State of Delaware v. Walter L. Minter

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
)
v. ) Case No’s.: 0505004020
) 1007011447
)
WALTER L. MINTER, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: April 15, 2014
Decided: May 15, 2014
Kevin Hudson, Esquire Cathy A. Johnson, Esquire
Deputy Attorney General Office of the Public Defender
Delaware Department of Justice 900 North King Street
820 N. French Street, 7th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801
Wilmington, DE 19801 Attorney for Defendant
Attorney for the State
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Walter L. Minter (hereinafter “Defendant”) brings this motion for dismissal of the
charges pending against him on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. On
April 15, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion, and the Court reserved decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 24, 2005, Defendant was charged with Driving Without a Valid License in
violation of 21 Del. C. § 2701, Failure to Have Minimum Insurance in violation of 21 Del. C. §
2118, Fictitious or Cancelled Registration Card, Number Plate or Tag in violation of 21 Del. C. §
2115, and Expired Tags in violation of 21 Del. C. § 2115. Hereinafter, the Court will refer to
these charges collectively as the “2005 motor vehicle charges.” Defendant signed the receipt of
the Summons, which had a scheduled court date of May 14, 2005. On May 10, 2005, four days
before his required appearance, Defendant presented to the Justice of the Peace Court and signed
a Jurisdictional Form indicating that he wished to be tried by this Court. Despite Defendant’s
unequivocal demand for the case to be transferred to the Court of Common Pleas, on May 31,
2005, The Justice of the Peace Court issued a Capias for his Failure to Appear for a Traffic
Summons. On March 19, 2008, the Justice of the Peace Court issued another Capias for Failure
to Appear for Trial, which was scheduled for March 8, 2008. Apparently, due to a clerical error,
the Justice of the Peace Court continued to retain jurisdiction over the matter until March 22,
2010, when after almost five years, the case was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas.
On March 22, 2010, Defendant signed an Order to Appear at his Arraignment in the
Court of Common Pleas, which was scheduled for August 31, 2010. On May 26, 2010, this case
was docketed in the Court of Common Pleas. The scheduled Arraignment on August 31, 2010,
was continued to September 1, 2010, and then later to December 20, 2010. Defendant did not
appear at the December 20, 2010 Arraignment, and a Capias was issued. Defendant has been
incarcerated in Salem County Correctional Facility in New Jersey since November 10, 2012. On
March 24, 2014, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss.
2
On July 13, 2010, Defendant was arrested for Assault in the Third Degree (hereinafter
“2010 assault charge”) in violation of 11 Del. C. § 611. Arraignment for that matter took place
on September 17, 2010, at which time Defendant entered a plea of not guilty. A non-jury trial
was scheduled for November 29, 2010, for which Defendant did not appear, and the Court issued
a Capias.
CONTENTIONS
Defendant argues that more than three years have elapsed between the date of the offense
and Defendant’s court hearing in this Court. Defendant argues that “a defendant has no duty to
bring himself to trial. The right to a speedy trial is ‘fundamental and the duty of the charging
authority is to provide a prompt trial.’”1 Defendant contends that under the four factors set forth
in Barker v. Wingo,2 which are used to determine if the right to a speedy trial has been violated,
it is clear that his right to a speedy trial has been violated.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in a criminal
trial, the accused has a right to a speedy trial.3 This right to a speedy trial is also included in
Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution.4 Additionally, the federal right to a speedy
trial applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo set forth the factors courts are to consider when determining
whether an individual’s right to a speedy trial has been violated: “(1) the length of delay; (2) the
1
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, p. 2 (quoting Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S.30, 38 (1970)).
2
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
3
U.S. CONST. VI.
4
Del. Const. art. I, § 7.
5
State v. Sells, 2013 WL 1654317, AT *2 (Del. Com. Pl. Apr. 17, 2013).
