State v. Suder

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) ID No. 1901005656
)
SHA’MIR SUDER, )
)
Defendant. )
)
Date Submitted: February 25, 2024
Date Decided: March 21, 2024
ORDER
Upon consideration of Defendant Sha’mir Suder’s (“Suder”) Motion for
Sentence Modification (“Motion”),1 Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), statutory
and decisional law, and the record, IT APPEARS THAT:
(1) On July 22, 2019, Suder pled guilty to Assault First Degree (IN19-08-
0087-W) and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony
(“PFDCF”) (IN19-02-0088-W).2 On November 8, 2019, Suder was sentenced as
follows: for Assault First Degree, 25 years at Level V, suspended after 2 years at
Level V for 6 months at Level IV, followed by 18 months at Level III; for PFDCF,
10 years at Level V.3
1
D.I. 42. Although Suder states that his letter is to let the Court know he is “putting in a
commutation,” his letter requests a sentence modification.
2
D.I. 20.
3
D.I. 34.
1
(2) Suder filed the instant Motion on February 28, 2024.4 Suder claims he
has completed the minimum mandatory portion of his sentence, and he asks the
Court to discharge the remaining time on his sentence for probation.5 In support of
his Motion, Suder states he has learned from his prior actions and is no longer
involved in gang activity.6
(3) Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) governs motions for modification
of sentence.7 The purpose of Rule 35(b) is to “provide a reasonable period for the
Court to consider alteration of its sentencing judgments.”8 Rule 35(b) contains
procedural bars for timeliness and repetitiveness.9 Under Rule 35(b), the “[C]ourt
may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on a motion made within 90 days after the
sentence was imposed” and will consider untimely motions “only in extraordinary
circumstances or pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4217.”10 Furthermore, the Court cannot
modify the minimum mandatory portion of a sentence.11
(4) Suder’s Motion is procedurally barred. His Motion is untimely since it
was filed over four years after his sentencing—well past the 90-day deadline.12 The
4
D.I. 42.
5
D.I. 42.
6
Id.
7
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
8
State v. Remedio, 108 A.3d 326, 331 (Del. Super. 2014).
9
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
10
Id.11
11 Del. C. § 4204(d); D.I. 27.
12
D.I. 27. Suder’s sentence does not fall under 11 Del. C. § 4217.
2
Court does not find any “extraordinary circumstances” exist to warrant an extension
of the 90-day deadline.13 Therefore, the Court finds the sentence is appropriate for
all the reasons stated at the time of sentencing.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Sha’mir Suder’s
Motion for Sentence Modification is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Jan R. Jurden
Jan R. Jurden, President Judge
cc: Original to Prothonotary
Erika R. Flaschner, DAG
Sha’mir Suder (SBI # 00795035)
13
See State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 607 (Del. Super. 2015) (explaining that extraordinary
circumstances must specifically justify the delay, be beyond the movant’s control, and be the
reason the movant was prevented from timely filing) (emphasis added).
3