State v. Anderson

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) Crim. I.D. No. 30109009 DI
)
LESTER ANDERSON, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW – DENIED.
This 25th day of March, 2024, after having considered Lester Anderson’s
(hereinafter “Defendant”) “Motion for Certification of Question [sic] of Law”
(hereinafter the “Motion”), the State’s response in opposition and the record in the
matter, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of Murder in the First
Degree on February 11, 1992.1 The State announced its intention not to seek capital
punishment shortly after Indictment,2 and at no time sought to reverse course.
Defendant was then sentenced to the mandatory life imprisonment on July 10, 1992.3
Defendant filed an unsuccessful direct appeal, followed by four unsuccessful
motions for post-conviction relief and respective appeals, among other various
motions in the ensuing years.4
1
See Docket: State v. Lester Anderson, Criminal Action No. 2012004283, D.I. 11.
2
D.I. 9.
3
D.I. 35.
4
D.I. 18, 38, 52, 57, 61, 65, 69, 71, 73-75. 77, 81, 84-85, 87, 90, 91-92, 93-94, 95,
103, 104-105, 115-118, 129.
2. Defendant has now filed his fifth motion for post-conviction relief
pending before the Court.5 Following that filing, Defendant, on September 11, 2023,
filed the instant Motion, which overlaps significantly with the issues raised in his
fifth post-conviction motion.6 The State responded in opposition on November 1,
2023.7 On November 27, 2023, Defendant replied to the State’s opposition.8
3. Defendant’s motion seeks to certify ten (10) questions of law to the
Delaware Supreme Court in which he argues raises constitutional questions of law
that have “not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.” 9 Specifically,
Defendant requests the following questions answered:
(1) Does Delaware’s capital sentencing scheme violate the United
States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment whereas the Court held, in
Powell, that Rauf [sic] is retroactive to capital and non-capital
offenders?
(2) In light of the holding in Rauf, overruling Brice, and Cohen, does
the application of those decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal
statute by defining terms place a particular conduct or class of
person covered by the statute beyond the state’s power to punish?
(3) Does a sentence enhancement, which increased the maximum
authorized statutory sentence is functional equivalent of an element-
based distinction must pertain to fundamental rights that effect a
stated class offender?
(4) Does the construction, constitutionality, or application of 11 Del.
4209 [sic] currently define a clear distinction between a particular
situated class of offender such as Class A 11 Del. 4205 [sic] as
commanded by the Apprendi Rule [sic]?
(5) Delaware title 11 Criminal Code Section 4209 [sic] is the statute that
specifies the penalties for murder first degree, which is where the
5
D.I. 130.
6
D.I. 137.
7
D.I. 140.
8
D.I. 148.
9
D.I. 137, p. 5, ¶12.
capital sentencing procedures are codified. Does Delaware
circumvent the protections held in In re Winship [sic] merely by
redefining the elements that constitute different crimes,
characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of
punishment?
(6) Does [sic] Delaware Courts recognize Apprendi [sic] Rule…[sic]
extending into the sentencing guidelines context in Blakely [sic]
which a judge may impose statutory maximum sentence solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict?
(7) Delaware legislature has by design created ambiguity in regards to
11 Del. 636 [sic] murder first degree, if found guilty, permits a judge
to impose a sentence upward departure from statutory class of
conduct or person where an aggravator is considered contrast to an
aggravator is automatic presume unconstitutional [sic]?
(8) What are the procedures to be followed in event that 11 Del. 4209[sic] is ruled unconstitutional that give notice prior or post-
deprivation, opportunity to be heard and defend or challenge
substantial right and to be safeguarded from State action not related
to legitimate interest or that is unfair practice, irrational and
arbitrary?
(9) Does an element-based distinction qualify as a specific category
effect Fifth, Sixth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments [sic] whether a
class of conduct or person in light of struct-down sentencing scheme
11 Del. 4209[sic]?
(10) Whether the imposition of an increased sentence under Delaware
law which bear [sic] upon a class of conduct or person as it relates
to provision [sic]and/or procedures is it the inquisition of an
aggravator that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt?10
4. Superior Court Civil Rule 75 controls the procedure for filing a motion
for certification of questions of law. Supreme Court Rule 41 controls the procedure
for the certification of questions of law. While this Court has the authority to certify
a qualifying question of law,11 the Supreme Court will only accept such a
certification where there exists “important and urgent reasons for an immediate
10
D.I. 137
11
Del. Supr. R. 41(a)(i).
determination by [the Supreme Court] of the questions certified.”12 Supreme Court
Rule 41 provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which a question may be
certified: “(i) Original question of law. The question of law is of first instance in
this State; (ii) Conflicting decisions. The decisions of the trial courts are conflicting
upon the question of law; (iii) Unsettled question. The question of law relates to the
constitutionality, construction or application of a statute of this State which has not
been, but should be, settled by the Court.”13
5. Defendant predicates his ten questions based upon the Delaware
Supreme Court case Rauf v. State.14 In Rauf, the Court held Delaware’s statutory
scheme in 11 Del. C. § 4209 as it relates to capital murder unconstitutional. In
Powell v. State,15 the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that its decision in Rauf is to
be applied retroactively to all applicable persons.
6. The State, in its response in opposition, correctly points out that
Defendant is not an applicable person. Rauf and Powell are inapplicable to
Defendant because he was not convicted of capital murder. Defendant mistakenly
assumes that Rauf was applicable to both capital and non-capital offenders; Rauf
very clearly only analyzes the constitutionality of the capital sentencing structure of
11 Del. C. § 4209.16 In Defendant’s case, not only did the State not seek capital
12
Del. Supr. R. 41(b)
13
Id.
14
145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016).
15
153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016).
16
Rauf, 145 A.3d at 433.
punishment for Anderson, but he was also not given a sentence of death. Therefore,
the ten questions Defendant now seeks this Court to certify are irrelevant to his case
and pending post-conviction motion.
7. The State is also correct in that Defendant’s Motion does not meet the
qualifications as set forth in Supreme Court Rule 41. The questions Defendant seeks
do not satisfy any of the listed reasons for certification. Therefore, certification is
inappropriate.
8. The arguments raised in Defendant’s Reply to the State’s opposition,
once again, are based upon the misinterpretation of Rauf being applicable to all first
degree murder convictions. As stated above, this is simply not the case. Defendant
was neither convicted of capital murder, nor sentenced under the capital punishment
scheme of 11 Del. C. § 4209, making Rauf inapplicable and an impermissible basis
for certification here. The fact that Defendant seeks clarification for aggravating
circumstances is irrelevant, as no aggravating circumstances were applied in
Defendant’s case. He was sentenced to life imprisonment following a non-capital
murder first conviction. There was never a need for any analysis of the statutory
aggravators found in 11 Del. C. § 4209, as mandatory life imprisonment was the
only option for Defendant’s sentencing judge. Defendant’s arguments in both his
initial Motion and his Reply are all arguments that pertain to capital murder
prosecutions. His was not that.
9. As a result, Defendant’s Motion for Certification of Question of Law is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Danielle J. Brennan, Judge
Original to Prothonotary
cc: John Williams, Deputy Attorney General
Lester Anderson, Pro Se, SBI: 225954