Williams v. Toll Brothers Builders

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
PAUL R. WALLACE NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
JUDGE 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801
(302) 255-0660
Date Submitted: July 11, 2022
Date Issued: July 12, 2022
Mr. Fredrick Williams Mr. Anthony N. Delcollo, Esquire
1470 Olmsted Drive Mr. Christopher J. Isaac, Esquire
Bear, Delaware 19701 OFFIT KURMAN, P.A.
222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1105
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
RE: Williams v. Toll Brothers Builders, et al.
C.A. No. N22C-05-002 PRW
Dear Mr. Williams and Counsel:
This Letter Order resolves the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under this
Court’s Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Upon review of the parties’ pleadings, their arguments
at the hearing of the motion, and the record in this case, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2011, Fredrick Williams purchased a new home from Defendant
Hockessin Chase, L.P., located on Olmsted Drive in Bear, Delaware.1 Since then,
1
Compl. at 1 (D.I. 1); Williams v. Toll Brothers Builders, 2021 WL 3200825, at *1 (Del. July
28, 2021) (hereafter “Williams III”).
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Mr. Williams has filed multiple lawsuits against Hockessin Chase (and others he
deems responsible), seeking damages related to alleged construction defects to the
driveway, stucco, roof, and other areas of his home. 2
Mr. Williams’s first two lawsuits were filed in the Court of Common Pleas.
The first was dismissed for failing to name and serve the proper defendants, and the
second was dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.3 Of particular import
here, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed Mr. Williams’s second suit based on
binding arbitration clauses contained in the home’s purchase agreement and
warranty contract.4 Mr. Williams didn’t appeal either of those dismissals.5
He instead initiated a new action in this Court in 2020 seeking the same relief
from the same defendants.6 The Defendants again moved to dismiss the suit, arguing
2
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 2 (D.I. 10) (“Plaintiff has filed multiple lawsuits in reference to his
residential property situated in Bear, Delaware, over the past five years.”); Williams III, 2021 WL
3200825, at *1.
3
Williams III, 2021 WL 3200825, at *1.
4
Order of Dismissal ¶ 3, Williams v. Michael Brown, et al., C.A. No. CPU4-19-002007 (Del.
Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 1, 2019) (Ex. A, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss) (hereafter “Williams I”) (“Pursuant to
both Section 11 of the purchase agreement for the sale of the home and Article VII of the warranty
agreement, the parties have agreed to resolve any and all claims arising out of the home or home
warranty through binding arbitration.”).
5
Order of Dismissal ¶¶ 2-3, Williams v. Toll Brothers Builders, et al., C.A. No. N20C-06-198
VLM (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2020) (Ex. C, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss) (hereafter “Williams II”);
Williams III, 2021 WL 3200825, at *1.
6
Williams II, Order of Dismissal ¶ 4.
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Mr. Williams’s complaint was barred by res judicata.7 Agreeing with the
Defendants, this Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the issues alleged
in the then-pending complaint before it stemmed from the same operative facts as
those alleged in the already dismissed Court of Common Pleas complaint.8
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the dismissal, agreeing
that the matter was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata.9 A
party’s claim is precluded “based on the same cause of action after a court has
entered judgment in a prior suit involving the same parties.” 10 Thus, because the
Court of Common Pleas determined that Mr. Williams was required to resolve his
dispute via arbitration, and he neither appealed that decision nor participated in
arbitration, the Supreme Court upheld this Court’s dismissal of Mr. Williams’s 2020
complaint on that basis.11
The Supreme Court did, however, address Mr. Williams’s assertion “that
binding arbitration was not his only available remedy,” pointing to this Court’s
7
Williams III, 2021 WL 3200825, at *1.
8
Williams II, Order of Dismissal ¶ 5.
9
Williams III, 2021 WL 3200825, at *2.
10
Id. (citing Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531, 534 (Del. 2000)).
