State v. Guseman

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) ID Nos. 1905004486
) Cr. A. Nos. IN19-06-0415, etc.
JEFFREY C. GUSEMAN, )
Defendant. )
Submitted: December 11, 2020
Decided: March 10, 2021
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE
(1) This 10th day of March, 2021, upon consideration of the
Defendant Jeffrey C. Guseman’s Motion for Sentence Reduction (D.I. 21), his
supplement to that motion (D.I. 25), the State’s Response (D.I. 26), and the
record in this matter, it appears to the Court that:
(2) On November 4, 2019, Jeffrey C. Guseman pleaded guilty to two
counts of manslaughter and one count of assault second degree (as a lesser
offense of assault in the first degree).1 He did so in exchange for the State’s
downgrading of the felony-assault count, dismissing of certain traffic-related
charges, and capping of its sentencing recommendation to 15 years of
1
Plea Agreement and TIS Guilty Plea Form, State v. Jeffrey C. Guseman, ID No.
1905004486 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2019) (D.I. 13).
unsuspended imprisonment.2 These offenses arose from a motor vehicle
collision that killed a husband and wife and seriously injured their adult son.
(3) Around 10:30 p.m. on Saturday night, August 18, 2018, Mr.
Guseman was driving his F150 pickup southbound on Salem Church Road.
Prashanth Raju was going northbound on the same road in his Toyota Camry.
In the rear seat of Mr. Raju’s car, were his parents—Mr. Raju Chanappa and
Mrs. Lakshmidezi Hanumanthappa. Mr. Guseman was behind another
uninvolved vehicle that he, for no reason at all, decided to pass in a no-passing
zone.
To do so, Mr. Guseman crossed over the solid double yellow line and
drove the wrong way in the single northbound lane at a speed of 70 MPH.
The speed limit there for one travelling in his assigned lane and in the correct
direction of travel is only 35 MPH. Mr. Gusemen crashed into the victims
head-on causing Mr. Raju’s Camry to overturn. When the lead investigator
arrived, Mr. Raju was still pinned in the driver’s seat of his overturned car, his
father was being ambulanced to the hospital, and EMTs were performing CPR
on his mother.
2
Id.
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Mr. Chanappa was pronounced dead immediately upon his arrival at
the emergency room. His wife, Mrs. Hanumanthappa, lingered for several
days and finally succumbed to her injuries on August 23 rd. Their son, Mr.
Raju, suffered fractures and multiple blunt force trauma injuries to all of his
upper and lower extremities.
When Mr. Guseman was taken to the hospital for treatment, he admitted
that he had had a couple of beers earlier in the day—and two of his beer cans
were found at the scene—but Mr. Guseman’s blood test registered no blood
alcohol or illicit drug content.
After the complete accident and forensic investigation, Mr. Guseman
was indicted for Mr. Chanappa and Mrs. Hanumanthappa’s deaths and
Mr. Raju’s assault.3 Before this, Mr. Guseman had a pretty minor criminal
history. But, before this, he had a long (twenty-three-year) and awful driving
record reflective of just the type of behavior he exhibited the night of August
18th. That history of driving convictions included, inter alia: no less than four
separate incidents of following too closely (accident-related); no less than two
separate incidents of careless driving (accident-related); three separate
3
Indictment and Rule 9 Warrant, State v. Jeffrey C. Guseman, ID No. 1905004486 (Del.
Super. Ct. May 13, 2019) (D.I. 1) (charging Mr. Guseman with two counts of manslaughter,
one count assault in the first degree, and three related traffic charges).
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inattentive driving violations (two accident-related, one not); two distinct
improper passing convictions; and five different speeding offenses.
(4) As mentioned earlier, Mr. Guseman entered his guilty plea in
November 2019. His sentencing occurred on July 10, 2020, after a
comprehensive presentence investigative (PSI) report was prepared. In
addition to those materials compiled in the PSI report, Mr. Guseman’s counsel
submitted, and the Court considered, a forensic psychiatric report authored by
forensic psychiatrist Neil S. Kaye, MD, and a mitigation report prepared by
mitigation specialist Teresa Sipagan. All of these materials that spoke to the
applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances present here were fully
examined by the Court before imposing Mr. Guseman’s sentence.
