State v. Brooks

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
)
v. ) I.D. No. 2011001029
)
TYRONE BROOKS, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: May 23, 2022
Decided: June 21, 2022
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Defendant Tyrone Brooks pleaded guilty to one count of Possession of a
Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”). He now claims his lawyer (“Defense
Counsel”) forced him to do so. The Court finds that Brooks’s guilty plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, his Rule 61 motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
A. The Arrest and Charges
Wilmington police stopped Brooks on suspicion of a window tint violation.
He was arrested after he told the officers that he had been evading a warrant. A car
search followed and surfaced a gun from underneath the driver’s seat.
Charged as a person prohibited, Brooks faced enhanced penalties. A PFBPP
conviction would be his fourth felony conviction. And two of his prior convictions
were “violent” felony convictions. 1 So Brooks not only was exposed to a mandatory
10-year sentence for PFBPP, 2 but also to a habitual offender term of 15-to-life.3
It appears that the State made an early 10-year plea offer to Brooks. But the
State rescinded its offer when Brooks filed a suppression motion.
B. The Suppression Motion
In an effort to link Brooks directly to the handgun under the driver’s seat, the
police obtained Brooks’s DNA. His DNA matched DNA found on the gun. Brooks
moved to suppress this evidence because, according to him, the police obtained
neither his consent nor a warrant to obtain DNA for comparison. As support for
Brooks’s position, the defense attached a “DNA search authorization form” to his
suppression motion that did not contain his signature (the “Defendant’s Form”).4
This is where things got interesting.
The State responded to the suppression motion by calling Brooks’s version of
the consent form a fake document. The State (i) attached to its opposition brief a
1
In addition to five misdemeanors, Brooks previously was convicted of felony drug
possession, Assault First Degree (a lesser offense of the indicted charge of
Attempted Murder First Degree), and PFBPP. The Assault First and PFBPP
convictions are classified by statute as violent felonies. See 11 Del. C. § 4201(c)
(2015). The drug offense had been classified as a violent felony, but was removed
from the statutory list before Brooks committed the instant PFBPP. See generally
Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537, 540 & n.12 (Del. 2017).
2
See 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(c) (2021).
3
See id. § 4214(a) (2018); see also id. § 4205(b)(3) (2003).
4
See Ex. A to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress (hereinafter “Defendant’s Form”).
2
DNA search authorization form that did contain Brooks’s signature (the “State’s
Form” and together with the Defendant’s Form, the “DNA Forms”);5 (ii) averred
that the State’s Form was the DNA Form produced to Brooks in discovery; and (iii)
observed cosmetic and linguistic irregularities in the Defendant’s Form that, in the
State’s view, evinced an effort by the defense to alter the State’s Form. 6
C. The Suppression Hearing
The DNA Forms comprised the first—and ultimately, the only—topic of
Brooks’s suppression hearing. Before the hearing began, Defense Counsel
represented that the Defendant’s Form was in Brooks’s client file, but that he could
5
See Ex. A to State’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress (hereinafter “State’s Form”).
The State also attached handwriting exemplars from other documents Brooks signed
tending to show that Brooks’s signature on the State’s Form was not forged. See
Exs. B–C to id.
6
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 6 n.1, 13–15. For example, the Defendant’s Form (i) misspells
words or spells them using symbols, misplaced capitalization, or letters from
different languages or alphabets; (ii) is spaced inconsistently; (iii) omits signature
lines; and (iv) blurs or overlaps sentences. In many ways, the Defendant’s Form
resembles a poorly converted PDF-to-Word file.
Compare State’s Form:
I have been informed [] that I have the right to refuse the Police to search
my person . . . . That I do not have to let the Police search my person . . . .
I do hereby waive these rights and authorize [signature of officer] of the
Wilmington Department of Police, to conduct a complete and thorough
search . . . . This written permission is . . . to the above named officer . . . .
with Defendant’s Form:
I froå684 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Del. 1996).
42
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
43
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (internal quotation marks
omitted). E.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (describing innocence cases
as “extremely rare”); accord Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1122–23 (Del. 2021).
