: “We have tremendous pressure to get people in the field
103
now. Honestly should have hired by Mid February.”).
104
See JX 921.
105
JX 462 at 16; see also Tr. (Lewis) 395:24-396:11.
106
JX 928.
26
included training for sales representatives. BTG budgeted only $35,000 for this line item,
approximately 90% less than what BTG committed to spend in the Commercial Plan.107
When the senior executives in the Pharmaceuticals Division realized that the budget
differed from what BTG had presented in the Commercial Plan, they instructed their staff
that the numbers “approved in the FY17 budget will be the reference point for development
of any numbers going forward.”108 No one disclosed the changes to Wellstat.109
L. BTG Tries To Make Its Efforts Look Better.
Fearing litigation and recognizing that its sales efforts were inadequate, BTG tried
to make its sales efforts look better. On May 24, 2016, Schneider asked the Pharmaceuticals
Division to prepare a white paper that would propose expanding the oncology sales team
from twelve to sixteen representatives.110 Schneider and Higham were scheduled to meet
with Wellstat in July, and Schneider told his staff that “it is in our best interests to have the
+4 on board [and] in training” before the meeting.111 On June 2, Higham forwarded the
completed white paper to Makin. He noted that “early indication[s] . . . highlight traction
107
JX 942 at 5.
108
Id. at 1.
109
Tr. (Lewis) 385:8-386:1.
110
JX 985 at 2.
111
Id.
27
(~80% of all sales) in the covered territories” and that all of the additional sales
representatives would be “self-funding.”112 Makin approved the request.113
BTG rushed the new representatives into service without adequate training or
support. On July 5, 2016, a BTG employee reported that “the existing reps are already very
frustrated at their lack of training on Vistogard, and the new ones never had any formal
training on Voraxaze. I don’t understand why [BTG management is] unwilling to train the
new reps appropriately.”114 The answer is that BTG had not supported Vistogard
adequately and was trying to cover up its failure to meet its obligations.
M. This Litigation
On July 7, 2016, the Wellstat and BTG teams met. Wellstat demanded BTG return
the distribution rights to Vistogard and compensate Wellstat to fund a “re-launch” of
Vistogard. Wellstat gave BTG ten days to respond.115
Instead of responding, BTG filed this action. In a complaint filed on July 15, 2016,
BTG sought (i) a declaratory judgment that it did not breach the Distribution Agreement,
(ii) specific performance by Wellstat of its obligations under the Distribution Agreement,
(iii) a preliminary injunction enjoining Wellstat from declaring BTG in breach, and (iv) in
112
JX 996 at 1.
113
JX 997.
114
JX 1029 at 1.
115
JX 1041; Tr. (Higham) 645:4-646:11.
28
the alternative, damages for breach of contract. In the course of this litigation, BTG largely
abandoned its affirmative claims against Wellstat.
On July 18, 2016, Wellstat gave BTG written notice that BTG had breached the
Distribution Agreement. On August 11, Wellstat answered the complaint and filed
counterclaims against BTG for breach of contract.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Each side claims that the other breached the Distribution Agreement. Under
Delaware law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are “first, the existence of the
contract, whether express or implied; second, the breach of an obligation imposed by that
contract; and third, the resultant damage to the plaintiff.”116 The existence of the contract,
namely the Distribution Agreement, is undisputed.
The central issue in this case is whether BTG breached the Distribution Agreement.
BTG originally sought a declaratory judgment that it did not breach the Distribution
Agreement. Wellstat filed a counterclaim asserting that BTG did breach the Distribution
Agreement. BTG’s claim that Wellstat breached the Distribution Agreement is advanced
principally as a defense to Wellstat’s assertion of breach.
This decision holds that BTG breached the Distribution Agreement and that Wellstat
is entitled to damages of approximately $55.8 million. This decision rejects the defensive
contention by BTG that Wellstat breached the Distribution Agreement.
116
VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 2003).
29
A. BTG’s Breach Of The Distribution Agreement
Wellstat contends that BTG breached the Distribution Agreement in two ways. First,
Wellstat claims that BTG failed to use Diligent Efforts to promote and market Vistogard.
Second, Wellstat claims that BTG failed to develop a Commercial Plan in good faith and
then failed to comply with the minimum commitments it set forth in the Commercial Plan.
Wellstat proved at trial that BTG breached the Distribution Agreement in both respects.
1. The Failure To Use Diligent Efforts
To exercise Diligent Efforts, BTG had to devote “efforts and resources, including
reasonably necessary personnel and financial resources, that specialty pharmaceutical
companies typically devote to their own internally discovered compounds or products . . .
.”117 Led by Makin, BTG’s senior management deployed a strategy of “[o]ptimising cash
contribution from [the Pharmaceuticals Division] and investing proceeds in high-growth
areas of Interventional Medicine.”118 Because of this strategy, Makin and her senior
management team did not permit the Pharmaceuticals Division to invest the resources in
Vistogard, including reasonably necessary personnel and financial resources, that specialty
pharmaceutical companies typically devote to their own internally discovered compounds
or products.
117
JX 152 § 2.11 (emphasis added).
118
JX 543 at 4.
30
Consistent with Makin’s strategy, the Pharmaceuticals Division sought to launch
Vistogard as cheaply as possible. Makin emphasized to senior management that Vistogard
was a “[l]ow priority for additional investment” and that the goal was to ensure that
Vistogard’s launch would be “delivered cost neutrally.”119 Higham carried out Makin’s
directive ardently by implementing a cost-cutting initiative and telling the division’s staff
that “all established products are prioritized ahead of [Vistogard] . . . .”120
The result of BTG’s cost-cutting was a sales force that was inadequate to launch
Vistogard. Until April 2016, BTG had, at most, seven oncology sales representatives who
split their time equally between Vistogard and Voraxaze.121 There is overwhelming
contemporaneous evidence that this was far fewer personnel than specialty pharmaceutical
companies would have devoted to Vistogard had it been one of “their own internally
discovered compounds or products . . . .”122
Outside consultants advised BTG that it needed to hire more sales representatives
for Vistogard. TGaS told the Pharmaceuticals Division that it needed to “at a minimum . .
