Lewes Public Library, Inc. v. New Covenant Presbyterian Church, Inc.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LEWES PUBLIC LIBRARY, INC., )
)
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. S19C-08-020 MHC
)
NEW COVENANT PRESBYTERIAN )
CHURCH, INC., )
)
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Submitted: December 9, 2021
Decided: March 23, 2022
Robert G. Gibbs, Esquire, R. Eric Hacker, Esquire, Morris James LLP, Georgetown, Delaware.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Lewes Public Library, Inc.
Daniel A. Griffith, Esquire, Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLC, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney
for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff New Covenant Presbyterian Church, Inc.
Conner, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This is the Court’s decision following a one day bench trial on September 7,
2021, and post-trial briefing regarding a real property dispute between
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Lewes Public Library, Inc. (the “Library”) and
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff New Covenant Presbyterian Church, Inc. (the
“Church”). The Library seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 6502
that its rights have vested in certain real property located in Sussex County,
Delaware. The Church holds a contingent future interest in the same real property
and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the Church’s rights to the
property vested and the interests of the Library were extinguished. Ultimately, the
Court is asked to define the intent of a grantor of property. The Court has carefully
considered the arguments, record, applicable statutes and relevant case law. For the
following reasons, the Library’s complaint for a declaratory judgment is
GRANTED.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2011, the Library began exploring locations for a new primary facility.1
Based upon the Library’s publicly announced need to relocate, Olde Towne Pointe,
1
Trial Tr. 17:1–5; see also Pl.’s Post-Trial Opening Br. 1.
2
LLC (the “Grantor”) offered to donate two parcels of land consisting of 2.61 acres
located in Lewes, Delaware (the “Property”) to the Library for use as the location of
the Library’s new main facility.2
In March 2012, the Library publicly announced the selection of 111 Adams
Avenue in Lewes, Delaware as the site of its new main facility.3 The following day,
Ms. Beckie Healey (“Healey”), then-president of the Library Board of
Commissioners, emailed Mr. Christian Hudson (“Hudson”), then-manager of the
Grantor, to advise him of the Library’s decision to select Adams Avenue as the site
for the primary Library facility and to decline Hudson’s offer to donate the Property.4
Hudson emailed a response indicating that his family would still like to contribute
financially to the Library.5
In December 2012, the Grantor recorded a deed (the “Deed”) conditionally
gifting the Property to the Library.6 Hudson executed the Deed on behalf of the
Grantor.7 The Grantor and the Library did not communicate between the
forementioned March 2012 email exchange and the recording of the Deed in
December of that same year.8 Under the Deed, the Library had ten years to use the
2
Joint Ex. 4 at 3; Trial Tr. 31:2–8; Joint Ex. 8. The two parcels in question are now designated as
Sussex County Tax Parcel 335-12.00-1.10 and Sussex County Tax Parcel 335-12.00-632.00.
3
Trial Tr. 32:23–33:16; Joint Ex. 13.
4
Pl.’s Ex. 1.
5
Id.; Trial Tr. 39:6–20.
6
Joint Ex. 7.
7
Id. at 2.
8
Trial Tr. 40:22–42:7, 69:2–71:4; Def.’s Post-Trial Opening Br. 10.
3
Property for a “library facility.” If not, the Property would pass to a non-profit
subsidiary of the Villages of Five Points Property Owners Association (“the
Association”) or to the Church.9 Notably, the Deed did not define the term “library
facility.” The Deed states in pertinent part:
PROVIDED, however, if the Grantee, Lewes Public Library, Inc. accepts the gift,
but fails to use the Property for a library facility, within ten (10) years of the
recording of this Deed, in that event, title to the Property shall be transferred to a
wholly owned subsidiary of The Villages of Five Points Property Owners
Association, Inc., which operates as a qualified U.S. Internal Revenue Code §
501(c)(3) organization . . . . If the Grantee refuses to accept the gift or rejects the
gift of the Property and the First Subsequent Grantee does not qualify under
501(c)(3) on the date its executory interest would otherwise vest title in the First
Subsequent Grantee, then in that event, title shall vest in New Covenant
Presbyterian Church . . . .10
On January 25, 2013, the Library’s Board of Commissioners voted to accept
the donation of the Property11 and soon thereafter it notified the IRS of the gift.12
The Grantor ceased operating in 2015.13 In June 2016, the Library opened the new
primary library facility at 111 Adams Avenue, Lewes, Delaware.14
On June 26, 2018, the Sussex County Planning & Zoning Commission
approved the Library’s final site plan for construction of a patio with a book
9
Joint Ex. 7.