(5) Mr. Guseman was sentenced: (a) for Manslaughter (N19-05-
0415W-Victim Raju Channappa)—25 years at Level V suspended after
serving five years at Level V for 20 years at Level IV (DOC Discretion),
suspended after serving six months at Level IV, for two years at Level III
(TASC); (b) for Manslaughter (N19-05-0416W-Victim Lakshmidevi
Hanumanthappa)—25 years at Level V suspended after serving five years at
Level V with no probation to follow; and (c) for Assault Second Degree (N19-
-4-
05-0417W-Victim Prashanth Raju)—Eight years at Level V suspended after
serving two years and six months at Level V with no probation to follow 4
(6) His sentencing order provides that Mr. Guseman’s sentence is
effective November 4, 2019, that the Level V terms for the manslaughter
counts are to be served concurrently while the Level V term for the felony
assault counts is to be served consecutive thereto, and that he is to be held at
Level V until space is available for his Level IV placement.5
(7) In short, Mr. Guseman’s seven-and-a-half-year period of
unsuspended imprisonment is comprised of the two concurrent two-year
minimum terms of incarceration that must be imposed under Delaware’s
manslaughter statute and that cannot be suspended6 and the additional five and
one-half years that the Court imposed as an exercise of its own sentencing
judgment.
4
Sentence Order, State v. Jeffrey C. Guseman, ID No. 1905004486 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov.
4, 2019) (D.I. 13). There are numerous financial, no-contact, evaluation and treatment
terms and conditions included as part of Mr. Guseman’s sentence. But as those are not
challenged in his motion, they are not fully recounted here.
5
Id.
6
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 632 and 4205(b)(2) (2018) (manslaughter is a class
B felony with a minimum term of two years at Level V); id. at § 4205(d) (“Where a
minimum, mandatory, mandatory minimum or minimum mandatory sentence is required
by . . . this section, such sentence shall not be subject to suspension by the court.”)
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(8) Mr. Guseman filed no direct appeal of his convictions or
sentences. Instead, he docketed the present motion under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 35(b) requesting substantial reduction of his cumulative prison
term.7 Mr. Guseman asks that the Court reduce his sentence to a total of five
years imprisonment suspended after completion of a Level V substance
abuse/mental health program followed by continued treatment at Level IV and
while on community supervision.8
(9) The Court may consider Mr. Guseman’s motion “without
presentation, hearing or argument.”9 The Court decide his motion on the
papers filed and the complete sentencing record in this case.
(10) When considering motions for sentence reduction, “this Court
addresses any applicable procedural bars before turning to the merits.”10 As
7
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b) (providing that, under certain conditions, the court may
reduce a sentence of imprisonment on an inmate’s motion); Jones v. State, 2003 WL
21210348, at *1 (Del. May 22, 2003) (“There is no separate procedure, other than that
which is provided under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35, to reduce or modify a
sentence.”).
8
D.I. 21 (Mr. Guseman specifically requests assignment to the KEY/CREST treatment
continuum. But that program has been phased out by the Department of Correction and
replaced with another Level V mental health/substance abuse treatment program.).
9
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
10
State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 6Lveel 06 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015).
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Mr. Guseman’s motion is his first and is timely filed, the Court finds there are
no procedural bars to the consideration of his request under Rule 35(b).
(11) The purpose of Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) historically
has been to provide a reasonable period for the Court to consider alteration of
its sentencing judgments.11 When an inmate files his motion for reduction of
his incarcerative term within 90 days of his sentencing, the Court has broad
discretion to decide whether to alter its judgment.12 “The reason for such a
rule is to give a sentencing judge a second chance to consider whether the
initial sentence is appropriate.”13 But, no doubt, as movant, Mr. Guseman
must shoulder the burden of establishing just cause for reduction or
modification of his otherwise legal sentence.14
11
Johnson v. State, 234 A.2d 447, 448 (Del. 1967) (per curiam).
12
Hewett v. State, 2014 WL 5020251, at *1 (Del. Oct. 7, 2014) (“When, as here, a motion
for reduction of sentence is filed within ninety days of sentencing, the Superior Court has
broad discretion to decide whether to alter its judgment.”); State v. Williams, 2015 WL
757551, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015) (“Where a motion for reduction of sentence is
filed within 90 days of sentencing, the Court has broad discretion to decide if it should alter
its judgment.”).
13
State v. Remedio, 108 A.3d 326, 331 (Del. Super. Ct. 2014) (internal citations and
quotations omitted) (observing that such a request is essentially a plea for leniency: an
appeal to the sentencing court to reconsider and show mercy).
14
See State v. Joseph, 2018 WL 1895697, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2018) (“The
burden is upon the movant to establish cause to modify a lawfully imposed sentence.”).