44
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). See Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53,
60 n.9 (Del. 1988) (noting that Delaware law’s interest in “the finality of guilty
pleas” is “fundamental” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
45
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
46
Hill v. Lockhart, 472 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 72 (2002).
11
that there be a definitive end to the litigable aspect of the criminal process.”48
Accordingly, the bases for ex post guilty plea challenges are “extremely narrow[.]”49
The narrowed grounds for post-sentence attacks on guilty pleas reflect
doctrines presuming the validity of convictions. “Rule 61 is intended to correct
errors in the trial process, not to allow defendants unlimited opportunities to
relitigate their convictions.”50 To deter abusive collateral litigation, the standards
and presumptions “adopted” under post-conviction rules purposefully have made
“winning [collateral] relief difficult[.]”51 For example, a defendant who seeks to
invalidate a conviction must contend with a “presumption of regularity.” 52 “The
presumption of regularity attaches to all final judgments . . . and implies those
judgments have been done rightly until contrary evidence appears.”53 Contrary
evidence will not be credited if it is based on unsupported or contradicted allegations:
On collateral attack, a silent record supports the judgment; the state receives
the presumption of regularity and all reasonable inferences . . . . [G]aps and
ambiguities in the record [do not] count against the state. Judgments are
presumed valid . . . and one who seeks collateral relief bears a heavy burden.54
48
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 745 (Del. 1990).
49
Jackson v. State, 654 A.2d 829, 832 n.2 (Del. 1995).
50
Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013).
51
Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1526 (2022).
52
E.g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992); accord Xenidis v. State, 2020 WL
1274624, at *2 (Del. Mar. 17, 2020).
53
Xenidis, 2020 WL 1274624, at *2.
54
Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Accord
Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1151 (3d Cir. 1996).
12
Accordingly, Rule 61 shifts to the defendant the burden of demonstrating that his
plea lacks a “sufficient factual and legal basis” that otherwise will be presumed.55
ANALYSIS
A Rule 61 analysis proceeds in two steps. First, the Court must determine
whether the motion is procedurally barred. 56 If it is not barred, the Court next
reviews the motion’s merits on a claim-by-claim basis.57 As explained below, part
of Brooks’s motion is procedurally barred and the rest of it fails on the merits.
A. Part of Brooks’s motion is procedurally barred.
Rule 61 is nothing “other than a procedural device[.]”58 As a result, there are
“several” procedural “limitations on the availability of postconviction relief.”59 Rule
61 contains four procedural bars that, if applicable, preclude review of all or part of
the defendant’s motion.60 Rule 61 bars claims that are untimely,61 successive,62
defaulted,63 or formerly adjudicated. 64
55
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1). See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 2007 WL 4965637,
at *1–2 (Del. Nov. 6, 2007).
56
E.g., Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
57
E.g., State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331, 342 n.15 (Del. 2017).
58
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1991).
59
Ploof, 75 A.3d at 820.
60
See generally Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)–(4).
61
Id. R. 61(i)(1).
62
Id. R. 61(i)(2).
63
Id. R. 61(i)(3).
64
Id. R. 61(i)(4).
13
The Plea Claims are not procedurally barred. These Claims are timely, are
not successive, and were not previously adjudicated. They also are not defaulted
because they allege ineffective assistance of counsel, which “generally cannot be
raised at trial or on direct appeal.” 65
The Suppression Claims, however, are barred as defaulted. This conclusion
follows from the Court’s discussion of the Plea Claims. So the Court will defer its
procedural analysis of the Suppression Claims for now.66
B. The Plea Claims fail to state a claim for post-conviction relief.
Brooks does not maintain his innocence. He seeks instead to invalidate his
guilty plea. But Brooks’s plea must be enforced if his plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered. It was. Brooks was required to show otherwise. He did not.
1. Brooks bears the burden of demonstrating that his plea is invalid.
To state a plea-based ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must
demonstrate prejudice: 67 “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.” 68 “A
65
Malloy v. State, 2011 WL 1135107, at *2 (Del. Mar. 28, 2011). See, e.g., Green
v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020) (stating general rule and principles).
