State of Delaware v. Royal.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
)
)
v. )
) ID No. 88005990DI
)
EDWARD ROYAL )
)
Defendant. )
)
)
)
Submitted:October 8, 2015
Decided:January 15, 2016
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief, DENIED.
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, MOOT.
Kathleen M. Jennings, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Carvel State
Building, 820 N. French Street, 7th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801
Edward Royal, pro se,SBI No. 00212232, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock
Road, Smyrna, DE 199777
BRADY, J.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Before the Court is a Motion for Postconviction Relief filed pursuant to Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) and Motion for Appointment of Counsel filed by Edward Royal
(“Royal”, “Defendant”) onOctober 8, 2015. 1The Defendant was convicted on March 1,
1989,following a jury trial, of charges of Burglary in the Second Degree, Kidnapping in the First
Degree and Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree. The charges arose from the rape of
a young woman in the hallway of her home.
Immediately prior to trial, the Court held a hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence based on claims the search warrant executed by police lacked probable cause and did
not properly support a night time search. The Motion was denied, and trial commenced. 2
Following the Defendant’s conviction, the Court ordered a presentence investigation.
While pending sentencing, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Judgment of Acquittaland New
Trial, which included a claim that “Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel.” 3Trial
counsel then filed a Motion to Withdraw. 4 The Court granted the motion and new counsel was
appointed by the Court for “post-conviction purposes and sentencing.” 5
On November 22, 1989, the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was granted as to the
charge of Kidnapping in the First Degree. 6 The Motion for New Trial was denied. 7
1
Def.’s Mot. forPostconviction Relief, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 45 (Oct. 8, 2015); Def.’s Mot.
for Appointment of Counsel, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 46 (Oct. 8, 2015).
2
Order, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 15 (Feb. 22, 1989).
3
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 19 (March 30,
1989).
4
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI (April 10, 1989).
5
Order, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 23 (Nov. 22, 1989) (granting Motion for Appointment of
Counsel); see also Order, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 24 (Dec. 4, 1989) (appointing counsel).
6
Order, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 22 (Nov. 22, 1989).
7
Order, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 22 (Nov. 22, 1989).
2
The Defendant was sentenced on January 26, 1990 to 10 years incarceration for the
charge of Burglary in the Second Degree, and received a life sentence for the charge of Unlawful
Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree.
Counsel who had been appointed to handle post-conviction matters filed an appeal. 8 On
appeal, the only issue raised was a claim that the trial court should not have permitted a
fingerprint expert to express an opinion about the age of Defendant’s fingerprint, found at the
scene of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on February 4, 1992. 9
The next entry in the docket is in 2001, which documents a letter to the trial judge from
the Defendant, dated February 11, 2001, in which the Defendant writes “I’m writing today fully
admitting completely to my offenses that I have committed”, expresses remorse for the impact
his crime had on the victim, and seeks the trial judge’s support in a commutation application.10
Subsequently, in June and October, 2001, the Defendant writes again regarding his application
for commutation. 11
In November, 2003, a letter was received by the Court, addressed to Andrew Rosen, an
Assistant Public Defender, thanking him for his efforts on Defendant’s behalf and “looking
forward to working with you and reactivate and proceed at some time in the near future.” 12 The
envelope is addressed to Mr. Rosen at the New Castle County Courthouse address. It is unclear
if it was ever forwarded to Mr. Rosen or any judicial officer.
On June 8, 2015, the Court received a “Notice of Service” sent by the Defendant
reflecting the Defendant had served a request for “copy of discovery Super.Ct.Crim. Rule 16”
8
Notice of Appeal, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 29 (Feb. 13, 1990).
9
Mandate Affirmed, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 38 (March 4, 1992).
10
Def.’s Letter, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 39 (Feb. 21, 2001).
11
Def.’s Letter, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 41 (June 27, 2001); see also Def.’s Letter, State v.
Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 42 (Oct. 18, 2001).
12
Def.’s Letter, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 43 (Dec. 9, 2003).
3
from a “Deputy Attorney General.” 13 On August 7, 2015, a second “Notice of Service” was
received by the Court reflecting that a similar request was again served.
On October 8, 2015, the Defendant filed a pro seMotion for Post-Conviction Relief,
Memorandum of Law and Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 14
In his Motion, Defendant raises 4 issues:
1) The search warrant was defective on several grounds – that there was no probable
cause, that it was illegally procured, that the Magistrate was not neutral and impartial, and that
the warrant did not legally support a nighttime search.
2) That there was insufficient evidence to support a finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the Defendant was guilty of the offenses charged.
