GAP 41 Ventures, LLC v. Snehyasmeena Corporation

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GAP 41 VENTURES, L.L.C., a )
Delaware Limited Liability )
Company, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N17C-12-275 ALR
)
SNEHYASMEENA )
CORPORATION, a Delaware )
Corporation, and SUKHDEV S. )
KABOV, SNEHAL A. PATEL, and )
NAINSHAD B. MANECKSHAW, )
jointly and severally, )
)
Defendants. )
Submitted: January 7, 2020
Decided: January 8, 2020
Upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability
DENIED
ORDER
This action arises out of a commercial lease for a restaurant. Plaintiff, Gap 41
Ventures, LLC, leased certain premises to a corporation who is a party to this action,
Snehyasmeena Corporation. The other defendants are individuals whom Plaintiff
claims personally guaranteed the liability of the corporate entity, Sukhdev S. Kabov,
Snehal A. Patel, and Nainshad B. Maneckshaw. In a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment as to Liability, Plaintiff seeks judgment as a matter of law against Mr.
Kabov, one of the individual defendants. Defendant Kabov opposes the entry of
summary judgment on the grounds that there are genuine issues of material fact in
dispute. This is the Court’s decision on the motion for partial summary judgment as
to liability of Mr. Kabov.
The Court may grant summary judgment only where the moving party can
“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”1 The moving party bears the initial
burden of proof and, once that is met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
show that a material issue of fact exists.2 At the motion for summary judgment
phase, the Court must view the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.”3 Summary judgment is only appropriate if Plaintiff’s claims lack evidentiary
support such that no reasonable jury could find in its favor.4
The Court has considered Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure; applicable decisional law; the parties’ various submissions; the argument
of counsel at yesterday’s hearing; and the entire record. The Court finds there is a
1
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56.
2
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680–81 (Del. 1979).
3
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
4
See Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187, 1200–05 (Del.
2015); Edmisten v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2012 WL 3264925, at *2 (Del. Aug. 13,
2012).
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genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding whether Mr. Kabov guaranteed
the lease personally or whether he signed the guaranty on behalf of Yasmeena, Inc.,
who is not a party to this action.
Under the circumstances presented here, the Court declines to award judgment
as a matter of law regarding the personal liability of Mr. Kabov at this stage of the
proceedings. The Court notes this matter will proceed to a bench trial in March
2020.
NOW, THEREFORE, this 8th day of January 2020, Plaintiff’s motion
for partial summary judgment as to liability of Sukhdev S. Kabov is hereby
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
________ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ___ ________ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ____
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
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