DiStefano v. Westminster Club

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DOMINIC P. DISTEFANO, )
DOMINIC V. DISTEFANO, and )
DEBRA C. DISTEFANO, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N20C-09-016 SPL
)
WESTMINSTER CLUB, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
This 27th day of February 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’, Dominic P.
DiStefano,1 Dominic V. DiStefano,2 and Debra C. DiStefano (the “DiStefanos”),
motion for summary judgment,3 Defendant’s, Westminster Club (“Westminster”),
motion for summary judgment,4 the parties’ responses to the cross-motions,5 and
their November 29, 2023, arguments,6 it appears to the Court that:
1
Plaintiffs note that “Dominic Sr.[’s] and Dominic Jr.[’s] names are misspelled
‘Dominic’ instead of ‘Domenic’ in the original deed to the DiStefano property and
throughout the pleadings in this case. The spelling ‘Dominic’ is continued to be
used herein to avoid confusion.” D.I. 39 (“Distefano Amend. Op. Brf.”) at 6, n.3.
The Court continues to use this spelling here.
2
Id.
3
D.I. 39 (“DiStefano Mot.” and “DiStefano Amend. Op. Brf.”).
4
D.I. 36 (“Westminster Mot.” and “Westminster Op. Brf.”).
5
D.I. 45 (“Westminster Ans. Brf.”); D.I. 46 (“DiStefano Ans. Brf.”).
6
D.I. 49.
Background
1. On September 1, 2020, the DiStefanos initiated this lawsuit against
Westminster, seeking adverse possession of a part of Westminster’s land where the
DiStefanos had installed a concrete pad and shed in 2006, and a declaratory
judgment asserting their rightful ownership of the land.7
2. Westminster answered the complaint8 and asserted a counterclaim
seeking a declaratory judgment “declar[ing] that [the DiStefanos] may not use [an
existing right of way] except for ingress and egress and not for parking.”9
Westminster asserts “that the Distefano property is subject to a 25-foot right of way
(“ROW”)”10 “to allow unrestricted and unobstructed access to Westminster’s
swimming complex.”11 Westminster contends “[p]arking on the ROW is not a
reasonable use of it[,]”12 and the DiStefanos “have been warned to not park cars in
the ROW but ignore/refuse to do so.”13
7
D.I. 1 (“Compl.”).
8
D.I. 16 (“Ans.”).
9
Id. ¶ 49.
10
Id. ¶ 36.
11
Id. ¶ 42.
12
Id. ¶ 41.
13
Id. ¶ 40.
3. The DiStefanos answered Westminster’s counterclaim, and asserted
their own counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment “to allow [the DiStefanos]
reasonable use of the ROW [and] prohibit [Westminster] from utilizing the ROW
for anything other than access.”14 The DiStefanos acknowledge that their “property
is subject to a 25-foot [ROW]”15 but argue that they “are permitted to use the ROW
on their property so long as such use does not inhibit use of the ROW by
[Westminster].”16 The DiStefanos seek permission “to continue to use the ROW as
historically used.”17
4. On December 15, 2022, the parties settled Plaintiffs’ claim for adverse
possession, leaving only the declaratory judgment counterclaims to be litigated.18
On September 22, 2023, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.19
Standard of Review
5. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 summary judgment will be granted
where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
14
D.I. 19 (“DiStefano Ans.) at 8.
15
Id. at 7, ¶ 6.
16
Id. at 7, ¶ 7.
17
Id. at 8, ¶9.
18
D.I. 24; D.I. 51.
19
D.I. 36 (“Westminster Mot.”); D.I. 37 (“DiStefanos Mot.”).
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”20
Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a material fact in dispute or if it
“seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the
application of the law to the circumstances.”21 The Court will not “indulge in
speculation and conjecture; a motion for summary judgment is decided on the record
presented and not on evidence potentially possible.”22 “Where cross motions for
summary judgment are filed and neither party argues the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact, the Court shall deem the motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation
for decision on the merits based on the record submitted with them.”23 The questions
before the Court “are questions of law not of fact, and the parties by filing cross
motions for summary judgement have in effect stipulated that the issues raised by
the motions are ripe for a decision on the merits.”24
20
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
21
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del. 1962).
22
In re. Asbestos Litig., 509 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Del. Super. 1986), aff’d sub. nom.
Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987).
