State v. Armstrong

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
)
v. )
)
SEAN ARMSTRONG, ) ID NO. 2207014137
)
Defendant. )
)
)
)
)
Date Submitted: June 23, 2023
Date Decided: July 7, 2023
Upon the State’s Motion in Limine. GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part.
ORDER
Nichole Whetham Warner, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Michael W. Modica, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.
SCOTT, J.
1
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the State of Delaware’s (“State”) Motion in Limine
pursuant to Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b) (the “Motion”). After reviewing the
Motion and the Defendant Sean Armstrong’s (“Mr. Armstrong”) Response, the
State’s Motion is GRANTED, in part, DENIED7, in part.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Armstrong is charged with Child Abuse in the Second Degree after his
infant son sustained injury to his arm while in his sole care. The State seeks to
introduce evidence of prior text messages (sent by Mr. Armstrong to the mother of
the infant after the infant sustained injuries while in Mr. Armstrong’s care),
testimony of eyewitnesses who observed Mr. Armstrong handle and speak to the
infant in an aggressive manner, and an interview of the infant’s sibling conduct at
the Child Advocacy Center, wherein she describes Mr. Armstrong’s treatment of and
statements to the infant. The text messages the State seeks to introduce include
photographs and statements about earlier injuries the infant sustained in Mr.
Armstrong’s care. The state seeks to admit the above evidence to show the Mr.
Armstrong’s (1) state of mind was either intentional or reckless, (2) absence of
mistake or accident, (3) modus operandi and (4) motive.
2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 (“D.R.E. __”), the Court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
Under D.R.E. 404(b)(1), evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character. Under D.R.E. 404(b)(2), such evidence may
be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
ANALYSIS
The State seeks to admit text messages, testimony of eyewitnesses who
observed Mr. Armstrong handle and speak to the infant in an aggressive manner, and
an interview of the infant’s sibling conduct at the Child Advocacy Center, to show
the Mr. Armstrong’s (1) state of mind was either intentional or reckless, (2) absence
of mistake or accident, (3) modus operandi and (4) motive.
Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is generally inadmissible to prove the
commission of the offense charged.1 This rule prevents the State from proving a
1
Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988).
3
charged offense by presenting evidence of other crimes on the theory that the
defendant acted in conformity with his prior bad acts. That is, the State cannot use
another offense to establish that the defendant had a propensity to commit the
charged offense.2 D.R.E. 404(b) sets forth the general rule and its exceptions.
Under D.R.E. 404(b)(1), evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character. Under D.R.E. 404(b)(2), such evidence may
be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
Five guidelines are to be considered by trial judges in assessing the
admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) are set forth in Getz v. State: (1) the
evidence must be material to an issue in the case; (2) the evidence must be introduced
for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not inconsistent with
the basic prohibition against evidence of bad character or criminal disposition; (3)
the evidence of other acts must be proved by plain, clear and conclusive evidence;
(4) the other acts cannot be too remote in time;3 and (5) the court needs to balance
the probative value of such evidence against its potential for prejudice under D.R.E.
2
Deshields v. State, 706 A.2d 502, 506 (Del. 1998).
3
Evidence is remote only when there is “no visible, plain, or necessary
connection” between the evidence and the charges currently before the court. See
State v. Ashley, 1998 WL 731568 (Del. Super.) (citing Lloyd v. State, 1991 WL
247734 (Del. 1991)).
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403. If the evidence is admitted, the judge must instruct the jury about the reason the
evidence was admitted.4
Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court identified additional factors to
consider when balancing the probative value and unfair prejudice of proffered
evidence under the fifth prong of Getz,5 as follows:
(1) The extent to which the point to be proved is disputed;
(2) The adequacy of proof of the prior conduct;
(3) The probative force of the evidence;
(4) The proponent's need for the evidence;
(5) The availability of less prejudicial proof;
(6) The inflammatory or prejudicial effect of the evidence;
(7) The similarity of the prior wrong to the charged offense;
(8) The effectiveness of limiting instructions; and
(9) The extent to which prior act evidence would prolong the proceedings.6
As to the text messages, photographs and statements about earlier injuries to the
infant sustained while in Mr. Armstrong’s care
To meet the first prong of Getz, the evidence must be material to an issue or
fact in dispute in the case. Evidence is material if it tends, of itself or in connection
with other evidence, to influence the result reached by the jury.7
Here, the first prong is satisfied because evidence of Mr. Armstrong’s prior
bad acts involving child abuse is being offered to prove Mr. Armstrong’s state of
mind and lack of mistake. Mr. Armstrong’s state of mind and the instances of abuse
4
Getz, at 734.
5
DeShields, 706 A.2d at 506–07.
6
Id.7
Lloyd v. State, 604 A.2d 418, 1991 WL 247737, at *2 (Del. Nov. 6, 1991).
