State v. Walker

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
E. SCOTT BRADLEY 1 The Circle, Suite 2
JUDGE GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
July 20, 2016
STATE MAIL – N443
Demaris H. Walker
SBI # 318389
James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
1181 Paddock Road
Smyrna, DE 19977
RE: State of Delaware v. Demaris H. Walker
Def. Id# 0203014277
Dear Mr. Walker:
This is my decision on your third Motion for Postconviction Relief. You were
convicted by a jury on three counts of Rape in the Second Degree and one count each
of Burglary in the First Degree, Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, Theft of a
Senior, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree in February 2003. The charges arose
out of your rape of an elderly woman on March 10, 2002. Ruby Wilson was home
alone and getting ready for bed when she heard a knock on her door. Wilson opened
her front door slightly, where she saw your co-defendant, Carlton Harding, standing
in front of her door, and you standing in front of her neighbor’s door. You violently
pushed Wilson’s door open, which caused her to fall to the floor. You and Harding
then entered Wilson’s apartment. You grabbed Wilson off of the floor and dragged
her into the bedroom, while Harding searched her apartment for money. You then
instructed Harding to hold Wilson’s legs apart while you raped her three times. The
first time with your fingers, then with a water bottle, and finally with a metal shaving
cream can. After the rapes, Wilson managed to push the emergency call button on her
walker. Upon seeing this, you and Harding fled in Wilson’s car. Harding eventually
returned to Wilson’s apartment to collect evidence that the two of you had left behind.
It was at this point that Harding confessed to the crimes. I sentenced you to 84 years
at Supervision Level V, suspended after serving 55 years at Supervision Level V for
probation. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld your convictions in an Order dated
December 18, 2003.1 You filed your first Motion for Postconviction Relief on
January 24, 2006. I denied it on December 20, 2006.2 The Supreme Court affirmed
my denial of your first Motion for Postconviction Relief.3 You filed your second
Motion for Postconviction Relief on September 23, 2011. I denied it on April 23,
2012.4 The Supreme Court affirmed my denial of your second Motion for
Postconviction Relief on September 27, 2012.5
1
Demaris Walker v. State of Delaware, 840 A.2d 642, 2003 WL 22998847 (Del. Dec. 18,
2003) (Table).
2
2006 WL 3851228 (Del. Super. Dec. 20, 2006).
3
935 A.2d 256, 2007 WL 2744920 (Del. Sept. 20, 2007).
4
2012 WL 2337316 (Del. Super. April 23, 2012).
5
54 A.3d 257 (Del. 2012)(Table).
2
You allege in your third Motion for Postconviction Relief (1) that your
enhanced sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
because you were seventeen at the time you committed the criminal acts, and (2) your
trial counsel failed to request the proper jury instruction on accomplice credibility.
Your motion is controlled by the version of Rule 61 in effect at the time your Rule 61
petition was filed. 6 Rule 61(d)(2) states that a “second or subsequent motion under
this rule shall be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted after a trial
and the motion either: (i) pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that
creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts
underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or (ii) pleads with particularity a
claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies
to the movant’s case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.” You have
not alleged the existence of new evidence nor have you pled with particularity a claim
that a new rule of constitutional law would retroactively apply to your case.7
In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the
6
See Collins v. State, 2015 WL 4717524, at *1 (Del. Aug. 6, 2015).
7
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) .
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possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.8 This case does not help you because you
were not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Your jury instruction
argument is based on Bland v. State.9 In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that the trial judge must tell the jury to, in part, view an accomplice’s testimony
with suspicion and great caution. Your trial counsel certainly gave the jury a number
of reasons to view Harding’s testimony with suspicion and great caution. Your trial
counsel got Harding to admit on cross-examination that he lied on more than ten
different occasions. Harding admitted he lied to Officer Glasco the first time he
spoke with him at Wilson’s apartment. Harding admitted that he lied when he told
Officer Glasco he was visiting a friend. Harding admitted that he lied when he told
Officer Glasco that he saw two black males getting into Wilson’s car. Harding
admitted that he lied when he told Officer Glasco he recognized Wilson’s car since
he was from the area. Harding admitted he lied to Officer Glasco when he told him
not only was Stephen Wilz with him that evening, but that Stephen Wilz was the
person who raped Wilson. Your trial counsel also got Harding to state “I don’t
know” or “I don’t recall” several times when questioned. There was a jury instruction
on credibility. While this may not have been the jury instruction you wanted, it did
8
Id.9
263 A.2d 286 (Del. 1970).
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tell the jury how to assess Harding’s credibility. Once again, you had many
opportunities to raise your complaint about the jury instruction, but did not do so.
Harding’s testimony was not the only evidence of your participation in the criminal
acts. The fact that Wilson’s car keys were found in your bedroom was damning
evidence of your participation in the criminal acts. Wilson told the police that one
of the assailants wore white gloves. You had access to white gloves belonging to
your mother, which she could not find after the crimes. This further indicated your
involvement in the criminal acts.
Your motion is summarily dismissed under Rule 61(d)(2). I have concluded
that, given your failure to meet the requirements of Rule 61(d)(2), there is also no
need to appoint counsel for you.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/ E. Scott Bradley
E. Scott Bradley
ESB/sal
cc: Prothonotary
Counsel
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