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(12) The Court has examined Mr. Guseman’s claim—i.e., his request
that the Court reconsider and decide if, on further reflection, its sentence now
seems unduly harsh—on the merits. Under every iteration of Delaware’s
criminal rules governing motions to reduce sentences, such entreaties are
addressed to the sound discretion of this Court.15
(13) Mr. Guseman cites several reasons that the Court should reduce
his sentence to no more than that that needed to complete a substance abuse
program: (a) his physical and mental health issues that he believes led to his
behavior and that he is willing to address through treatment; (b) his
completion of one year of his sentence as “an exemplary prisoner”; (c) his
training and history of gainful employment as a plumber; (d) his family
support and its need for his financial and other support; and (e) his remorse.16
(14) At bottom in this sentence reduction motion, Mr. Guseman asks
that the Court reweigh mitigating circumstances he believes were present at
the time of his sentencing and then reduce his term of imprisonment. “A
request for leniency and reexamination of the sentencing factors is precisely
the stuff of which a proper and timely Rule 35(b) motion is made.”17
15
Hewett, 2014 WL 5020251, at *1. See also Shy v. State, 246 A.2d 926 (Del. 1968);
Lewis v. State, 1997 WL 123585, at *1 (Del. Mar. 5, 1997).
16
D. I. 21 and 25.
17
Remedio, 108 A.3d at 331-32 (emphasis in original).
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(15) The Court may exercise great discretion when entertaining a
timely Rule 35(b) application, but it has no authority to reduce or suspend the
mandatory portion of any substantive statutory minimum sentence.18 Again,
Mr. Guseman must serve no less than the concurrent minimum two-year terms
of imprisonment for his manslaughter convictions. And again, that is a
minimum term of incarceration that is required and cannot be suspended or
reduced.19 Mr. Guseman’s requested reduction would violate that two-year
minimum required by 11 Del. C. §§ 632, 4205(b)(2) and 4205(d). That the
Court cannot do.20 So the Court turns to the remaining five-and-a-half-year
period of incarceration that it imposed in its own sentencing discretion.
(16) By the time of sentencing, the Court had been well-informed of
Mr. Guseman’s history of mental health issues. The Court had familiarized
18
State v. Sturgis, 947 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. 2008) (“Superior Court Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35(b) provides no authority for a reduction or suspension of the mandatory
portion of a substantive statutory minimum sentence.”) (emphasis in original).
19
See n.6, supra.
20
See Williams, 2015 WL 757551, at *2 (Addressing a request to reduce a two-year
minimum term imposed for a class B felony and holding “while the Court has wide
discretion to reduce a sentence upon a timely Rule 35 application, the Court has no
authority to reduce or suspend the mandatory portion of any substantive statutory minimum
sentence.”); State v. McFarland, 2020 WL 3564615, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 1, 2020)
(“[T]he Court has no authority to reduce or suspend the mandatory portion of any
substantive minimum sentence.”); State v. Puligini, 2020 WL 4036218, at *3 (Del. Super.
Ct. July 15, 2020) (same).
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itself with Mr. Guseman’s full social and work history. The Court has never
doubted the sincerity of Mr. Guseman’s remorse for decimating the
Channappa-Hanumanthappa family. And the Court commends Mr. Guseman
for the strides he has made during the Level V term of this sentence, as well
as, his expressed desire to seek further treatment after his release. But these
mitigators just don’t outweigh the aggravating circumstances present in this
case. Those aggravators include the specifics of Mr. Guseman’s crime, its
dire permanent effect, and the history of Mr. Guseman’s repetitive driving
conduct over more than two decades—it was predictable that at some point
Mr. Guseman was going to take a life on the road. Unfortunately, he took
two.
(17) That said, the Court has fully reviewed Mr. Guseman’s
application, the record of his case, his prior criminal and driving history, and
all sentencing information available. The Court carefully weighed the
applicable aggravators and mitigators before imposing its sentence. The
Court finds that when those and all other sentencing factors in his case are
reconsidered, Mr. Guseman’s statements of regret may be commendable, his
desire to engage treatment admirable, and his work history impressive, but
they do not warrant a sentence reduction here. Instead, after a thorough
review of the merits of Mr. Guseman’s request, the Court finds its original
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sentencing judgment is appropriate for the reasons stated at the time it was
rendered.
(18) Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion under Rule
35(b)21 and DENY Mr. Guseman’s request to reduce the seven and one-half-
year term of imprisonment he must serve.
SO ORDERED this 10th day of March, 2021.
Paul R. Wallace, Judge
Original to Prothonotary
cc: Mr. Jeffrey C. Guseman, pro se
Barzilai K. Axelrod, Deputy Attorney General
Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire
Investigative Services Office
21
Hewett, 2014 WL 5020251, at *1; Rondon v. State, 2008 WL 187964, at *1 (Del. Jan.
15, 2008) (“The merit of a sentence modification under Rule 35(b) is directed to the sound
discretion of the Superior Court.”).
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