3) The Superior Court’s denial of the Motion to Suppress was arbitrary, violated due
process, and was contrary to Mason. 15
4) The fingerprint expert lacked scientific data to support his testimony and therefore
it was error to allow that testimony.
Notably, the Defendant makes no claim that his trial attorney was ineffective in any way.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
Before addressing the merits of Defendant’s claims, the Court must apply the procedural
bars set forth in Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). 16 Rule 61, provides that the Court must
reject a motion for postconviction relief if it is procedurally barred. That Rule provides that a
motion is procedurally barred if the motion is untimely, repetitive, a procedural default exists, or
13
Def.’s Letter, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 44 (June 11, 2015).
14
Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 45 (Oct. 8, 2015)
15
Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242 (Del. 1987).
16
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
4
the claim has been formerly adjudicated. 17Rule 61(i)(1) provides that a motion for
postconviction relief is time barred when it is filed more than one year after the conviction has
become final or one year after a retroactively applied right has been newly recognized by the
United States Supreme Court or by the Delaware Supreme Court. 18 Rule 61(i)(3) bars
consideration of any claim “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the conviction” unless the
petitioner can show “cause for relief from the procedural default” and “prejudice from violation
of the movant’s rights.” 19 Rule 61(i)(4) provides that any claim that has been adjudicated “in the
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding,
or in a federal habeas corpus proceedings” is barred “unless reconsideration of the claim is
warranted in the interest of justice.” 20
If a procedural bar exists, the Court will not consider the merits of Defendant’s
postconviction claim unless Defendant can show that the exception found in Rule 61(i)(5)
applies. 21 Rule 61(i)(5) provides that the procedural bars can be overcome if Defendant makes
out a “colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation
that undermines the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings
leading to the judgment of conviction.” 22
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendant acknowledges procedural bars are present in this case that could prevent the
Court from hearing his claims. Defendant however requests that this Court allow review “in the
aspect of actual innocence exception” and “miscarriage of justice in relation to Constitutional
17
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
18
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
19
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
20
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
21
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
22
Id.5
Violations.” 23 The rule in effect at the time Defendant filed his Motion for Postconviction relief
no longer contains an exception based on a miscarriage of justice in relation to constitutional
violations. 24Rather, the exception requires Defendant to plead with particularity that a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive, applies to Defendant’s case and renders the conviction
invalid. 25 Defendant has failed to so plead.
Defendant’s argument that the Court should hear the matter, despite any procedural
bars,based on a claim of actual innocence is also without merit.Not only does Defendant fail to
plead facts to support such a finding, Defendant wrote a letter to the trial judge, dated February
11, 2001, in which the Defendant writes “I’m writing today fully admitting completely to my
offenses that I have committed”, expresses remorse for the impact his crime had on the victims,
and seeks the trial judge’s support in a commutation application. 26There is no basis whatsoever
to permit the Court to excuse the time barred claims on this ground.
Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction relief is barred under Rule 61(i)(1).The instant
motion was filed more than one year after Defendant’s conviction became final. Defendant has
not asserted a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of
conviction became final. Defendant’s conviction became final thirty days after the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.27 The instant motion was not filed until 23 years after
the conviction became final, nearly a quarter century later. 28Subsection (2)(i) and (2)(ii) of
section (d) to Rule 61state that if the motion is not filed within the time limits, the movant must
23
Def.’s Mot. forPostconviction Relief, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 45 (Oct. 8, 2015).
24
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
25
Seeid.
26
Def.’s Letter, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 39 (Feb. 21, 2001).
27
Mandate, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 38 (March 4, 1992).
28
Def.’s Mot. forPostconviction Relief, State v. Royal, No. 88005990DI, Docket No. 45 (Oct. 8, 2015).
6
plead new evidence exists or that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases,
applies to the movant’s case and renders the conviction invalid. 29
Defendant’s motion is also procedurally barred on other grounds. To the extent that
Defendant seeks to relitigate the question ofwhether the expert testimony should have been
admitted, it is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) as formerly adjudicated. 30 Pursuant to
Rule 61(i)(3), Defendant’s remaining claims: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to
support his conviction; and (2) whether the search warrant was valid, are procedurally barred as
waived because he failed to raise these issues when hesought review by the Delaware Supreme
Court on appeal.
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY
DISMISSED. Having determined Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is procedurally
barred, Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel to assist him with his postconviction
motion is MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________/s/___________________
M. Jane Brady
Superior Court Judge
29
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i)-(ii).
30
Rule 61(i)(4) provides that any claim that has been adjudicated “in the proceedings leading to the judgment of
conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceedings” is barred “unless
reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
7