. double your sales organization” of nineteen representatives in advance of Vistogard’s
119
JX 361 at 3.
120
JX 424.
121
JX 523 at 56; JX 828.
122
JX 152 § 2.11.
31
launch.123 Because Makin’s strategy and the resulting budget constraints foreclosed this
path, the Pharmaceuticals Division engaged a new consulting firm, ZS Associates, and
instructed them to assume as an “immutable factor” in their analysis that the
Pharmaceuticals Division would not expand its sales force.124 Notwithstanding this
limitation, ZS Associates saw the matter much as TGaS had. In July 2015, ZS Associates
told BTG it would need “19-20 Oncology focused [full-time equivalents],” or more than
twice BTG’s existing oncology sales force, to reach Vistogard’s sales targets.125 ZS
Associates also concluded that “up to 22 Oncology [full-time equivalents],” or more than
three times Vistogard’s existing oncology sales force, would still provide BTG with returns
that exceeded the industry average.126 Four months later, ZS Associates reported that using
thirty representatives, or more than four times BTG’s existing oncology sales force, would
still be profitable for BTG, even after deducting the royalty payments to Wellstat (in
violation of the Distribution Agreement).127
The Pharmaceuticals Division also recognized that Vistogard’s sales force was too
small and repeatedly made this clear to BTG’s senior management. In October 2015, the
123
JX 382.
124
JX 387; JX 388.
125
JX 462 at 6.
126
Id.
127
JX 588.
32
Pharmaceuticals Division sought authority to hire nine additional oncology sales
representatives immediately and emphasized that the additional representatives were
“crucial to achiev[ing] optimal top line revenues.”128 Consistent with the ZS Associates
analysis, the managers in the Pharmaceuticals Division believed that BTG should have
twenty-two sales representatives servicing Vistogard and Voraxaze, but they proposed
sixteen because of the limitations that Makin had placed on the division.129 When Higham
sensed Makin’s disapproval and pushed for phasing in nine sales representatives over time,
the managers in the Pharmaceuticals Division immediately asked to accelerate the hiring
because they knew the sales team had “[p]ainfully low coverage.”130
Faced with overwhelming contemporaneous evidence, BTG’s witnesses offered
several after-the-fact justifications for the inadequate sales force. None were credible.
First, BTG’s witnesses claimed that sales representatives were not expected to be
the “main promotional driver” for Vistogard and so a smaller sales force was appropriate.131
The contemporaneous documents contradict this carefully prepared testimony. Documents
authored by ZS Associates and the Pharmaceuticals Division repeatedly touted the
128
JX 594 at 1.
129
See JX 996.
130
JX 697; see also JX 698.
131
See, e.g., Tr. (Schneider) 57:20-58:6; Tr. (Lewis) 289:5-14.
33
importance of sales representatives for achieving Vistogard’s potential.132 Just as tellingly,
the number of sales representatives was the key driver in BTG’s sales model,133 so much
so that BTG falsified other inputs to conceal that its planned sales force would be unable
to achieve BTG’s own projections.134 Sales representatives in fact proved critical once
Vistogard launched.135 BTG did not use a small sales force because it believed that sales
representatives were unimportant to Vistogard’s success. BTG used a small sales force
because senior management did not want to invest the necessary resources in Vistogard.
Second, BTG’s witnesses claimed that their executives made a reasonable judgment
that phasing in additional sales representatives over time was the better approach. 136 BTG
asserts that this decision “was made by those who knew the market best – the team
responsible for the-day-to-day work on Vistogard.”137 There is considerable irony in this
132
See, e.g., JX 462 at 6 (ZS Associates opining that Vistogard was “promotionally
sensitive”); JX 594 at 1 (Moody telling Soderstrom that more sales representatives “will
strongly bolster the launch of Vistogard and will be crucial to achieve optimal top line
revenues”); JX 607 at 18 (highlighting importance of sales representatives); JX 645 at 2
(white paper justifying increased sales representatives on grounds that “Vistogard will
require promotional efforts to raise disease awareness”).
133
See JX 823 at 31; Tr. (Schneider) 212:19-213:20.
134
See JX 829.
135
See JX 996 at 1 (noting that approximately 80% of all sales had occurred in
territories with sales representatives).
136
See, e.g., Tr. (Schneider) 93:24-95:2.
137
Dkt. 266 at 34-35.
34
litigation-driven, counter-factual contention. The managers in the Pharmaceuticals
Division, who knew the market best and were responsible for the day-to-day work on
Vistogard, repeatedly argued for expanding the sales force immediately. They thought that
Vistogard’s “[l]ong-term performance [would] be set in first 6 months.”138 Moody told
Soderstrom explicitly that the managers in the Pharmaceuticals Division “don’t
recommend” phasing in sales representatives.139
Higham overruled the team that knew the market best. Importantly, Higham did not
overrule the team because he thought hiring additional sales representatives over time was
the best way to increase Vistogard’s revenue. He overruled the team because he understood
Makin’s corporate strategy, including not investing in the Pharmaceuticals Division, and
believed that Makin would not approve the team’s plan.140
Third, BTG’s witnesses claimed that they were caught flatfooted when the FDA
approved Vistogard earlier than expected and that BTG responded by hiring additional
sales representatives as quickly as it could.141 The litigators invented that story as well.