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reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice
to the defendant.”6 Each factor is to be weighed along with the individual facts of the case.7
With respect to the third factor, the assertion of the right to a speedy trial, a Defendant
who is incarcerated in a different state while awaiting trial in Delaware must request trial in
accordance with the Uniform Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter “UAD”).8 Under the UAD,
“prisoners incarcerated in a foreign state who have charges pending in Delaware have specific
rights to a trial in Delaware within 180 days of the giving of proper written notice. …”9
The Court will analyze each factor separately and then weigh them together to determine
whether Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated with respect to the 2005 motor vehicle
charges and the 2010 assault charge.
A. LENGTH OF DELAY
“The right to a speedy trial attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime
through arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first.”10 Defendant was arrested on April 24,
2005 for the traffic violations, and on July 13, 2010 for the 2010 assault charge. The case
against Defendant for the 2005 motor vehicle violations, after proceeding through the Justice of
the Peace Court in 2005 and 2008, was not filed in this Court until May 26, 2010. Thereafter,
Defendant was scheduled to appear in traffic court on August 31, 2010. This appearance was
continued to December 19, 2010, and Defendant failed to appear on that date.
6
Id.7
Id.8
11 Del. C. § 2542.
9
State v. Davis, 1993 WL 138993 (Del. Super. Apr. 7, 1993)(citing 11 Del. C. § 2542). “Prisoner’s rights under the
UAD do not accrue until the Defendant specifically asks the prison official detaining him to send the required forms,
registered mail, to the jurisdiction from which a detainer has been lodged.” (State v. McDowell, 824 A.2d 948 at
*952).
10
Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002)
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With regard to the 2005 motor vehicle violations, however, the extensive delay between
Defendant’s arrest date in 2005 to his scheduled traffic court appearance in 2010 causes
considerable concern. The Court therefore finds that the first factor, length of delay with respect
to the 2005 motor vehicle violations, weighs in favor of Defendant. In contrast, the Court finds
that there existed no delay with respect to the 2010 assault charge, as Defendant was scheduled
for trial within 180 days from the date of arrest, and therefore this factor weighs against
Defendant.
B. REASON FOR DELAY
The Court considers the reason for the delay when assigning weight to each party’s
argument.11 “Thus, a ‘deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should
be weighted heavily against the [State],’ while a ‘more neutral reason such as negligence or
overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily’ against the State.”12
With respect to the 2005 motor vehicle charges, the initial delay from 2005 to 2010 was
the result of the Justice of the Peace Court failing to transfer the matter to this Court. As the
cause of the initial delay was a result of an error in the Justice of the Peace Court, the reason will
weigh against the State. Defendant’s failure to appear for the most recent four years weighs
against him. However, the primary factor for the delay of almost five years remains the clerical
error. Accordingly, this factor must weigh against the State.
Similarly, in the 2010 assault charge matter, Defendant failed to appear in this Court from
2010 through 2014. Although Defendant has been incarcerated in New Jersey since 2012, the
State was not informed of the incarceration, and Defendant did not attempt to bring the matter to
11
Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 274.
12
Id. at 274 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).
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trial under the UAD. The Defendant’s actions are the cause of the delay in the 2010 assault
charge matter, and therefore this factor weighs against Defendant.
C. DEFENDANT’S ASSERTION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
This factor is afforded considerable significance in the speedy trial analysis.13 “A
defendant’s failure to assert the right to a speedy trial ‘will make it difficult for a defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial.’”14
Defendant has not asserted his right to a speedy trial at all in either of these matters until
the filing of this motion. The UAD specifically states that “[t]he written notice and request for
final disposition … shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the Commissioner of Correction …
who shall promptly forward it together with the Certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official
and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.”15 “The right to dismissal
vests only where the ‘prosecutor is actually aware of the request and fails to act.’”16
Here, Defendant has offered no evidence of an effort to adhere to the requirements
outlined in the UAD. Defendant failed to request a speedy trial, and he provided no notice to the
prosecutor. However, the Defendant requested the transfer of the 2005 motor vehicle charges
when he appeared at the Justice of the Peace Court on May 10, 2005, and therefore he could not
participate in the matter until he was provided an arraignment date. The Defendant should not be
forced to remind the State to prosecute him. Thus, even though Defendant failed to assert his
right to a speedy trial with regard to the 2005 motor vehicle charges, this factor weighs against
the State for failing to prosecute the matter for an extraordinary amount of time.