23
Radulski v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 8676027, at *4 (Del. Super.
Ct. Oct. 28, 2020) (cleaned up).
24
Id. (cleaned up).
Analysis
I. The Superior Court’s Jurisdiction To Address Easements On Real
Property Through A Declaratory Judgment Action
6. The parties have framed their dispute as a declaratory judgment action
under Chapter 65 of Title 10 and contend that this Court is an appropriate forum for
addressing, and resolving, their dispute.25 “The decision to entertain an action for
declaratory judgment is discretionary with a trial court, the only limitation being that
the Court cannot abuse its discretion.”26 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides
“prospective, i.e., forward-looking relief,”27 but it neither broadens nor narrows the
jurisdiction of this court; “[j]urisdiction under the Act hinges upon whether law or
equity would independently have jurisdiction without reference to the Act.”28 And
where the declaratory judgement is sought “within a common law or statutorily
authorized cause of action,” this Court maintains jurisdiction.29 Within these
25
D.I. 27, 28. While the agreement of the parties, in and of itself, does not suffice
to confer jurisdiction upon this Court, the Court is satisfied that it may enter a
declaratory judgment as to the scope of the easement in the context of the cross
claims presented here.
26
Burris v. Cross, 583 A.2d 1364, 1372 (Del. Super. 1990) (cleaned up).
27
Employers Insurance Co. of Wassau v. First State Orthopaedics, P.A., 2024 WL
74148, at *11 (Del. Jan 8, 2024) (internal citations omitted).
28
Burris, 583 A.2d at 1376-77.
29
Id. at 1377 (emphasis in original).
established parameters, an action to establish the scope of an easement may be within
the Superior Court’s jurisdiction.30
7. Here, Westminster contends the DiStefanos “physically interfered with
their right to possession and use” of the easement and, thus, the scope of the
easement may be assessed within a trespass action.31 While this Court may be
authorized to address the scope of the easement within a cause of action within this
Court’s jurisdiction, it is unlikely this declaratory judgement will fully resolve the
parties’ concerns.32 In the absence of “mutual accommodation,” the parties may
need to seek to define the day-to-day contours of the easement; to the extent
additional prospective judicial guidance may be required, the Court of Chancery
instructs that “[a]n injunction is a proper way to prevent continued interference with
an easement.”33
30
Id. at 1377.
31
C.f. Burris, 583 A.2d at 1377. In Burris, this Court found it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the scope of the easement was not “determinable within a
common law or statutorily authorized cause of action.” Id. at 1377-78.
32
Rather than dismissing this action and directing the parties to start anew in the
Court of Chancery, the Court exercises its discretion to address the parties claims
within the scope of its jurisdiction. “It is clear that one action in Chancery could
resolve all the issues, formulate the proper equitable and legal remedies and enforce
those remedies if necessary.” Burris, 583 A.2d at 1374. “In the case at hand, an
action in Chancery appears to be not only ‘equally serviceable,’ but indeed superior
to the remedy available in this Court.” Id. at 1376.
33
Bogia v. Kleiner, 2019 WL 3761647, at *9 (quoting Rowe v. Everett, 2001 WL
1019366, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug 22, 2001)). Tellingly, all Delaware cases cited as
authority on this issue by both parties emanate from Court of Chancery actions, and
II. A Retrospective Assessment of the Scope of the Easement Burdening 810
Cheltenham Road
8. The DiStefanos’ property is “[subject] to a twenty-five (25) foot right
of way along the northeasterly property line leading from Cheltenham Road to lands
of the Westminster Club.”34 “Deeds are specialized forms of contract, and like other
contracts are not subject to construction unless the language is ambiguous.”35 By its
terms, this easement permits access to and from the Westminster Club over the
property presently owned by the DiStefanos. The parties do not contend, and the
Court does not find, that further interpretation on this point is warranted.
no Superior Court authority is offered to support this Court prospectively defining
the scope of an easement as it appears the parties’ desire. This Court may define the
scope of an easement in the context of a matter at law. See, e.g., Pryde v. Delmarva
Power & Light Co., 2009 WL 388942 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2009) (addressing
the scope of an easement within the context of claims of negligence, timber trespass
(a statutory claim), trespass, and conversion). The Court of Chancery may address
the scope of an easement prospectively through an injunction or declaratory
judgment. See Bogia, 2019 WL 3761647, at *9. This is so because “[j]urisdiction
under the [Declaratory Judgment] Act hinges upon whether law or equity would
independently have jurisdiction without reference to the Act.” Burris, 583 A.2d at
1376-77.
