State v. Massey

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
) Def. I.D. # 2108001587A
v. )
)
)
RHANDY D. MASSEY, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: July 2, 2024
Decided: July 17, 2024
Upon Remand from the Supreme Court of Delaware for Evidentiary Hearing
OPINION
Rebecca E. Anderson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 13
The Circle, Georgetown, DE 19947; Attorney for State of Delaware.
John R. Garey, Esquire, 48 The Green, Dover, DE 19901; Attorney for Defendant
Rhandy Massey.
KARSNITZ, R. J.
1
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Rhandy D. Massey (“Defendant”) was charged with multiple criminal
offenses1 stemming from allegations made by his two minor daughters, M.M. and
L.M., of sexual abuse.
On Friday, January 20, 2023, two days before trial, Defendant submitted a
motion (the “3508 Motion”) pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3508 (commonly called the
“Rape Shield Statute”), requesting an in camera hearing to determine the
admissibility of prior sexual conduct, more fully described below, pertaining to
the alleged victims in this matter, L.M. and M.M. Defendant's motion initially
addressed three prior allegations: (1) an allegation made by both girls against their
half-brother, Nathan Massey, (2) statements by a babysitter about sexual contact
between the girls themselves, and (3) an allegation made by the girls against
Defendant unrelated to the current charges. The key issue prior to trial became
allegation (1). The State filed its response via email on Sunday, January 22, 2023.
I addressed the motion on Monday, January 23, 2023, in a pre-trial hearing before
1
First Degree Rape, victim under 12; Second Degree Rape, victim under 12; two counts of
Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child; two counts of Sexual Solicitation of a Child; five counts
of Unlawful Sexual Contact, victims under 13; and three counts of Second Degree Sexual
Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of Trust.
2
jury selection began. I denied the 3508 Motion, stating:
I’m going to deny your request to delve into this
information … When I look at the standards set forth for
me … in Bailey,2 I just don’t think you have sufficient
evidence that this was false, and I think you have to have
that because … I don’t really think this is a Rape Shield
question, it’s kind of related to it but not exactly it, but it’s
a question of whether that kind of questioning should be
allowed, and I think that there’s a level that you have to
have to be able to allow this kind of evidence that you
don’t have here.
[The judge in Bailey] uses the clear and convincing
standard and I don’t think you’ve met that standard, and I
think we would end up trying the case against the half
brother if we would allow this to come into evidence. So
… I’m going to deny your motion with respect to all of the
allegations you’ve alleged in this particular motion.3
At the conclusion of a four-day jury trial, on January 27, 2023, Defendant
was convicted of all charges. On February 6, 2023, Defendant filed a motion
requesting a new trial pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 33 (the
“Rule 33 Motion”). In support of the Motion, Defendant argued, inter alia, that I
used an incorrect legal standard in denying Defendant's 3508 Motion by not
applying Bryant v. State.4 I denied the Rule 33 Motion on March 7, 2023.
On March 27, 2023, I sentenced Defendant to a total of 119 years of
incarceration.
2
State v. Bailey, 1996 WL 587721 (Del. Super. Sept. 12, 1996).
3
Transcript of Motion, Monday, Jan. 23, 2023, at 26-27.
4
734 A.2d 157 (Del. 1999).
3
Defendant filed a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court and filed
an opening brief, asserting, inter alia, that I erred by denying his 3508 Motion for
an in camera proceeding to allow him to determine the relevancy or the truth or
falsity of the complaining witnesses’ prior allegations of sexual abuse, and
excluding evidence of past incidents of a sexual nature pertaining to the
complaining witnesses to show that they had prior sexual knowledge.
In connection with his appeal, Defendant filed a motion to remand this case
to me (the “Defense Remand Motion”) for the resolution of his motion to release
the presentence investigation report (the “PSI Report”) to him. In his interview
with the PSI investigator, Defendant disclosed that one daughter had previously
accused her cousin, A.M., of another incident of sexual abuse. The PSI
investigator subsequently obtained the report documenting this allegation and
attached it as an exhibit to the PSI Report. In his Defense Remand Motion,
Defendant asserted that the State’s failure to notify him of the sexual abuse
allegation against the cousin, A.M., and to disclose the police report documenting
the allegation, constituted a Brady5 violation that could be raised on direct appeal.
