USAA Casualty Insurance Company v. Hamilton

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Defendant Below/Appellant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No.: N23C-08-084 FWW
)
HENRY HAMILTON, )
)
Plaintiff Below/Appellee. )
Submitted: June 24, 2024
Decided: July 8, 2024
Upon the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Below/Appellee
Henry Hamilton
DENIED.
Upon the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Below/Appellant
USAA Casualty Insurance Company
GRANTED.
Upon the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Below/Appellant USAA Casualty
Insurance Company
MOOT.
M. Claire McCudden, Esquire, and Lisa M. Grubb, Esquire, MARSHALL
DENNEHEY, P.C., 1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 600, P.O. Box 8888, Wilmington,
DE 19899-8888, Attorneys for Defendant Below/Appellant USAA Casualty
Insurance Company.
Brian E. Lutness, Esquire, SILVERMAN, MCDONALD & FRIEDMAN,
Brandywine East Plaza, 1523 Concord Pike, Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19803,
Attorney for Plaintiff Below/Appellee Henry Hamilton.
WHARTON, J.
This 8th day of July 2024, upon consideration of the Second Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Below/Appellee Henry Hamilton (“Hamilton”),1 the
Response in Opposition to Appellee’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment and
Appellee’s Second Request for Summary Judgment of USAA Casualty Insurance
Company (“USAA”), 2 Hamilton’s Reply Brief,3 and the record in this case, it
appears to the Court that:
1. USAA insured Hamilton’s 2009 Chevrolet Colorado pickup truck under
a policy that included Personal Injury Protection coverage (“PIP”). On November
25, 2022, Hamilton drove his pickup truck to Hilton Marine Supply Company to
repair rotten wood that was part of the roof of a garage building. Hamilton reversed
the pickup truck to the garage building. There, he exited the pickup truck and
configured a ladder in the motor vehicle’s truck bed to reach the area in need of
repair. He positioned the bottom of the ladder on the truck bed and leaned the top
of the ladder against the garage building. The ladder slipped on the truck bed as
Hamilton was climbing it. He fell and sustained bodily injury.
2. Hamilton petitioned the Arbitration Panel of the Insurance Commission
to adjudicate his insurance claim. The Arbitration Panel heard Hamilton’s claim on
1
Hamilton’s Second Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 18.
2
USAA’s Resp. to the Second Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 20.
3
Hamilton’s Reply Br., D.I. 22.
2
July 12, 2023. 4 On July 20, 2023, the Arbitration Panel decided for Hamilton in the
total amount of $81,804.62.5
3. On August 9, 2023, USAA appealed to this Court from the Decision of
the Arbitration Panel.6 Before Hamilton filed a complaint in this appeal de novo, the
parties submitted cross motions for summary judgment, which the Court denied on
January 26, 2024. 7 In its Order denying those motions, the Court pointed out that
Hamilton had failed to properly initiate his de novo action in this Court by filing a
complaint as required by Superior Court Civil Rule 3(c). 8 Hamilton then filed his
Complaint and Answers to Form 30 Interrogatories on February 19th.9 USAA filed
its Answers to Appellant’s Complaint and Answers to Form 30 Interrogatories on
April 10th. 10 Hamilton moved for summary judgment again on April 18th.11 USAA
responded in opposition and moved for summary judgment again on May 20th.12
Hamilton replied on June 7th.13
4
D.I. 1.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 2024 WL 323506 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 26,
2024).
8
Id. at *4.
9
D.I. 15.
10
D.I. 17.
11
Hamilton’s Second Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 18.
12
USAA’s Resp. to the Second Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 20.
13
Hamilton’s Reply Br., D.I. 22.
3
4. Surprised that neither party addressed the obvious procedural elephant
in the room highlighted in its January 26th Order, on June 12th, the Court directed
the parties to submit simultaneous letter memoranda “addressing what
consequences, if any, should result from Hamilton’s failure to comply with Rule
3(c).”14 Both parties responded on June 24th. 15
5. In moving for summary judgment before this Court,16 Hamilton asserts
that the facts of this case satisfy the two-part test to determine if the accident
involved a motor vehicle set out in Kelty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company17 and, accordingly, he should be awarded PIP benefits. 18 Hamilton argues
that “the vehicle was not merely the situs of the accident but the bed of the truck was
where the ladder was placed and the cause of the ladder slipping” and “there was no
independent cause that broke the causal link.”19
6. Opposing Hamilton’s motion for summary judgment, USAA also
moves for summary judgment. 20 It asserts that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that judgment should be entered in its favor, denying PIP benefits
14
D.I. 23.
15
D.I. 26 (Hamilton); D.I. 27 (USAA).
16
Hamilton’s Second Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 18.
17
73 A.3d 926, 932 (Del. 2013).
18
Hamilton’s Second Mot. for Summ. J. at ¶ 7, D.I. 18.
