AIU Insurance Company v. Philips Electronics North America Corporation

EFiled: Jan 11 2018 01:28PM EST
Transaction ID 61557866
Case No. 9852-VCS
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
AIU INSURANCE COMPANY, :
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE :
COMPANY, BIRMINGHAM FIRE :
INSURANCE COMPANY OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, GRANITE STATE :
INSURANCE COMPANY, LEXINGTON :
INSURANCE COMPANY, and :
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE :
COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA., :
:
Plaintiffs, :
:
v. : C.A. No. 9852-VCS
:
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH :
AMERICA CORPORATION, T H :
AGRICULTURE & NUTRITION, L.L.C. :
and THE T H AGRICULTURE & :
NUTRITION L.L.C. ASBESTOS :
PERSONAL INJURY TRUST, :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Date Submitted: October 2, 2017
Date Decided: January 11, 2018
Marc S. Casarino, Esquire of White and Williams LLP, Wilmington, Delaware and John S.
Favate, Esquire of Hardin Kundla McKeon & Poletto, P.A., Springfield, New Jersey,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
David J. Baldwin, Esquire, Jennifer C. Wasson, Esquire and Andrew H. Sauder, Esquire
of Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware and Kenneth H. Frenchman,
Esquire of McKool Smith, P.C., New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendants Philips
Electronics North America Corporation and T H Agriculture & Nutrition L.L.C.
Daniel K. Hogan, Esquire and Garvan F. McDaniel, Esquire of Hogan♦McDaniel,
Wilmington, Delaware and Sander L. Esserman, Esquire, Steven A. Felsenthal, Esquire
and David A. Klinger, Esquire of Stutzman, Bromberg, Esserman & Plifka, Dallas, Texas,
Attorneys for Defendant T H Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. Asbestos Personal Injury
Trust.
SLIGHTS, Vice Chancellor
The parties in this case are bound together in a contractual relationship that
involves the administration of an asbestos trust, The T H Agriculture & Nutrition,
L.L.C. Asbestos Personal Injury Trust (the “Trust”), created to fund settlement
payments to victims of asbestos exposure. The Trust was initially funded by
Defendants, Philips Electronics North America Corporation (“PENAC”) and
T H Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. (“THAN”), pursuant to THAN’s plan of
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.1
As of THAN’s Chapter 11 filing, THAN and its then-parent, PENAC, faced
significant asbestos-related liability and were engaged in insurance coverage
litigation with several of their insurers (Plaintiffs in this action).2 While THAN’s
Chapter 11 case was pending, the AIG Insurers, PENAC and THAN entered into a
settlement agreement to resolve the coverage litigation (the “Settlement
Agreement”). 3 The Bankruptcy Court approved the Settlement Agreement on
1
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012). In this opinion, “THAN” refers to (1) THAN before,
on and after the effective date of its plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, and (2) any successor(s) to the “reorganized” THAN.
2
Plaintiff insurers are AIU Insurance Company, American Home Assurance Company,
Birmingham Fire Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, Granite State Insurance Company,
Lexington Insurance Company and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh,
Pa. (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or the “AIG Insurers”).
3
The Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiffs’ “First
Amended Complaint” (the “Amended Complaint”). Am. Compl., Ex. B (Apr. 20, 2017).
1
May 6, 2009, and confirmed THAN’s “First Amended Prepackaged Plan of
Reorganization” (the “Plan”) soon thereafter.4
The Plan provides for the Trust’s assumption of THAN’S pre-petition
asbestos-related liabilities, and directs to the Trust (via injunction) all asbestos-
related personal injury claims on which THAN might otherwise be liable. 5 To
recover on an injury claim, the claimant (or his/her representative) must submit the
claim to the Trust, which then determines the amount, if any, the claimant is entitled
to receive. The AIG Insurers are required (per the Settlement Agreement) to make
incremental reimbursement payments to PENAC based on the total amount paid by
the Trust on asbestos-related cancer claims.6
The parties’ current dispute centers on the scope of the AIG Insurers’ right
under the Settlement Agreement to conduct a yearly “audit [of] payments and
distributions made by the Trust.”7 Specifically, the parties dispute “what an audit
must include to satisfy [Plaintiffs’ audit] right.”8 In an earlier decision, the Court
4
Dkt. 31 (TAB 7.A (Plan)). The Plan was affirmed (as modified) by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York on October 26, 2009, and became
effective on November 30, 2009. Am. Compl. ¶ 16; see Plan §§ 1.69, 12.2.
5
See Plan §§ 4.4, 11.5 (establishing an “Asbestos PI Channeling Injunction”).
6
Settlement Agreement § 2.1.
7
Settlement Agreement § 2.3.
8
AIU Ins. Co. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 2015 WL 3526976, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 4,
2015) (“AIU I”).
2
determined that the Settlement Agreement “provides [Plaintiffs] with a broad audit
right,” but expressly refrained from declaring the precise scope of that right. 9
Following that decision, the parties made some progress toward the completion of
an audit as contemplated by the Settlement Agreement, and an initial audit (of sorts)
occurred on June 21–24 and July 25, 2016. Plaintiffs contend that the audit was
“incomplete” and, thus, did not satisfy their audit right under the Settlement
Agreement.