11
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related decision in Wang v. Hockessin Chase, L.P. 12 Without reaching the merits of
whether Mr. Williams might actually be accorded relief under Wang, the Supreme
Court questioned “whether the Court of Common Pleas was aware of the Wang
decision or whether the court’s consideration of Wang would have changed its
decision in Williams’s case.” 13
Before admonishing then-defense counsel for not drawing the Court of
Common Plea’s attention to Wang,14 the Supreme Court observed:
In Wang, homeowners asserted similar construction-defect
claims against Hockessin Chase as the claims that Williams has
asserted against Hockessin Chase. The Wang defendants sought
dismissal of the homeowners’ claims, as they did of Williams’s
claims, on the grounds that the sales contract and warranty
required the homeowners to submit the dispute to binding
arbitration. The contract and warranty at issue in Wang appear
to include very similar language regarding arbitration as the
Williams contract and warranty. . . . [The Wang Court] denied
the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that it was
“unable to interpret the sales contract and warranty to mean that
any action under the Warranty must be resolved by binding
12
Id. (citing 2018 WL 6046620 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2018)).
13
Id. (noting also Hockessin Chase, L.P. v. Wang, 2019 WL 1046643 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2019)
(dismissing Hockessin Chase’s action to confirm an arbitral award, and “agree[ing] with th[is]
Court’s reasoning and conclusion” that binding arbitration was not the only remedy available to
the Wangs under the contract and warranty)).
14
Id. at *3 (“Although we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, we are troubled by the
appellees’ counsel’s failure to bring Wang to the attention of the Court of Common Pleas in the
2019 case, and we take this opportunity to remind the bar of counsel’s obligation to cite adverse
authority.”). Defendants are represented by different counsel in this matter.
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arbitration or that, if another remedy is pursued, the buyer forfeits
their rights under the Warranty” and that “other remedies are a
plausible means of dispute resolution.”15
The Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the Court of Common Pleas
judgment indeed precluded Mr. Williams’s later suit in this Court because
Mr. Williams failed to cite Wang in his original proceedings, pursue reargument, or
appeal on that basis.16
A. MR. WILLIAMS RETURNS TO THIS COURT.
On May 2, 2022, Mr. Williams filed a new complaint initiating this action
against Defendants Toll Brothers Builders, Hockessin Chase, L.P., Michael Brown,
Timothel J. Hoban, and Michael Klein. 17 He again seeks damages related to the
alleged faulty construction of his home on Olmstead Drive.18
Mr. Williams offers a host of reasons in support of his request for damages—
$5M from each defendant—but chief among them are: (i) Toll Brothers Builders’
15
Id. at *2.
16
Id. at *3.
17
See generally, Compl. The Defendants aver that “Toll Brothers Builders” is not an existing
legal entity; Michael Brown is a former employee of “Toll Brothers, Inc.”; Michael Brown has not
been served and should therefore be dismissed from suit; Timothel J. Hoban “apparently refers to
Timothy J. Hoban”; and Michael Klein is now a former employee of Toll Brothers, Inc., and
according to Defendants, appears to be sued in his individual capacity rather than official capacity
as a Toll Brothers, Inc. employee. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 1 nn.1-3, ¶ 7 n.13.
18
Compl. at 6.
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alleged widespread fraud that duped him into buying the home; (ii) claims of faulty
and defective craftmanship and failure to repair; (iii) the Defendants’ supposed
disparate treatment in handling his home repair complaints based on racial animus
and the parties’ litigious history; and (iv) his reluctancy to enter into arbitration
because of his belief that the arbitration process is “fake,” and tantamount to “a
school kid grading his own papers.” 19 He appears to add a new defect to his faulty
construction claim list, alleging a “Statewide Inspection” further damaged his home
in the summer of 2021 while attempting to make stucco repairs at Defendant Michael
Klein’s behest.20
Notably, though his request for relief isn’t on based on Wang’s holding per
se, Mr. Williams does briefly assert that the reason no other homeowners “went to
the so called arbitration [was because] the Arbitrator always ruled against them.”21
He thus attributes Wang as a “victory for Delaware homeowners” who may now
bypass the “fake” arbitration process imposed by the Defendants, and enforce
builders to “stand by their product[s]” via the traditional judicial process.”22
19
See generally id.