When Wellstat filed the New Drug Application in July 2015, BTG believed that FDA
approval could come as soon as January 2016, and BTG also recognized the “need to plan
138
JX 607 at 18.
139
JX 594.
140
See, e.g., JX 424.
141
See, e.g., Tr. (Schneider) 72:2-74:3, 205:8-206:7.
35
(and be ready) for earlier approval . . . .”142 FDA approval came just one month earlier than
anticipated, in December 2015. BTG then waited nearly four months to hire any additional
sales representatives.143 BTG did not fail to hire enough sales representatives because the
FDA approved Vistogard early. BTG failed to hire enough sales representatives because it
did not want to incur the expense.
Fourth, BTG points to the number of sales representatives that it used when
launching Voraxaze as proof that Vistogard’s sales force was large enough. If anything,
the comparison proves that BTG should have used a larger sales force for Vistogard than
it did for Voraxaze. It is true that the two drugs are comparable in that both treat toxicity
from chemotherapy drugs, but the chemotherapy drug Voraxaze treats is used far less
frequently than 5-FU. Consequently, the market for Voraxaze is much smaller than it is for
Vistogard. For Voraxaze, BTG projected peak sales of $15 million.144 For Vistogard, BTG
projected peak sales of $56 million.145 BTG therefore should have deployed more sales
representatives for Vistogard.
142
JX 478.
143
JX 921.
144
JX 1304 at 10.
145
JX 823 at 35; Tr. (Suvari) 824:18-825:10.
36
Perhaps more importantly, BTG viewed the launch of Voraxaze as unsuccessful, in
large part because BTG failed to deploy an adequate sales force.146 In fact, when
developing their internal analysis in preparation for the launch of Vistogard, the
Pharmaceuticals Division included a slide titled “Lessons Learned from Voraxaze.”147 The
lessons included that “[o]ncology products are promotionally sensitive,” that “[i]t is
important to identify and call on all stakeholders within an account,” and that “[i]n-depth
training . . . is necessary to ensure that [sales representatives] are confident selling to
oncologists . . . .”148 Yet, because of Makin’s corporate strategy and Higham’s zealous
implementation of it, BTG ignored all of these “lessons learned.” It cut the promotional
budget for Vistogard, did not pursue the necessary promotional efforts, failed to hire
enough sales representatives, and then failed to provide them with adequate training or
support.
BTG finally argues that, even if it failed to provide “reasonably necessary
personnel” as required by the Distribution Agreement, BTG’s other marketing activities
constituted Diligent Efforts. To make this argument, BTG overstated the extent of its other
marketing activities. For example, BTG emphasized its medical education efforts, but BTG
146
See JX 472 at 3 (“Voraxaze has been short of annual goals”); JX 535 at 43 (BTG
noting that Voraxaze was “underperform[ing]”).
147
JX 600 at 20.
148
Id.
37
also conceded that pre-launch disease awareness was a critical component of these
efforts.149 BTG had to adjust its sales forecast downward in February 2016 because it had
engaged in “[m]inimal pre-launch disease education effort[s].”150 Similarly, BTG
emphasized its digital marketing strategy, but BTG budgeted minimal amounts for digital
marketing,151 and Vistogard’s full website was not operational until June 2016, three
months after launch.152
Even assuming that BTG’s other promotional activities were as significant as BTG
claims, they would not show that BTG met its obligation to exercise Diligent Efforts. The
Distribution Agreement defines Diligent Efforts as what “specialty pharmaceutical
companies typically devote to their own internally discovered compounds or products . . .
.”153 BTG’s outside consultants and its own employees emphasized the critical role of sales
representatives for Vistogard’s success, and they told BTG to hire more sales
representatives. BTG’s own model treated the number of sales representatives as the key
149
See, e.g., JX 463 at 3 (“Increasing clinical understanding of severe 5-FU toxicity
. . . will be a cornerstone to initial and sustained product usage.”); JX 936 at 2; accord JX
1083 at 67 (“Conducting pre-market diseases state education 4-6 months prior to [FDA]
approval is better practice in industry.”).
JX 759 at 63 (emphasis omitted); see also JX 824 (showing “Impact of truncated
150
Dis. Awareness”).
See JX 1132 (showing $135,000 budget for “Digital” for the entire
151
Pharmaceuticals Division).
152
JX 998; JX 1046 at 12.
153
JX 152 § 2.11.
38
input and showed that BTG could not achieve its projections for Vistogard using the
number of sales representatives that BTG deployed. Other specialty pharmaceutical
companies would not have ignored this data. They would not have deployed a sales force—
both before and after Vistogard’s launch—that was far smaller than what the most
knowledgeable people recommended, what the model contemplated, and what would
generate greater-than-industry-standard profits.
Despite warnings from Wellstat, BTG’s outside consultants, and its own employees,
BTG deployed a sales force that was far too small to achieve Vistogard’s revenue potential.
BTG breached the Distribution Agreement by failing to exercise Diligent Efforts when
sizing and deploying its sales force for Vistogard.
2. The Failure To Develop And Implement A Commercial Plan
To comply with its obligations under the Distribution Agreement, BTG had to
“prepare in good faith [an] initial commercial plan and budget” for Vistogard that
“include[d] minimum commitments of resources, personnel and financing . . . .”154 BTG
breached this obligation by failing to prepare a Commercial Plan in good faith. BTG then
breached the Distribution Agreement again by failing to deliver on the inadequate
commitments contemplated by the hastily prepared Commercial Plan.
154
JX 152 § 8.1.