10
Id.
11
Trial Tr. 42:8–44:18; Pl.’s Ex. 2.
12
See Pl.’s Ex. 3.
13
Pre-Tr. Stip. ¶2.
14
Trial Tr. 45:15–17.
4
exchange kiosk and two benches (the “Structure”) on the Property.15 Before the Deed
was recorded, the Property became subject to Sussex County Ordinances requiring
i) that the Property be used for “community service uses,” and ii) that the Grantor
“maintain architectural and signage control of any facility” on the Property.16 Sussex
County’s approval of the final site plan stated that the Structure qualified as a
community service use under the applicable Sussex County Ordinance.17 The
Library also obtained a Sussex County building permit for construction of the
Structure.18
In March 2019, the Library built the Structure on the Property.19 Sussex
County issued a Certificate of Occupancy/Compliance on March 14, 2019, which
stated that the Structure conformed with the Building Code and Zoning Code for
Sussex County.20 The Structure holds approximately 100 books of various genres
and reading levels at any given time.21 Individuals associated with the Library
regularly rotate the books available at the Structure and it was well used especially
during the pandemic.22
15
Lewes Pub. Library, Inc. v. New Covenant Presbyterian Church, Inc., 2020 WL 4731146, at
*1 (Del. Super. Aug. 14, 2020); Pl.’s Ex. 15; Joint Ex. 10.
16
Joint Ex. 3 at 2.
17
Joint Ex. 10.
18
Joint Ex. 11.
19
Trial Tr. 93:3–14, 145:13–17.
20
Joint Ex. 12.
21
Trial Tr. 160:16–63:9.
22
Id.5
On August 19, 2019, the Library asked this Court for a declaratory
judgment that its interest in the Property vested.23 The Church, being the
Library’s last remaining adversary,24 counterclaimed for a declaratory
judgment that the Church’s rights to the Property vested and the interests of
the Library extinguished.25 Both parties moved for summary judgment.26 The
Court denied the Library’s motion for summary judgment ruling that the intent
of the Grantor needed to be ascertained and dismissed the Church’s
counterclaim without prejudice.27
At trial, both Parties introduced into evidence several newspaper
articles regarding the Property dispute. Without objection, an April 2013 Cape
Gazette article became part of the record.28 The article was published more
than one year after the Library publicly decided on Adams Avenue as the site
for the new main library facility. In the context of discussing the Property
dispute, the article quoted Hudson as saying, “I think the property owners
23
See Compl. ¶ 82.
24
See Lewes Pub. Library, Inc. v. New Covenant Presbyterian Church, Inc., Del. Super., C.A.
No. S19C-08-020, Conner, J. (Apr. 30, 2021) (ORDER).
25
See Def.’s Answ. to Pl’s Compl., Cross-cl. & Countercl.
26
Lewes Pub. Library, Inc., 2020 WL 4731146, at *1.
27
Id. at *3.
28
Pl’s Ex. 16; Trial Tr. 198:8–13; 228:14–29:5; see generally Beeks v. State, 129 A.3d 231 (Del.
2015) (TABLE).
6
association is mad because they didn't get the property, but we wanted the
library to get it.”29
III. PARTY CONTENTIONS
The Library and the Church have argued exhaustively over whether the use of
the term “library facility” in the Deed meant that the Grantor intended for a fully
functioning library to be built on the Property. Both parties have highlighted certain
attributes of the Structure in efforts to bolster their arguments as to whether the
Structure is a library facility. The Library has emphasized that the Structure has been
used extensively by community members and refers to it as the “Lending Library.”30
Conversely, the Church has focused on the fact that the Structure takes up less than
one percent of the Property and prefers calling the Structure a “little gazebo.”31
The Library contends that it accepted the Grantor’s offer to gift the Property
when the Library’s Board voted to accept the gift and the Library notified the IRS
of the gifted Property. The Library further contends that the Structure falls within
the broad definition of a “library facility” as specified in the Deed. Thus, according
29
Pl’s Ex. 16.
30
Trial Tr. 10:7–9; see also Pl.’s Post-Trial Answering Br. 1, 12.
31
Trial Tr. 22:19–23:2; see also Def.’s Post-Trial Opening Br. 14, 26.
7
to the Library, title has fully vested in the Library because the Library has satisfied
both conditions of the Deed.