20
Id. at 2.
21
Id. at 5.
22
Id. at 4.
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B. THE DEFENDANTS MOVE TO DISMISS UNDER THIS
COURT’S CIVIL RULE 12(B)(6).
Defendants have responded to Mr. Williams’s complaint via this Court’s Civil
Rule 12(b)(6)—once again moving to dismiss the lawsuit. 23
First, they argue that Mr. Williams’s complaint is barred by res judicata
because the facts alleged here stem from the same operative facts asserted in the
earlier, already dismissed lawsuits. 24 They also posit that Mr. Williams’s citation to
Wang is misplaced because in Wang, the parties actually participated in arbitration
proceedings.25 Whereas here, Mr. Williams refuses to submit to arbitration, and
neither are the Defendants compelling it.26 This is so, the Defendants say, because
the Supreme Court—in affirming this Court’s prior dismissal of the earlier
litigation—determined that “counsel’s failure to cite Wang does not warrant
reversal” and thus, any claim in this regard is barred by res judicata. 27
Second, the Defendants contend that Mr. Williams’s assertions don’t meet the
pleading standard required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to the extent he is
23
D.I. 10.
24
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 3-8.
25
Id. ¶ 8.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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asserting any new bases for relief, e.g., that the Defendants and/or their agents treated
him disparately. 28 Relatedly, the Defendants also argue that if Mr. Williams is now
faulting Statewide Inspection for damaging his home, this also fails as Statewide
Inspection is a non-named third-party to this suit, and even so, Mr. Williams hasn’t
sufficiently pleaded a negligence claim.29
Finally, the Defendants aver that regardless of what Mr. Williams’s claims
are, they are barred by the statute of limitations. Say Defendants: “When bringing
claims based on ‘negligence related to the purchase of a home, the statute of
limitations begins to run on the date of the settlement or closing.’”30 Based on
Mr. Williams’s allegations, he became aware of the alleged issues with his home no
later than 2017; thus, according to the Defendants, the pending claims are now
almost five years old and untimely. 31
28
Id. ¶ 9.
29
Id. ¶ 10. The Defendants also note the difficulty in discerning what, exactly, Mr. Williams’s
claimed causes of action are. Regardless, Defendants argue that nothing alleged in the Complaint
supports recovery on breach of contract, negligence, or discrimination claims. Id. ¶ 11.
30
Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Altenbaugh v. Benchmark Builders, Inc., 2021 WL 1215828, at *2 (Del. Supr.
Mar. 26, 2021), aff’d, 271 A.3d 188 (Del. 2022); see also Silverstein v. Fischer, 2016 WL 3020858,
at *4 (Del. Supr. May 18, 2016) (holding the statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract,
negligence and fraud is three years)).
31
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II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 12 (B)(6)
A party may move to dismiss under this Court’s Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.32 In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion,
the Court (1) accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint;
(2) credits vague allegations if they give the opposing party notice of the claim;
(3) draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant; and (4) denies
dismissal if recovery on the claim is reasonably conceivable. 33
The Court, however, need not “accept conclusory allegations unsupported by
specific facts or . . . draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.”34 Neither must the Court adopt “every strained interpretation of the
allegations proposed by the plaintiff.”35 Still, even with those cautions in mind,
Delaware’s pleading standard is “minimal.”36 Dismissal is inappropriate unless
“under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the complaint state a
32
Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).
33
Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011).
34
Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011), overruled on other
grounds by Ramsey v. Ga. S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255, 1277 (Del. 2018).
35
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001).
36
Cent. Mortg., 27 A.3d at 536 (citing Savor, Inc v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 895 (Del. 2002)).
