State v. Dixon

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
CRAIG A. KARSNITZ 1 The Circle, Suite 2
RESIDENT JUDGE GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
March 23, 2022
Traevon Dixon
SBI #656483
Unit 18-AL-6
James T. Vaughan Correctional Center
1181 Paddock Road
Smyrna, DE 19977
Stephanie Tsantes, Esquire
Office of Conflicts Counsel
116 West Market Street
Georgetown, DE 19947
Kevin Gardner, Esquire
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
13 The Circle
Georgetown, DE 19947
Re: State of Delaware v. Traevon Dixon
Def. ID# 1809015332
Motion for Postconviction Relief (R-1)
Motion for Appointment of Postconviction Counsel
Dear Mr. Dixon and Counsel:
On March 7, 2022, Traevon Dixon (“Dixon” or “Movant”) filed his Motion
for the Appointment of Postconviction Counsel (the “PCC Motion”) and on March
9, 2022, Movant filed his first pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief (the “Rule 61
Motion”) in connection with the above-referenced case. This is my decision on
both Motions.
On September 24, 2019, I accepted Movant’s guilty pleas to two charges:
Murder in the Second Degree (“Murder”) and Possession of a Firearm during the
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”). On February 26, 2020, on the Murder charge
I sentenced Movant to thirty (30) years of incarceration at Level 5, with credit for
516 days already served, suspended after fifteen (15) years for six (6) months at
Level 4 Work Release, followed by six (6) months at Level 4 Home Confinement,
followed by two (2) years at Level 3 probation. That same day, on the PFDCF
charge I sentenced Movant to incarceration for five (5) years at Level 5, with no
probation to follow.
Movant did not take a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, and has
filed no other motions or petitions seeking relief from the judgment in state or federal
court.
PCC Motion
Rule 61 provides that I shall appoint postconviction counsel for Movant for
his first timely Rule 61 Motion if it seeks to set aside, inter alia, a judgment of
conviction after a trial that has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate
review and is for a crime designated as a class A, B, or C felony under 11 Del. C.
2
§4205(b).1 In this case, although this is Movant’s first Rule 61 Motion, it is not
timely (see discussion below) and there was no trial affirmed by direct appellate
review, notwithstanding the class of the felony. Thus, I am not obligated to appoint
postconviction counsel for Movant.
Rule 61 further provides that I may appoint counsel for Movant for his first
timely Rule 61 Motion if it seeks to set aside a judgment of conviction that resulted
from a guilty plea (as in this case) only if I determine that: (i) the conviction has
been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review; (ii) the Rule 61 Motion
sets forth a substantial claim that Movant received ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel in relation to his guilty plea; (iii) granting the Rule 61 Motion would result
in vacatur of the judgment of conviction for which Movant is in custody; and (iv)
specific exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of postconviction
counsel.2 In this case, although this is Movant’s first Rule 61 Motion, it is not timely
(see discussion below), there was no direct appellate review, Movant’s claims about
the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel are insubstantial, and there are no other
exceptional circumstances that warrant the appointment of postconviction counsel.
The Motion to Appoint Postconviction Counsel is DENIED.
1
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2)(i).
2
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
3
Rule 61 Motion
Before addressing the merits of the Rule 61 Motion, I first address the four
procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).3 If a procedural bar exists,
as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim. 4 Under
the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for post-
conviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, procedural
default, or former adjudication.5
First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed
more than one year after the conviction becomes final, or if it asserts a retroactively
applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final,
more than one year after the right was first recognized by the Supreme Court of
Delaware or the United States Supreme Court.6 In this case, Movant’s conviction
became final for purposes of Rule 61 thirty (30) days after I imposed sentence on
February 26, 2020, because he did not file a direct appeal.7 Movant filed his pro se
Rule 61 Motion on March 7, 2022, well beyond the one-year period. The Rule 61
3
Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.
1990).
4
Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del.
Super. April 28, 2009).
5
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
7
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1).
4
Motion does not assert a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after
the judgment of conviction is final, more than one year after the right was first
recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or the United States Supreme Court.
Therefore, consideration of the Rule 61 Motion is procedurally barred by the one-year
limitation.
I need not consider the other three procedural bars under Rule 61 since the Rule
61 Motion is untimely.
The four procedural bars to do not apply either to a claim that the Court lacked
jurisdiction or to a claim that pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that
creates a strong inference of actual innocence,8 or that a new retroactively applied
rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.9 Movant asserts no such
claims.
Since the Rule 61 Motion is procedurally barred, it is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
_____________________________
/s/Craig A. Karsnitz, Resident Judge
cc: Prothonotary
8
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
9
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
5