19
Id.20
USAA’s Resp. to the Second Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 20.
4
to Hamilton. 21 In consideration of Kelty’s two-part test, USAA argues that
Hamilton’s injury was in no way caused by use or operation of the motor vehicle
except as a stationary platform and Hamilton’s pickup truck cannot be considered an
active accessory in causing his injuries. 22 Further, “[t]here is nothing to support that
Hamilton’s injuries occurred as a result of the nature of using his truck as a motor
vehicle.”23
7. In his Reply, Hamilton confirms that no party finds any material facts
to be at issue.24 He states that “[t]he ladder slipped on the bed of the truck causing
the accident” and “the accident could not have occurred without the truck as the
ladder could not have reached the roof in question.”25 Hamilton contends that PIP
benefits are warranted because the truck was an active accessory in causing the
injury and there was no act of independent significance that broke the causal link
between the use of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted. 26
8. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is
appropriate if, when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
21
Id.22
Id. at ¶ 8.
23
Id.
24
Hamilton’s Reply at ¶ 1, D.I. 22.
25
Id. at ¶ 4.
26
Id. at ¶ 5.
5
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”27 The moving party
initially bears the burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its
claims or defenses.28 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to show that there are material issues of fact the ultimate factfinder
must resolve. 29 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court's
function is to examine the record, including “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether genuine issues
of material fact exist “but not to decide such issues.” 30 Summary judgment will only
be appropriate if the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact. When
material facts are in dispute, or “it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into
the facts, to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances,” summary
judgment will not be appropriate. 31 However, when the facts permit a reasonable
person to draw but one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter
27
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 A.3d
845, 847 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015), aff'd, 140 A.3d 431 (Del. 2016) (quoting Moore v.
Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979)).
28
Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 681.
29
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
30
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del.
1992).
31
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69, (Del. 1962) (citing Knapp v.
Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957)).
6
of law.32 Where the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment and have
not argued that there is an issue of material fact to the disposition of either motion,
the Court will treat the motions as a stipulation for decision on the merits based on
the record submitted with the motions. 33 Because the parties agree there are no
material factual disputes, the issue is one of law and summary judgment is
appropriate.
9. Delaware requires the owners of Delaware-registered motor vehicles to
obtain certain insurance coverage.34 The PIP mandate requires insurance that
provides for “[c]ompensation to injured persons for reasonable and necessary
expenses....” 35 PIP coverage is available to each person “occupying such motor
vehicle and to any other person injured in an accident involving such motor vehicle,
other than an occupant of another motor vehicle.” 36
10. To determine whether a claimant is eligible for PIP benefits, the correct
analysis is to apply first, the disjunctive two-part test in National Union Fire
Insurance Company of Pittsburgh v. Fisher 37 to determine whether the plaintiff is an
32
Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).
33
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(h).
34
Friel v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1813293, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 6,
2014), aff'd, 108 A.3d 1225 (Del. 2015) (citing 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)).
35
Id. (quoting 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(a)).
36
Id. (quoting 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(c)).
37
692 A.2d 892, 896 (Del. 1997).
7
occupant, and second, the two-part test in Kelty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company38 to determine whether the accident involved a motor vehicle.39
11. It is unnecessary here for the Court to conduct a Fischer analysis
because neither party raises occupancy as an issue.40 Still, “[o]ccupancy alone is
insufficient to end the analysis for PIP eligibility.” 41 Since neither party took issue
with Hamilton’s occupancy, this case turns on whether the accident involved a motor
vehicle under Kelty’s two-part test.
12. Kelty holds that for a claimant's injury to have occurred in an accident
involving a motor vehicle the insured vehicle must have been an “active accessory”
in causing the injury, and the causal connection between the use of the vehicle and
the claimant's injury must not have been broken by an independent act.42 The
Delaware Supreme Court defined active accessory to require “something less than
proximate cause in the tort sense and something more than the vehicle being the
38
73 A.3d 926, 932 (Del. 2013).
39
Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 4515699, at *2 (Del. Super.
Ct. July 27, 2015) (citing Friel, 2014 WL 1813293 at *5).
40
See Finney v. Atl. States Ins. Co., 2017 WL 6034119, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec.
6, 2017), aff'd, 189 A.3d 187 (Del. 2018); see also Shaw v. State, 2021 WL
1291772, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2021), aff'd, 2021 WL 5121200 (Del. Nov.
4, 2021) (where the Court forewent a Fischer analysis as the defendant conceded
that the plaintiff was an occupant of the vehicle).
41
Friel, 2014 WL 1813293 at *5.
42
Id. at *4 (citing Kelty, 73 A.3d at 930).