Plaintiffs have filed a six-count Amended Complaint in which they assert
several claims arising out of the Settlement Agreement and the Plan. Counts I–V of
the Amended Complaint relate to Plaintiffs’ audit right and Count VI relates to
Plaintiffs’ offset-related rights. 10 PENAC, THAN and the Trust have variously
moved to dismiss each count of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs have cross-
moved for summary judgment on Counts V and VI.
As explained below, with respect to Counts I–V, the dispositive issues raised
by the parties’ motions turns on the proper construction of the following clause in
Section 2.3 of the Settlement Agreement: “[Plaintiffs] shall have the right to audit
payments and distributions made by the Trust.” 11 The parties have offered
9
Id.
10
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98–147.
11
Settlement Agreement § 2.3.
3
competing reasonable constructions of that language, and the present procedural
posture does not allow the Court to choose between those constructions. Because
the clause is ambiguous, the Court will receive extrinsic evidence regarding the
intended meaning of the term “audit” in Section 2.3 to aid in its construction of that
provision. While the parties have attempted to address the scope of the audit through
the negotiation of an audit protocol, that process, as evidenced by this litigation, has
failed. A definitive construction of the Settlement Agreement as relates to audit
rights is necessary to guide the parties as they continue to work through the
processing of asbestos claims in the years to come.
Count VI, relating to a purported right to offset for miscalculated payments
made by the Trust, must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The Trust is not a party to the Settlement Agreement, and
Plaintiffs have failed to identify any basis other than the Settlement Agreement upon
which Plaintiffs may be entitled to offset their payment obligations to PENAC under
that agreement. Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to plead the existence of conditions
precedent to any set-off right they may have.
4
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts are drawn from the allegations in the Amended Complaint,
documents integral to the Amended Complaint and those matters of which the Court
may take judicial notice, including the admissions of the parties. 12 The Court’s
June 4, 2015, decision in this matter provides a detailed discussion of the parties and
their relationships.13 I will not repeat that detail here. Instead, I will focus on the
facts relevant to the parties’ current dispute.
A. The Trust’s Distribution Procedures
The process by which the Trust reviews and liquidates asbestos-related
personal injury claims (“Asbestos PI Claims”) is governed by the “Trust Distribution
Procedures” (the “TDP”).14 The TDP “establish a schedule of eight asbestos-related
diseases (‘Disease Levels’), seven of which have presumptive medical and exposure
requirements . . . and specific liquidated values (‘Scheduled Values’) . . . .”15
12
Merritt v. United Parcel Serv., 956 A.2d 1196, 1201–02 (Del. 2008) (“Voluntary and
knowing concessions of fact made by a party during judicial proceedings . . . are termed
‘judicial admissions.’” In general, judicial admissions are “conclusive and binding both
upon the party against whom they operate, and upon the court.”); In re Gardner Denver,
Inc., 2014 WL 715705, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2014) (On a motion to dismiss, the court
may consider documents outside of the complaint when the document, or a portion thereof,
is (1) “integral to a plaintiff's claim and incorporated into the complaint,” or (2) “an
adjudicative fact subject to judicial notice.”) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
13
AIU I, 2015 WL 3526976, at *1–5.
14
Dkt. 31 (TAB 5.B: Trust’s “First Amended Distribution Procedures”).
15
TDP § 2.1.
5
Under the TDP, Asbestos PI Claims are processed via “Expedited Review” or
“Individual Review.” “[C]laims that undergo Expedited Review and meet the
presumptive [medical and exposure criteria] for the relevant Disease Level” are paid
the Scheduled Value indicated for that Disease Level. 16 By contrast, for claims
processed via Individual Review, the Trust calculates claim value “based on the
historic liquidated values of other similarly-situated claims in the tort system for the
same Disease Level.” 17 In making these calculations, the Trust “takes into
consideration all of the factors that affect the severity of damages and values within
the tort system.” 18 Generally, the liquidated value of a claim processed via
Individual Review may not exceed the “Maximum Value” indicated for the relevant
Disease Level—although it may exceed the Scheduled Value for that Disease
Level.19
16
TDP § 5.3(a)(1).
17
TDP § 5.3(b)(2).
18
Id. Such factors include (1) the extent to which the claim’s characteristics differ from
the presumptive medical and exposure criteria assigned to the relevant Disease Level;
(2) the claimant’s personal characteristics, occupational history and time of exposure; and
(3) settlement and verdict histories in the claimant’s jurisdiction for similar claims.
TDP § 5.3(b)(2)(i)–(vi).
19
TDP § 5.3(b)(1)(B). For example, the Maximum Value for Asbestos PI Claims
involving mesothelioma (Disease Level VIII) is $900,000, whereas the Scheduled Value
for such claims is $150,000. TDP § 5.3(b)(3).
6
B. Relevant Contractual Provisions
The Amended Complaint principally implicates Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of the
Settlement Agreement.20 Section 2.3 provides, in full:
[Plaintiffs] shall have the right to audit payments and distributions
made by the Trust at their own expense, no more than once per year.
