State v. Anderson

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) ID No. 1608006981
)
TYRONE ANDERSON, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: July 17, 2023
Decided: July 26, 2023
ORDER
Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Sentence Modification:
DENIED.
This 26th day of July 2023, upon consideration of the Motion for Sentence
Modification filed by Defendant Tyrone Anderson, it appears to the Court that:
1. In November 2017, a jury found Mr. Anderson guilty of four counts of Drug
Dealing Heroin, four counts of Aggravated Possession of Heroin, one count of
Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and one count of Attempted Possession of
Heroin.1 The Aggravated Possession counts merged with the Drug Dealing
counts for sentencing.2 All told, the Court sentenced Mr. Anderson to a period
of fifty-nine years and six months at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after
serving twenty years in prison for decreasing levels of supervision.3
1
Anderson v. State, 2018 WL 6344697, at *1 (Del. Dec. 4, 2018).
2
Id.3
Id.1
2. After unsuccessfully moving for postconviction relief in April 2021, Mr.
Anderson has now filed this, an untimely pro se motion for sentence
modification under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b).4 This time, his motion
concerns “Bill No. 47.” Although it is difficult to discern, Mr. Anderson is
ostensibly referring to 16 Del. C. § 4701, which was enacted and took effect on
December 15, 2019.5 He reports that the statute supersedes the harsher sentence
he is serving because:
. . . Bill No. 47 eliminated the enhanced sentence for two grams
or more (Tier 2 Drug Dealing) with an aggravated factor for
being in a vehicle (sic). It also eliminated enhanced sentencing
for prior violent felonies (in the Defendant’s case, a criminally
negligent homicide).
...
The Defendant, from the inception of his case, comes under
jurisdictional construction based on similar circumstances
pursuant to it that would assign the Defendant a longer
sentence than he would have been required to serve under the
laws in effect at the time that he was originally sentenced.6
3. In other words, this is a retroactivity issue: because Mr. Anderson was sentenced
in 2017 – before the General Assembly revised 16 Del. C. § 4701 in 2019 – he
asks the Court to modify his sentence so it conforms to the statute as it is
currently written.7
4
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35.
5
16 Del. C. § 4701. Prior to its enactment, the General Assembly introduced the statute as “Senate Bill 47” (added
by 82 Del. Laws 2019, ch. 217 § 1, eff. Dec. 15, 2019) in June 2019.
6
D.I. 117 (Def.’s Mot. for Sent. Mod.) at 2-3.
7
Id.
2
4. Rule 35(b), however, is not “an instrument for re-examination of previously
imposed sentences in light of subsequent statutory changes.” 8 The purpose of
the Rule is to give the sentencing judge a second chance to consider whether the
initial sentence was appropriate.9 And, importantly, entertainment of untimely
Rule 35(b) motions is permitted only when a Defendant demonstrates
extraordinary circumstances for consideration.10 Circumstances are
“extraordinary” if they “specifically justify the delay, are entirely beyond a
petitioner’s control, and have prevented the applicant from seeking the remedy
on a timely basis.”11
5. Mr. Anderson’s recent discovery of a four-year-old statute does not constitute
an “extraordinary circumstance” in any sense. So, his motion is procedurally
barred as untimely. But, even assuming arguendo that the motion was not
barred, the Court will briefly explain why it lacks substantive merit, as well.
6. The Delaware Supreme Court addressed Mr. Anderson’s issue in Fountain v.
State,12 which held that retroactive applications of sentencing changes to those
already serving a sentence would “have a large effect on segments of the public,
law enforcement and defense resources, and the judiciary itself.”13
Consequently, before retroactively applying a statutory sentencing change, the
8
State v. Thomas, 220 A.3d 257, 261 (Del. Super. 2019).
9
State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 606 (Del. Super. 2015).
10
State v. Diaz, 2015 WL 1741768, at *2 (Del. Apr. 15, 2015).
11
Id. (citations omitted).
12
139 A.3d 837 (Del. 2016).
13
Id. at 843.
3
Court must be sure that the enacting legislation “provide[s] for retroactivity
explicitly . . . and include[s] special procedures to address its retrospective
application.”14 This, of course, is because courts do not favor applying
legislation retroactively, especially absent clear and express language that the
legislature intended that.15
7. In the face of this existing and recent case law, the General Assembly would
have needed to make its retroactive intent clear when it enacted 16 Del. C. §
4701, and include special procedures to address its retrospective application.
But it did not. That silence speaks loudly here. The Court cannot – and will not
– find retroactivity in the General Assembly’s stead.16
8. For the foregoing reasons, retroactive applicability of 16 Del. C. § 4701 is
prohibited, and Mr. Anderson’s motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
Francis J. Jones Jr., Judge
cc: Prothonotary (Criminal Division)
14
Id.
15
State v. Ismaaeel, 840 A.2d 644, 654 (Del. Super. 2004).
16
The Court also will not find that Mr. Anderson’s sentence violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, as he contends. A law violates ex post facto principles of Constitutional law when it changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law permitted at the time the crime was committed. See
DiStefano v. Watson, 566 A.2d 1, 5 (Del. 1989). Clearly, that is not the case here.
4