8
mere situs of the injury.” 43 Similar to Friel v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company,44
the first part of the Kelty test is the dispositive issue in this case - whether the motor
vehicle was an “active accessory” in causing Hamilton’s injury.45
13. In Friel the Court described the facts it found relevant. The plaintiff
was employed as a delivery driver who delivered products to various customers on
pallets placed in his employer’s truck.46 The unloading process included the use of
chains and a claw to connect these pallets to a forklift. 47 When the plaintiff arrived
for a particular delivery, he parked the truck, applied the air brake and turned off the
truck.48 He then exited the truck, opened the back and removed the load bar.49 The
plaintiff was standing in the back of the truck during the unloading process. 50 While
unloading approximately the tenth pallet of product, the plaintiff bent down to hook
up the chains and he injured his back.51 At the time of the injury, the plaintiff’s
employer had an automobile insurance policy that included PIP coverage.52 The
43
Id. (quoting Kelty, 73 A.3d at 931).
44
2014 WL 1813293 (Del. Super. Ct. May 6, 2014), aff'd, 108 A.3d 1225 (Del.
2015).
45
Id. at *4.
46
Id. at *1.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at *2.
9
plaintiff filed a claim with the insurance company and was denied coverage. 53 The
insurance company reasoned that the plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of an
“automobile accident.” 54 The plaintiff filed suit against the insurance company in
this Court alleging a breach of contract for failing to pay PIP benefits. 55
14. The Court in Friel found that the plaintiff’s motor vehicle did not
qualify for PIP coverage because it was not an “active accessory” in causing the
plaintiff’s injury. 56 In making this determination, the Court wrote:
[T]he vehicle is the mere situs of the injury. The injury was
in no way caused by use or operation of the motor vehicle,
except as a stationary platform from which product was
being unloaded.57 The injury did not occur by virtue of the
inherent nature of using a motor vehicle.58
15. Based on the agreed upon facts in this case, the Court finds that
Hamilton’s motor vehicle was not an “active accessory” in causing his injury. The
motor vehicle was the mere situs of the injury when Hamilton fell from the ladder
that he situated in its truck bed. Hamilton’s injury was in no way caused by use or
operation of the pickup truck except as a stationary platform to extend his ladder’s
reach to repair a building. 59 Hamilton’s injury did not occur by virtue of the inherent
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at *5.
57
Id.
58
Id. at *5 (citing Kelty, 73 A.3d at 931 n.29).
59
Id. at *5.
10
nature of using a motor vehicle. 60 Hamilton was not using the truck as a truck when
he placed the ladder in the truck bed. Rather, he used it as an improvised platform
upon which to elevate the ladder.
16. Because the Court finds that Hamilton’s pickup truck was not an “active
accessory” in causing his injuries under the circumstances present here, it is
unnecessary for the Court to address the “independent significance” prong of Kelty.61
Hamilton is not eligible to recover PIP benefits because he was not involved in an
accident involving a motor vehicle as required by statute and defined by case law.62
17. The Court now turns to the issue for which it sought supplemental letter
memoranda. Hamilton, by letter dated “July 24 [sic], 2024” purports to explain the
failure of “the appellant [sic]” to file a timely complaint as required by Rule 3(c).63
Throughout his letter to the Court, counsel for Hamilton transposes “appellant” and
“appellee,” mistakenly referring to his client as the “appellant” and USAA as the
“appellee.” 64 Counsel’s transposition of the parties makes it somewhat difficult to
follow Hamilton’s argument, but as the Court understands it, Hamilton thought he
was meeting his obligation to file the first pleading on appeal by filing a motion for
60
Id. at *5 (citing Kelty, 73 A.3d at 931 n.29).
61
Jarrett v. Titan Indem. Co., 2017 WL 6343552, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 11,
2017).
62
Friel, 2014 WL 1813293, at *5.
63
D.I. 26.
64
Perhaps this confusion accounts, at least in part, for his failure to understand his
client’s obligations under Rule 3(c) properly.
11
summary judgment. 65 In any event, Hamilton asks the Court to overlook his
defalcation because he has manifested his intention to purse the litigation, USAA
has suffered no prejudice, and, citing Purcell v. State Farm, 66 the sanction of
dismissal should be reserved where there is a clear record of dilatory conduct, which
is absent here.
18. For its part, USAA now seems aware that something was awry. It asks
the Court, after failing to do so up to this point, to dismiss Hamilton’s complaint
because it is untimely. 67
19. In light of the Court’s determination to grant summary judgment in
favor of USAA, USAA’s belated Motion to Dismiss is MOOT.
THEREFORE, Plaintiff Below/Appellee Henry Hamilton's Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendant Below/Appellant USAA Casualty
Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
65
D.I. 26.
66
2018 WL 3814592 (Del. Aug. 9, 2018) (another case where the parties had
difficulty transitioning from the Insurance Commissioner’s Arbitration Panel to the
Superior Court.)
67
D.I. 27.
12