The Church argues that the intent of the Grantor was for the Library to construct
a full-fledged library on the Property, and since the Library failed to do so it has not
fulfilled the Deed restrictions. The Church also raises other contentions including
that the Library is unable to take title to the Property because the Structure exists in
violation of restrictions imposed by Sussex County Ordinances and by the Five Point
Property Owners Association. The Court is dismissing these arguments since neither
Sussex County nor the Association are parties to the litigation at this time.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ten Del. C. § 6501 states in relevant part, “[e]xcept where the Constitution of
this State provides otherwise, courts of record within their respective jurisdictions
shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. . . .” 32 The Superior Court Civil Rules as well
as case law make clear that “[t]he existence of another adequate remedy does not
preclude a judgment for declaratory relief . . . .”33
32
10 Del. C. § 6512 (providing that, “[t]his chapter . . . is to be liberally construed and
administered.”).
33
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 57; Clemente v. Greyhound Corp., 155 A.2d 316, 321 (Del. Super. 1959).
8
For a declaratory judgment to be appropriate:
1) the controversy must involve a claim of right or other legal interest of the party
seeking declaratory relief;
2) the claim of right or other legal interest must be asserted against one who has
an interest in contesting the claim;
3) the conflicting interests must be real and adverse; and
4) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination. 34
“Superior Court has jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action only if it
would otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of the declaratory
judgment action.”35 “Normally actions to determine title to land are actions at law,
and thus within this Court's jurisdiction.”36 Specifically, the Delaware Supreme
Court has acknowledged this Court’s role in construing terms in the context of
deed restrictions.37
34
Weiner v. Selective Way Ins. Co., 793 A.2d 434, 439 (Del. Super. 2002) (citing Rollins Int'l
Inc. v. International Hydronics Corp., 303 A.2d 660, 662 (Del. 1973)).
35
Burris v. Cross, 583 A.2d 1364, 1377 (Del. Super. 1990).
36
Id.; see also Walker v. Five N. Corp., 2007 WL 2473278, at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 31, 2007);
Wolfman v. Jablonski, 99 A.2d 494, 497 (Del. Ch. 1953) (“This court, generally speaking, will
not decide title to real estate.”).
37
See Seaford Golf & Country Club v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 925 A.2d 1255, 1261
(Del. 2007).
9
V. DISCUSSION
A. Declaratory Judgment is the Proper Vehicle to determine the
Library’s Claim
The Library’s claim clearly meets the four above-mentioned prerequisites to
pursuing a declaratory judgment under 10 Del. C. § 6501. Both parties in this case
claim an interest in the Property. The action involves their rights and legal relations.
Those interests are real and adverse. And finally, this matter is ripe for judicial
determination.38
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction in the present case. This is not an
action to remove cloud from title,39 reform or cancel a deed. Rather, the Library asks
the Court to interpret a contract in hopes of a declaration that it is the rightful owner
of the Property. This Court has jurisdiction to interpret a contract independent of the
Delaware Declaratory Judgment Act.40
38
See XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. WMI Liquidating Tr., 93 A.3d 1208, 1217 (Del. 2014) (quoting
Stroud v. Milliken Enters., Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1989).
39
See State v. Williams, 1981 WL 96487, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1981) (“A cloud upon title has
been defined as a title or encumbrance, apparently valid on its face, but which is in fact
invalid. It is something which, nothing else being shown, constitutes an encumbrance upon or a
defect in title.”).
40
See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co., 1992
WL 22690, at *8 (Del. Super. Jan. 16, 1992), aff'd sub nom. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co.
v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1198 (Del. 1992).
10
B. Acceptance
As a preliminary matter, it is clear that the Library accepted the donation of
Property under the conditions of the Deed. The first donation offer was terminated
by Healey’s March 2012 email.41 The filing of the Deed in December 2012
constituted a separate offer that was accepted by the Library when the Board of
Commissioners publicly voted to accept the gift. 42
C. The Term “Library Facility” is Ambiguous
Sussex County has confirmed that the Structure complies with applicable
County Ordinances. The Court turns now to the remaining Deed restrictions. “The
fundamental rule in construing a deed is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the parties as reflected in the language they selected.”43 It is undisputed that the
Structure was built within ten years as required by the Deed. What is in debate is
whether the Structure is a “library facility.” When the meaning of a disputed term is
undefined by the deed, courts turn to dictionaries for direction in determining the
plain meaning of the term.44 When consideration of dictionary definitions fail to
41
See Friel v. Jones, 206 A.2d 232, 233–34 (Del. Ch. 1964); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 38(1) (1981) (“An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by his rejection of the offer,
unless the offeror has manifested a contrary intention.”).
42
See Shockley v. Halbig, 75 A.2d 512, 513 (Del. Ch. 1950) (“being beneficial, the acceptance of
[a] gift will be presumed.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 65 cmt. a (1981).