34
DiStefano Amend. Op. Brf., Ex. A. (2005 Deed, 1973 Deed). In the 1967 Deed
transferring the parcel acquired by the DiStefanos from Eastern Developers of
Delaware, Inc. to Independence Mall, Inc., provides for a perpetual “right of ingress
over a 25 foot wide right of way, the Northeasterly side of which is the Northeasterly
boundary line of the hereinabove described parcel.” To the extent there is an
argument that the easement only permits ingress, the Court finds that egress is a
necessary complement to that right and, thus, the extant right-of-way easement
contemplates ingress and egress.
35
Bogia, 2019 WL 3761647, at *6.
9. In its simplest terms, the issue before the Court is whether the
DiStefanos may park vehicles on a portion of the easement. And, the short answer
is, yes. The Delaware Supreme Court has explained:
Generally speaking, the owners of a servient estate burdened by an
easement in favor of a dominant estate may use the premises as they
choose, but may not interfere with the proper and reasonable use by the
owner of the dominant estate of their dominant right. To determine
what constitutes interference with one’s reasonable use of an easement,
the court must consider the purposes for which the easement was made,
the nature and situation of the property subject to the easement and the
manner in which it has been used and occupied.36
There is no record evidence that the DiStefanos’ parking along one side of the
easement with one side of the parked cars’ tires off the paved roadway unreasonably
interfered with Westminster’s ingress or egress. Westminster’s hypothetical
scenarios are not far-fetched, but there is no record evidence to support their
occurrence, and this Court must not engage in speculation or conjecture when
addressing a motion for summary judgment. Of course, what is reasonable under
varying circumstances may require a more nuanced prospective assessment beyond
what this Court may provide in this declaratory judgment action.
10. To resolve easement disputes, the Delaware Supreme Court has turned
to the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 for guidance.37 The
36
Vandeleigh Industries v. Storage Partners of Kirkwood, LLC, 901 A.2d 91, 96-97
(Del. 2006) (cleaned up).
37
Id. at 100-01.
Restatement suggests “maximizing the aggregate utility of the servitude and the
servient estate . . . . Aggregate utility is generally produced by interpreting an
easement to strike a balance that maximizes its utility in serving the purpose intended
while minimizing the impact on the servient estate.”38 Further, “[t]he person who
holds the land burdened by a servitude is entitled to make all uses of the land that
are not prohibited by the servitude and that do not interfere unreasonably by the uses
authorized by the easement.”39 The Restatement also addresses situations where the
servient owner locates improvements upon an easement and instructs “[w]hether the
improvement is an unreasonable interference with the servitude depends on the
character of the improvement and the likelihood that it will make future development
of the easement difficult. If the improvement is temporary and easily removed, it is
generally not unreasonable.”40 The Court must not interpret a servitude in a manner
that would deprive the easement owner “that to which it was legally entitled.”41
11. Thus, the DiStefanos, owners of property burdened by an easement (the
“servient estate”), may use the property as they choose, provided they do not
unreasonably interfere with Westminster’s, the easement holder (the “dominant
38
Id. at 100 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 cmt. b).
39
Id. at 101 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 cmt. c).
40
Id.
41
Vandeleigh, 901 A.2d at 98.
estate”), reasonable use.42 The Court will assess “the purposes for which the
easement was made, the nature and situation of the property subject to the easement,
and the manner in which the easement has been used and occupied”43 in determining
whether the DiStefanos’ use of a portion of the easement for occasional parking
constituted an unreasonable interference.
12. Since 1964, Westminster, a seasonal swim and recreation club, has
owned the property located at 808 Cheltenham Road, and has used the easement
over the property at 810 Cheltenham Road for its members’ ingress and egress.44
During the summer months, club members use the easement every day of the week.45
While the pool is closed from October through April, members use the easement on
a more limited basis to access the tennis and basketball courts and occasional events
on Westminster’s grounds.46 Westminster also uses the easement during the “off
season” for mail delivery, maintenance, and to perform repairs to club grounds and
facilities.47
42
Id. at 96.
43
Id. at 96-97 (cleaned up).
44
Westminster Op. Brf. at 3-4.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
13. In 1973, Dominic V. (“Dominic Sr.”) and Marie DiStefano purchased
the property at 810 Cheltenham Road encumbered by the “25 foot right of way along
the northeasterly property line leading from Cheltenham Road to lands of the
Westminster Club.”48 A 2005 deed conveyed the property to Dominic Sr., Domenic
P. (“Dominic Jr.”) and Debra C. DiStefano with the same express easement.49
14. A 21 to 22-foot-wide portion of the 25-foot-wide easement is paved
asphalt.50 The DiStefanos’ driveway connects their two-car garage to the easement;
the driveway can accommodate up to four parked cars.51 Neither the physical nature
and situation of the easement nor the manner it has been used or occupied have
changed in any material way throughout the DiStefanos’ ownership of the
property.52 Former Westminster Club President, Wayne Surles, testified that the
nature of easement is the same as it had been in 1984.53
15. Since acquiring the property at 810 Cheltenham Road in 1973, the
DiStefanos have on occasion parked, and permitted their guests to park, on the
48
Compl. at Exh. A (“Original Deed”); Westminster Mot. at 2.
49
Compl. at Exh. B (“2005 Deed”) at 2; Westminster Mot. at 4.
50
DiStefano Mot. at Exh. E (“Dominic Jr. Dep.”) at 24.
51
Dominic Jr. Dep. at 15-17.
52
DiStefano Mot. at Exh. K (“Surles Dep.”) at 13-15; see also, DiStefano Mot. at
Exh. G, Dominic Jr. October 11, 2004, Letter.
53
Surles Dep. at 13-14.
easement between their driveway and the Westminster parking lot.54 Beginning in
the 1980s, Dominic Sr. often parked his pickup truck on the right side of the
easement.55 When the DiStefanos have room to park their vehicles in their driveway,
they do so.56 And when the DiStefanos park vehicles on the easement, they position
them in a single-file line with “a tire on the grass.”57 The easement is described as
sufficiently wide to accommodate three cars of ordinary size.58 No evidence has
been offered to establish the width or length of the DiStefanos’ occasional
interference with the easement or that the DiStefano’s occasional interference denied
Westminster club members access to the club.
16. The DiStefanos maintain that while they are entitled to park on the
easement, Westminster’s use is limited to ingress and egress,59 and Westminster does
54
Id.
55
Surles Dep. at 14-15, 20-21; see also Dominic Jr. Dep. at 39.
56
Dominic Jr. Dep at 18.
57
Dominic Jr. Dep. at 38-39.
58
Dominic Jr. Dep. at 40 (“[M]y math shows that you could have three other vehicles
of standard width traverse up and down [the easement] simultaneously.”) In fact,
the proffered calculation allows for the width of a parked vehicle in addition to the
three “traversing” vehicles. Id.
59
Dominic Jr. Dep. at 9, 29; DiStefano Mot. at Exh. G, Dominic Jr. October 11,
2004, Letter (“This should be nothing new to the Board or the Club membership
since my late mother would periodically keep everyone aware of this and personally
install no-parking signs during swim meets herself over thirty odd years of
membership”).
not contend that it is entitled to park on the property.60 In the years following the
DiStefanos’ acquisition of the burdened property, Westminster recognized the
DiStefanos’ assertion of “parking privileges,”61 and assisted in moving Westminster
member or guest vehicles off of the easement at the DiStefanos’ request.62 There
does not appear to be a change in circumstances in the use of either property; rather,
new ownership of the burdened property and new leadership of the Westminster
Club appear to have prompted the parties to seek guidance from the Court, in the
form of a declaratory judgment, as to the permitted use of the easement. As
discussed above, while the Court may speak to the general rights pertaining to this
easement, it is not jurisdictionally positioned to define the parties’ prospective rights
more granularly.
17. In 2004, Westminster informed the DiStefanos that their parking on the
easement during the summer season interfered with ingress and egress of traffic.63
60
Westminster Ans. Brf. at 7.
61
Surles Dep. at 14-15.
62
Dominic Jr. Dep at 29-30; see also DiStefano Mot. at Exh. G, September 7, 2004,
Letter (If someone parks on the road and it is brought to the attention of the club
employees on duty, attempts will be made to have the vehicles removed”).