39
BTG’s initial Commercial Plan was a PowerPoint presentation that BTG assembled
in one week.155 The Distribution Agreement required that the Commercial Plan identify a
minimum commitment of personnel. The presentation did not contain a commitment; BTG
said only that “there may be” additional sales representatives beyond its existing seven,
“[d]epending on strength of indication and initial uptake.”156 BTG also misleadingly
implied that it could assign up to forty representatives from another business unit to
Vistogard when BTG already had rejected this idea internally.157 Contrary to what the
Distribution Agreement required, BTG had not thought through how many sales
representatives it would use after the launch of Vistogard and told the Committee that its
plans for this phase were “[u]nder development.”158
The Distribution Agreement also required that the Commercial Plan identify
minimum commitments for expenditures. BTG’s Commercial Plan did not contain these
commitments. BTG specified the amount of money that it had budgeted in different high-
level categories, but refused to commit to those numbers.159 More importantly, the numbers
that BTG included in its Commercial Plan were not reliable budget numbers developed
155
See JX 514; JX 519.
156
JX 523 at 61.
157
Id.; see also JX 472 at 5.
158
JX 527 at 3.
159
See JX 523 at 60 (“Revisions may occur throughout the course of the business
planning cycle.”).
40
after meaningful analysis. BTG generated the numbers simply by taking the percentage
allocated to that category in the Pharmaceuticals Division’s budget from the prior fiscal
year and multiplying that number by the amount that BTG intended to spend on
Vistogard.160 The numbers in the Commercial Plan were therefore not “minimum
commitments of resources” prepared in good faith. They were artificial numbers that BTG
included to give the appearance that BTG had prepared a real plan, when in fact BTG had
not done the necessary work.
BTG subsequently changed the expenditure figures that it had presented in the
Commercial Plan. This fact demonstrates that BTG never took those numbers seriously. In
April 2016, BTG set its budget for Vistogard without regard for the numbers that BTG had
presented. BTG cut spending on advertising and promotion by almost 50%. BTG cut
spending on Commercial Operations, which included training for sales representatives, by
almost 90%.161 BTG’s disregard for the Commercial Plan during its internal budgeting
process shows that BTG did not prepare the Commercial Plan in good faith. Equally
important, BTG’s cavalier disregard for the numbers it provided to Wellstat resulted in
BTG separately breaching its obligation to “promote and distribute [Vistogard] . . . in
material compliance” with the Commercial Plan.162 Even though BTG failed to develop
160
JX 942.
161
JX 928.
162
JX 152 § 8.1.
41
meaningful figures for the Commercial Plan, once it showed those numbers to Wellstat,
BTG had to stick to those numbers. BTG could not cut them unilaterally and without
disclosing the cuts to Wellstat, yet that is precisely what BTG did.
BTG did not prepare a Commercial Plan in good faith. It prepared a disingenuous
and misleading plan that BTG never took seriously. BTG then failed to market Vistogard
in accordance with its Commercial Plan. These acts constituted further breaches of the
Distribution Agreement.
B. The Defense Of An Alleged Breach By Wellstat
Before turning to damages, this decision addresses BTG’s claim that Wellstat
breached the Distribution Agreement. BTG advances this claim in an effort to excuse its
own material breaches of the Distribution Agreement on the theory that Wellstat breached
first and compromised BTG’s efforts to fulfill its own contractual obligations. BTG’s
arguments are meritless.
BTG first claims that Wellstat failed to use Diligent Efforts to obtain FDA approval
for Vistogard because Wellstat filed the New Drug Application approximately eighteen
months later than Wellstat initially had planned. The evidence at trial showed that the delay
did not result from Wellstat’s failure to exercise Diligent Efforts. It instead occurred due
to events outside of Wellstat’s control.163 In any event, Wellstat’s delay in filing the New
163
These events included (i) Wellstat’s third-party manufacturer suffering
equipment failures that contaminated one of Vistogard’s first batches, (ii) unexpected FDA
42
Drug Application did not prejudice BTG’s ability to market Vistogard, nor did it cause
BTG any damage.164 If anything, the delay gave BTG more time to plan and prepare.
BTG also claims that Wellstat refused to provide BTG with clinical data that BTG
needed for commercial activities. Dr. Michael Bamat, a Wellstat scientist, candidly
acknowledged that, for several months at the beginning of 2015, Wellstat did not share data
from its clinical studies with Vistogard, even though Bamat believed that Wellstat should
have.165 In May 2015, BTG and Wellstat met to address the issue, and afterwards BTG sent
Wellstat a list of the data that they wanted.166 In the weeks following the meeting, Bamat
gave BTG the information that he had.167 Thereafter, Wellstat regularly provided BTG with
clinical information as it became available.168 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that
Wellstat did not provide the information in as timely a fashion as it should have, Wellstat
cured the problem long before it created any issues for BTG with the launch of Vistogard.
decisions on several matters, and (iii) poor performance by Wellstat’s third-party database
vendor. See Tr. (Bamat) 882:6-887:21.
164
BTG in fact argued that it would have benefited from even more time. See, e.g.,
Tr. (Schneider) 203:8-24 (asserting BTG was forced to “accelerate[] our spend in
preparation for this faster-than-expected launch”).
165
Tr. (Bamat) 892:10-893:10.
166
See JX 418; JX 420.
167
See, e.g., JX 419; JX 421; JX 422; JX 426.
168
See Tr. (Bamat) 896:22-900:16.
43
Viewing the evidence as a whole, Wellstat acted in good faith and fulfilled its
contractual commitments. The same cannot be said for BTG. Wellstat’s actions do not
excuse BTG’s breaches of the Distribution Agreement.
C. Damages
“[T]he standard remedy for breach of contract is based upon the reasonable
expectations of the parties . . . .”169 “It is a basic principle of contract law that remedy for
a breach should seek to give the nonbreaching [] party the benefit of its bargain by putting
that party in the position it would have been but for the breach.” 170 “Expectation damages
thus require the breaching promisor to compensate the promisee for the promisee’s
reasonable expectation of the value of the breached contract, and, hence, what the promisee
lost.”171 Expectation damages should “be measured as of the time of the breach.”172
Expectation damages “should not act as a windfall.”173 But “the injured party need
not establish the amount of damages with precise certainty where the wrong has been
169
Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2001).