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claim for which relief might be granted.” 37 “Generally, matters outside the pleadings
should not be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss.”38 But the Court may
consider documents or exhibits outside the pleadings when they are “integral to
a . . . claim and incorporated into the complaint.” 39
B. CLAIM PRECLUSION
A litigant is precluded from bringing a second action against a defendant using
the same facts as the first claim of action:
[I]f the pleadings framing the issues in the first action would have
permitted the raising of the issue sought to be raised in the second
action, and if the facts were known, or could have been known to
the plaintiff in the second action at the time of the first action.40
Claim preclusion is a burden-shifting analysis requiring a defendant to first
demonstrate that “the same transaction formed the basis for both the present and
37
Unbound Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Invoy Holdings Inc., 251 A.3d 1016, 1023 (Del. Super. Ct.
2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Cent. Mortg., 27 A.3d at 537 n.13 (“Our governing
‘conceivability’ standard is more akin to ‘possibility . . . .’”).
38
In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995).
39
Windsor I, LLC v. CWCap. Asset Mgmt. LLC, 238 A.3d 863, 873 (Del. 2020); see also
Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1083 (“[A] claim may be dismissed if allegations in the complaint or in the
exhibits incorporated into the complaint effectively negated the claim as a matter of law.”).
40
LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 193 (Del. 2009) (emphasis in original);
Taylor v. Desmond, 1990 WL 18366, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1990), aff’d, 1990 WL 168243(Del. Aug. 31, 1990) (“In essence, the doctrine of res judicata serves to prevent a multiplicity of
needless litigation of issues by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause of action which
has been raised or should have been raised in a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
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former suits; and second, plaintiff neglected or failed to assert claims which in
fairness should have been asserted in the first action.” 41 Upon such a showing, and
to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must then demonstrate “that there was some
impediment to the presentation of the entire claim for relief in the prior forum.”42
Delaware Courts apply a transactional approach when assessing whether a
claim is precluded, following a five-part test that considers whether: (1) the original
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (2) the parties to the
original action were the same as those parties, or in privity, in the case at bar; (3) the
original cause of action or the issues decided were the same as the case at bar;
(4) the issues in the prior action must have been decided adversely to the appellants
in the case at bar; and (5) the decree in the prior action was a final decree.43
Claim preclusion requires a “pragmatic consideration, with the fact finder
‘giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space,
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
41
Wilson v. Brown, 2012 WL 195393, at *4 (Del. Jan. 24, 2012) (citing LaPoint, 970 A.2d at
193-94)).
42
Id. (quoting Kossol v. Ashton Condo. Ass’n, 1994 WL 10861, at *2 (Del. Jan 6, 1994)).
43
Dover Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092 (Del.
2006).
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treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding
or usage.’”44
III. DISCUSSION
A. THE DOCTRINE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION AGAIN REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF
MR. WILLIAMS’S COMPLAINT.
“When a defendant asserts an affirmative defense, like res judicata, as a basis
for pleading stage dismissal, that motion to dismiss will be granted only if ‘the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts to avoid it . . . .’” 45 Thus, the Court must first
determine whether the parties have carried their respective burdens on the five res
judicata elements.
1. The Defendants have established that the same transaction formed the
basis for both the present and former suit.
The first prong of the res judicata test is satisfied here, as the original court
disposing of the issue had proper jurisdiction. In the earlier lawsuits dismissing
Mr. Williams’s complaints, both this Court and the Court of Common Pleas had
proper subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Legal rather than equitable remedies
44
LaPoint, 970 A.2d at 193 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982)).
45
Fortis Advisors LLC v. Shire US Holdings, Inc., 2020 WL 748660, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13,
2020) (quoting Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 183–84 (Del. 2009)).
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were sought, and the parties either consented to or otherwise appeared in the
respective proceedings, thus satisfying this prong of the test.
The second prong requires that the subsequent suit involve the same parties,
or parties in privity, to the original action. Collectively, the named defendants in
Mr. Williams’s previous—and already dismissed—cases are: (i) Toll Brothers
Builders; (ii) Michael Brown; (iii) Hockessin Chase, L.P.; and (iv) Timothy J.
