Parker v. Steinbrecher

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
SHALA S. PARKER, and )
CHRISTOPHER PARKER, )
)
Plaintiffs, ) C.A. No.: N22C-05-038 FWW
)
v. )
)
HENRY F. STEINBRECHER, )
and DARRELL D. PUTNAM, )
)
Defendants. )
Submitted: December 7, 2023
Decided: March 26, 2024
Upon Defendant Darrell D. Putnam’s Motion for Summary Judgment
DENIED.
ORDER
Frederick S. Freibott, Esquire, and Dennis A. Mason, II, Esquire, THE FREIBOTT
LAW FIRM, P.A., 1711 East Newport Pike, P.O. Box 6168, Wilmington, Delaware
19804, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sheila S. Parker and Christopher Parker.
Miranda D. Clifton, Esquire, HECKLER & FRABIZZIO, 800 Delaware Avenue,
Suite 200, P.O. Box 128, Wilmington, Delaware 19899, Attorney for Defendant
Henry F. Steinbrecher.
Jeffrey A. Young, Esquire, YOUNG & McNELIS, 300 South State Street, Dover,
Delaware 19901, Attorney for Defendant Darrell D. Putnam.
WHARTON, J.
This 26th day of March 2024, upon consideration of Defendant Darrell D.
Putnam’s (“Putnam”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”),1 Defendant
Henry F. Steinbrecher’s (“Steinbrecher”) Response to Putnam’s Motion for
Summary Judgment,2 Plaintiffs Shala S. Parker’s (“Shala Parker”) and Christopher
Parker’s (collectively with Shala Parker, “Plaintiffs”) Response to Defendant
Putnam’s Motion,3 Defendant Putnam’s Response to Defendant Steinbrecher’s
Response,4 Defendant Putnam’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Response,5 and the record,
it appears to the Court that:
1. Plaintiffs allege that on October 21, 2020, at approximately 3:39 p.m.,
Shala Parker was operating a vehicle traveling in the left lane of I-495 southbound
near Wilmington, with Putnam operating the vehicle directly behind her, and
Steinbrecher operating the vehicle traveling directly behind Putnam.6 Further,
Plaintiffs allege that Shala Parker slowed her vehicle due to congested traffic, and
Putnam slowed his vehicle before he was rear-ended by Steinbrecher and pushed
into the rear bumper of Shala Parker’s vehicle.7
1
Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 34.
2
Def. Steinbrecher’s Resp. to Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 36.
3
Pls.’ Resp. to Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 38
4
Def. Putnam’s Resp. to Def. Steinbrecher’s Resp., D.I. 39.
5
Def. Putnam’s Resp. to Pls.’ Resp., D.I. 40.
6
Compl. at ¶ 4, D.I. 1.
7
Id.
2
2. The Complaint asserts the following: Count I-Negligence of Defendant
Putnam;8 Count II-Negligence of Defendant Steinbrecher;9 Count III-Causation and
Damages;10 and Count IV-Loss of Consortium.11 Putnam answered on June 15,
2022, asserting affirmative defenses, a counterclaim for comparative negligence and
a crossclaim for contribution and/or indemnification.12 Steinbrecher answered on
August 18, 2022, also asserting affirmative defenses and a crossclaim.13
3. Putnam moved for summary judgment on November 20, 2023.14
Steinbrecher responded in opposition on November 29, 2023.15 Plaintiffs responded
in opposition on December 6, 2023.16 Putnam responded, separately, to both
opposing responses on December 7, 2023.17
4. Putnam’s summary judgment motion is pursuant to Superior Court
Civil Rule 56(b).18 He contends that summary judgment is appropriate because there
is “no viable or testimonial evidence to suggest an impact to the rear of the Plaintiff’s
8
Compl. at 2, D.I. 1.
9
Id. at 3.
10
Id. at 4.
11
Id.
12
D.I. 6.
13
D.I. 11.
14
Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 34.
15
Def. Steinbrecher’s Resp. to Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 36.
16
Pls.’ Resp. to Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 38
17
Def. Putnam’s Resp. to Def. Steinbrecher’s Resp., D.I. 39; Def. Putnam’s Resp.
to Pls.’ Resp., D.I. 40.
18
Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 34.