5
being lack of mistake are both material facts in dispute here. In Morse v. State8,
where this Court admitted prior uncharged abusive acts against defendant’s
stepdaughter, the Supreme Court found the first factor was met because of the
uncharged abuse was relevant to defendant’s state of mind – a material issue in
dispute.9 Here, the evidence is being used to rebut the claims that Mr. Armstrong’s
claims that the child’s injuries were accidental and as such, this evidence is material
to a central issue of this case: intent.
The second Getz factor is satisfied because the evidence shall only be used for
permissible purposes as prescribed in D.R.E. 404(b), not for the purpose of proving
propensity. The eyewitness testimony regarding how Mr. Armstrong spoke to and
handled the child would show motive as the testimony alleges Mr. Armstrong treated
his older daughter differently than his son regarding ability to express emotion.
Additionally, the prior statements and text messages to the mother of the child show
state of mind, absence of mistake and the behaviors of Mr. Armstrong follow a
common scheme or plan. The prior statements and text messages go towards Mr.
Armstrong’s awareness of his actions.
The third factor of Getz is satisfied because the evidence is plain, clear and
conclusive. In Morse, this factor was met because the evidence of prior abuse was
8
120 A.3d 1 (Del. 2015).
9
Id. at 9-10.
6
established through photographs, eyewitness testimony and videos.10 Here, the State
is offering evidence of the bad acts through eyewitness testimony, Mr. Armstrong’s
own statements and photographs. Therefore, the evidence is plain, clear and
conclusive.
The fourth Getz factor is satisfied. In Morse, the court found this factor to be
met when the act occurred within two years of the charged offense.11 Here, because
the prior bad acts occurred less than a year before this offense, the factor is satisfied.
The fifth and final factor requires this Court to consider the Deshields factors.
In Morse, even though the evidence of uncharged infant abuse though photographs,
eyewitness testimony and videos were undeniably prejudicial, the evidence was
properly admitted.12 This was because the defendant disputed the intent element of
the crimes charged and the State carries the burden of proving all the elements of a
criminal evidence, therefore, defendant’s previous actions were highly relevant to
the intent.13 Here the fifth factor is satisfied because the probative value of the
evidence of the bad acts is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. The extent to which the point to be proved is not in dispute here: the child
was in Mr. Armstrong’s care at the time of the injuries. The proof of the prior
10
Id. at 10-11.
11
Id. at 11.
12
Id.13
Id.7
conduct is adequate considering eyewitness testimony, as well as Mr. Armstrong’s
statements. The probative force of the evidence is great as it will aid the jury in
determining Mr. Armstrong’s state of mind. The State has sufficient need for the
evidence as to prove state of mind, lack of mistake and common plan. It does not
appear there is availability of less prejudicial proof. Undoubtably there is a
significant inflammatory effect of the evidence that may cause prejudice to Mr.
Armstrong. However, the State’s significant need to prove the intent, which is
disputed by Mr. Armstrong here, outweighs the prejudice. There is similarity of the
prior wrong to the charged offense and the effectiveness of limiting instructions will
be sufficient to remedy the prejudicial effect, as is the intention of a limiting
instruction. Here, the prior act evidence would not prolong the proceeding. As such,
the fifth factor is satisfied.
Because all five favors of Getz are satisfied and having found the Court’s
consideration of Deshields favors admission, the States Motion to present text
messages, photographs, and statements about earlier injuries to the infant is
GRANTED.
Limiting Instruction
Because this Court is granting admission of text messages, photographs and
statements about earlier injuries to the infant, it will give the following Limiting
Instruction:
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Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, during this trial you have heard evidence
that the defendant was involved in an act similar to the [indicted offense] that
he is now charged with. You may not consider evidence relating to these other
crimes, wrongs, or acts allegedly committed by the defendant for which he is
not now on trial for the purpose of concluding that he is of a certain character,
or possesses a certain character trait, and that he was acting in conformity with
that character or character trait with respect to the crimes charged in this case.
You may not use that evidence as proof that the defendant is a bad person and
therefore probably committed the [indicted offense] he is charged with. You
may use the evidence only to help you in determining defendant’s motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident. You are instructed your use of any such evidence
presented on other crimes or bad acts only if you believe it and only as it
relates to the defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
As to the CAC video statement of a child witness
To the extent that the child witness is expected to provide direct examination
at trial and the video would be duplicative of such testimony, the CAC is
inadmissible. Accordingly, the State’s Motion to present the CAC video statement
is DENIED.
If there are matters contained in the CAC that are not duplicative of the child
witness’ testimony, this Court reserves judgment on such matters until they arise at
trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the State’s Motion in Limine is hereby
GRANTED, in part and DENIED, in part.
/s/ Calvin L. Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
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