Smith v. State of Delaware

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KAMELA SMITH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF ) C.A. No. N19C-01-186 CLS
CORRECTIONS, DELAWARE )
BUREAU OF PRISONS, and )
DELORES J. BAYLOR )
WOMEN’S CORRECTIONAL )
INSTITUTION, )
Defendants.
Date Submitted: March 18, 2021
Date Decided: May 25, 2021
Upon Defendant State of Delaware’s Motion for Summary Judgment
GRANTED.
ORDER
Christian G. Heesters, Esquire, Schuster Jachetti, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorney for Plaintiff Kamela Smith.
Kenneth L. Wan, Esquire, Anna E. Currier, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General,
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant State of
Delaware.
SCOTT, J.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendant State of Delaware’s (the “State”) Motion for
Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). At this juncture, the question is whether
Plaintiff Kamela Smith’s (“Ms. Smith”) claims are barred by either sovereign
immunity or the State Tort Claims Act.
After careful consideration of the State’s Motion, Ms. Smith’s Response, and
Delaware law, the State’s Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On January 19, 2017, Ms. Smith was injured by a metal bathroom stall door
at the Delores J. Baylor Women’s Correctional Institution (“Baylor”) where she
performed voluntary ministerial services for the Seeds of Greatness Church
(“Church”).1 Ms. Smith claims that the State had a contract with the Church of which
Ms. Smith was a third-party beneficiary.2
On January 16, 2019, Ms. Smith filed the Complaint. Through it, Ms. Smith
alleges the following claims: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Negligence; (3) Gross
Negligence; (4) and Wanton Negligence.
On February 22, 2019, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss which this Court
subsequently denied. On February 16, 2021, after engaging in discovery, the State
1
The State concedes as such in their Answer. See D.I. 24.
2
No contract has been produced to show the existence of a relationship between
Baylor and the Church.
1
filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). Attached to the
Motion, the State includes an affidavit from Debra Lawhead, the director of the State
of Delaware Insurance Coverage Office, that states there is no insurance coverage
for this event.3 On March 18, 2021, Ms. Smith filed her Response to the State’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule 56, summary judgment is proper
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.4 Summary judgment will not be granted if material facts
are in dispute or if “it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts to
clarify the application of the law to the circumstances.”5 This Court considers all of
the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.6
In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden
of showing that there are no material issues of fact.7 If the moving party makes this
showing, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there are
material issues of fact.8
3
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2.
4
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
5
Infante v. Horizon Servs., Inc., 2019 WL 3992101, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 23,
2019).
6
Id.7
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
8
Id. at 681.
2
PARTIES’ ASSERTIONS
The State, in their Motion, argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
the Delaware Tort Claims Act bars recovery because no statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity exists, there is no insurance coverage that would constitute a
waiver, and no contract that would constitute a waiver of immunity exists.
Ms. Smith, in her Response, claims that sovereign immunity does not apply
here due to 10 Del. C. § 4012(2) and that material facts exist which prevent the Court
from granting summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
A. Sovereign Immunity
A fundamental premise of our systems of law and government is that the State,
its agencies and its employees, acting in their official capacities, are immune from
civil liability.9 The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the State may not
be sued without its consent.10 Such immunity may only be limited or waived by act
of the General Assembly.11 Unless the State has waived sovereign immunity, any
claims against the State and/or its agencies are barred without further inquiry.12 In
9
U.S. Const. Amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.”).
10
Doe v. Cates, 499 A.2d 1175, 1176 (Del. 1985).
11
Id. See Del. Const. art. I, § 9 (“Suits may be brought against the State, according
to such regulations as shall be made by law.”).
12
Boyer v. Garvin, 2020 WL 532747, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2020).
3
order to overcome the State's sovereign immunity: (1) the State must waive
immunity; and (2) the STCA must not otherwise bar the action.13 There are two
means by which the State, through the General Assembly, may waive immunity: (1)
by procuring insurance coverage under 18 Del. C. § 6511 for claims cited in the
complaint;14 or (2) by statute which expressly waives immunity.15
Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 6511, sovereign immunity has not been waived in
this matter because the claims against the State are not covered by the state insurance
coverage program, whether by commercially procured insurance, or by self-
insurance.16 The affidavit of Debra Lawhead, director of the State of Delaware
Insurance Coverage Office, adequately demonstrates that the State has not procured
insurance coverage for the risks implicated by Plaintiff's claims.17 Ms. Lawhead
avers that she reviewed Plaintiff's complaint and that neither the State of Delaware
or the Department of Correction has not purchased any insurance that would be
applicable to the circumstances and events alleged in the Complaint.18
13
Id. at 1176–77.
14
Id. at 1180.
15
Id. at 1176; J.L. v. Barnes, 33 A.3d 902, 913 (Del. Super. 2011); Janowski v.
Div. of State Police Dep't of Safety & Homeland Security, 2009 WL 537051 (Del.
Super. Feb. 27, 2009).
16
Parker, 2012 WL 1536934, at *2; Barnes, 33 A.3d at 913.
17
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2.
18
Id.4
Since there is no insurance that would be applicable to the circumstances and
events alleged in the Complaint, there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity
pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 6511. Moreover, there is no statute that expressly waives
sovereign immunity for the Ms. Smith’s claims. Thus, “sovereign immunity exists
and no further analysis is necessary.”19 Accordingly, Ms. Smith’s claim is barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and summary judgment is appropriate.
B. Ms. Smith’s Argument
In her Response to the State’s Motion, Ms. Smith claims that 10 Del. C. §
4012(2) provides an exception to the State’s defense of sovereign immunity.
Contrary to Ms. Smith’s assertion, 10 Del. C. § 4012 of the State Tort Claims
Act creates several limited exceptions to local government immunity. The predicate
to those exceptions, however, is that a local government employee committed a
negligent act or omission. Negligent conduct under § 4012 cannot act as a sufficient
predicate to entitle a plaintiff to defeat the state government’s sovereign immunity
defense. In other words, § 4012 does not apply to Ms. Smith’s claim against the State
and only applies towards municipal and county tort claims.
Instead, 10 Del. C. Section 4001 is applicable here. However, rather than
engaging in a lengthy discussion of Section 4001, the Court must consider 18 Del.
19Parker, 2012 WL 1536934, at *2; Boyer v. Garvin, 2020 WL 532747, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2020).
5
C. Section 6511. Section 4001 and Section 6511 must be read in pari materia.20 The
Delaware Supreme Court has held that insurance coverage must also exist in order
to make a claim under § 4001.21 Accordingly, since there is no insurance coverage,
Ms. Smith cannot demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity regarding her claims.
Also noteworthy here, while the state agencies are the proper parties, Delores
J. Baylor Women’s Correctional Institution building is not. For the purpose of
clarity, summary judgment is granted for each defendant.
CONCLUSION
Based on the facts of this case and Delaware law, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity under 10 Del. C. § 4001 operates to bar Ms. Smith’s claims against the
State of Delaware. For the foregoing reasons, the State of Delaware’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Calvin L. Scott
The Honorable Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
20
Tomei v. Sharp, 902 A.2d 757, 770 (Del. Super. 2006); Watson v. Burgan, 610
A.2d 1364, 1368 (Del. 1992).
21
Doe, 499 A.2d at 1181.
6