Bozier v. Mountaire Farms

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
RICHARD F. STOKES SUSSEX COU NTY C OUR THO USE
JUDGE 1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2
GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
TELEPHONE (302) 856-5264
Jean Ricot Bozier, pro se Barry M. Willoughby, Esquire
27007 Seaford Road Lauren E.M. Russell, Esquire
Seaford, Delaware 19973 1000 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
RE: Jean Ricot Bozier v. Mountaire Farms & Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Bd.
C.A. No. S14A-02-004 RFS
Date Submitted: July 21, 2014
Date Decided: August 7, 2014
Dear Parties:
Before the Court is the appeal of Jean Ricot Bozier (“Bozier”) of a decision
rendered against him by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board”)
cancelling his unemployment benefits due to his termination from his former
employer Mountaire Farms, Inc. (“Mountaire”). For the reasons explained below, the
Board’s decision is AFFIRMED.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mountaire hired Bozier on April 19, 2013 as a day-shift general laborer, and
terminated him three days later for an unexcused absence on April 22, 2013.1
The day Bozier was hired, April 19, 2013, he signed-off on, received copies of
and attended an orientation explaining Mountaire’s company policies and procedure.
The Court specifically looks to Mountaire’s policy and procedure regarding absences
under the “No-Fault Policy” (the “Policy”).2 Pursuant to the Policy, the following
absences are excused:
Vacation - (which has been pre-approved)
Military leave including reasonable travel time to and from assignment
Jury duty and other legal proceedings for which a subpoena has been
issued.
Note: Legal proceedings for charges against the employee, jail time,
DUI classes, meetings with attorneys, appointment with Probation
Officer, custody hearings are not considered excused absences.
Bereavement leave in according with Bereavement leave policy.
Days of partial days when no work is available.
Workers compensation with appropriate documentation.
Approved personal (up to 30 days) or medical leaves in accordance
withpolicy.
Layoff
Immigration reporting including reasonable travel time to and from
location.
Approved religious observances.
Note: documentation on observances must be updated annually by the
employee and approved by Human Resources.
Absences not included in the list above are considered “unexcused
1
The facts are reflected in the transcripts filed in the appeal. The Board adopted the
Referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that are described in the opinion.
2
Rawle at 15.
2
absences” and will be counted as attendance infractions.3
Furthermore, the Policy states an employee will be discharged for one
unexcused absence during the first 15 days of employment. The Policy also states the
employee should contact the Human Resources Department in the case of tardiness
or any other absence not mentioned in the list above. The phone number of the
department is provided in the paperwork. In determining whether an employee’s
absence is unexcused, Mountaire considers if the absence complied with the excused
list, whether there was notification to the employer and the frequency of the absences
“rather than [the] reason for [the] occurrence.” 4
On April 22, 2013, which was Bozier’s first scheduled day of work, he claims
to have been stopped by the police and thus late for his shift. What occurred
subsequently has been in dispute between Bozier and Mountaire. Bozier claims he
called Mountaire, and personally spoke to an individual who told him to report to
work after the traffic stop. He further alleges that once he arrived at Mountaire, he
was turned away by security. However, Mountaire claims that Bozier never called,
which is corroborated by business records including call logs from April 22, 2013.
The phone number he would have called is also operated by an automatic system, so
3
Rawle at 13.
4
Id.
3
Bozier would not have been able to carry-out the conversation he claims to have had.
In addition, Bozier did not have his paperwork with him and thus did not have access
to the phone number. Moreover, Mountaire explains that Bozier would not have been
turned away at the gate, but would have been directed to the Human Resources
building adjacent to the security gate. As a newly hired employee, he would have
been processed through the Human Resources Department to receive an ID card and
equipment. Bozier was fired for violating Mountaire’s Policy.
On September 29, 2013, Bozier filed a claim for benefits with the Delaware
Department of Labor. His claim was denied by a Claims Deputy on October 22,
2013, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314 (2). The denial was based on the Claims
Deputy’s determination that Mountaire fired Bozier for just cause. Bozier appealed
the denial on October 29, 2013.
A hearing was held before an Appeals Referee on November 25, 2013. Both
parties testified, and the Appeals Referee accepted Mountaire’s version of the facts
and found that Bozier’s testimony was not credible. As a result, the Appeals Referee
affirmed the Claims Deputy’s decision.
On December 13, 2013, Bozier filed an appeal with the Board of the Appeals
4
Referee’s decision.5 The Board scheduled a hearing for February 5, 2014, where
Bozier provided additional testimony. In adopting the Appeals Referee’s factual
determinations, the Board affirmed the Claims Deputy’s denial in its opinion on
February 12, 2014.
Bozier filed a Notice of Appeal on February 18, 2014 in this Court, seeking
reversal of the Board’s decision. Bozier contests the determination that he did not call
and did not appear at Mountaire on April 22, 2013 and consequently violated the
Policy.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In affirming the Appeals Referee’s decision, the Board adopted the factual
findings the Appeals Referee made. This Court will review the Appeals Referee’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law and will be bound by those findings of fact
in the absence of fraud and if supported by the evidence.6 It is not within this Court’s
province to evaluate evidence, decide credibility issues or determine factual
5
Although Mountaire suggests Bozier’s initial appeal to the Board was filed late, this
point was not presented below and will not be entertained at this phase of the litigation. See
Estiverne v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2014 WL 2528540, at *2 (Del. Super. May 23,
2014) (“[U]nder 19 Del. C. § 3220, the Board may act sua sponte and consider the merits of a
procedurally barred appeal.”).