43
Smith v. Smith, 622 A.2d 642, 646 (Del. 1993) (citing Rohner v. Niemann, 380 A.2d 549, 552
(Del. 1977)).
44
Seaford Golf & Country Club, 925 A.2d at 1261.
11
“yield a uniform, single, plain meaning . . . .” the disputed term is ambiguous, and
courts must then turn to the intent of the donor or grantor.45 This concept was
articulated in Seaford Golf & Country Club v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.46
In that case, the Superior Court was tasked with determining whether the
meaning of the term “plant,” which was undefined by the deed, was limited to a
manufacturing plant, or included the land on which the manufacturing plant was
located.47 On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that in such circumstances, courts are
to turn to dictionaries for guidance in determining the plain meaning of an undefined
term.48 The various dictionary definitions cited by counsel failed to “yield a uniform,
single, plain meaning; that is, dictionary definitions [were] found to support either
view.”49 As a result, the term was ambiguous and the Supreme Court ruled the next
step was to determine the donor’s intent.50
The Court recognizes that through the course of time, libraries and their uses
have changed. The structure built in this case is a relatively new concept but the
traditional operation of providing books to the public still exists at this structure.
However, “library facility” is undefined by the Deed. Thus, the Court must first look
to dictionary definitions for the plain meaning of the term. Unsurprisingly, the
45
Id. at 1262.
46
Id. at 1264.
47
Id. at 1256.
48
Id. at 1261.
49
Id. at 1264.
50
Id.12
Library cites definitions broadly construing the term while the Church prefers
narrower definitions.51 The term is susceptible to both interpretations,52 which means
that there is no established plain meaning of the term. Consequently, the term is
ambiguous and the Court must consider the intent of the Grantor.
D. Intent
If the answer to whether the Grantor intended for a fully functioning library
to be built on the Property by use of the term “library facility” is no, the Library’s
interest in the Property has vested. Unfortunately, the Court does not have the benefit
of sworn testimony of any representative of the Grantor.
In Gibson v. Main the Court was tasked with determining what a grantor
meant by the word “garages.”53 The restrictive deed prohibited the purchaser of land
from building, among other things, “any stores or garages upon said lands.”54
Garages could, of course, mean garages of every kind.55 The Court reasoned that the
underlying purpose for the restriction was to make the conveyed lands “safe and
desirable for residential purposes.”56 The Grantor, therefore, likely did not intend to
51
Pl. Post-Trial Opening Br. 18–19; Def.’s Post-Trial Opening Br. 23–25.
52
Lewes Pub. Library, Inc, 2020 WL 4731146, at *3, rearg. den., 2020 WL 5530339 (Del.
Super. Sept. 14, 2020).
53
Gibson v. Main, 129 A. 259, 262 (Del. 1925).
54
Id. at 260.
55
Id.
56
Id.
13
prohibit private garages that were to be used in connection with a residence.57 The
Court found that garages are so essential to the comfort and convenience of a home,
to disallow them would be inconsistent with the grantor’s purpose.58 The Court went
on to hold that the defendant was entitled to build a garage to use as a bungalow.59
In the case at hand, the Deed clearly evinces that the Property was intended to
be used for charitable purposes. The Library was one of three charitable
organizations listed in the Deed, the others being the Church and a 501(c)(3)
subsidiary of the Association. Moreover, it is clear that the Grantor was aware that
the Library’s new primary facility would be built at a location other than the
Property. With this information at hand, the Grantor still deeded the land to the
Library and Hudson stated, “we wanted the Library to get [the Property].”60
While it is possible that the Grantor hoped the Library would change course
and build a fully functioning library on the Property, if the Grantor wanted the term
“library facility” to be construed narrowly it could have expressed that intent, but it
did not. The Delaware Supreme Court has warned that “an interpreting court should
be most chary about implying contractual terms when the contract could easily have
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 261.
60
Pl’s Ex. 16.
14
been drafted to expressly provide for such terms, limitations or conditions.” 61 If the
Grantor intended this Property to be used for a specific type of library facility, then
a more exclusive provision should have appeared in the Deed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Library accepted the Property and used it for a library facility within the
requisite ten year period. To take the Property away now would be inconsistent with
the Grantor’s intentions. Accordingly, the Court finds the Library’s interest in the
Property has vested.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Mark H. Conner
Mark H. Conner, Judge
cc: Prothonotary
61
Murfey v. WHC Ventures, LLC, 236 A.3d 337, 357 (Del. 2020) (quoting Nationwide Emerging
Managers, LLC v. Northpointe Hldgs., LLC, 112 A.3d 878, 897 (Del. 2015).
15