Before conducting any audit, AIG shall agree to keep all information
confidential and shall further agree not to utilize any information for
anything other than to assess whether the Trust in fact made payments
to the claimants as set forth in the quarterly reports.21
Section 2.4 of the Settlement Agreement provides that Plaintiffs may not
dispute the Trust’s payments and distributions to claimants, or dispute or offset their
20
The Amended Complaint also cites Section 8 of the Settlement Agreement and
Section 10.4 of the Plan. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 100, 109, 119. Per Section 8 of the Settlement
Agreement, Plaintiffs, PENAC and THAN “shall cooperate to preserve the validity,
finality, and enforceability of [the] Settlement Agreement.” Settlement Agreement § 8.
Per Section 10.4 of the Plan, “nothing in the Plan, the Plan Documents, [or] the
Confirmation Order . . . shall in any way operate to, or have the effect of, impairing: (a) any
Asbestos Insurance Entity’s legal, equitable or contractual rights, if any, in any respect
under any Asbestos PI Insurance Contracts.” Plan § 10.4; see also Plan § 14.8 (providing
that the Plan is binding on PENAC, THAN and the Trust). Pursuant to the Plan’s
definitional provisions, (1) the Plan Documents include an “Asbestos Records Cooperation
Agreement” (“Cooperation Agreement”) between PENAC, THAN and the Trust; (2) each
Plaintiff insurance company is an Asbestos Insurance Entity; and (3) the Settlement
Agreement is an Asbestos PI Insurance Contract. Plan §§ 1.11, 1.14, 1.23, 1.30, 1.85,
1.109; Plan, Ex. G, § IX. Count I of the Amended Complaint alleges, inter alia, that
PENAC and THAN have breached Section 8 of the Settlement Agreement, and Counts II
and III allege that all three Defendants have breached Section 10.4 of the Plan. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 100, 109, 119. For reasons explained below, whether vel non these alleged breaches
occurred depends, at least in part, on what an “audit” must include to satisfy Plaintiffs’
audit right under Section 2.3 of the Settlement Agreement which, in turn, depends on the
proper construction of Section 2.3’s first sentence.
21
Settlement Agreement § 2.3.
7
payment obligations under the Settlement Agreement on account of the Trust’s
allegedly improper calculation or payment of claims, with two exceptions:
(a) If Plaintiffs “determine based on their review and/or audit” that one
or more of the Trust’s payments to cancer claimants “were
miscalculated due to an accounting error,” Plaintiffs may notify the
trustees of the accounting error and request that they review the matter.
“If the [trustees] agree that there has been an accounting error, Plaintiffs
will be credited the amount of any overpayment by [Plaintiffs] resulting
from the accounting error . . . .”22
(b) If Plaintiffs “have reason to believe” that the Trust has paid one or
more fraudulent cancer claims, “such that the Trust . . . has a right to
recover back payments made” on those claims, Plaintiffs may bring
evidence of such fraud to the trustees’ attention and request that they
review the evidence. If the trustees “agree that the evidence supports”
Plaintiffs’ fraud claim or otherwise “warrants further investigation” and
the Trust “ultimately recovers back all or some of” the amounts paid
toward fraudulent cancer claims, “PENAC will credit [Plaintiffs] with
the applicable percentage . . . of the recovered amount . . . .”23
Sections 2.4(a) and (b) also provide that “PENAC agrees to cooperate with
[Plaintiffs] in obtaining any pertinent information.”24
C. The Parties’ Interactions Following the AIU I Decision
In AIU I, the Court held, inter alia, that Section 2.3 of the Settlement
Agreement “provides [Plaintiffs] with a broad audit right that is not limited to only
22
Settlement Agreement § 2.4(a).
23
Settlement Agreement § 2.4(b).
24
Settlement Agreement § 2.4(a)–(b).
8
verifying that the Trust’s stated payments and distributions were actually made.”25
The Court cautioned, however, that its decision “should [not] be construed as
directing what an audit must include to satisfy [Plaintiffs’ audit] right.”26
Following AIU I, Plaintiffs moved to compel the Trust’s production of
“preliminary information” to facilitate their audit of the Trust’s payments and
distributions.27 On February 8, 2016, the Court ordered the Trust to produce certain
“initial information for each cancer claimant whose cancer claim ha[d] been paid by
the Trust” as of that date.28 Thereafter, on March 7, 2016, the Trust “produced a
spreadsheet to Plaintiffs containing [the specified] information regarding 7,538
cancer claims paid by the [Trust] since its inception.”29 After reaching agreement
with the Trust on an audit protocol (the “2016 Audit Protocol”), Plaintiffs selected
25
AIU I, 2015 WL 3526976, at *8.
26
Id.
27
Am. Compl. ¶ 80; Dkt. 85.
28
Dkt. 110 ¶ 1; see also Am. Comp. ¶ 80. This “initial information” comprised (1) the
claimant’s name and date of birth; (2) the last four digits of the claimant’s social security
number; (3) whether the claimant’s claim was “Exigent Health, Hardship and/or
Extraordinary”; (4) the law firm representing the claimant; (5) the claimant’s malignant
disease category; and (6) the start date and end date for the claimant’s occupational
exposure to asbestos. Dkt. 110 ¶ 1.