170
Genecor Int’l, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 766 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 2000).
171
Duncan, 775 A.2d at 1022.
172
Comrie v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 837 A.2d 1, 17 (Del. Ch. 2003).
173
Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 974 A.2d 140, 146 (Del. 2009).
44
proven and injury established.”174 “[D]oubts about the extent of damages are generally
resolved against the breaching party.”175
Wellstat claims expectation damages equal to the net present value of the difference
between (i) the revenue Wellstat would have earned if BTG had used Diligent Efforts and
(ii) the revenue that Wellstat will earn under the status quo, given BTG’s actual efforts.
Both sides retained multiple experts to grapple with the calculation. Wellstat claims that
its damages exceed $112 million. BTG claims that Wellstat suffered no damages at all.
The amount of Wellstat’s damages turns primarily on three hotly disputed issues.
The first is the size of Vistogard’s patient population. The second is the rate at which an
appropriately sized sales team could gain access to physicians and educate them on
Vistogard’s benefits. The third is which set of BTG’s projections to use when determining
what Wellstat will earn under the status quo.
1. Vistogard’s Patient Population
The first major damages-related dispute is the size of Vistogard’s patient population.
Neel Patel, one of Wellstat’s expert witnesses, estimated the size of Vistogard’s patient
population using a sixty-eight question survey that he distributed to forty-two
174
Siga Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 132 A.3d 1108, 1131 (Del. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
175
Id.; accord Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 613 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“Public policy has led Delaware courts to show a general willingness to make a wrongdoer
bear the risk of uncertainty of a damages calculation where the calculation cannot be
mathematically proven.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases)).
45
physicians.176 Patel’s opinion regarding Vistogard’s patient population largely turns on two
data points: (i) the number of patients who suffer early-onset 5-FU toxicity and (ii) the
percentage of physicians who would treat those patients with Vistogard.
Patel’s survey distinguished among patients suffering from mild, moderate, and
severe toxicity. Patel included all three categories of patients in Vistogard’s patient
population. BTG claims that Patel’s model should have excluded patients that his survey
classifies as suffering from “mild” or “moderate” toxicity, because the FDA only approved
Vistogard for “early-onset, severe or life-threatening toxicity.”177 Excluding both
categories would reduce Wellstat’s damages to no more than $19.2 million.
Physicians often assess the severity of toxicity using grades. One widely used
industry standard, the Common Terminology Criteria for Adverse Events (the “Common
Terminology”), defines mild toxicity as Grade 1, moderate toxicity as Grade 2, severe
toxicity as Grade 3, and life-threatening toxicity as Grade 4. Patel used a four-grade metric
in his survey, but he did not precisely align his metric with the Common Terminology.
Patel’s survey defined mild toxicity as Grades 1-2, moderate toxicity as Grade 3, and severe
toxicity as Grade 4.178 Thus, Patel’s survey described Grade 3 patients as “moderate,” while
176
Tr. (Patel) 1210:22-1211:8.
177
JX 1077 at 27.
178
JX 674 at 6.
46
the Common Terminology would classify them as “severe.” BTG accordingly argues that
the Grade 3 patients should be excluded when calculating damages.179
The problem with BTG’s position is that Patel’s classifications worked in BTG’s
favor. The drug profile presented in the survey accurately described Vistogard as indicated
for patients “exhibiting early-onset, severe or life-threatening toxicity.”180 Because the
survey described Grade 3 as “moderate,” rather than “severe,” some of the physicians who
responded that they would not treat Grade 3 patients with Vistogard likely did so because
the drug’s indication did not support using Vistogard to treat moderate toxicity. Had Patel
classified Grade 3 toxicity as “severe,” as called for by the Common Terminology, it is
likely that more doctors would have said that they would prescribe Vistogard. This
conclusion is supported by Patel’s survey, which found that physicians were almost twice
179
More aggressively, BTG argued that deviating from the Common Terminology
warranted disregarding Patel’s survey entirely. BTG relied on two trademark cases in
which the court rejected surveys that used classifications that did not accord with statutory
definitions. See Icon Enters. Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Prods. Co., 2004 WL 5644805, at *28 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 7, 2004); J & J Snack Foods, Corp. v. Earthgrains Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 358, 369
(D.N.J. 2002). Those cases are obviously distinguishable. Toxicity grades are not fixed by
statute and, as noted, lack a precise industry standard. Moreover, the surveys in those cases
skewed the classifications far beyond recognition. See Icon, 2004 WL 5644805, at *27-28
(noting the definition “omits a crucial and indeed distinguishing characteristic of
suggestive marks” and that omission was “no mere technical flaw”); J & J, 220 F. Supp.
2d at 370-71 (noting that the flaws in the definition were “substantial” and “permeated the
entire survey to make its finding completely untrustworthy and unreliable”). Patel’s work
shifted the grades slightly in a manner that favored BTG. A wholesale rejection of Patel’s
analysis is not warranted.
180
JX 1077 at 27.
47
as likely to prescribe Vistogard to treat “severe” toxicity (i.e. Grade 4 in the survey) as they
were to treat “moderate” toxicity (Grade 3 in the survey).181 By classifying Grade 3 as
moderate toxicity, rather than severe toxicity, Patel depressed the size of Vistogard’s
patient pool and favored BTG.