Defendant also asserted that the State’s failure to disclose the A.M. allegation is
inherently intertwined with the Nathan Massey allegation that was the subject of
the 3508 Motion which I denied, could also be raised on direct appeal, and that
because of these violations he was unable to present a complete defense. On
5
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4
September 25, 2023, the Delaware Supreme Court ordered the Office of
Investigative Services to provide it with the sealed PSI Report.
The Supreme Court also granted Defendant leave to file an amended
opening brief. On October 30, 2023, Defendant filed his amended opening brief
with the Court, which added to the previous claims an additional claim of a Brady
violation with respect to the A.M. allegation. Defendant contended that the A.M.
incident would have shown how L.M. acquired knowledge of sexual interaction,
putting her in a position to conjure false allegations. Defendant also contended
that this would have opened the door for him to utilize an expert to explain how
a child copes with sexual abuse, how it influences her future behavior, and
whether it could result in subsequent false allegations.
On November 9, 2023, the State filed its own Motion to Remand and to
Stay Briefing (the “State Remand Motion”), in which the State also asked the
Supreme Court to remand the case to me in order to afford Defendant the
opportunity to inquire of the complainants whether their prior allegations against
Defendant and Nathan Massey were false, to supplement the record through an
evidentiary hearing, and to afford me the opportunity to reconsider my ruling on
the 3508 Motion.6 This would also allow any missing record to be to be completed
concerning the A.M. allegation.
6
Citing Bailey v. State, Del Supr., No. 475, 1995, Walsh, J. (June 7, 1996) (ORDER).
5
On November 9, 2023, the Supreme Court entered an Order7 remanding
the case to me for an evidentiary hearing within 90 days8 with respect to the
complainants’ prior allegations of sexual abuse against Nathan Massey,
Defendant, and A.M. as to falsity, and to make any findings and grant such relief
as may be appropriate. I also was directed to complete any missing record about
the A.M. allegation. The briefing schedule was stayed until further order of the
Court. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction over the case.
On February 21, 2024, I held the hearing required by the Supreme Court.
The witnesses were M.M., L.M., and Inga Lambert (formerly Massey), the
mother of the two complaining witnesses and the former wife of Defendant. A
video interview from the Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”) was also introduced
as evidence. This testimony and evidence, and my legal analysis thereof, are set
forth below.
On April 22, 2024, Defendant filed his brief in support of his request for
relief. On May 16, 2024, the State filed its response. On May 31, 2024, Defendant
filed his reply. On July 2, 2024, I held oral argument. These are my factual
findings and legal opinion following the remand hearing ordered by the Supreme
Court.
7
Massey v. State, Del. Supr., No. 131, 2023, Traynor, J. (Nov. 9, 2024) (ORDER).
8
If it was not feasible for me to hold this hearing within 90 days, I was required to file a status
report with the Supreme Court. I filed one such report, after the scheduling order was established,
when the State’s request for an extension was granted.
6
II. SCOPE OF REMAND HEARING
At oral argument on July 2, 2024, the parties expressed divergent views on
the scope of my powers on remand under the terms of the Supreme Court’s
November 9, 2023 Order. The State took the view that I could make factual
findings and then, under applicable law, reconsider Defendant’s 3508 Motion and
any additional allegations concerning A.M. in light of those factual findings. In
other words, I could issue a legal opinion, based upon the evidence of record as
expanded by the remand hearing. Defendant took a more expansive view that I
had power to order more fulsome relief, such as granting Defendant a new trial
now, without further Supreme Court review. However, because the Supreme
Court has retained jurisdiction, I view my powers as limited by the specific terms
of the Court’s Order. An unsigned portion of the Order states that I can, in
addition to holding an evidentiary hearing, completing any missing record, and
making supplementary factual findings, “grant such relief as may be appropriate.”
However, the Comments of Justice Traynor state that I may only hold the
evidentiary hearing and make any supplementary factual findings.