29
Am. Compl. ¶ 81; see also Dkt. 121 ¶ 10.
9
584 of those claims “to be the subject of [their] initial annual audit,” and then
conducted that audit on June 21–24 and July 25, 2016.30
Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he materials reviewed during the initial audit raised
questions [regarding] possible payment miscalculations . . . and whether certain
claims paid by the [Trust] were based on fraudulent information.”31 Plaintiffs raised
these concerns with the Trust in a letter dated May 9, 2017.32 In response, the Trust
stated that Plaintiffs had not provided “evidence or a sufficient basis for further
investigation.” 33
Plaintiffs, in turn, advised the Trust that they “strongly
disagree[d]” with the Trust’s assessment; that “there is substantial evidence of
payment miscalculations and/or fraud, all . . . of which is in the Trust’s sole
possession and control”; and that such evidence “more than justifies cooperation and
further investigation by the Trust.” 34 The Trust replied that if Plaintiffs were
30
Am. Compl. ¶ 81; Dkt. 121 ¶ 10. In agreeing to the 2016 Audit Protocol, Plaintiffs
“reserve[d] the right to seek relief from the Court [if] any contested issues ar[o]se during
the course of the audit . . . [and as necessary] to obtain and assure preservation of any
evidence necessary in connection with [P]laintiffs’ rights under the Settlement
Agreement . . . .” App. to Trust’s Opening Br. in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summ. J. (“App. to TOB”), Vol. I, Tab 3.F (May 6, 2016 Letter from
Plaintiffs’ Counsel to the Trust’s Counsel) at 2.
31
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 83–84.
32
App. to TOB, Vol. I, Tab 3.I (Plaintiffs’ May 9, 2017 Letter).
33
App. to TOB, Vol. I, Tab 3.J (Trust’s Reply Letter) at 5.
34
App. to TOB, Vol. I, Tab 3.K (Plaintiffs’ Reply Letter) at 6.
10
attempting to raise “concerns about the extent of the audit materials [they were]
provided for review,” their concerns came too late since the 2016 Audit Protocol—
to which Plaintiffs agreed and with which the Trust complied—“specified, in clear
terms, the audit materials that the Trust would make available for [Plaintiffs’]
review.”35
According to Plaintiffs, the 2016 Audit Protocol does not capture the full
scope of their audit right under the Settlement Agreement, and their agreement to
that protocol in no way limits their audit right. Moreover, Plaintiffs maintain that
their initial audit remains incomplete “because [their] questions [as to] fraud and
payment miscalculations remain unanswered.”36
D. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on April 20, 2017. As noted, the
Amended Complaint contains six counts, five of which relate to Plaintiffs’ audit
right under the Settlement Agreement.37 PENAC and THAN have moved to dismiss
35
App. to TOB, Vol. I, Tab 3.L (Trust’s Sur-Reply Letter) at 1.
36
Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to PENAC and THAN’s Mot. to Dismiss and the Trust’s Mot. to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Pls.’ Cross Mot. for Summ. J.
3 (July 3, 2017) (“POB”).
37
Am. Compl. ¶ 140. Count VI of the Amended Complaint requests a declaration as to
“the nature and extent of Plaintiffs’ [offset-related] rights under Section 2.4(a) and (b) of
the Settlement Agreement,” and specific enforcement of those rights as against PENAC
and the Trust. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145–46.
11
Counts I, II, V and VI of the Amended Complaint under Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). The Trust has moved to dismiss Counts III, IV and VI under Chancery
Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on those Counts, and to
dismiss Count V as moot or, alternatively, under Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). Finally,
Plaintiffs have cross-moved for summary judgment on Counts V and VI.
II. ANALYSIS
The parties’ current dispute reduces to two issues:
1. What must an “audit” include to satisfy Plaintiffs’ audit right under the
Settlement Agreement?
2. If an audit conducted by Plaintiffs leads Plaintiffs to question whether
the Trust has made payment miscalculations or paid fraudulent claims
(or both), and Plaintiffs then raise such questions with the Trust’s
trustees, does the Settlement Agreement require the Trust to investigate
and attempt to resolve those questions?
For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that (1) the Settlement
Agreement is ambiguous as to what an audit must include to satisfy Plaintiffs’ audit
right; and (2) the Settlement Agreement does not require the Trust to investigate or
resolve Plaintiffs’ questions as to possible payment miscalculations or the payment
of fraudulent claims by the Trust. The decision to investigate such questions, or not,
is committed to the sole discretion of the trustees.
12
A. Standards Governing the Parties’ Motions
The standards governing the parties’ motions are well settled. On a motion to
dismiss under Chancery Rule 12(b)(1), “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing th[e] Court’s [subject matter] jurisdiction” over the challenged
claim(s).38 “[I]f it appears from the record that the Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim,” the Court will dismiss the claim.39
On a motion to dismiss under Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), “(i) all well-pleaded
factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even vague allegations are ‘well-pleaded’
if they give the opposing party notice of the claim; (iii) the court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; and (iv) dismissal is
inappropriate unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any
reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.”40
Finally, on a motion for summary judgment, the court may grant summary
judgment only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”41 “When the issue before the
38
Lewis v. AimCo Props., L.P., 2015 WL 557995, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2015) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
39
AFSCME Locals 1102 & 320 v. City of Wilm., 858 A.2d 962, 965 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(citation omitted).
