Moss v. Mountaire Farms

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
RICHARD F. STOKES SUSSEX COU NTY C OUR THO USE
JUDGE 1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2
GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
TELEPHONE (302) 856-5264
Raylena Moss, pro se Mountaire Farms
1007 Cecil Street, P.O. Box 710
Salisbury, MD 21804 Selbyville, DE 19975
RE: Raylena Moss v. Mountaire Farms and Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Bd.,
C.A. No. S14A-05-001-RFS
Date Submitted: July 25, 2014
Date Decided: September 29, 2014
Dear Parties:
Before the Court is the appeal of Raylena Moss (“Moss”) of a decision
rendered against her by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board”)
regarding her termination by her former employer, Mountaire Farms (“Mountaire”).
For the reasons explained below, the Board’s decision is AFFIRMED.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Moss was employed by Mountaire from July 27, 2012 until her termination on
December 10, 2013. During this time Moss worked as an associate in the washroom
department.
1
After her termination, Moss filed for unemployment insurance benefits with the
Delaware Department of Labor’s Division of Unemployment Insurance. The Claims
Deputy/Agency Representative for the Division found that Mountaire met its burden
of showing just cause for Moss’ discharge, and therefore found her disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits.
Moss filed a timely appeal to an Appeals Referee. The Appeals Referee agreed
with the Claims Deputy regarding Moss being discharged from her work with
Mountaire for violation of a company policy. Specifically, Mountaire claimed that
Moss violated the company’s attendance policy.
In his written opinion, the Referee described the events that took place during
the months of November and December, 2013, which ultimately led to Moss’
termination. Moss was working for Mountaire at its Princess Anne hatchery,
beginning on July 27, 2013. The hatchery has an attendance policy that states once
an employee reaches six attendance points they are to be terminated immediately. The
strict attendance policy was put into place because the hatchery site is a smaller
operation and attendance is critical.
Every employee is made aware of the attendance policy and is required to sign
the attendance policy which states “when an employee’s record initially reaches . . .
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six occurrences the employee’s position will be terminated.”1 The attendance policy
states that absence from work will be regarded as one occurrence except for those
absences related to an approved Leave of Absence. The approved leave of absence
includes absences for funeral leave, jury duty, family, and medical leave. The
attendance policy also states that should an employee be absent for two or more
consecutive days, each absence will be considered a separate occurrence unless the
employee can supply an authorized medical certification stating an inability to work
for the days in question, and in such a case, the employee will only be charged with
one occurrence. Moss acknowledged that she was aware of this policy.
Moss’s first absence occurred on August 15, 2013. For this she received one
occurrence on her record. Moss was then absent from work on September 12, 2013,
bringing the total number of occurrences to two. Under the policy, Moss was able to
remove half of an occurrence if she completed thirty days without missing or being
late for work. Thus, in order to achieve this, she needed a perfect attendance record
until October 12, 2013. Moss reached this date, and therefore half of an occurrence
was removed from her record, bringing her total to one and a half occurrences. On
November 5, 2013, Moss was late for work and received half of an occurrence, which
brought the total to three occurrences. Moss then missed work on November 25,
1
R. at 8.
3
2013, bringing her total to four. Mountaire issued Moss a warning, which was mailed
to and received by Moss. This served as the final warning for violation of the
attendance policy. It also included a provision that if Moss received five occurrences
she would be suspended and if she received six occurrences she would be terminated.
Moss left work early on December 6, 2013 and received one occurrence
bringing the total to five. On December 9, 2013 Moss missed work and received one
occurrence bringing her total to six, the maximum number of occurrences allowed by
Mountaire’s attendance policy. Therefore, when Moss came into work on December
10, 2013, she was terminated.
The Appeals Referee held that Moss was terminated for just cause. The Referee
also held that Mountaire met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the claimant was terminated for just cause. Therefore, he concluded that
Moss was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Moss filed
a timely appeal to the Board. Moss did not appear at the Board hearing, and as a
result, the Board dismissed her appeal for failure to appear.2 This appeal followed.