3
car by Defendant Putnam before Defendant Putnam was struck in the rear by
Defendant Steinbrecher, and no other evidence of negligent driving by Defendant
Putnam[.]”19
5. Steinbrecher asks the Court to deny Putnam’s Motion. He asserts three
areas of factual dispute.20 Steinbrecher contends that the first fact in dispute is the
difference in the speed vehicles were traveling in the two lanes before Shala Parker
made her lane change.21 That difference is a material fact in determining whether
Shala Parker was established in her lane and whether Putnam was careless and/or
inattentive.22 The second fact in dispute is whether Shala Parker’s vehicle and
Putnam’s vehicle were stopped or in-motion at the time they collided.23 According
to Steinbrecher this dispute is factually material because Shala Parker’s testimony
shows that the collision with Putnam was imminent regardless of Steinbrecher’s
actions.24 Lastly, Steinbrecher contends that there is a factual dispute over who
caused the actual impact to Shala Parker’s vehicle, given her testimony regarding
her lane change and her observations of the accident unfolding in her rearview
mirror.25
19
Id. at ¶ 6.
20
Def. Steinbrecher’s Resp. to Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 36.
21
Id. at ¶ 4.
22
Id.
23
Id. at ¶ 5.
24
Id.
25
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.
4
6. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to deny Putnam’s Motion. They assert two
areas of factual dispute.26 First, Plaintiffs contend that there is conflicting testimony
regarding whether the Shala Parker and Putnam vehicles were stopped or in motion
at the time of the collision.27 Plaintiffs also contend that there is conflicting evidence
as to which vehicle struck which vehicle first.28
7. Responding to Steinbrecher, Putnam argues that Steinbrecher’s
Response does not raise any material factual disputes, nor does it offer any evidence
that Putnam was negligent. Putnam contends that Steinbrecher’s three “disputes”
are simply distinctions among the versions of the accident and have no bearing on
Putnam’s negligence.29 He argues that: 1) there is no evidence or testimony to
suggest Putnam was exceeding the posted or reasonable speed limit at the time of
the accident or just before, and it is immaterial to Putnam’s negligence whether
traffic in the two lanes of travel was going at the same speed or at different speeds;30
2) Shala Parker’s theory that Putnam did not slow down prior to striking the rear of
her vehicle has no evidentiary basis and is pure speculation;31 and 3) Steinbrecher
offers an entirely unsupported and speculative argument in theorizing that the
26
Pls.’ Resp. to Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 38
27
Id. at ¶ 4.
28
Id. at ¶ 5.
29
Def. Putnam’s Resp. to Def. Steinbrecher’s Resp. at ¶ 1, D.I. 39.
30
Id.
31
Id. at ¶ 2.
5
collision between Steinbrecher’s vehicle and the rear of Putnam’s vehicle was
simultaneous with Putnam’s vehicle striking Shala Parker’s vehicle.32 Putnam
argues that immaterial differences in testimony among parties do not create genuine
issues of material fact, and that “[t]he only material facts here are that Defendant
Putnam was able to control his vehicle and avoid striking the rear of Plaintiff’s
vehicle until he was propelled forward when Defendant Steinbrecher crashed into
his rear.”33
8. Responding to Plaintiffs, Putnam asserts that they do not raise any
material issues of fact or support any allegation of negligence on his part. He argues
that: 1) there is no evidence to suggest he was traveling at an unsafe or unreasonable
speed, and “the fact that Defendant Putnam testified that the incident happened very
quickly, and he was unable to identify the minutia of the details is not an argument
for evidence of negligence on his part[;]”34 and 2) there is in fact no conflicting
evidence as to which vehicle struck which vehicle first, and “the fact that Plaintiff
Shala Parker only heard one [] impact does not by any means suggest all impacts
were simultaneous and any such theory defies logic and physics.”35
32
Id. at ¶ 3.
33
Id. at ¶ 4.
34
Def. Putnam’s Resp. to Pls.’ Resp. at ¶ 2, D.I. 40.
35
Id. at ¶ 3.
6
9. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is
appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”36 The moving party initially bears
the burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its claims or
defenses.37 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party to show that there are material issues of fact to be resolved by the ultimate
factfinder.38 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court's function
is to examine the record, including “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether genuine issues
of material fact exist “but not to decide such issues.”39 Summary judgment will only
be appropriate if the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact. When
material facts are in dispute, or “it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into
the facts, to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances,” summary
judgment will not be appropriate.”40 However, when the facts permit a reasonable
36
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 A.3d
845, 847 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015), aff'd, 140 A.3d 431 (Del. 2016) (quoting Moore v.
Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979)).
37
Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 681.
38
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
39
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del.
1992).
40
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69, (Del. 1962) (citing Knapp v.
Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957)).
7
person to draw but one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter
of law.41
10. “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.’ A dispute about a material fact is genuine if ‘the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party’.”42
11. Putnam’s December 19, 2022 deposition included the following
testimony:
Q. From the time [Shala Parker] pulls over in the left-
hand lane and begins to go forward, in distance or in time,
whichever’s [sic] easier for you, can you tell me how far
she made it prior to her having to slow and then the impact
happened?43
A. It was almost immediate. Like I said, as soon as she
- - I started to lock my breaks up. She pulled in front of
me, I hit my breaks hard, and then like I said, it’s all a blur
from there.
Q. Okay.
A. That’s the best answer I can give you.44
…
Q. Did you strike the rear of her vehicle and then the
back of your truck got hit, or did the back of your car get
hit and then you were pushed forward?
41
Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).
42
Smith v. Haldeman, 2012 WL 3611895, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
43
Def. Putnam’s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. C, 16-17, D.I. 34.
44
Id. at Ex. D, 17.
8
A. Apparently I was pushed forward into her vehicle,
based on what the policeman told me, because I told him I
don’t know what happened. He said you hit her is what he
told me, because he looked at it and he goes there’s no way
you hit her twice. Because I told him - - I said I just started
bouncing around. That’s exactly what I told him.45
Q. All right. Let me unpack a little bit of what you said
there, because the police officer was not there to see it
happen. Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. All right. So leaving aside the officer’s conclusion,
were you hit and then you hit my client, or the other way
around?
A. I think it was almost simultaneous. Like I said, it
was a boom. I mean, it was just. I don’t - - I don’t see any
way that I - - you know, that I hit her and then got hit and
then hit her again, because I don’t - - I don’t - - in my
mind’s eye, I don’t feel all those collisions.46
…
Q. Did you come to a full stop upon impact with my
client’s car?47
A. I believe so. But like I said, it’s - - you’re asking me
- - it was - - it was - - it was - - there was a whole lot of
things that happened at once. I believe I came to a stop,
but, you know.
…
Q. [] Were you pushed into my client?
45
Id. at Ex. D, 18-19.
46
Id. at Ex. D, 19.
47
Id. at Ex. D, 21.
9
A. Yes. Like I said, there was an immediate - - I got
pulled back and forward. That’s why I said it was like a
Ping-Pong ball.48
Q. Gotcha. And you only recall there basically being,
like, one impact?
A. I only recall myself going backwards and then
forwards. That’s what I recall.49
12. Plaintiff Shala Parker’s December 20, 2022 deposition included the
following testimony:
Q. What did you see happen?
A. The truck coming up on my rear.
Q. Okay. Would you say the truck was slowing down?
Was it stopped?
A. No.
Q. Were you watching in your rear-view mirror the
whole time the accident happened?
A. Yeah, I watched it happen.
Q. Okay. Did the truck ever come to a complete stop
before your vehicle was struck?
A. No.
Q. Did it slow down before your vehicle was struck?
A. I don’t think it did, no.
48
Id. at Ex. D, 22.
49
Id. at Ex. D, 23.
10
Q. Did you hear an impact before your vehicle was
struck?
A. No.
Q. Did you hear an impact after your vehicle was
struck that wasn’t involving, you know, that wasn’t the
vehicle hitting you?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Is the only thing you remember hearing is
[sic] your vehicle being struck?
A. Yes, ma’am.50
13. Steinbrecher and Plaintiffs correctly point out that there is a dispute in
the record over whether Putnam’s vehicle was completely stopped at the time of the
collision between Putnam’s vehicle and Shala Parker’s vehicle. Putnam’s testimony
conflicts with Shala Parker’s testimony. Shala Parker testified that Putnam’s vehicle
was not completely stopped and Putnam testified that he believed his vehicle was
completely stopped. The jury must decide what happened on this material issue.
The Court denies Putnam’s Motion because there is a genuine issue of fact whether
Putnam’s vehicle was stopped at the time of impact with Shala Parker’s vehicle.
50
Id. at Ex. B, 22-23.
11
THEREFORE, Defendant Darrell D. Putnam’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
12