40
Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002).
41
Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).
13
Court involves the interpretation of a contract, summary judgment is appropriate
only if the contract in question is unambiguous.”42
B. The Controversy Relating to the Precise Scope of Plaintiffs’ Audit
Right Under the Settlement Agreement Is Not Moot
Count V of the Amended Complaint seeks a declaration as to the scope of
Plaintiffs’ audit right under the Settlement Agreement. Defendants contend that
Count V is moot because the scope of Plaintiffs’ audit right has already been
determined—by AIU I and by the parties in the 2016 Audit Protocol. According to
Defendants, “Plaintiffs have had their audit” in keeping with these set parameters
and the matter should now be put to rest. 43 Plaintiffs disagree. According to
Plaintiffs, neither the Court’s AIU I decision nor the 2016 Audit Protocol definitively
determined “what an audit must include to satisfy [Plaintiffs’ audit] right.” 44 Thus,
42
United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Hldgs., Inc., 937 A.2d 810, 830 (Del. Ch. 2007).
43
See PENAC and THAN’s Br. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss 21 (June 9, 2017) (“P-
T Opening Br.”). See also Trust’s Opening Br. in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summ. J. 38 (June 9, 2017) (“TOB”) (“The common thread running
through [Counts III–V] of the Amended Complaint is [Plaintiffs’] bewilderingly selective
indifference to last year’s resolution of the scope of [their] audit right . . . .”); TOB at 40
(“Section 2.3 is [Plaintiffs’] audit right and, as noted, the audit has happened.”); TOB at 42
(positing that the Court’s AIU I decision, together with Plaintiffs’ agreement to the 2016
Audit Protocol, “ultimately settled the precise scope of [Plaintiffs’] audit right”); TOB at
40 (“[Plaintiffs] already ha[ve] exercised [their audit] right on terms to which [they]
agreed.”); P-T Opening Br. at 22 (to the same effect); P-T Opening Br. at 21 (“[B]ecause
[Plaintiffs’ audit] rights have been determined and Plaintiffs have had their audit, Count
Five is now moot.”); TOB at 42 (“With the scope of [Plaintiffs’] audit right now settled,”
Count V is moot.).
44
AIU I, 2015 WL 3526976, at *8.
14
Plaintiffs argue, there is an actual, justiciable controversy as to the precise scope of
their audit right under the Settlement Agreement.
For this court to exercise jurisdiction over a particular dispute, the legal
issue(s) in dispute must be “amenable to a judicial resolution.”45 “If a grant of relief
‘cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy,’ the dispute is moot.”46
A dispute “that has become moot normally will be dismissed.”47 Of course, “if the
alleged injury still exists despite the occurrence of intervening events, a justiciable
controversy remains, and the mootness doctrine will not operate to deprive a court
of jurisdiction to hear the case.”48
Notably, Section 2.3 entitles Plaintiffs to “audit payments and distributions
made by the Trust” once per year.49 Thus, absent a definitive judicial construction
of Section 2.3 as to the precise scope of Plaintiffs’ audit right—an issue as to which
45
Gen. Motors Corp. v. New Castle Cty., 701 A.2d 819, 823 (Del. 1997) (“A proceeding
may become moot . . . if the legal issue in dispute is no longer amenable to a judicial
resolution . . . .”); NAMA Hldgs, LLC v. Related World Mkt. Ctr., LLC, 922 A.2d 417, 435
(Del. Ch. 2007) (“The doctrine of mootness requires a court to dismiss a claim ‘if the
substance of the dispute disappears due to the occurrence of certain events following the
filing of an action.’”) (quoting Multi–Fineline Electronix, Inc. v. WBL Corp. Ltd., 2007
WL 431050, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2007)).
46
NAMA Hldgs., 922 A.2d at 435 (quoting The Library, Inc. v. AFG Enters., Inc., 1998
WL 474159, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1998)).
47
Glazer v. Pasternak, 693 A.2d 319, 320 (Del. 1997).
48
NAMA Hldgs., 922 A.2d at 435.
49
Settlement Agreement § 2.3.
15
the Settlement Agreement is silent50—the parties’ current dispute likely will recur
year after year in connection with future audits.51 The Court’s AIU I decision did
not specifically identify “what an audit must include to satisfy [Plaintiffs’ audit]
right.” 52 Nor did Plaintiffs’ agreement to the 2016 Audit Protocol “ultimately
settle[] the precise breadth of [their] audit right.”53 Therefore, as discussed in more
detail below, the parties’ current dispute as to the precise scope of Plaintiffs’ audit
right under the Settlement Agreement is an actual, justiciable controversy.54
C. The Settlement Agreement is Ambiguous as to the Precise Scope of
Plaintiffs’ Audit Right
“In deciding a motion to dismiss [pursuant to Chancery Rule 12(b)(6)], the
trial court cannot choose between two differing reasonable interpretations of
50
See AIU I, 2015 WL 3526976, at *8; see generally Settlement Agreement.