I am guided by an analogous remand hearing in State v. Collins.9 In that
case, the parties requested that the Supreme Court remand to the Superior Court
to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a discrepancy involving a trial exhibit. The
Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded “as requested by the parties”
9
2015 WL 412924 (Del. Super. Dec. 22, 2015).
7
to the Superior Court to “conduct a hearing on the discrepancy.” 10 The Superior
Court held a hearing and issued an opinion with factual findings and related legal
conclusions, in which it noted that “in granting the parties’ request for remand to
conduct a hearing on the discrepancy, the Supreme Court gave the [Superior]
Court broad discretion in determining how to proceed on the legal issues.”11
Therefore, I state my supplementary factual findings herein, based on the
record and any additional evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, and my
legal opinion.
III. BRADY VIOLATION
Defendant alleges that the State committed a Brady12 violation by failing to
turn over evidence reflecting prior abuse of L.M. by her cousin, A.M., prior to trial.
Both L.M. and A.M. were juveniles at the time of the alleged offense. Defendant
argues that given the lack of corroborating evidence to buttress the allegations
against Defendant, the credibility of the complaining witnesses becomes critical,
and, therefore, Defendant should be granted a new trial based upon this Brady
violation. I disagree for four reasons.
First, there was corroborating evidence. Of note, there was significant
corroborating evidence of L.M.'s allegations against Defendant and subsequent
10
Collins v. State, Del. Supr., No. 88, 2015, Seitz, J. (Oct. 23, 2015) (ORDER).
11
State v. Collins, 2015 WL 412924 (Del. Super. Dec. 22, 2015).
12
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
8
testimony at trial that Defendant's semen was found on a pink blanket used by
Defendant in the family living room. L.M. testified that Defendant would ejaculate
on the blanket.
Second, Defendant was not prejudiced under Brady because he was well
aware of the allegation involving his daughter, L.M. and his nephew, A.M. The main reporting
person and witness to the alleged abuse was Defendant's juvenile son and L.M.’s
half-brother, Nathan Massey. Defendant's wife at the time, Inga Massey, testified
that she immediately left work upon finding out about the allegations and called
Defendant on her way to him and their children. When Inga arrived at football
practice where Defendant and the girls were, Defendant told Inga that he did not
feel it was necessary to take L.M. to the hospital so long as nothing else happened.
According to Inga, Defendant himself spoke to Nathan Massey and L.M. about the
allegations involving A.M. Defendant was aware of the allegations at the time they
were reported, as the entire Massey family was involved.
Third, Defendant himself was the one who told the PSI investigator about
the allegation, so he was clearly aware of the allegation. He could have requested
that the trial court allow him to explore the allegation for credibility purposes when
he asked the trial court to explore the allegations made by L.M. and M.M. against
his son, Nathan Massey. However, he made no such request despite being aware
of the allegations.
Fourth, even if Defendant was not aware of a police report regarding the
9
incident involving A.M., he is not prejudiced because he has now, following the
evidentiary hearing, had the chance to cross-examine L.M. about her disclosure at
the CAC. He also had the opportunity to cross-examine Inga about the disclosure
and subsequent actions taken by Inga and by Defendant following the allegations
brought forth by Nathan Massey. There has been no evidence presented by
Defendant as to falsity, either by L.M. or by Inga, regarding the allegations against
Nathan. Therefore, any evidence relating to A.M. would be inadmissible in trial
under § 3508 and the Delaware Rules of Evidence.13
IV. THE REMAND HEARING AND § 3508 ANALYSIS
A. DEFENDANT’S 3508 MOTION
In my view, Defendant’s original 3508 Motion was poorly constructed and
undeveloped. It also put me in a position with little time to analyze the issues on
the eve of trial. In his 3508 Motion, Defendant asserted that the alleged victims,
ages 9 and 11 at the time of the trial, were the subject of other incidents where
either the alleged victims or others on their behalf claimed sexual abuse occurred.
I will detail the incidents but, before doing so, I will explain Defendant’s
arguments for their admission. Defendant asserted the incidents showed a general
sexual indoctrination, or “sexualization,” of the young girls. At one point
Defendant argued that an expert could explain how this general sexual
13
Rules 608 (Witness’s Character for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness) and 403 (Exclusion of
Relevant for Prejudice).
10
indoctrination14 might lead to the claims made against him. Defendant’s
alternative argument was that he should be able to show the prior incidents
because Defendant had a question as to their validity, and thus the credibility of
the alleged victims. I call this the falsity issue. At oral argument on remand,
Defendant expressly abandoned the “sexualization” issue and relied solely on the
falsity claim.