66
See infra Analysis § C.
67
See generally Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Because the
Plea Claims fail for lack of prejudice, the Court need not determine whether Defense
Counsel performed deficiently. See, e.g., Ruffin v. State, 2019 WL 719038, at *2
(Del. Feb. 19, 2019).
68
Grosvenor v. State, 849 A.2d 33, 35 (Del. 2004).
14
reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome . . . .”69 "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial[,] not just
conceivable.”70 Bare allegations of prejudice will not suffice. 71 Nor will allegations
that do not “pertain[] to the validity of the plea[.]” 72 Instead, the defendant “must
make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them[.]”73
Pleading guilty is one of the defendant’s “autonomy interests.”74 Because its
“consequences . . . are the defendant’s alone,” the decision to plead guilty is “too
important to be made by anyone else.”75 Autonomous choices, however, “may
sometimes make the defendant worse off than if defense counsel had the final
say[.]”76 Even so, a defendant “cannot shift responsibility to his trial counsel for
decisions in which he played a major role.” 77 The Court “cannot disregard” the
defendant’s choices because his choices may, in turn, “substantially influence
counsel’s choices.”78 What the defendant commands, he must also obey.
69
Green, 238 A.3d at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70
Swan v. State, 248 A.3d 839, 859 (Del. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71
See, e.g., Purnell v. State, 106 A.3d 337, 342 (Del. 2014).
72
MacDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064, 1074 (Del. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996).
74
Reed v. State, 258 A.3d 807, 822 (Del. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75
Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 842 (Del. 2009). Accord Taylor v. State, 213 A.3d
560, 568 (Del. 2019); see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
76
Taylor v. State, 28 A.3d 399, 406 (Del. 2011).
77
Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1021 (Del. 2017).
78
Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1376 (Del. 1989).
15
A guilty plea will be enforced if it was knowingly and voluntarily entered.79
The defendant bears the burden of establishing that “his plea was made either
involuntarily or under misapprehension or mistake as to his legal rights.”80 In
shouldering that burden, two “formidable barrier[s]” stand in the defendant’s path.81
First, the defendant will be bound by his plea colloquy statements, which are
“presumed to be truthful.”82 And second, “[i]n the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary,” the defendant will be bound by his answers in his Truth-
in-Sentencing forms. 83 In all this, there is a “near-presumption” of validity that
operates “against granting” a post-sentence motion attacking a guilty plea.84 “[I]n
acting as an incentive to think through a guilty plea before sentence is imposed,” a
near-presumption of validity “tends to separate meritorious second thoughts” from
“sour grapes over a sentence once pronounced.”85
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the Plea Claims.
79
See, e.g., Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 505 (Del. 1969).
80
Raison v. State, 469 A.2d 424, 425 (Del. 1983).
81
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
82
Id.83
Scarborough v. State, 938 A.2d 644, 651 (Del. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
84
Vonn, 535 U.S. at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
Id. See also State v. Owens, 2021 WL 6058520, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21,
2021) (“Calibrated to screen for the wrongfully convicted, Rule 61 should not be
used to launch post hoc strikes on issues inessential to a judgment of guilt.”).
16
2. Brooks’s plea was knowing and voluntary.
a. Defense Counsel did not “coerce” Brooks into pleading guilty.
Brooks principally claims that Defense Counsel was ineffective because he
“coerced” him into pleading guilty, which Brooks now says he “did not want” to do.
The Court, however, will not “upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from
a defendant” of his “expressed preferences[,]” but will “look to contemporaneous
evidence” instead.86 Contemporaneous evidence from Brooks’s plea colloquy and
TIS Form undermines his belated assertion that he did not want to plead guilty.
To begin, Brooks’s colloquy shows that he knowingly and voluntarily pleaded
guilty. Brooks said he (i) reviewed the plea agreement with Defense Counsel; (ii)
understood all his trial rights; (iii) knew he would waive his trial rights by pleading
guilty; (iv) knew he was pleading guilty to PFBPP; (v) knew he would receive a 10-
year prison sentence; (vi) knew he could have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty;
and (vii) knew his plea would forsake all his pre-plea challenges (e.g., to the DNA
issue). Brooks does not offer a reason to think any of these statements are untrue.