51
Cf. NAMA Hldgs., 922 A.2d at 435 (“[I]f the alleged injury still exists despite the
occurrence of intervening events, a justiciable controversy remains . . . . ”).
52
AIU I, 2015 WL 3526976, at *8.
53
TOB at 42. Here, I cannot reasonably conclude that Plaintiffs’ (qualified) agreement to
a particular audit protocol for a single audit constitutes a manifestation of assent
permanently to exclude from the scope of Plaintiffs’ audit right any information outside
the scope of that particular protocol. See App. to TOB, Vol. I, Tab 3.F at 2.
54
Gen. Motors Corp., 701 A.2d at 823; see Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v.
Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del. 1992) (“The proper construction of any
contract . . . is purely a question of law.”); 805 Third Ave. Co. v. M.W. Realty Assocs., 448
N.E.2d 445, 447 (N.Y. 1983) (“Interpretation of [a] contract is a legal matter for the
court.”).
16
ambiguous [contractual] provisions.”55 Likewise, on cross-motions for summary
judgment, if the cross-movants both offer reasonable interpretations of the operative
contractual language, the court “may, in its discretion, deny summary judgment [so
that it may] . . . inquire into or develop more thoroughly the facts at trial in order to
clarify the law or its application.”56
While Counts I–IV of the Amended Complaint state separate claims, whether
any of those claims are viable depends fundamentally on what an audit must include
to satisfy Plaintiffs’ audit right, which in turn depends on the proper construction of
Section 2.3 of the Settlement Agreement. 57 Plaintiffs acknowledge as much in
55
VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 615 (Del. 2003).
56
In re Comverge, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7368-VCMR (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2016)
(ORDER) (citing Alexander Indus., Inc. v. Hill, 211 A.2d 917 (Del. 1965)).
57
Specifically, Count I of the Amended Complaint alleges (1) that PENAC and THAN
have breached Sections 2.3 and 8 of the Settlement Agreement “by refusing to allow
Plaintiffs to exercise their right to conduct a commercially reasonable audit of the [Trust]
unless Plaintiffs agree to . . . conditions [not contained in] the Settlement Agreement,” and
(2) that “PENAC has breached Section 2.4 of the Settlement Agreement by refusing to
cooperate with Plaintiffs in obtaining information pertinent to” the Trust’s miscalculation
of claim payments and payment of fraudulent claims. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98–100. Counts II
and III of the Amended Complaint allege that all three Defendants have breached
Section 10.4 of the Plan, in that Defendants’ entry into (or reliance on) the Cooperation
Agreement has operated to impair Plaintiffs’ audit right under the Settlement Agreement.
Id. ¶¶ 109, 119. Count IV of the Amended Complaint alleges that the Trust has tortiously
interfered with Plaintiffs’ audit right under the Settlement Agreement “by refusing to allow
Plaintiffs to exercise their right to conduct a commercially reasonable audit of the [Trust]”
unless Plaintiffs agree to conditions not contained in the Settlement Agreement. Id. ¶ 129.
If Plaintiffs’ construction of Section 2.3 of the Settlement Agreement is correct, Counts I,
II and III adequately plead the requisites of a claim for breach of contract under New York
law, see AIU I, 2015 WL 3526976, at *9–11, and Count IV adequately pleads the requisites
of a claim for tortious interference with contract under New York law. See id. at *11.
17
Count V of the Amended Complaint, which seeks a declaration of Section 2.3’s
proper construction with respect to “the nature and extent of” Plaintiffs’ audit
rights.58
The Settlement Agreement is governed by New York law.59 “Like Delaware,
New York follows traditional contract law principles that give great weight to the
parties’ objective manifestations of their intent in the written language of their
agreement.”60 Thus, “a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous
on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.”61 A written
agreement “is unambiguous if the language it uses has ‘a definite and precise
meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [agreement]
itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of
opinion[.]’”62 Contractual language is ambiguous only if the disputed language is
And, as explained below, it is at least reasonably conceivable that Plaintiffs’ construction
of Section 2.3 is correct.
58
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 138–40.
59
Settlement Agreement § 18. The Plan is also governed by New York law. Plan § 14.1.
60
In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 54 (Del. Ch. 2001); accord Greenfield v.
Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002) (“The fundamental, neutral precept
of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.
The best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their
writing.”) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
61
Greenfield, 780 N.E.2d at 170 (citations omitted).
62
Id. at 170–71 (citation omitted).
18
“reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more
different meanings.”63 Whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question of
law for the court to decide.64
After carefully reviewing Section 2.3, and considering the parties’ competing
constructions of that provision, I am satisfied that both constructions are reasonable.
