Hylak v. Manor Care - Pike Creek of Wilmington, DE, LLC

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BRIDGET HYLAK as Power of )
Attorney for MARLENE HYLAK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N17C-04-148 ALR
)
MANOR CARE – PIKE CREEK )
OF WILMINGTON, DE, LLC, a )
Delaware Limited Liability Company, )
)
Defendants. )
Submitted: June 19, 2020
Decided: July 14, 2020
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
DENIED
ORDER
Upon consideration of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
Plaintiff’s response in opposition; the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; the
Delaware Rules of Evidence; the facts, arguments, and legal authorities set forth by
the parties; decisional law; and the entire record in this case, the Court hereby rules
as follows:
1. This civil lawsuit arises out of medical care received by Marlene Hylak
at Defendant’s nursing home/long-term-treatment facility. Plaintiff, as power of
attorney for Ms. Hylak, alleges that Ms. Hylak suffered injuries to her hip as a result
of Defendant’s negligent nursing care. The deadline for Plaintiff’s expert reports
was December 31, 2019.1 Among other reports not relevant to the instant motion,
Plaintiff produced the report of Elizabeth Ridgley, Plaintiff’s sole liability expert.
Ms. Ridgley is a Registered Nurse.
2. Defendant now moves for summary judgment arguing that Ms. Ridgley
is not qualified to testify regarding the applicable standard of care because Ms.
Ridgley lacks experience in the skilled nursing and long-term care settings. Because
Ms. Ridgley is not qualified, Defendant argues, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the initial
burden of proving a deviation from the standard of care, an element that must be
supported by expert testimony in Delaware.2
3. The Court may grant summary judgment only where the moving party
can “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”3 A genuine issue of material fact
is one that “may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”4 The moving party
bears the initial burden of proof and, once that is met, the burden shifts to the non-
moving party to show that a material issue of fact exists.5 At the motion for summary
judgment phase, the Court must view the facts “in the light most favorable to the
1
See D.I. 52.
2
18 Del. C. § 6853(e) (“No liability shall be based upon asserted negligence unless
expert medical testimony is presented as to the alleged deviation from the applicable
standard of care in the specific circumstances of the case . . . .”).
3
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
4
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680–81 (Del. 1979).
5
Id.
2
non-moving party.”6 Summary judgment is appropriate only if Plaintiff’s claims
lack evidentiary support such that no reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor.7
4. Section 6854 of Title 18 of the Delaware Code requires that a medical
expert testifying as to the standard of care be “familiar with the degree of skill
ordinarily employed in the field of medicine on which he or she will testify.”8 When
a witness’s qualifications are challenged under Section 6854, the burden is on the
party proffering the witness to establish that the witness meets Section 6854’s
requirements.9
5. Generally, a medical professional in one school of medicine is not
competent to testify about the standard of care in a different school of medicine.10
That general rule gives way, however, when “the methods of treating a particular
6
Brozka v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
7
See Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187, 1200–05 (Del.
2015); Edmisten v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2012 WL 3264925, at *2 (Del. Aug. 13,
2012).
8
18 Del. C. § 6854 (“No person shall be competent to give expert medical testimony
as to applicable standards of skill and care unless such person is familiar with the
degree of skill ordinarily employed in the field of medicine on which he or she will
testify.”).
9
See Loftus v. Hayden, 391 A.2d 749, 753 (Del. 1978) (“When objection is made to
[a medical expert’s] qualification, the witness must present facts from which the
Court can reasonably conclude that the witness has the foundation essential to the
expertise which he claims.”).
10
Miller v. Christiana Care Health, Servs., Inc., 2018 WL 4705932, at *3 (Del.
Super. Sept. 28, 2018); Hurley v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 1988 WL 130399, at *1
(Del. Super. Nov. 28, 1988).
3
ailment are generally the same in either school.”11 Plaintiff argues that the medical
setting in which Ms. Ridgley has nursing experience is not relevant to the standard
of care in this case. Plaintiff argues that Ms. Ridgley’s years of experience in nursing
generally, along with her education, training, and experience as a nursing educator
in a hospital’s rehabilitation unit, make her competent to opine about the standard of
care applicable to rehabilitation nurses, regardless of the types of medical facilities
in which she has worked. Defendant argues that Ms. Ridgley must have experience
in the skilled nursing and long-term care setting to be qualified to opine about the
standard of care applicable to nurses in those settings.
6. This Court addressed similar arguments in Miller v. Christiana Care
Health Services, Inc.,12 a medical negligence case involving emergency-room
doctors. Following an emergency-room visit that ended with a patient’s death, the
patient’s estate brought a medical negligence action against the hospital.13 The estate
offered the testimony of two standard of care experts who did not practice emergency
medicine but nonetheless had experience with the patient’s underlying medical
condition.14 In support of its motion for summary judgment, the hospital argued that
the experts’ lack of experience in the emergency-room setting rendered them
11
Hurley, 1988 WL 130399, at *2; accord Miller, 2018 WL 4705932, at *3.
12
2018 WL 4705932.
13
Id. at *1.
14
Id. at *2.
4
unqualified under Section 6854.15 This Court disagreed, finding that differences in
medical specialties or the setting of care between the treating professional and the
medical expert do not alone make the expert unqualified.16 Both experts testified
that the applicable standard of care was the same across medical specialties and does
not change based on the setting of care.17 Based on that testimony, the Court found
that the experts were qualified to testify and denied the hospital’s motion.18
7. Here, Ms. Ridgley, by affidavit, attests that she not only has “provided
care to patients similar to Ms. Hylak” but also has “provided nursing care to patients
who have undergone [the procedure from which Ms. Hylak was recovering] over
100 times.”19 Based on that experience, Ms. Ridgley confirms that the “standards of
care are not different in a hospital or in a skilled rehabilitation facility with respect
to postoperative care of these types of patients.”20 Ms. Ridgley’s affidavit also states
that a hip precaution, the procedure involved in this case, is a “standard nursing
procedure” that “does not differ from facility to facility.”21 Thus, like the estate in
Miller, Plaintiff has offered evidence showing that the applicable standard of care
15
Id.
16
Id. at *3–4.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex., at 2.
20
Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex., at 2.
21
Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex., at 2.
5
does not change based on medical specialty or setting of care.22 Therefore, while
Defendant is entitled to challenge Ms. Ridgley’s testimony at trial, Defendant is not
entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has produced evidence showing Ms.
Ridgley is qualified to testify under Section 6854.
NOW, THEREFORE, this 14th day of July 2020, Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
________ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ___ ________ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ____
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
22
See Miller, 2018 WL 4705932, at *4.
6