Hoban.46 Here, Mr. Williams names a cumulation of the same Defendants as before,
with the addition of Mr. Michael Klein. Res judicata doesn’t require an exacting
relationship.47 “Parties are in privity for res judicata when their interests are
identical or closely aligned such that they were actively and adequately represented
in the first suit.”48 Thus, to the extent Mr. Klein was a prior employee or agent of
46
See Compl., Williams v. Toll Brothers Builders, et al., C.A. No. CPU4-17-005342 (Del. Ct.
Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 2017) (naming Toll Brothers Builders and Michael Brown); Compl., Williams
v. Toll Brothers Builders, et al., C.A. No. CPU4-19-002007 (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. June 11, 2019)
(naming Toll Brothers Builders, Michael Brown, and Hockessin Chase, LP); Compl., Williams v.
Toll Brothers Builders, et al., C.A. No. N20C-06-198 VLM (Del. Super. Ct. June 22, 2020)
(naming Toll Brothers Builders, Hockessin Chase, LP, Michael Brown, and Timothy J. Hoban).
47
See Aveta Inc. v. Cavallieri, 23 A.3d 157, 180 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Privity is instead ‘a legal
determination for the trial court with regard to whether the relationship between the parties is
sufficiently close to support preclusion.’”) (quoting Higgins v. Walls, 901 A.2d 122, 138 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2005)).
48
Aveta, 23 A.3d at 180 (collecting cases); see also Kohls v. Kenetech Corp., 791 A.2d 763, 769
(Del. Ch. 2000) (“[P]reclusion can properly be imposed when the claimant’s conduct induces the
opposing party reasonably to suppose that the litigation will firmly stabilize the latter’s legal
obligations.”).
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Toll Brothers, Inc., or any of its subsidiaries, 49 his interests are so “closely aligned”
to those of Toll Brothers, Inc. “such that they were actively and adequately
represented” in the earlier lawsuits.50 The second prong is therefore met.
Turning to the third prong, in both suits before the Court of Common Pleas
and the earlier litigation in this Court, Mr. Williams alleged that the Defendants were
responsible for negligent construction that caused damage to his driveway, roof,
stucco, and other internal and exterior defects in his home. Here, too, his sole request
for relief is “damages for the full price” he paid for the home and “the [c]urrent value
of the property . . . if they hadn’t defrauded me and made all the repairs.”51 So the
cause of action giving rise to Mr. Williams’s earlier lawsuits—defective
workmanship and failure to repair—is directly “related in time, space, origin, or
49
As asserted by the Defendants in each litigation, Toll Brothers, Inc. is the proper entity name
rather than “Toll Brothers Builders.” But the Defendants’ Motion is unclear whether Mr. Klein
was a former employee of Toll Brothers, Inc. In back-to-back sentences, Defendants’ claim: “[a]t
all times Michael Klein was acting in his capacity as an employee of Toll Bros, Inc.[,]” but “Toll
Brothers, Inc., a separate entity and not the employer of Mr. Klein, continues to be omitted as a
named party.” See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 7, n.13. Regardless, counsel for Defendants accepted
service and entered their appearance on his behalf in this litigation. See D.I. 9.
50
To the extent Mr. Williams also seeks damages from Statewide Inspection for causing separate
and unrelated damage to his home, he must properly plead, file, and serve a suit against Statewide
Inspection. For purposes of this suit, however, because Mr. Williams neither named or impleaded
Statewide Inspection as a party, any supposed claims he has made against it will not considered.
51
Compl. at 7.
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motivation” to this cause of action seeking damages for the Defendants’ alleged
defective workmanship and failure to repair to his home. 52
Fourth, the prior actions were decided adversely to Mr. Williams each time.
The Court of Common Pleas determined that Mr. Williams must at the very least try
to resolve his disputes with the Defendants through binding arbitration and
dismissed his case without hearing the merits. Thus, when Mr. Williams refiled the
same complaint in this Court, res judicata precluded him from “initiat[ing] a third
proceeding [arising] out of the same operative facts.” 53 The Supreme Court of
Delaware affirmed the dismissal on the same basis.