Thus, the provision is, by definition, ambiguous.65 To repeat, Section 2.3’s operative
language reads: “[Plaintiffs] shall have the right to audit payments and distributions
made by the Trust at their own expense, no more than once per year.” 66 The
operative term “audit” is undefined, and the Settlement Agreement says nothing of
what information must be made available to Plaintiffs to satisfy their audit right.67
Under Plaintiffs’ construction of Section 2.3, they are entitled to access
(and audit) information concerning the Trust’s calculation of payments to cancer
claimants, including how the Trust calculated particular claim values for claims
liquidated through its Individual Review process (the “IR Process”). This is a
63
Riverside S. Planning Corp. v. CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 869 N.Y.S.2d 511, 516 (App.
Div. 2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted), aff'd, 920 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 2009).
64
See, e.g., Consedine v. Portville Cent. Sch. Dist., 907 N.E.2d 684, 689 (N.Y. 2009)
(“Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law . . . .”).
65
VLIW Tech., 840 A.2d at 615.
66
Settlement Agreement § 2.3.
67
See generally Settlement Agreement.
19
reasonable construction of Section 2.3’s operative language. The word “audit”
carries a confirmatory connotation.68 An “audit” of reported payments, therefore,
might reasonably be understood to denote a process whereby the auditor(s)
(i.e., Plaintiffs) may confirm how the reported payments were calculated so that they
can confirm that the calculations are, in fact, correct.69 From this, it follows that a
“proper” audit of reported payments would require access to information concerning
how the auditee (i.e., the Trust) calculated particular payment
amounts. 70 Accordingly, it is reasonable to construe an “audit” of the Trust’s
reported claim payments to require access to information concerning how the Trust
calculated particular claim values for claims liquidated through the IR Process.
Defendants offer a different (but also reasonable) construction of Section 2.3’s
operative language. According to Defendants, nothing in Section 2.3 “grant[s]
68
See, e.g., Aron v. Gillman, 128 N.E.2d 284, 287 (N.Y. 1955) (“[T]he very purpose of an
audit is to verify and reconcile the book entries of a business according to proper
accounting practice, and to see that they are accurate.”); Audit, Webster’s New World
College Dictionary (4th ed. 2010) (“A formal, often periodic examination and checking of
accounts or financial records to verify their correctness.”); Audit, Random House Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2005) (“to examine (accounts, records, etc.) for purposes
of verification”); Bianco v. Bianco, 830 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (App. Div. 2007) (“[I]t is common
practice for courts to refer to the dictionary in determining plain meaning.”)
(citation omitted).
69
See Aron, 128 N.E.2d at 287; Albert A. Volk Co. v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d
662, 666 (App. Div. 1947) (“Inquiry to ascertain the true situation with respect to financial
matters beyond a mere superficial examination of books is essential to a proper audit.”).
70
See Albert A. Volk Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
20
Plaintiffs the right to [audit] . . . the Trust’s proprietary [IR] [P]rocess . . . or its
reasoning for paying particular claim amounts.” 71 This, too, is a reasonable
construction of Section 2.3. The provision rather conspicuously does not specify
what information concerning “payments and distributions made by the Trust” must
be furnished to Plaintiffs when they exercise their audit right.72 If the contracting
parties intended that such information should include proprietary details of the
Trust’s IR Process for each cancer claim paid by the Trust,73 it is reasonable to expect
that they would have expressed that intent in the Settlement Agreement. Yet, again,
the Settlement Agreement is silent.74
71
PENAC and THAN’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss and in Opp. to Pls.’
Cross Mot. for Summ. J. 12 (Aug. 1, 2017); Trust’s Reply in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss
and Response Opposing Pls.’ Cross Mot. for Summ. J. 11–12 (Aug. 1, 2017) (“TRB”).
72
Settlement Agreement § 2.3; see generally Settlement Agreement.
73
As noted, for Asbestos PI Claims liquidated via the IR Process, the Trust’s claim
valuation calculus takes into account “the historic liquidated values of other similarly-
situated claims in the tort system for the same Disease Level” and “all of the factors that
affect the severity of damages and values within the tort system.” TDP § 5.3(b)(2).
The Trust’s methodology for parsing and evaluating these factors is proprietary, and they
understandably wish not to share it with Plaintiffs or others. See Trust’s Mot. for Protective
Order with Respect to Outstanding Discovery and to Stay Further Discovery Pending a
Discovery Conference with the Court ¶ 22 (Nov. 18, 2016) (Plaintiffs seek information
“that [is] intrinsically and highly proprietary, regarding, essentially, how . . . the Trust
[and its claims processor] ‘grade’ claims. The subject areas include . . . the identification
of products for which THAN (and now the Trust) have legal responsibility; the process by
which some claims were approved in excess of the ‘Scheduled Values’; [and] standards for
assessing actual or potential limitations bars[.]”).
74
For instance, the Settlement Agreement makes no reference to “Individual Review” of
asbestos-related cancer claims, to “Disease Levels” or to the “Scheduled Value”
(or “Maximum Value”) indicated for particular Disease Levels; nor does it express the
21
Moreover, given that “[t]he Trust’s claims grading process is the centerpiece
of a structured settlement process fashioned . . . as an alternative to [tort] litigation,”
disclosure of “the Trust’s internal processes [c]ould . . . make it more difficult for
the Trust to resolve claims in a fair and expeditious manner.”75 In any event, insofar
as Plaintiffs suspect that the Trust has paid fraudulent claims or miscalculated claim
payments (due to accounting error), Plaintiffs’ sole remedy under the Settlement
Agreement is to notify the Trust’s trustees of Plaintiffs’ concern(s) and request that
the trustees review the matter. 76 Recognizing Plaintiffs’ limited remedy in this
regard, it would be reasonable to exclude the Trust’s proprietary information from
the scope of Plaintiff’s audit right under the Settlement Agreement.