Brooks’s TIS Form reinforces his colloquy. There, Brooks affirmed that he
(i) reviewed the TIS Form with Defense Counsel; (ii) understood all its questions;
(iii) understood all his rights; (iv) decided freely and voluntarily to plead guilty; and
86
Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017).
17
(v) was not threatened or forced by anyone, including Defense Counsel, to plead
guilty. Pitched against his TIS Form, Brooks’s “coercion” allegation rings hollow.
Brooks’s colloquy and TIS Form control in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. On this record, Brooks’s conclusory allegation
that he “did not want to plead guilty” is neither clear nor convincing.
Defense Counsel intended to pursue the suppression hearing, advised Brooks
that his motion was viable, and emphasized that the Court had not ruled on the
authenticity of the DNA Forms. Brooks saw things differently. He criticized
Defense Counsel for submitting the Defendant’s Form, found the motion too risky,
and dropped the hearing in favor of reinitiating plea negotiations. There is nothing
in the record suggesting that Defense Counsel ever forced Brooks to do anything.
Brooks, in his autonomy, was entitled to prefer a plea over his suppression
motion. For one reason or another, he may have now come to regret that decision.
But he cannot now shift to Defense Counsel any miscalculation of litigation risks
involved in his suppression motion when those risks were not Defense Counsel’s
risks in the first place.87 To the extent Brooks suffered any “prejudice” from
pleading guilty, he brought it on himself. Defense Counsel was not ineffective.
To be sure, Brooks confronted a Hobson’s choice: plead guilty to a 10-year
prison sentence or chance a prison sentence of anywhere from 15 years to life. Seen
87
See Cabrera, 173 A.3d at 1021; Shockley, 565 A.2d at 1376.
18
this way, Brooks probably did feel “coerced” into pleading guilty. But that
“coercion” was not created or exerted by Defense Counsel and so is not the kind of
improper pressure Rule 61 remedies. Brooks’s dilemma was a product of statutory
law, minimum mandatory sentencing, Fourth Amendment precedent, the State’s
absolute prosecutorial discretion, and perhaps most importantly, Brooks’s own
criminal history and behavior. 88
Defense Counsel helped release Brooks from the traps Brooks set for himself.
Brooks ignored a favorable plea offer only to base a suppression motion on a
document of questionable legitimacy. He did withdraw the motion and disavow the
Defendant’s Form, but his hearing conduct made him a weak candidate for the
State’s sympathies. Yet, Defense Counsel still managed to persuade the State to
reoffer the 10-year deal Brooks’s suppression motion took off the table. That effort
rescued Brooks from the possibility of a lifelong prison sentence. Although a decade
in jail is not ideal, Brooks’s “decision to plead guilty as a means to avoid additional
prison time does not amount to ‘coercion.’” 89 The “coercion” allegation fails.
88
Cf. Dolby v. State, 2012 WL 686027, at *1 (Del. Mar. 2, 2012) (defining plea
coercion as “threat[s] to take action that are not legally authorized”).
89
Edwards v. State, 2007 WL 4374237, at *1 (Del. Dec. 17, 2008).
19
b. Defense Counsel did not withhold Brooks’s “full discovery.”
Brooks alternatively alleges that his plea is invalid because Trial Counsel
ineffectively withheld his “full discovery”—i.e., the State’s Form—until the
suppression hearing—i.e., the day he pleaded guilty. This allegation fares no better.
For one thing, Brooks’s complaint is refuted by the record. As noted above,
Brooks eventually admitted that he discussed the State’s Form with Defense Counsel
four days before the hearing. 90 The Court need not accept contradicted post-
conviction allegations. 91
For another, Brooks does not allege that he would not have pleaded guilty if
he had learned of the State’s Form “earlier” than four days before the hearing. To
the contrary, Brooks insisted that he would have pleaded faster if he knew about the
90
Compare, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 11:16, 12:14, 18:10–11 (Brooks claims he had “never
seen” the State’s Form until the hearing), with id. at 17:23 (Brooks states that he
learned of the State’s Form “four days ago”), and id. at 12:7–8 (Brooks equivocates
that a physical version the State’s Form was not “sent” to him, but that he reviewed
an electronic “copy” during his pre-suppression meeting with Defense Counsel).