2
See R. at 57 (“[James T. Wakley:] This is the case of Raylena Moss versus Moutnaire
Farms. This was the claimant’s appeal from a referee’s determination that the claimant was
discharged from her employment with just cause in connection with the scope of her
employment. Let the record reflect that the claimant was noticed at the address of record of the
date, time and location of the Board’s hearing for a hearing to be held on April 16th, 2014 at 2:20
PM in Dover. It is now 3:32 PM. A diligent search of the premises has revealed that the claimant
has not appeared to prosecute the appeal and on motion the appeal will be dismissed.”).
4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing appeals from the Board, this Court examines only the record
upon which the Board relied in making its decision.3 This Court only determines
whether substantial evidence supported the Board’s decision, and whether the
Board’s decision lacked legal error.4 The requisite degree of evidence is only “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”5 Evaluating the evidence, deciding credibility issues, and determining
factual questions are not within this Court’s purview. 6 Ultimately, the Court only
decides whether a sufficient basis supports the Board’s decision.
ANALYSIS
Moss argues that she missed the Board’s hearing because she was running late.
Her hearing was scheduled to be held at the Board’s office in Dover, Delaware at
2:20pm. The Board sent Moss a written notice setting forth the date, time, and
location of the hearing for her appeal. Moss contends that she is entitled to
unemployment benefits because (1) she was excused by her supervisor for one or
3
Burgos v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 2011 WL 1487076, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 19, 2011)
4
Id.5
Id.6
Id.5
more of her absences, and because (2) she was at the Board’s office at 2:45pm for her
hearing at 2:20pm, and claims that her name was never called as she waited to be
heard. Regarding her first reason, Moss claims that she was told by her supervisor
that if she received a doctor’s note for her absence on Friday, December 6, 2013, it
would be forgiven and would not count towards her occurrences.
This Court’s appellate review of a Board decision is limited to the merits.
Because the Board did not hear Moss’ case on the merits, the only issue this Court
may address is whether or not the Board abused its discretion in dismissing her case.
The Court has previously addressed this issue:
The Board maintains statutory authority to promulgate regulations designed to
ensure the prompt and orderly determination of the parties rights. In that
regard, the Board has adopted Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board Rule
B which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll parties are required to be present
for a hearing at the scheduled time. Any party who is not present within 10
minutes after the scheduled time for hearing shall be deemed to waive his right
to participate in said hearing.” The Court cannot conclude that the Board
abused its discretion by dismissing Claimants appeal. This Court has
previously recognized “the importance of adhering to a hearing schedule to
efficiently manage and dispose of cases and the need to enforce rules such as
Rule B to engender cooperation from the interested parties.” Thus, the Court
concludes that the Board did not act arbitrarily by dismissing Claimant's appeal
for failure to appear.7
7
Archambault v. McDonald’s Restaurant, 1999 WL 1611337, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar.
22, 1999).
6
The Board in this case did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Moss’
appeal for failing to appear on time for her appeal. Moss was given clear written
notice of the time, place, and location of the Board’s hearing. The written notice sent
to Moss informed her that she was required to arrive “at least 15 minutes before the
time of [her] hearing is scheduled to begin.”8 The notice also informed Moss that
“failure to appear for [her] hearing in a timely manner c[ould] result in [her] appeal
being dismissed.”9 The Board waited for over fifteen minutes after the scheduled start
time, but Moss failed to appear when called.10 Moss was put on notice of the
consequences of her failure to appear on time for her hearing. Moss cannot argue the
Board abused its discretion when she was put on notice of the consequences of her
failure to appear before the Board for her hearing. The Board’s decision is in
accordance with the applicable law and is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
8
R. at 55.
9
Id.
10
Moss argues that she was told by a person upon her arrival that she had missed her
appeal and that she should leave. She was told this at 3:00 PM. Whether or not this is true is
irrelevant. Nor is it relevant that the Board did not put on the record until 3:32 PM that Moss’s
appeal was being dismissed. Moss knew what time she was required to be present for her appeal.
7
CONCLUSION
The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Richard F. Stokes
Richard F. Stokes
cc: Prothonotary
Judicial Case Manager
8