In the present procedural posture, the Court is unable to choose between the
parties’ competing reasonable interpretations of the ambiguous contractual language
relevant underlying concepts using different language. See generally Settlement
Agreement. On one hand, it is not surprising that the Settlement Agreement makes no
reference to defined terms in the TDP, given that the Settlement Agreement was drafted
and executed prior to the finalization and confirmation of the Plan. Id. at Signature Pages;
Am. Compl. ¶ 16. On the other hand, if the parties to the Settlement Agreement intended
that Plaintiffs should have the right to audit proprietary details of the Trust’s IR Process, it
would be reasonable to expect that they would identify the relevant conceptual antecedents
in the writing memorializing the audit right.
75
TRB at 12.
76
See Settlement Agreement § 2.4.
22
that is at the heart of their dispute.77 Thus, the parties’ dispositive motions must be
denied with respect to Counts I–V of the Amended Complaint.
D. Count VI of the Amended Complaint Must Be Dismissed
Plaintiffs allege in Count VI that there is an actual, justiciable controversy
regarding (1) “Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a determination by the [Trust] . . . that the
[Trust] has made payment miscalculations and . . . paid claims based on fraudulent
information”;78 and (2) “the nature and extent of Plaintiffs’ [offset] rights [in respect
of PENAC] under Sections 2.4(a) and (b) of the Settlement Agreement.”79 I address
each allegation in turn.
First, as a matter of law, the Settlement Agreement does not entitle Plaintiffs
to a determination by the Trust that the Trust has, in fact, miscalculated
claim payments or paid fraudulent claims. The Trust is a stranger to the
Settlement Agreement;80 thus, Plaintiffs do not have any contractual rights against
the Trust under that Agreement. 81 That being so, Plaintiffs “cannot, under
77
See VLIW Tech., 840 A.2d at 615; United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 830.
78
Am. Compl. ¶ 143.
79
Am. Compl. ¶ 142.
80
Settlement Agreement § 1.18 (defining the term “Parties” in the Settlement Agreement;
the term includes Plaintiffs, PENAC and THAN but does not include the Trust).
81
See Bartsch v. Bartsch, 388 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (App. Div. 1976) (“[P]arties to a contract
cannot, under its terms, impose any liability upon a stranger to that contract.”).
23
[the Settlement Agreement’s terms], impose any liability upon [the Trust].”82 And
Plaintiffs have not pled that there is some other legal instrument that evidences
“Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a determination by the [Trust] . . . that the [Trust] has made
payment miscalculations [or] . . . paid claims based on fraudulent information.”83
Second, Plaintiffs have failed to plead the existence of a justiciable
controversy as to the nature or extent of their alleged offset rights under Section 2.4
of the Settlement Agreement. Under Section 2.4, Plaintiffs’ offset rights are subject
to several conditions precedent, including:
1. Plaintiffs must inform the Trust’s trustees of Plaintiffs’ belief that
the Trust (i) miscalculated certain claim payments due to accounting
error; or (ii) paid one or more fraudulent claims;84 and
2. The trustees must agree that the Trust has (i) miscalculated the
specified claim payments due to accounting error; or (ii) been
defrauded with respect to the claim (or claims) specified.85
Here, Plaintiffs have not pled that these conditions precedent have been satisfied.86
Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to plead the existence of a justiciable controversy as to
the nature or extent of their offset rights under Section 2.4 of the Settlement
82
Id.
83
See generally Am. Compl.
84
Settlement Agreement § 2.4.
85
Id. Moreover, in the case of fraud, the Trust must actually “recover[] back all or some
of the amounts paid” on fraudulent cancer claims. Id. § 2.4(b).
86
See generally Am. Compl.
24
Agreement.87 Count VI is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ respective motions with respect to
Counts I through V of the Amended Complaint are DENIED. Defendants’ motions
to dismiss Count VI of the Amended Complaint are GRANTED. The parties shall
confer and, within ten (10) days, submit a schedule for the development of extrinsic
evidence as appropriate to assist the Court in its construction of Section 2.3 of the
Settlement Agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
87
Following the audit, Plaintiffs raised concerns regarding “payment miscalculations
and/or fraud” with the Trust. The trustees, for their part, have (repeatedly) disagreed with
Plaintiffs’ assessments. See App. to TOB, Vol. I, Tabs 3.I–3.L. The Settlement Agreement
affords Plaintiffs no remedy in the event of such disagreement beyond the exercise of their
audit rights. See Settlement Agreement § 2.4. Given this limitation, it is all the more
appropriate that Plaintiffs’ bargained-for audit rights, such as they are, be fully realized so
that Plaintiffs may make their best case to the trustees and, in turn, the trustees (neutrals in
this dispute) may make fully informed judgments.
25