State v. Jiminez

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. # 1812006069
)
JONATHAN JIMINEZ, )
)
Defendant. )
Date Submitted: August 19, 2020
Date Decided: August 31, 2020
ORDER DENYING JONATHAN JIMINIZ’S MOTION
TO AMEND SENTENCE
This 31st day of August, 2020, upon consideration of the Motion to Amend
Sentence filed by Jonathan Jiminez (“Defendant”); Rule 35 of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Criminal Rule 35”); the facts, arguments and legal
authorities set forth in the Rule 35 Motion; and, the entire record in this case:
1. On December 17, 2018, Defendant was indicted on the following
felonies: (1) Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child; (2) Sexual Solicitation of a Child;
and (3) six counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact, Second Degree.1 Convictions of
these charges require registration as a Tier 2 sex offender and require public notice
1
From the time of indictment to the time of sentencing, Defendant was at
liberty.
of such status for 25 years. If convicted of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child,
Defendant faced a minimum mandatory sentence of two years at Level V.
2. On November 18, 2019, the State and Defendant negotiated a Plea
Agreement whereby Defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of Unlawful Sexual
Contact Third Degree. Defendant and the State agreed to recommend a sentence to
the Court of 30 days at Level V followed by two years of Level III probation.2
Following the plea, the Court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and scheduled
sentencing for March 20, 2020.
3. On March 13, 2020, counsel for Defendant requested a continuance of
the sentencing due to a conflict in counsel’s schedule. The Court approved this
request on March 16, 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, prevented
sentencing from occurring until August 7, 2020.
4. Prior to sentencing, counsel for Defendant and the State submitted
Sentencing Memorandums. In Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum, he changed
his position and requested that the Court impose no Level V time. Defendant also
requested that if the Court did impose Level V time, that it be served “Weekends
Only.” The State opposed any request that differed from the agreed-upon
recommendation in Defendant’s Plea Agreement.
2
Notably, on the Plea Agreement, Defendant circled – and initialed – the fact that
the State and Defendant were agreeing to a sentence that included 30 days of Level
V time.
2
5. On August 7, 2020, after reviewing the presentence investigation report
and hearing testimony from the State, the victims and Defendant, the Court followed
the State and Defendant’s recommendation for Level V time presented at the time
of the Plea Agreement and sentenced Defendant to the following: (1) for IN18-12-
1175: one year at Level V, suspended after 30 days followed by one year at Level
III probation; (2) for IN18-12-1176: one year at Level V, suspended for 1 year at
Level III probation; (3) for IN18-12-1177: one year at Level V, suspended for one
year at Level III probation; (4) for IN18-12-1178: one year at Level V, suspended
for one year Level III probation; and (5) IN18-12-1180: one year at Level V,
suspended for one year at Level III probation. The probation time for IN18-12-1175
and IN18-12-1176 is consecutive; the probation time for IN18-12-1177, IN-12-1178
and IN18-12-1180 is concurrent.
6. Defendant filed his Motion to Amend Sentence on August 14, 2020.
7. In the Motion, Defendant renewed his request that the Court modify his
sentence so that he may serve his Level V time on weekends only. Defendant seeks
this modification due to the negative impact his incarceration will have on his
employment and his family’s financial situation – the same arguments considered
and rejected by the Court during sentencing. Defendant contends that the Court did
not consider these consequences in determining Defendant’s sentence.
3
8. Defendant argues that if he loses his current employment, he will not
be employable at the same capacity in the future. This, Defendant argues, will have
an “extraordinarily deleterious” effect on his wife and two children. Although
Defendant’s wife is employed, the family relies on Defendant’s income in order to
pay the mortgage for the home they purchased in May 2020 and other living
expenses.
9. According to Defendant, prior to sentencing, he held a managerial
position in which he and three co-workers had an understanding that Defendant’s
absence due to incarceration would not result in job loss. During the last week of
July 2020, Defendant was offered, and accepted, a promotion to a position that
would not offer such protection. Defendant cites in his Motion “the blatant
unfairness to two innocent children whose lives and their futures, literally, are
impacted in a more substantial way if their father loses his employment” as a basis
for his sentence modification.
10. Pursuant to Criminal Rule 35(b), the Court may reduce a sentence of
imprisonment on a motion made within 90 days after the sentence is imposed.3 The
intent of Criminal Rule 35(b) has historically been to provide a reasonable period
for the Court to consider alteration of its sentencing judgments.4 Where a motion
3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
4
Johnson v. State, 234 A.2d 447, 448 (Del. 1967) (per curiam).