I addressed the §3508 issue prior to trial. I reviewed the documents of other
incidents and found no evidence of falsity. I find it of significant importance that
the children involved were very young. In at least one incident, the child was
two years of age and likely not competent to testify. There were no facts as in
Bryant15 where a teenager made claims of sexual assault against a number of
people, and then retracted them. Circumstances such as those in Bryant rightfully
require some relief from §3508 under a “cry wolf” theory. We did not have those
circumstances here.
I am of the opinion, then and now, that Defendant never met the threshold
of §3508 to require an out of the presence of the jury examination of the alleged
victims as mandated by §3508. The requirements of §3508 are:
(1) The defendant shall make a written motion to the
14
In my mind, this argument raises interesting issues of how children learn about sex in general.
Common sources of knowledge are parents, siblings, friends and sex education. The important
point here is not how and when a child learns about sex. For me, the sophistication of the child
tells us nothing about a child’s propensity to lie. Defendant never bridged that gap for me.
15
Bryant v. State, 734 A.2d 157 (Del. 1999).
11
Court and prosecutor stating that the defense has an
offer of proof concerning the relevancy of evidence
of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness
which the defendant proposes to present, and the
relevancy of such evidence in attacking the
credibility of the complaining witness.
(2) The written motion shall be accompanied by an
affidavit in which the offer of proof shall be stated.
(3) If the court finds that the offer of proof is
sufficient, the court shall order a hearing out of the
presence of the jury, if any, and at such hearing
allow the questioning of the complaining witness
regarding the offer of proof made by the defendant.
(4) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court
finds that evidence proposed to be offered by the
defendant regarding the sexual conduct of the
complaining witness is relevant, and is not
inadmissible, the court may issue an order stating
what evidence may be introduced by the defendant,
and the nature of the questions to be permitted. The
defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the
order of the court.
Section (a)(3) gives me a gatekeeping function. If I determine that “…the offer of
proof is sufficient…” then I must hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury.
For me, what was offered by Defendant did not meet that standard. As I said when
I denied Defendant’s original 3508 Motion on January 23, 2023, what was offered
to me before trial was factually insufficient as there was no indication whatsoever
of falsity. Defendant points to the fact that, despite the allegations, the State did not
prosecute. In my view, that is not enough to demonstrate falsity. I also weigh
heavily the age of all the people involved in the incidents.
12
B. THE REMAND HEARING
I held the evidentiary hearing on February 21, 2024. I will now describe all
the incidents originally raised by the alleged victims, and those actually presented
at the remand hearing. There were originally five such incidents raised, but this
number was reduced to two as the case proceeded:
(1) 2015 Incident
A.M., L.M.’s cousin, allegedly engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse with
L.M, then two years old. This was reported to Inga, L.M.’s mother, by the
babysitter. The babysitter had been told by a young teenage boy, who had himself
been told by Nathan Massey, that Nathan had observed A.M., with his pants down,
insert his penis into L.M. The police followed up and scheduled forensic interviews
with both Nathan and L.M. at CAC. The police also spoke to Inga. At the remand
hearing, L.M. was unable to answer any questions regarding this incident. Inga also
had little recall of the incident, and simply referred to the police reports.
It came as no surprise to me that the alleged victim had no recollection of the
incident which occurred when she was two years of age. I also heard from the
mother and reviewed the child’s interview at the CAC. None of the evidence proved
any falsity. I found the CAC interview was instructive. It lasted about 20 minutes.
For the first five minutes, the child tried to please the interviewer. The rest was
playtime. At some point, she did indicate someone touched her inappropriately, but
that very general statement was the extent of her recollection.
13
(2) First 2017 Incident
L.M., now four years of age, and M.M. awoke the sleeping Defendant and told
him that their half-brother, Nathan Massey, then 11 or 12 years old, pulled down
his pants and told M.M. to suck his penis. Defendant confronted Nathan, who
denied this. Inga called home and was told by Defendant about this incident. She
returned home and took her daughters to the hospital. The hospital informed the
police of the incident, and the police responded to the hospital. Inga reported the
incident to the police, who arranged for forensic interviews of the girls. During the
CAC interview, L.M. implicated Nathan in unlawful sexual contact against her as
well. At the remand hearing, the witnesses generally verified these facts.