91
See, e.g., Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74 (On collateral attack, a “presentation of
conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to . . . dismissal[.]”); State
v. Melendez, 2003 WL 23095688, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003) (“Melendez’s
claims might warrant [relief] if [the record] did not wholly contradict . . . his Rule
61 motion.”), aff’d, 2004 WL 1965650 (Del. Aug. 25, 2004); State v. Guess, 2014
WL 3510017, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014) (same); State v. Jones, 2008 WL
4173816, at *23 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2008) (same); see also Owens, 2021 WL
6058520, at *14–15 & n.134 (collecting additional authority in denying Rule 61
evidentiary hearing that would have been based on contradicted allegations).
20
State’s Form earlier.92 No harm, no foul: Brooks ultimately received the 10-year
offer that was proposed pre-suppression. Based on Brooks’s own representations,
then, any delay did not affect, let alone prejudice, his decision to plead guilty. The
“discovery” allegation fails.
In sum, Trial Counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, the Plea Claims fail.
C. The Suppression Claims are waived and barred.
Finally, the Court considers the Suppression Claims. These Claims do not
allege ineffective assistance. They simply seek to revive Brooks’s suppression
motion. But Brooks waived his suppression challenges by aborting his hearing and
then knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty.93 By consequence, the Suppression
Claims are now subject to procedural default under Rule 61.94
Rule 61 bars claims that could have been raised during a defendant’s direct
proceedings, but were not. 95 Here, Brooks could have pursued the Suppression
Claims instead of pleading guilty. The Court explained this to him. 96 But he pleaded
guilty anyway. That choice was binding then and it remains binding now.
92
E.g., Hr’g Tr. at 10:14, 11:18–21 (Brooks says that, had he known about the State’s
Form earlier, he “would have just took the plea” instead of moving to suppress).
93
E.g., Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004); Miller v. State,
840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003).
94
See Blackwell v. State, 736 A.2d 971, 973 (Del. 1999).
95
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
96
Hr’g Tr. at 14:22–15:7.
21
Moreover, to the extent Brooks implies that the Suppression Claims negate
the voluntariness of his plea, Brooks could have said so on direct appeal. 97 He did
not. In fact, he did not appeal at all. Rule 61, however, “is not designed as a
substitute for direct appeal.”98 So the Court will not treat it that way.
The Suppression Claims are barred unless an exception applies. None does.
Under Rule 61(i)(3), a procedural default may be excused if the defendant shows
“cause” for the default and “prejudice” resulting from the cause. 99 Brooks alleges
neither. True, ineffective assistance of counsel can establish cause for a procedural
default.100 But the Suppression Claims do not allege ineffective assistance. Even if
they did, “[a]ttorney error [that] falls short of ineffective assistance of counsel does
not constitute cause for relief from a procedural default.”101 As explained already,
Defense Counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, the Suppression Claims are
barred without exception.
97
See, e.g., Kalil v. State, 2014 WL 2568029, at *3 (Del. June 5, 2014).
98
Flamer, 585 A.2d at 745.
99
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(A)–(B). See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 88–89 (1977). There also are exceptions for innocence and retroactive rules.
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2), (i)(5). Brooks does not invoke them.
100
See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 11–13 (2012).
101
Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 475 (Del. 2000). See also Somerville, 684 A.2d
at 1237 (finding that Rule 61(i)(3)(A)’s cause standard is higher than the cause
standard governing a pre-sentence Rule 32(d) motion to withdraw a plea).
22
CONCLUSION
Brooks knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. That decision waived and
defaulted his remaining challenges. Accordingly, his Rule 61 motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Charles E. Butler, Resident Judge
23