4
for reduction of sentence is filed under Criminal Rule 35(b), within 90 days of
sentencing, the Court has broad discretion to decide if it should alter its judgment.5
“The reason for such a rule is to give a sentencing judge a second chance to consider
whether the initial sentence is appropriate.”6
11. Defendant filed his Motion on August 14, 2020, less than 90 days after
the imposition of the sentence, and has, therefore, made a timely request under
Criminal Rule 35.7
12. Although timely filed, Defendant’s Motion lacks merit and is denied.
“The point of a plea agreement is to secure the client the most certainty he can get
as to his sentence by reaching an agreement with the State about the recommended
sentence, and then advocating to the court that it should accept the parties’ good faith
agreement.”8 The sentence in this case was imposed pursuant to a Plea Agreement
between the State and Defendant and signed by Defendant. Pursuant to Superior
Court Criminal Procedural Rule 11(c)(1), the Court addressed Defendant personally
in open court and determined that Defendant understood the nature of the charge to
5
Hewett v. State, 2014 WL 5020251, at *1 (Del. Oct. 7, 2014) (“When, as here, a
motion for reduction of sentence is filed within ninety days of sentencing, the
Superior Court has broad discretion to decide whether to alter its judgment.”).
6
State v. Reed, 2014 WL 7148921, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 16, 2014) (citing United
States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541–43 (2d. Cir. 1968) (explaining the time
limitation and purpose of then-existent sentence reduction provision of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 35, the federal analogue to current Criminal Rule 35(b)).
7
Del. Super. Crim. R. 35(b).
8
State v. Harden, 180 A.3d 1037, 1049 (Del. 2018).
5
which the plea was offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if
any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law. Accordingly, Defendant
acknowledged in open court that the range of possible penalties included the
sentence that was imposed by the Court in this case.
13. Unlike in Harden, the same counsel represented Defendant here from
January 2019 through sentencing – a time that spanned a year and seven months. As
a result, Counsel had sufficient time to investigate mitigating evidence and prepare
Defendant for allocution and sentencing.9 In addition, prior to sentencing, the Court
received sentencing memoranda from both the State and Defense counsel, where the
issues of aggravating and mitigating factors were discussed.
14. In considering the appropriate sentence to impose, the Court considered
the victim impact statements, the submissions by the State and Defendant, the pre-
sentence investigation, Defendant’s criminal history and custody status at the time
of the offense, Defendant’s family history and the statutory range of penalties for
each offense set by the Legislature.
15. Moreover, during sentencing, the Court permitted Defendant and
Defense counsel an opportunity to address the Court, which they did. The Court
also discussed the practical difficulties associated with an individual going in and
out of incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such an arrangement would
9
Id. at 1050.
6
pose serious health risks to other incarcerated individuals, facility staff, and the
public, in addition to the Defendant, himself. The Department of Correction has
instituted a number of restrictions in order to minimize health and safety risks due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the State’s response to Defendant’s
Motion, weekend incarcerations have been suspended. Even if the Court were to
find sentence modification appropriate in this case, which it does not, the
modification Defendant seeks is not possible.
16. Defendant’s current situation is the culmination of several deliberate
decisions he made, including the original underlying criminal conduct, pleading
guilty, and deciding not to attempt to make arrangements with his employer ahead
of sentencing, despite previously agreeing to the State’s sentencing
recommendation.10 Courts have consistently rejected familial and financial
hardship as bases for granting a Rule 35 motion, and they are not appropriate factors
for consideration in the context of a sentence modification motion.11
17. Defendant had nearly nine months between pleading guilty and his
sentencing. This was more than sufficient time to prepare for the sentencing hearing
and for the sentence itself. In fact, had Defendant’s counsel not requested a
10
See Iverson v. State, 2010 WL 376899, at *1 (Del. Jan. 12, 2010); State v. Liket,
2002 WL 31133101, at *3 (Del. Sept. 25, 2002).
11
Liket, 2002 WL 31133101, at *3 (citing United States v. Ashor, 1996 WL 164948,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1996); United States v. Stein, 1992 WL 55722, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 11, 1992)).
7
continuance in the sentencing, the Court would have sentenced Defendant in March
2020.
18. The Court is not bound by the State’s or Defendant’s sentence
recommendations, but courts traditionally give respect and deference to good faith
plea bargains, such as the one made here.12 Defendant had no reason not to anticipate
being sentenced to 30 days at Level V, as this was precisely what the State and the
Defendant recommended as a result of his guilty plea.13
19. The State contends that Defendant’s reasoning for seeking modification
of his sentence shows a lack of remorse for the harm he caused his victims. Based
on Defendant’s submissions, the Court agrees. Defendant continues to focus on the
negative consequences his sentence will have on his own life and appears to lack
understanding of the extent of the harm he caused his two victims.14
20. The sentence is appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of
sentencing. No additional information has been provided to the Court that would
warrant a reduction or modification of this sentence. In fact, no new information
has been provided to the Court at all that was not previously considered prior to or
during sentencing. The sentence imposed was well within the statutory guidelines,
as well as reasonable and just under the circumstances presented.
12
See Harden, 180 A.3d at 1051.
13
Cf. Id. at 1047–49.
14
See Id. at 1039–40.
8
21. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this Court finds that
Defendant has not demonstrated cause for the relief sought in the Rule 35 Motion.
IT IS ORDERED that Jonathan Jiminez’s Motion to Amend Sentence is
DENIED.
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