The empirical literature supports this finding. Patel’s survey indicated that only 5%
of all 5-FU patients experience either Grade 3 or Grade 4 toxicity (as defined in the survey),
yet numerous scientific studies have found a 15-20% rate of Grade 3 or Grade 4 toxicity
(as defined in the Common Terminology).182 Similarly, Patel’s survey found that 39% of
physicians would prescribe Vistogard for Grade 3 toxicity (as defined in the survey), yet a
January 2016 pricing study by BTG found that 53% of physicians would prescribe
Vistogard for Grade 3 toxicity (as defined by the Common Terminology).183
Because Patel’s classification of Grade 3 toxicity favored BTG by reducing the size
of the patient pool, there is no reason to exclude the “moderate” patients from Patel’s
estimate. The treatment of patients suffering from mild toxicity (Grades 1-2) warrants a
different conclusion. Because Grades 1-2 patients did not fall within the indicated use of
181
JX 1077 at 57 (73% of physicians reported that they would treat severe toxicity
with Vistogard, compared to 39% for moderate toxicity).
182
See, e.g., JX 68 at 20 (BTG presentation citing two scientific studies finding 16%
of patients suffer early-onset severe toxicities); JX 1081 at 31 (noting that literature
generally reports “15-20% incidence of severe early-onset toxicity” and collecting
authorities).
183
JX 681 at 19, 22.
48
Vistogard, BTG could not market Vistogard for use by these patients. 184 Even though
physicians are permitted to prescribe Vistogard for off-label use and to purchase Vistogard
for that purpose, the evidence indicates that sales for mild toxicity are likely to be minimal,
because there are cheap and widely available alternative therapeutic treatments.185
Moreover, pharmaceutical companies generally do not include off-label prescriptions in
their sales forecasts.186 Patients receiving Vistogard for mild toxicity are therefore excluded
from Patel’s sales forecast.
2. Access Rate
The second major damages-related dispute concerns the access rate, which is the
rate at which sales representatives can gain access to oncologists to discuss Vistogard. The
rate is expressed as a percentage of oncologists. Wellstat’s expert, Howard Brock,
estimated access rates ranging from 50% to 90%, depending on how frequently the
184
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a); 82 Fed. Reg. 2193 (Jan. 9, 2017) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. §§ 201, 801, 1100) (amending definition of “intended uses” to read “if the totality
of the evidence establishes that a manufacturer objectively intends that a device introduced
into interstate commerce by him is to be used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than
ones for which it has been approved, cleared, granted marketing authorization, or is exempt
from premarket notification requirements (if any), he is required . . . to provide for such
device adequate labeling that accords with such other intended uses.”).
185
See Tr. (Patel) 1222:22-1223:12 (noting that other oncology products involving
off-label use do not have “many viable substitutes”).
186
Tr. (Boghigian) 1006:4-9.
49
oncologists prescribe 5-FU.187 BTG’s expert, William Suvari, estimated an average access
rate of 30% across all oncologists.188
Neither expert offered compelling evidence to support their access rate. Brock
justified his range based on his industry experience. He testified that “doctors have a
tendency to be very interested” in specialty oncology pharmaceuticals.189 He opined that a
higher access rate was appropriate for Vistogard because “the low disease state awareness”
for early-onset 5-FU toxicity would lead doctors to be “more interested to learn about the
product.”190 Brock’s opinion makes intuitive sense, but it would be more powerful if
backed by empirical data.
Suvari attempted to ground his conclusion in empirical data, but did so
unpersuasively. Suvari pointed to an executive summary of a ZS Associates study that
found that 27% of oncologists were “accessible” to sales representatives. Suvari chose not
to obtain or review the full study, nor did he examine the underlying data. 191 He also does
not appear to have interpreted the 27% figure accurately, because the ZS Associates study
defines an “accessible” oncologist as one that is reached by sales representatives more than
187
Tr. (Brock) 1249:6-24.
188
JX 806 at 3; Tr. (Suvari) 857:14-860:15.
189
Tr. (Brock) 1250:1-20.
190
Tr. (Brock) 1252:11-21.
191
Tr. (Suvari) 860:20-861:18.
50
70% of the time.192 The ZS Associates study observed that sales representatives still
reached doctors outside of the “accessible” category, albeit with less frequency. The ZS
Associates study, therefore, did not provide meaningful support for Suvari’s access rate.
The competing expert testimony results in some doubt about the appropriate access
rate, but “doubts about the extent of damages are generally resolved against the breaching
party.”193 That principle applies here. Brock’s arguments for the higher access rate were
logical and his testimony was credible. This decision adopts Brock’s access rate.
3. Projections Of Vistogard’s Sales Under The Status Quo
The final major damages-related issue is what sales forecast to use to determine the
amounts Wellstat would earn under the status quo in light of BTG’s actual efforts to market
Vistogard. Wellstat points to Vistogard’s statements to investors in early 2016 that
Vistogard would generate peak sales of $35 million, but BTG did not create an internal
sales forecast supporting peak sales of $35 million. Instead, one of Wellstat’s experts,
Christopher Gerardi, constructed a forecast by applying a curve that implied peak sales of
$35 million after ten years.194 Gerardi’s top-down forecast is too speculative to be a reliable
measure of what Wellstat would have earned under the status quo.
The better approach is to use BTG’s actual sales forecast, albeit after removing the
false, hard-coded increase that BTG inserted to mislead Wellstat. Once that deviation is
192
Id.193
Siga Techs., 132 A.3d at 1131.
194
JX 1082 at 25.
51
removed, the model provides the best evidence of the sales that BTG would achieve based
on its actual efforts. The remainder of the model was prepared in the ordinary course of
business and its assumptions accurately reflect BTG’s actual marketing efforts, including
BTG’s decision to deploy a sixteen-person sales team, with nine of the representatives
phased in over time. This decision adopts BTG’s corrected sales forecast for purposes of
calculating Wellstat’s damages.195
4. Other Damages Arguments
In addition to the three major damages-related issues discussed above, BTG threw
a grocery bag of other arguments against the wall. Wellstat added an argument of its own.
