State of Delaware v. Dunn.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) Cr. ID No. 1309021876
)
TARRANCE DUNN, )
)
Defendant. )
)
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
DENIED
Submitted: September 15, 2014
Decided: September 24, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rocanelli, J.
Tarrance P. Dunn (“Defendant”) was charged by Grand Jury for two
separate incidents and charged with two counts of Robbery First Degree.
Defendant was represented by J. Edinger, Esquire. At Final Case Review,
Defendant rejected the State’s plea offer and the case was set for trial.
Defendant waived his right to trial by jury and the case proceeded to a non-
jury trial before this judicial officer on April 15 and 16, 2014. Defendant
was found Guilty of Theft Under $1500 (LIO of Robbery First 13-12-0668)
and Robbery First Degree (14-01-1562).
Although Defendant is represented by counsel, Defendant filed a
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as a self-represented litigant. The State
has filed its response in opposition to Defendant’s Motion. This is the
Court’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.
A motion for judgment of acquittal is governed by Superior Court
Criminal Procedural Rule 29 which provides that such motions should be
presented at the close of the State’s evidence or within seven (7) days after
the fact-finder is discharged. As the State points out, Defendant’s motion is
untimely as it was filed nearly five months after Defendant was found
Guilty. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is time-barred. Nevertheless, the
Court will address Defendant’s motion on the merits.
The standard of review for a motion for judgment of acquittal is
whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of all the elements of the crime. 1 The trier of fact does not distinguish
between direct and circumstantial evidence in making its determination.2
Conflicting evidence was offered at trial. The State presented the
testimony of both victims, as well as three police officers. Defendant
testified as a witness, and also recalled one of the investigating police
officers as a witness in Defendant’s case. Additional evidence was also
offered for the Court’s consideration.
As fact-finder, the Court followed the direction that we regularly give
to our juries when assessing the evidence and the credibility of witness
testimony:
I must judge the believability of each witness and determine the
weight to be given to all trial testimony. I considered each
witness’s means of knowledge; strength of memory and
opportunity for observation; the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the testimony; the motives actuating the
witness; the fact, if it was a fact, the testimony was
contradicted; any bias, prejudice or interest, manner of
demeanor upon the witness stand; and all other facts and
1
Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 1998) (citing Davis v. State, 706
A.2d 523, 524 (Del. 1998); Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del.
1995)).
2
Id. (citing Davis, 706 A.2d at 524; Hoey v. State, 689 A.2d 1177, 1181
(Del. 1997); Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Del. 1990)).
circumstances shown by the evidence which affect the
believability of the testimony. After finding some testimony
conflicting by reason of inconsistencies, I have reconciled the
testimony, as reasonably as possible, so as to make one
harmonious story of it all. To the extent I could not do this, I
gave credit to that portion of testimony which, in my judgment,
was most worthy of credit and disregarded any portion of the
testimony which, in my judgment, was unworthy of credit. 3
With respect to the alleged robbery on September 25, 2013, the Court
heard the testimony of the victim and the police officers, and also watched a
videotape of the scene on the DART bus where the crime took place. The
Court found that the evidence established that the Defendant was guilty of
the lesser-included offense of (Misdemeanor) Theft Under $1500, but did
not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of (Felony) Robbery First
Degree.
With respect to the alleged robbery on September 29, 2013, the Court
rejected the testimony offered by Defendant, which was inconsistent with
other record evidence and also inconsistent with Defendant’s own prior
statements. The Court found that the record evidence established
Defendant’s guilt of Robbery First Degree beyond a reasonable doubt.
3
Dionisi v. DeCampli, 1995 WL 398536, *1 (Del. Ch. June 28, 1995).
Therefore, the Court made findings of fact based on the entire record,
including all direct and circumstantial evidence, and the references there
from, and the Court found that the State met its burden of proving the
elements of Theft Under $1500 (LIO of Robbery First 13-12-0668) with
respect to Count One of the Indictment and Robbery First Degree (14-01-
1562) with respect to Count Two of the Indictment. The Court found the
State did not meet its burden of proving Defendant guilty of Robbery First
Degree (13-12-0668) with respect to Count One of the Indictment.
Sentencing is scheduled for October 24, 2014.
NOW, THEREFORE, THIS 24th day of September, 2014,
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
_____________________________
Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli