IN THE C()URT ()F COMM ()N PLEAS FOR TI“IE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND F()R NEW CAS“I`LI`§ C()UNTY
NEIL NE'I`TLETON,
Appellant,
C.A. No. CPU4-13-OO3812
v.
JENNIFER COHAN,
DIRECTOR ()F THE DELAWARE
DIVISION ()F I\/IOTOR VEHICLES
\._/\_/\./\_./\_.'-.../\_z\_/\_/\_/\_/\_/
Appellee.
Subniitted: june 11, 2014
Decided: July 1, 2014
Kevin P. O’Neill, Esq. Frederick H. Schranck, Esq.
1201 King Street Departrnent of Justice
Wilmington, DE 19801 P.O. Box 778
Al'lorneyfor the Appellant Dover, Delaware 19903
A!'lr)rneyfor Appellee
FINAL ORDER AND OPINI()N FOLLOWING
APPEAL FROM ’I`HE DIVISI()N ()F MO'I`OR VEHICLES
Neil Nettletoil, Appellant (hei‘eiriafter' "Nettletori" or "Appeilant") brings this appeal from
a decision of the Division of I\/lotor Vehicles (hereiiwaftei‘ "DMV") denying the reinstatement of
his license on the basis of an outstanding perinanerit revocation of privileges in the state of
1
1
illinois The DMV denied the reinstatement, as l)claware and illinois are party states to the
iiiterstate Driver’s License Conipact (hereinafter "the Coiiipact"), and under illinois law, any
driver with four or more driving under the influence (hereinafter "DUI") convictions will have
his license permanently revoked.
FACTS
Appellant was initially issued a Dela.ware Driver’s license i\lo. 1014750 on October 4,
1990. Appellant was also issued a Delaware license on l\/larch 4, 1999. Appellant possessed an
illinois driver’s license for a short period of time before surrendering it in July 2000 and
receiving a Delaware license. it was during the time Appellant possessed an illinois license that
he was convicted of DUI in lllinois.
Appellant has four DUI convictions.' On October 26, 2010, Appellant satisfied all of the
requirements necessaryz for reinstatement of his Delaware driving privileges However, the State
of illinois revoked Appellant’s illinois license after' receiving notice that Appellant had been
convicted of a fourth DUI, and as a result, the Delaware i)i\/IV refused to issue a new license.
T_he DMV did not issue a formal denial of Appellaiit’s request for reinstatement, and no
hearing was held. Tlie parties agreed that the issue will be addressed on the aforementioned
facts.
S'FANHAILD or Rl~:vlr<;w
"The standard of review of an appeal from an administrative decision of the DMV is on
the record, and, as such, is limited to correcting errors of law and determining whether
substantial evidence exists to support the hearing officer's factual findings and conclusions of
l 'l`wo in Delaware (1992 and 2006); one in illinois (2000); and one in New jersey (2004).
2 Appellant satisfied both the legal requirernezits and tile aicohol education and improvement
programs required for reinstatement.
law."3 'l` he Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the decision
below if the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is the "product of an orderly and
logical deductive process."4' “'l`he substantial evidence standard demands more than a scintilla
but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Substaiitial evidence requires such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."$
Discusslon
Appellant argues that the Dl\/IV erred in refusing to issue a license due to the illinois
permanent revocation because the one-year limit on the extra-territorial revocation has passed.
Appellant also argues that the "blind coinputerizatioii"" present in this case violates Article I,
Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution.~
i. Tbe Dl\/IV Did Not Er'r in `Refusing to Reinstate Appellant’s Privileges
Pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2?'07(b)(2), "|_`t]he Departinent shall not issue an
operator’s...license to any: (2) Person whose license has been revoked under this chapter until
the expiration of 1 year after such license was revoi2009 WL 188001, at * 2 (i`)el. Com. l’l. Jan. 28, 2009) (citing Shahan v.
Landing;
632 A.2d 1357 (Del 1994)).
4 Howard v. Vosh~ell,
621 A.2d 804, 806 (Del. Super. 1992) (quoting Quaker' I{z'll Place v. State
Hurnan Relalfons', Del.Super., 498 A.2d 175, 179 (1985`)).
5 Howard, 621 A.2d at 806 (citing Quaker~ Izii!! Pface, 498 A.2d at 179).
6 625 iii camp star sas-20a
application was made shall not issue a license to drive.? Appellant'relies heavily on the
exception contained within this .paragraph, which states that after one year has passed from the
date of revocation, the individual may apply for a license q`f`j)erlrtilled by lana Arguably,'with
slightly different facts, if the offense was committed in l`)elaware, the Court may permit a license
reinstatement. However, that is clearly not the case here. As the Court found in full v_
Cr)mrnissioiver o_flhe Departnzenz o_f[“`i,¢l)lic Sug‘iery:
Ait. V of the `Cornpact does not provide an exception to § 6-103(/§)(3)
[Oklahoma’s statute proliibiting the issuance of license to individuals meeting
certain criteria]. if he latter statute plainly proliibits the issuance of an Oklahoma
driver’s license to an individual who is silbie<.‘t to an extraterritorial revocation or
suspension. ...{'l`he Defendant] is ineligible...to apply for an Oklahoma driver’s
license because his driving privileges are currently revoked in another
jurisdiction. 'fo hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the general purpose
and object of both the Compact and § 6-103(./§)(3).8
'l`he Appellant argues that the Court si'zouid apply the law as set forth in Sfare v.
Vargasozr, a decision out of the Suprenie Court of lowa, in which the Court allowed the one-year
exception to apply when allowing for the issuance of a temporary restricted license to an
individual whose license had been pei‘rnarieiitly revoked in Florida.g I-Iowever, that case is
distinguishable from this matter, as the iowa Supi'eine Court granted the issuance of a lerrzporary
reslrz`c!ed Zicense, not a completely unrestricted license as the Defendant seeks here.
721 nat C. § 3101 Ai-~r_ v. § 2.
8 176 P.sa 1227, 1232 (oi