13
Sells, 2013 WL 1654317, at *3.
14
Id. (quoting Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 275).
15
11 Del. C. § 2542(b).
16
State v. Farrow, 2005 WL 1653992 (Del. Super. June 3, 2005)(quoting Synopsis to H.B. No. 108 of the 131st
General Assembly, 63 Del. Laws Ch. 32).
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With respect to the 2010 assault charge, Defendant neither exercised his right nor actively
participated in the handling of the case. Even in his motion to dismiss, Defendant offers no
argument that he exercised his right to a speedy trial. Thus, Defendant has ultimately failed to
show that he has made any effort, with the exception of this motion, to assert his right to a
speedy trial. The Court therefore finds that this factor weighs heavily against Defendant in the
2010 assault charge.
D. PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT AS A RESULT OF THE DELAY
“Trial courts should consider the prejudice factor ‘in light of three of defendants’
interests that the speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.’”17 Defendant only raises the third interest in his
motion; the Court shall address all three.
First, preventing excessive pretrial incarceration. In this matter, Defendant was not
incarcerated in Delaware for the 2005 motor vehicle violations or for the 2010 assault charge.
Second, the anxiety of the accused pending a trial. “[E]ven if an accused is not
incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged … by living under a cloud of anxiety.”18
Defendant does not allege that he suffered from anxiety as a result of the delay of his trial, but
the Court finds that he was “presumptively prejudiced” in this matter.19
Finally, the Court must determine if Defendant’s defense has been impaired as a result of
the delay. Defendant alleges that the memories of individuals associated with the matter, along
with the memory of Defendant himself, are likely to have faded since the date of Defendant’s
17
Sells, 2013 WL 1654317 at *4 (quoting Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 276).
18
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
19
Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at *277.
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arrest. Defendant also alleges that certain documents needed for trial, including his proof of
insurance, may not be obtainable due to the delay. The Court finds, with regard to the 2005
motor vehicle charges, that prejudice has occurred against Defendant with respect to his ability
to obtain documents necessary for trial, but that Defendant could have obtained such documents
prior to his scheduled appearances in front of the Court, and therefore the prejudice in that regard
is self-induced. The Court does find, however, that due to the time lapse of nine years between
Defendant’s arrest and this motion, in particular the first five years which are in no way
attributable to the Defendant, it is likely that memories of involved parties have faded, officers
involved in the matters may not be members of the force or easily subpoenaed to testify, and thus
Defendant may be prejudiced in his ability to put forth a proper defense. This factor weighs in
favor of Defendant with regard to the 2005 motor vehicle charges.
With respect to the 2010 assault charge, it is likely that the memories of witnesses and
officers have faded in the four years since Defendant’s scheduled trial date, which can inhibit
Defendant’s ability to properly defend the charge. This factor, therefore, weighs in Defendant’s
favor.
E. BALANCING THE FACTORS
The balancing of the four factors weighs in favor of Defendant’s contention that his right
to a speedy trial has been violated with regard to the 2005 motor vehicle charges, as every factor
weighed in Defendant’s favor. With regard to the 2010 assault charge, only the prejudice to the
defense factor weighed in Defendant’s favor. Defendant failed to appear at his scheduled trial,
and failed to notify the State that he wished to assert his right to a speedy trial, which is a
necessary requirement for establishing a speedy trial violation. Defendant did not include any
evidence supporting the notion that he has filed the proper documentation to demand a speedy
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trial, and, in fact, Defendant does not even address this factor in his motion. Therefore, the
balancing of the four factors weighs against Defendant with regard to the 2010 assault charge.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 15th day of May, 2014, that Defendant’s
motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on the 2005 motor vehicle charges is GRANTED.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on the 2010 assault charge is DENIED.
The Honorable Carl C. Danberg,
Judge
cc: Juanette West, Judicial Case Management Supervisor
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