(3) The 2018 Incident
M.M. reported to police officers that Defendant touched her in her crotch area.
It was later conceded that they were just rough-housing, and his elbow accidentally
touched her groin area. Defendant subsequently dropped his request to introduce
evidence of this incident.
(4) Second 2017 Incident
In the police report of the 2018 incident, the police were told by a babysitter
for the girls that she saw them “putting things up each other’s butts.” Defendant
subsequently dropped his request to introduce evidence of this incident.
(5) Undated Incident
There was some mention in the police reports of cocaine use by Defendant and
14
that Defendant exposed himself to the girls in his car. Defendant did not pursue his
request to introduce evidence of this incident.
For whatever reasons (perhaps the young ages of the alleged victims, A.M.,
and Nathan Massey), the police and the State did not pursue charges against anyone
for the first two incidents. In any event, just as I ruled in my initial ruling on the
3508 Motion, the testimony at the remand hearing and the CAC report contained
absolutely no evidence of falsity, or that either L.M. or M.M. had ever recanted
their stories. Indeed, their testimony at the remand hearing essentially buttressed
their original reports from 2015, 2017, and 2108, with allowances made for the
young ages of the girls and the dimming of memories over time. As discussed
below, a determination of falsity is a lynchpin of my legal analysis, and my
determination of falsity was the stated purpose of the Supreme Court’s remand.
Moreover, Defendant at the remand hearing dropped his “sexualization” theory and
defaulted to falsity.
C. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In his opening argument and reply, and at oral argument on July 2, 2024,
Defendant asked me to reconsider my denials of his 3508 Motion and his Rule 33
Motion, and to order a new trial where the §3508 evidence would be presented to
the jury. Moreover, in Defendant’s view, the Supreme Court’s remand Order
permits me to pick and choose which incidents, and how much of each incident,
may be presented to the jury – it is not an “all or nothing” proposition. He again
argued that I applied the wrong legal standard when denying these two Motions.
15
Defendant cites Bryant v. State16 as the proper legal standard. However, the
Delaware Supreme Court in that case specifically noted, "the Superior Court did
not consider the Rape Shield Statute in its ruling and in this appeal the State has
not relied upon the statute as a basis for exclusion."17 The decision instead focuses
on the ability of counsel to cross-examine a witness concerning prior specific
incidents of untruthfulness.18 Defendant, in the Motion, argues that the Delaware
Supreme Court created a standard when it stated: "even where the evidence is
inconclusive as to falsity, prior allegations of sexual assault may be admitted
to challenge credibility.”19 The Supreme Court went on to say:
Given the minimal corroborative evidence in this case and the
unusual social history of the complaining witnesses the issue of
credibility looms large. Any attempt to restrict cross-examination
under these circumstances must proceed on a complete record with
a full appreciation of the relevance of such testimony. We conclude
that, on this record, the trial court's ruling regarding the five
excluded allegations, without further effort to determine their
falsity, was an abuse of discretion. Because we cannot with
confidence assess the impact of the excluded evidence, we must
reverse and remand for a new trial.20 [Emphasis supplied]
In my view, this case is distinguishable from Bryant. Bryant notes that "the
precise issue is not before us..."21 Furthermore, the allegations in the Bryant case
included two allegations which were demonstrably false because the alleged
victims recanted their statements. Such recantation evidence or other evidence
16
734 A.2d 157 (Del. 1999).
17
Id. at *2 n.2.
18
Id. at *2.
19
Id. at *3.
20
Id.
21
Id.
16
of falsity does not exist here. Moreover, Bryant did not address 11 Del. C. § 3508
and how that specific statute would affect the admissibility or inadmissibility of
supposed prior false allegations.
Rather, I rely upon State v. Bailey,22 a § 3508 case. The Delaware Superior
Court in that case found that prior allegations of sexual assault may be
admissible at trial only if t h e d efendant makes a showing that the witnesses'
prior allegations of sexual assault were false.23 In this case, Defendant failed to
make any showing of falsity, only self-serving assertions that the prior allegations
may have been false accusations. There have been no recantations of any prior
allegations against either Nathan Massey, the half-brother to both alleged victims,
or against A.M., their cousin. In fact, both alleged victims referenced Nathan in
their forensic interview at the CAC following their allegations of abuse against
Defendant. During that interview, both girls maintained that something had
occurred with Nathan previously.