Nothing stuck.
a. The Cost Of Vistogard
BTG criticized Patel’s survey for omitting information about Vistogard’s price.
BTG argued that physicians would be less likely to prescribe Vistogard if they knew that
each treatment costs $75,000. This argument is not persuasive. Patel testified credibly that
oncologists are not particularly price-sensitive for specialty products like Vistogard
because they only prescribe them when it is clearly warranted.196 BTG’s January 2015
195
Another Wellstat expert, Harry Boghigian, opined in a rebuttal report that BTG’s
sales forecast had other flaws in addition to the hard-coded bump such that a higher figure
should be used. Wellstat did not elicit testimony on this topic during trial. See Tr.
(Boghigian) 988:6-995:22. Wellstat also did not meaningfully address these issues in post-
trial briefing. Wellstat’s other challenges to BTG’s model are therefore waived. See
Emerald P’rs v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999).
196
Tr. (Patel) 1220:12-1222:4.
52
pricing study for Vistogard supports Patel’s testimony. That study found the greatest price
elasticity for Grade 1 or Grade 2 toxicity, which this decision excluded from Patel’s
model.197 That study also found that more physicians would prescribe Vistogard at the
much higher price of $120,000 than Patel found in his survey.198 Patel’s failure to include
Vistogard’s price in his survey does not undermine the validity of his data. His opinion
regarding the size of the Vistogard market remains conservative.
b. The Early Termination Right
BTG claims that Wellstat’s damages should be limited by the fact that BTG has the
right to terminate the Distribution Agreement “for convenience” five years after FDA
approval of Vistogard.199 Contract damages are determined by the “expectations of the
parties before or at the time of the breach.”200
When BTG breached the Distribution Agreement, BTG did not intend to exercise
its early termination right. In March 2016, Schneider characterized the Distribution
Agreement as an “evergreen contract for 10 years.”201 In June 2016, BTG analyzed the
financial impact of Wellstat exercising its early termination right, precisely because BTG
197
JX 681 at 22.
198
Id.; see also Schneider Dep. at 322:18-23 (acknowledging that BTG chose a price
for Vistogard that “for the most part avoided physicians making an economic choice”).
199
JX 152 §12.2.
200
Siga Techs., 132 A.3d at 1133.
201
JX 870.
53
did not want to terminate the Distribution Agreement and was concerned that Wellstat
might. BTG’s analysis showed that BTG would lose at least $79 million if Wellstat
terminated the Distribution Agreement after five years.202
It would have been economically irrational for BTG to terminate the Distribution
Agreement at a point when Vistogard was approaching its peak sales potential, after BTG
had invested in generating those sales, and when Vistogard needed relatively little
additional investment from BTG. Tellingly, BTG’s damages expert did not model the
possibility of BTG’s early termination and BTG did not advance the argument until trial.203
BTG’s early termination right does not reduce Wellstat’s damages.
c. Mitigation
The Distribution Agreement provides that Wellstat is entitled to the return of
Vistogard’s distribution rights if BTG has materially breached the agreement. 204 BTG
argues that Wellstat’s damages should be reduced to account for any potentially greater
sales of Vistogard that Wellstat could achieve after it recovers the distribution rights and
pursues a new promotional plan.
202
JX 1002 at 27. The actual number would be higher if BTG terminated, because
BTG’s analysis assumes that Wellstat would pay BTG 30% of net sales for three years
after Wellstat’s exercise of the early termination right. See JX 152 § 12.2.
203
See JX 1084 at 4.
204
JX 152 § 12.11(a)(i).
54
“Failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving
the failure falls upon the defendant.”205 BTG failed to introduce any evidence or expert
testimony that would quantify how much Wellstat’s damages might be mitigated through
future sales of Vistogard.206 BTG accordingly failed to meet its burden of proof that
Wellstat’s damages should be mitigated by future sales of Vistogard.
d. Renewal
The initial term of the Distribution Agreement was ten years, beginning on the date
the FDA approved Vistogard. The Distribution Agreement provides that it “shall
automatically renew for successive two (2) year periods unless either Party provides notice
three (3) months in advance of the expiration of the then-current Term.”207 To increase the
size of its damages recovery, Wellstat argues that it should receive damages for lost
Vistogard sales during the first two-year renewal period.
Courts will award damages for a renewal term when a plaintiff can prove that the
contract would have been renewed with reasonable certainty.208 In this case, whether the
Distribution Agreement would have been renewed is highly speculative. The Distribution
205
Tanner v. Exxon Corp., 1981 WL 191389, at *4 (Del. Super. July 23, 1981).
206
At trial, the court rejected BTG’s attempt to introduce previously undisclosed
expert testimony about Wellstat’s failure to mitigate. Tr. (Court) 1319:10-20.
207
JX 152 § 12.1.
208
See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Carestream Health, Inc., 2009 WL 3535466,
at *9 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 2009); see also Supervalu, Inc. v. Assoc. Grocers, Inc., 2007 WL
624342, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2007).
55
Agreement’s initial term does not expire until December 2025. Predicting how BTG and
Wellstat would approach the renewal right eight years in the future would be, at best, an
educated guess. This fact countenances against awarding Wellstat lost profits for the
renewal period.209
At the same time, much of the difficulty inherent in assessing whether the
Distribution Agreement would be renewed results from BTG’s breach. The major factor
that BTG and Wellstat would consider when deciding whether to renew is how successful
Vistogard had been and would continue to be. BTG botched Vistogard’s launch, making it
impossible to evaluate Vistogard’s success. Because Delaware law resolves doubts
regarding the amount of damages against the breaching party, a sound argument exists that
Wellstat should receive damages for the renewal term.