6
Boughton v. Dep’t. Of Labor, 300 A.2d 25, 26 (Del. Super. 1972).
5
questions.7 When reviewing the factual determinations of the Board, the Court is to
“consider the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below.”8 In
this case, that is Mountaire. The requisite degree of evidence is only “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 9
The test is if the evidence adequately supports the agency’s factual findings and
is legally correct.10
DISCUSSION
Parties’ Contentions
Bozier argues that he was late for his first day of work due to an unforeseen
police stop. Bozier contends he called Mountaire to notify them he would be late and
was told to come in anyway without issue, but that once he did arrive, he was turned
away.
The Board found that although Bozier’s circumstances may have been
unfortunate, there is no record establishing Bozier came to work nor that he called to
7
Pochavatilla v. U.S. Postal Serv., 1997 WL 524062, at *2 (Del. Super. June 9,1997).
8
Id.
9
Short v. Mountaire Farms and Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2013 WL 5492576, at *2
(Del. Super. Sept. 25, 2013).
10
29 Del.C. § 10142
6
notify Human Resources of his tardiness. Therefore, his termination was for just
cause because this conduct violates the Policy.
Analysis
In review of the factual dispute as to what actually occurred the morning of
April 22nd, 2013, this Court relies on the factual determinations of the Board. Based
upon the record, the Court finds substantial evidence that supports the Appeals
Referee’s findings of fact adopted by the Board that were adverse to Bozier. The
Policy and business records were admitted into evidence. Bozier knew a one day
absence would result in termination in the first 15 days of employment. His
explanations could rationally be rejected. He did not have the paperwork and
therefore did not have the Human Resources number. The call would have been
processed through an automated system, rather than a personal connection. The
absence of a call is reflected by Mountaire’s standard records including logs and
internal documents. The policy of Mountaire is to process all newly-hired employees
and to direct them to Human Resources even if late on the first day of a job.
Reasonable reliance can be made on the business records and policies and Bozier’s
admitting that he did not have the phone number with him.
With this evidential support, Bozier’s termination was for just cause and he
7
is therefore disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits. Title 19,
Section 3314 of the Delaware Code states in pertinent part:
“[a]n employee is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits
if he or she has been terminated for just cause. The term ‘just
cause’ denotes a wilful or wanton act in violation of either the
employer’s interest, or the employee’s expected standard of
conduct. Willful or wanton conduct is ‘that which is evidenced
by either conscious action, or reckless indifference leading to a
deviation from established and acceptable workplace
performance.’ In a termination case, the employer has the
burden of proving just cause.” 11
Additionally, although Bozier never explicitly states he did not intentionally
violate the Policy, the Court infers this is what he seeks to express. From his
perspective, Bozier argues that although he was indeed late for his shift, this
conduct was unintentional because he was pulled over by the police. In his
statement to the Delaware Department of Labor, Bozier claimed “I could not help
it, the police stopped me.”12 Mountaire offers no argument to counter that Bozier
acted intentionally or recklessly. However, Mountaire does argue to the Court that
pursuant to the Policy, one unexcused absence within the 15-day period will result
in termination. The Policy does not mention intent, but is instead “based on
occurrences and is a ‘no fault’ policy based on frequency rather than reason for
11
19 Del. C. § 3314 (II)(b).
12
Rawle at 2.
8
occurrence.” 13 The Court therefore finds that under the Policy, Bozier’s intent is
irrelevant in finding he violated the Policy.
The Court finds that Bozier’s absence was unexcused under the Policy.
The Policy explicitly states that a missed day of work within the first 15 days of
employment is treated with termination. Bozier’s absence does not fit within the
list of excused absences, and although Bozier argues the circumstances were out
of his control, the Board found he did not report for his first day of work. The
Court is not free to second-guess assessments of credibility.
In any event, the Policy is based on the occurrence alone and not the reason
for it.14 Moreover, Mountaire’s records make it clear Bozier never called human
resources as required by the Policy. The Policy makes it explicit that “employees
are responsible for their attendance record and ensuring that they notify the proper
Department each day of an absence.” 15 The Policy regarding unexcused absences
and notification is unequivocal and Bozier failed to comply with the Policy.
13
Rawle at 13.
14
R. at 13.
15
Rawle at 16.
9
Under Delaware law, “violation of a reasonable company rule may
constitute just cause for discharge if the employee is aware of the policy and the
possible subsequent termination.”16 The employee’s “knowledge of a company
policy may be established by evidence of a written policy, such as an employer’s
handbook or by previous warning of objectionable conduct.”17 Bozier had copies
of, signed-off on and attended an orientation explaining the Policy. Bozier does
not contend that he was uninformed of such a Policy and as such, the Court finds
that Bozier was aware of the Policy. Further, although neither party speaks to the
reasonableness of the Policy, the Court finds it was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Base on the aforementioned, the Board’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Richard F. Stokes
Richard F. Stokes
Cc: Prothonotary
Judicial Case manager
Catherine C. Damavandi, Esq.
16
Wisley, 2014 WL 2528540, at *2.
17
Id. (citations omitted).
10
Delaware Department of Justice
820 North French Street, 6th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
11