DocketNumber: C.A. No. 98C-12-020 HDR
Citation Numbers: 787 A.2d 751
Judges: Ridgely
Filed Date: 3/16/2001
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
OPINION
This case involves a claim for recovery of unpaid workers’ compensation benefits. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff William Kelley’s (“Kelley”) motion for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, summary judgment is granted in favor of the plaintiff pursuant to Huffman v. C.C. Oliphant & Son, Inc.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 29, 1988, Mr. Kelley was injured in an industrial accident while in the employ of ILC Dover, Inc. (“ILC”) as a maintenance man. Following Kelley’s injury, he received workers’ compensation benefits from ILC’s insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty”) in the form of temporary total disability benefits. Subsequently, Liberty filed a petition to terminate with the Industrial Accident Board (“IAB”); Kelly also filed a petition with the IAB seeking an increase in permanent partial disability.
On November 9, 1995, the IAB granted Liberty’s petition to terminate and reduced Kelley’s benefits from $242.13 per week in temporary total disability to $82.13 per week in temporary partial disability. The IAB also awarded Kelley a medical witness fee and attorney’s fees.
Subsequently, Kelley took a limited appeal of the IAB’s decision reducing compensation to the Superior Court. On October 31, 1997, the Superior Court reversed the decision of the IAB, reinstating Kel
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Kelley, through his counsel, issued a letter dated July 18, 1998, demanding payment of all workers’ compensation benefits due. Plaintiffs counsel received payment for the reinstated total disability benefits on August 27, 1998. The medical witness fees and attorney’s fees are still unpaid.
Plaintiff filed this action seeking liquidated damages for late payment of the total disability benefits, as well as the unpaid medical witness fees, unpaid attorney’s fees, plus liquidated damages. Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment.
II.PARTIES’ARGUMENTS
In support of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argues that no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the award of total disability benefits, medical witness fees and attorney’s fees. Kelley argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Huffman because defendants failed to make timely payment of amounts owed upon proper demand.
Defendants argue that (a) plaintiffs Huffman demand was insufficient and vague; (b) the defendants had a reasonable justification to deny payments; (c) the reversal by the Superior Court negated defendants’ obligation to pay the medical witness and attorney’s fees, and (d) plaintiffs acceptance of the check for back total disability benefits constituted an accord and satisfaction of the entire debt owed.
III.SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment will only be granted if, after reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IV.DISCUSSION
A civil action “to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction.”
The plaintiff further seeks liquidated damages under 19 Del. C. § 1103(b), which provides, “[i]f an employer, without any reasonable grounds for dispute, fails to pay an employee wages as required under this Chapter, the employer shall in addition be liable to the employee for liquidated damages in the amount of 10% of the unpaid wages for each day, except Sunday and legal holidays, upon which such failure continues after the day upon which payment is required or in an amount equal to the unpaid wages, whichever is smaller....”
Defendants contend that Kelley’s Huffman demand is unenforceable because it was not specific as to what compensation was being sought. Kelley’s letter demanded “payment of all workers’ compensation benefits due” because the “Board award has not been paid.” The language used in Kelley’s Huffman demand letter is almost identical to the demand language in MacDonald v. Smalls Insurance Co.
In Holden v. Gaico,
The defendants also argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the dates that demand and/or payment letters were sent, postmarked, and re
Defendants next argue that they had a “reasonable justification” for failure to pay benefits due, and that “reasonable justification” avoids liability for liquidated damages. Specifically, the defendants contend they did not know what Kelley was owed and whether he had received or was receiving Second Injury Fund benefits following the IAB’s termination order. The Supreme Court in Huffman held that absent an IAB order permitting termination, an employer’s good faith belief that the claimant is no longer entitled to compensation is irrelevant.
Furthermore, the Second Injury and Contingency Fund established under 19 Del. C. § 2347, by its terms, does not continue benefits following an IAB order terminating benefits, even during the pen-dency of the appeals process. Because the statute prohibits such continuation of payments, Kelley would not have received any such payments and the “reasonable justification” argument fails as a matter of law.
Defendants next argue that the Superior Court’s reversal of the appealed portions of the IAB’s decision resulted in the reversal of the ancillary awards of attorney’s fees and medical witness fees previously awarded by the IAB. Superior Court Civil Rule 72(c) permits partial or limited appeals of agency decisions. In Johnson v. General Motors,
Finally, the defendants assert a defense of accord and satisfaction. Generally, the elements of accord and satisfaction are as follows: 1) that a bona fide dispute existed as to the amount owed that was based on mutual good faith; 2) that the debtor tendered an amount to the creditor with the intent that payment would be in total satisfaction of the debt; and 3) that the creditor agreed to accept the payment in full satisfaction of the debt.
Y. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Huffman because the defendants failed to make timely payment of amounts owed upon proper demand. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the plaintiff. Counsel shall confer and plaintiff may submit a form of order, on notice within ten days.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. Huffman v. C.C. Oliphant & Son, Inc., Del. Supr., 432 A.2d 1207 (1981).
. William Kelley v. Brookside Apartments/ILC of Dover, IAB Hearing No. 964869/853835, Stone, J., Robinson, J. (Nov. 9, 1995) at *25.
. Kelley v. ILC of Dover, Inc., Del.Super., C.A. No. 97A-03-004, 1997 WL 817847, Ridgely, P.J. (Oct. 31, 1997) (Mem.Op.).
. ILC of Dover Industries, Inc. v. Kelley, Del. Supr., 716 A.2d 974 (1998).
. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., Del. Supr., 690 A.2d 914, 916 (1996).
. Borish v. Graham, Del.Super., 655 A.2d 831, 833 (1994).
. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e); MacDonald v. Smalls Insurance Co., No. 98C-11-030, 2000 WL 1611093, Ridgely, PJ. (Aug. 7, 2000) (Mem. Op.).
. 19 Del. C.% 1113(a).
. 19 Del. C. § 2357.
. 19 Del. C. Ch. 11; Holden v. Gaico, Del. Supr., 736 A.2d 202, 203 (1999).
. Holden at 203; Huffman, 432 A.2d at 1210 (emphasis added).
. Holden, 736 A.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
. 19 Del. C. § 1103(b).
. MacDonald at *5, 2000 WL 1611093.
. id.
. Holden, supra.
. Id.
. Id.
. See 19 Del. C. § 2357.
. Huffman, 432 A.2d at 1209.
. Id.
. Johnson v. General Motors, 1990 WL 18397, Taylor, J. (Feb. 5, 1990).
. Id.
. Keeler v. Metal Masters, Del.Supr., C.A. No. 97C-09-005, Ridgely, PJ. (Oct. 27, 1999), aff'd Metal Masters Foodservice Equipment Co., Inc. v. Keeler, Del.Supr., No. 510, 1999, 755 A.2d 389, Berger, J. (2000).
. Aciermo v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline Corp., Del. Supr., 693 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1997).
. Id. at 1068-1069.
. 19 Del. C. § 2305.