As these decisions left nothing for the any of the courts to further determine
or consider, each decision was a final decree, thereby satisfying the fifth and final
prong of the res judicata test.54 Accordingly, the Defendants have established that
the same transaction formed the basis for both the present and former suits.
52
LaPoint, 970 A.2d at 193 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982)).
53
Williams II, Order for Dismissal ¶ 5.
54
See Showell Poultry, Inc. v. Delmarva Poultry Corp., 146 A.2d 794, 796 (Del. 1958) (“A final
judgment is generally defined as one which determines the merits of the controversy or the rights
of the parties and leaves nothing for future determination or consideration.”)
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2. Mr. Williams failed to assert claims which in fairness should have been
asserted in the first action.
The Defendants have also carried their second burden here. In their motion,
they argue that to the extent Mr. Williams now cites Wang as a basis for relief in this
action in this Court, res judicata precludes direct application and consideration of
Wang here. 55 They assert first that Wang is inapposite because the defendants there
actually submitted to arbitration before turning to traditional litigation—unlike here,
where neither the Defendants nor Mr. Williams seek to enter into such artbitral
proceedings. Even so, the Defendants argue that the Delaware Supreme Court
already addressed Wang’s inapplicability here, holding that the parties’ failure to
cite or address Wang in the 2019 Court of Common Pleas litigation did not warrant
reversal of this Court’s decision dismissing Mr. Williams’s new 2020 Superior Court
complaint.56
Though Mr. Williams cannot be entirely faulted for failing to raise Wang
himself during the pendency of his 2019 Court of Common Pleas case given his pro
se status, he did learn of its potential importance to his case soon thereafter, and his
55
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 8.
56
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failure to address it then (or ever) in the Court of Common Pleas, in part, has doomed
his attempts to initiate new cases here.
Accordingly, Mr. Williams cannot survive the pending motion to dismiss
unless he can establish that he was somehow impeded from presenting his entire
claim—including Wang—in the Court of Common Pleas litigation. And this he
cannot do.
3. Mr. Williams has not established there was an impediment to the
presentation of his entire claim in the Court of Common Pleas.
Though he cites to it now, not even a strained or liberal reading of
Mr. Williams’s complaint suggests an impediment precluded him from raising Wang
as a basis for relief in his initial Court of Common Pleas lawsuit. Tellingly, he also
failed to heed the Delaware Supreme Court’s directed guidance in preserving this
claim:
If Williams believed that the Court of Common Pleas overlooked
Wang, he should have cited it or pursued reargument or an appeal
on that basis. Indeed, even now, he might possibly seek relief
from the Court of Common Pleas under that court’s Civil Rule
60(b), but we express no opinion on whether relief would be
warranted in the circumstances of this case.” 57
57
Williams III, 2021 WL 3200825, at *2.
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Thus, Mr. Williams’s instant Complaint merely praising Wang as a “victory
for Delaware homeowners” is not enough to demonstrate that he was impeded from
presenting his full claim in the first instance. Claim preclusion “exists to provide a
definite end to litigation, prevent vexatious litigation, and promote judicial economy
. . . extend[ing] to all issues which might have been raised and decided in the first
suit.”58 So his failure to raise Wang in the earlier proceedings precludes him from
litigating the merits of its effect now in this litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because res judicata precludes Mr. Williams from pursuing the charges in his
most recent—but almost identical—complaint filed in this Court against those he
deems responsible for the problems with his home, the Court must GRANT
dismissal under its Rule 12(b)(6). The Court—as did the Delaware Supreme Court
last year—notes though that “even now, he might possibly seek relief from the Court
of Common Pleas under that court’s Civil Rule 60(b).”59 If Mr. Williams does,
58
Wilson v. Brown, 2012 WL 195393, at *4 (Del. Jan. 24, 2012) (internal citations omitted).
59
Williams III, 2021 WL 3200825, at *2.
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however, this Court too can “express no opinion on whether relief would be
warranted in the circumstances of this case.” 60
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________
Paul R. Wallace, Judge
60
Id.