Nonetheless, on the facts of this case, awarding damages for the renewal period
would be too speculative. The damages analysis is already assumption-laden and covers a
ten-year period that extends eight years into the future. Adding damages for a renewal
period is not something that this court can attempt with any degree of confidence.
5. The Damages Award
209
Cf. Bradshaw v Trover, 1999 WL 463847, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 30, 1999)
(disallowing personal injury plaintiff’s evidence on lost profits from the non-renewal of a
contract as a result of her injury; finding that “[a]lthough the contract had previously been
renewed, whether [the contract] would have been renewed further is unknown and
speculative”).
56
BTG’s expert, Christopher Barry, calculated what Wellstat’s damages would be
under various scenarios depending on how the court resolved the three major damages
issues in this case. Barry helpfully provided a decision tree that illustrated the different
outcomes. Barry’s chart arrives at damages of $55.8 million in a scenario that (i) excludes
mild toxicity patients from Patel’s forecast, (ii) uses Brock’s access rate of 50-90%, and
(iii) uses the corrected BTG model. Wellstat has not objected to Barry’s calculations.
Barry did not provide a more precise figure than $55.8 million. Barry will provide
Wellstat with his specific figure in dollars and cents, and that figure will be used as the
damages award.
D. Interest
Prejudgment interest in Delaware cases is awarded as a matter of right.210 Subject
to the court’s discretion, a party is also entitled to post-judgment interest until the date of
payment on an amount that includes both the amount of the judgment and the amount of
prejudgment interest.211 Unless the parties have specified another rate by contract or the
210
Brandywine Smyrna, Inc. v. Millenium Builders, LLC, 34 A.3d 482, 486 (Del.
2011).
211
Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 620-21 (Del. Ch. 2010).
57
court determines that a different rate is warranted by the equities, the statutory rate of
interest governs.212 In a breach of contract case, interest runs from the date of breach.213
In this case, Section 4.8 of the Distribution Agreement specifies a rate of 1% per
month for “payments that are not paid on or before the date such payments are due under
this Agreement.”214 Similar language has been held to be sufficient to specify an interest
rate for purposes of pre- and post-judgment interest.215
Pre- and post-judgment interest therefore will accrue at a rate of 1% per month,
compounded monthly. Interest shall run from September 15, 2015, when BTG first
breached the Distribution Agreement by failing to provide the Commercial Plan.
212
See 6 Del. C. § 2301(a) (establishing legal rate); Summa Corp. v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 409 (Del. 1988) (“While the legal rate of interest has
historically been the benchmark for pre-judgment interest, a court of equity has broad
discretion, subject to principles of fairness, in fixing the rate to be applied.” (citations
omitted)); Brandin v. Gottlieb, 2000 WL 1005954, at *29 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2000) (“In the
Court of Chancery the legal rate is a mere guide, not the inflexible rule.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
213
Citadel Hldg. Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 826 (Del. 1992); Wilson v. Pepper,
1995 WL 562235, at *6 (Del. Super. Aug. 21, 1995).
214
JX 152 § 4.8.
215
See Miller v. Silverside, 2016 WL 4502012, at *9 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2016);
see also Bride One, LLC v. Regency Ctrs., L.P., 2017 WL 3189230, at *5 (Del. Super. July
20, 2017); Millcreek Shopping Ctr. LLC. v Jenner Enters., Inc., 2017 WL 1282068, at *2
(Del. Super. Mar. 31, 2017).
58
E. Attorneys’ Fees
Wellstat sought attorneys’ fees under the bad faith exception to the American Rule.
“The bad faith exception to the American Rule applies in cases where the court finds
litigation to have been brought in bad faith or finds that a party conducted the litigation
process itself in bad faith, thereby unjustifiably increasing the costs of litigation.”216
Wellstat correctly points out that BTG acted aggressively and took disingenuous
positions during the litigation. In discovery, BTG refused to produce documents relating
to BTG’s strategic shift away from specialty pharmaceuticals or provide a witness pursuant
to Court of Chancery Rule 30(b)(6) on the topic, claiming that the subject was not relevant.
BTG also objected to Makin being identified as a custodian for documents, claiming that
she did not possess relevant information. These positions could not have been asserted in
good faith, yet BTG forced Wellstat to prevail on a motion to compel before BTG complied
with its discovery obligations.217 Equally concerning, at trial BTG presented a misleading
demonstrative regarding the calculation of Wellstat’s damages.218
Although these instances of misconduct were problematic, it would be
disproportionate to shift attorneys’ fees broadly in favor of Wellstat. A more tailored
remedy would address these problems. The parties shall confer regarding an award of
216
Beck v. Atl. Coast PLC, 868 A.2d 840, 850-51 (Del. Ch. 2005) (Strine, V.C.).
217
See Dkt. 140 (granting Wellstat’s first and second motions to compel); Dkt. 219
(granting Wellstat’s third motion to compel).
218
See Tr. (Gerardi & Court) 1299:14-1302:4; Tr. (Court) 1319:10-1320:1-2.
59
attorneys’ fees that will remedy the harm that Wellstat suffered. If the parties cannot agree,
then Wellstat may make a targeted application.
III. CONCLUSION
Judgment is entered in favor of Wellstat on its claim for breach of contract. BTG is
liable for damages of $55.8 million plus compound interest at a rate of 1% per month from
September 15, 2015, until the date of payment. Wellstat is awarded its costs as a prevailing
party. BTG and Wellstat shall confer regarding the limited award of attorneys’ fees
contemplated by this decision. If there are other outstanding issues that the court needs to
address before a final order can be entered, then the parties shall submit a joint letter within
thirty days that identifies the issues and proposes a path that will enable the court to bring
this case to a conclusion. Otherwise, the parties shall confer regarding a final order to
implement these rulings.
60