There was considerable discussion at oral argument of several Rhode Island
cases. In State v. Oliveria,24 cited by the Delaware Supreme Court in Bryant, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the complaining witness’ prior allegations
of abuse were admissible even if those prior allegations had not been proven false
22
1996 WL 587721 (Del. Super. Sept. 12, 1996).
23
Id. at *6.
24
576 A.2d 111 (R.I. 1990).
17
or withdrawn. However, almost twenty years later, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court limited its holding in Oliviera, stating that “[a]lthough Oliviera does not
require a defendant to prove the falsity of a prior accusation, unless there is a
minimal showing that the prior accusation was, in fact, false, its probative value is
slight. As we stated in Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1035, a prior true allegation is irrelevant
because it is not probative of the witness’ character for truthfulness … Even though
under our case law a defendant need not prove the falsity of the prior accusation,
he must at least present some indicia tending to show that the prior accusation was
false …”25
In this case, Defendant has not even presented a minimal showing that the
prior allegations were, in fact, false, and there are no indicia tending to show that
the allegations were false. Thus, the allegations presented in the 3508 Motion and
at the remand hearing are irrelevant because they are not probative of the
complaining witnesses’ character for truthfulness. Defendant has failed to meet
this threshold requirement.
In its response and at oral argument on July 2, 2024, the State argued that,
absent any evidence of falsity, there is no basis for the admission of the §3508
evidence. Moreover, the additional §3508 evidence, if admitted at a new trial,
would only confuse the jury and its prejudicial effect would far outweigh its
probative value. The acts alleged to have been committed by Nathan and A.M.
25
State v. Manning, 973 A.2d 524, 535 (R.I. 2009).
18
are sufficiently different in kind from those of which Defendant was convicted,
and as such would otherwise be irrelevant or inadmissible at trial. I agree.
Additionally, I believed when I ruled on the 3508 Motion and the Rule 33
Motion, and I continue to believe after the remand hearing, that an appropriate
purpose for introduction of this evidence was not shown by Defendant. Defendant
wanted to make the contradictory arguments that the alleged victims were lying
about Nathan and A.M., but that they were previously abused by Nathan and A.M.
None of the police reports provided to Defendant during pre-trial discovery or
after the Brady violation was discovered show that either alleged victim provided
false information or lied about the prior allegations against Nathan, A.M., or
anyone else. In my view, Defendant has not met any standard to allow for
introduction of this evidence at trial.
I did not want the trial to turn into a trial within a trial against Nathan, and
I do not want a new trial to turn into a trial within a trial against Nathan and A.M.
In State v. Benson,26 the defendant was charged with raping a boy, N.B., under
the age of 12. The defendant moved under § 3508 to introduce evidence from
incidents where N.B. had engaged in sexual contact with his minor sisters to
establish N.B.’s possible motive to fabricate the allegations against the defendant
to impeach N.B.s credibility.27 The defendant and the State could not agree on
26
2019 WL 1014792 (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 2019).
27
N.B. ultimately pleaded delinquent in Family Court to two misdemeanor-level offenses.
19
which of five categories of evidence relating to N.B.’s sexual conduct towards his
sisters, if any, were admissible under § 3508. The Court determined that only three
of the five categories of evidence were admissible, stating that the scope of that
evidence must be limited in order to prevent [the] trial from devolving into a trial
within a trial:
Section 3508 expressly permits the Court to limit the scope of the
evidence offered to only that which is necessary to attack the
complaining witness’s credibility, and the rules of evidence also
give the Court discretion to limit evidence to avoid wasting time
and to protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.28
For all the reasons discussed above, I again deny Defendant’s 3508 Motion on the
facts of record, as expanded by the remand hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
This matter is returned to the Delaware Supreme Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
Craig A. Karsnitz
cc: Prothonotary
28
Benson, 2019 WL 1014792, at *2; see also State v. Davis, 2007 WL 4234453 (Del. Super.
November 28, 2006).
20