63
Compl. at Exh. F at 1; see DiStefano Mot. at Exh. G, September 7, 2004, Letter
(“In addition, the Club requires that no one else (including residents and guests of
the DiStefano household) park on the road for the Pool Season, Memorial Day
weekend through Labor Day weekend, inclusive. This is necessary to provide room
for emergency vehicle access and Club traffic”); see also Dominic Jr. Dep. at 41.
But there is no record evidence of any vehicles or pedestrians being denied access
to the Westminster Club due to a DiStefano vehicle parked on a portion of the
easement.64 The Court does not minimize Westminster’s theoretical concerns, but
it finds no evidence of an actual interference with the easement (a denial of access
to the Westminster grounds) caused by the DiStefanos’ parking.65
18. The easement exists to provide access to the Club. The parties’
submissions establish that the easement has been consistently used by Westminster
for club access and occupied by the DiStefanos for parking vehicles. For over 30
years – from 1973 until 2004 – the record reveals the DiStefanos and Westminster
engaged in a “spirit of mutual accommodation.”66 That spirit has waned.
Nonetheless, no evidence exists that the DiStefanos’ limited parking has
unreasonably interfered with Westminster’s use of the easement. Returning to the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9, specifically comment c, the Court
likens the DiStefanos’ parking on a side of the easement to the erection of a
64
Dominic Jr. Dep. at 30 (“That right-of-way has never been obstructed either way.
They have never obstructed it so I couldn’t use it. And I’ve never obstructed it so
they couldn’t use it”).
65
Id.; Dominic Jr. Dep. at 42 (“There’s never been a problem accessing that. There
has never been a vehicle or a pedestrian that could not get to the pool property”).
66
Bogia, 2019 WL 3761647, at *9. “It is assumed that the owner of an easement
and the possessor of the servient tenement are to exercise their respective rights and
privileges in a spirt of mutual accommodation.” Id. (quoting Baer v. Dallas Theater
Center, 330 S.W. 2d 214, 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)).
temporary improvement to the property.67 Motor vehicles, by their very nature, are
easily removed as circumstances require; periodic, high-volume pool events may
reasonably require removal of these temporary obstructions so as not to interfere
with Westminster’s ingress and egress.
Conclusion
In their motion for summary judgment, the DiStefanos ask this Court to
declare:
(1) that the Westminster Club’s use of the right-of-way on the
DiStefano’s property is expressly limited to ingress and the
Westminster Club is not permitted to park on the right-of-way on the
DiStefano’s property, and (2) that the DiStefanos are permitted to use
the right-of-way on their property the way they have historically used
it, including parking, so long as they do not interference with ingress
and egress to Westminster Club[.]68
Westminster, on the other hand, seeks a declaration that “parking on the [easement]
by the [DiStefanos] interferes with the reasonable use and enjoyment of the
[easement] by the [Westminster] Club and is not permitted according to the plain
terms of the [easement].”69 The record does not demonstrate that the DiStefanos’
parking on a portion of the easement unreasonably interferes with Westminster’s
ingress and egress to the pool property and they may continue to park on the
67
See, Vandeleigh Industries, 901 A.2d at 96-97 (quoting Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes § 4.9 cmt. c).
68
DiStefano Amend. Op. Brf. at 18.
69
Westminster Op. Brf. at 17.
easement, in the manner described, so long as they do not interfere with
Westminster’s ingress or egress. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED,70 and Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is DENIED.
To be sure, this Court’s declaration does not provide the DiStefanos unlimited
license to park as they wish on the easement. Rather, based on the undisputed facts
presented to the Court, the DiStefanos’ parking has not unreasonably interfered with
Westminster’s easement. Should the parties require additional, prospective, judicial
guidance, that must be sought in another forum. In the meantime, the Court
encourages the parties to engage in meaningful discussion in the spirit of mutual
accommodation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________
Sean P. Lugg, Judge
70
Westminster does not contend that it is permitted to use the easement for parking.
Westminster Ans. Brf. at 7; but see, Bogia, 2019 WL 3761647, at *7. In Bogia, the
Court of Chancery referenced secondary sources supporting the proposition that the
owner of the dominant estate may have parking rights on an easement equivalent to
those of the owner of land upon which the easement runs. Id. (quoting M.O.
Regensteiner, Right To Park Vehicles On Private Way, 37 A.L.R. 2d 944 §2[b]
(1954)). This proposition is not advanced by Westminster in this proceeding.