Grimes v. D.O.C. Commissioner

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RUSSELL GRIMES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) C.A. No.: N22M-05-149 KMM
v. )
)
D.O.C. COMMISSIONER and )
WARDEN ROBERT MAY (JTVCC), )
)
Defendants. )
Submitted: November 28, 2023
Decided: February 6, 2024
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment: DENIED.
Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Petition for a Writ of Mandamus: GRANTED.
INTRODUCTION
1. Petitioner Russell Grimes (“Grimes”) is currently incarcerated at James
T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware. In November of 2018, Grimes
was transferred from Delaware to a Pennsylvania institution for two years pursuant
to the Interstate Corrections Compact (the “Compact”).1 While at the Pennsylvania
correctional institution, Grimes permissibly purchased an electronic tablet computer
at the commissary (the “Computer”). Grimes used the Computer to store and listen
1
11 Del. C. §§ 6570 – 6573.
to music, which he also purchased, for a total cost of approximately $800.2
2. Upon his return to Delaware in February 2021, the Delaware
Department of Corrections (the “DOC”) confiscated the Computer. Grimes filed
this action on May 31, 2022, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the DOC
Commissioner and Warden Robert May (together “Respondents”) to return Grimes’
Computer to him.3
3. There are two motions pending: (1) Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(5) and
Rule 12(b)(6);4 and (2) Grimes’ Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Superior
Court Civil Rule 56.5 The motions are addressed in turn below.
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
4. Grimes contends that he has the right to possess the Computer while
incarcerated in Delaware because it was lawfully purchased while he was
incarcerated in Pennsylvania. He further contends that the DOC has no legitimate
basis to confiscate his property and, therefore, he seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel the DOC to return the Computer.
5. Respondents moved to dismiss Grimes’ petition under Rules 12(b)(5)
and 12(b)(6) because Grimes failed (1) to comply with the mandatory service
2
D.I. 1.
3
Id.
4
D.I. 23.
5
D.I. 22.
2
requirements of 10 Del. C. § 3103(c), and (2) to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted due to Grimes’ failure to establish a clear right to the performance of a
non-discretionary duty, and that he has no other remedy available.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Standard of Review
6. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(5), the Court may dismiss an
action for insufficiency of service of process. Under Rule 4(j), a plaintiff is provided
120 days to serve the defendant with the summons and complaint and if plaintiff
cannot show good cause why service of process was not completed in this time-
period, the action “shall be dismissed.” “Good cause”, synonymous with good cause
and excusable neglect, requires a showing of some reasonable basis for not
complying with the time-period in Rule 4(j).6 “Excusable neglect is defined as
‘neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances.’ In contrast, failure to perfect service as a result of mistake,
inadvertence, or ‘half-hearted’ efforts does not qualify as excusable neglect.”7
7. Where service on a governmental organization is involved, Superior
Court Civil Rule 4(f)(1)(IV) provides additional procedures for service of process.
In addition to serving the summons and complaint on the chief executive officer,
service must satisfy other applicable law for the service of summons upon such
6
Woinski v. Emerson, 2019 WL 2006486, at *4 (Del. Super. May 2, 2019).
7
Id. (italics in original; citations omitted).
3
defendant.8 Specifically here, in addition to serving Respondents, 10 Del. C. §
3103(c) requires a plaintiff to personally serve one of the following three persons:
(1) the Attorney General; (2) the State Solicitor; or (3) the Chief Deputy Attorney
General.9
8. Dismissal is appropriate under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) when
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.10 On a 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court: accepts as true all well pleaded factual allegations; credits vague
allegations as “well pleaded” if they give the opposing party notice of the claim;
draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party; and denies
dismissal if there is a reasonably conceivable set of circumstances of recovery on
the claim.11
9. The Court also considers the standard a party must meet to obtain a writ
of mandamus, which is an “extraordinary remedy.”12 The Court may issue a writ of
8
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 4(f)(1)(IV).
9
Drake v. State, 1979 WL 195352 (Del. Super. Nov. 5, 1979); Miller v. State, 2003 WL 1900394,
at *4 (Del. Super. June 16, 2009). 10 Del. C. § 3103(c) provides: “No service of summons upon
the State, or upon any administrative office, agency, department, board or commission of the state
government, or upon any officer of the state government concerning any matter arising in
connection with the exercise of his or her official powers or duties, shall be complete until such
service is made upon the person of the Attorney General or upon the person of the State Solicitor
or upon the person of the Chief Deputy Attorney General.”
10
Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. Endurance Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 2023 WL 3145914, at *8 (Del.
Super. Apr. 28, 2023); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).
11
Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011).
12
Mell v. New Castle Cnty., 835 A.2d 141, 145 (Del. Super. 2003); Johnson v. Phelps, 2009 WL
597625, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 20, 2009). The Superior Court has jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus under 10 Del. C. § 564.
4
mandamus to “a State officer, tribunal, board, or agency to compel the performance
of an official duty.”13 Such a writ will not be issued to create a duty or to compel a
discretionary act.14 Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue where the petitioner
has demonstrated that: (1) there is a clear right to the performance of a duty; (2) no
other adequate remedy is available; and (3) the agency arbitrarily failed or refused
to perform its duty.15
Analysis
Insufficient Service of Process
10. Grimes filed this action on May 31, 2022. Thus, under Rule 4(j) service
was required to be completed by September 28, 2022. As the Court found in its
October 27, 2023 Order Denying Grimes’ Motion for Default Judgment, Grimes had
not served the Attorney General, the State Solicitor, or the Chief Deputy Attorney
General at that time.16 Grimes still has not served, or attempted to serve, any of
those persons. Thus, he has not completed service of process as required by Section
3103(c).
11. Grimes did not seek leave to extend the Rule 4(j) time-period.
However, in his Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for
13
Land v. Carroll, 810 A.2d 350 (Table), 2002 WL 31546530, at *1 (Del. Nov. 14, 2002). See
also Clough v. State, 686 A.2d 158, 159 (Del. 1996).
14
King v. State, 108 A.3d 1225 (Table), 2015 WL 317128, at *1 (Del. Jan. 23, 2015); Capital
Educators Ass’n v. Camper, 320 A.2d 782, 786 (Del. Ch. 1974).
15
Land, 2002 WL 31546530, at *1 (citing In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988)).
16
D.I. 21; 10 Del. C. § 3103(c).
5
Summary Judgment (filed on November 28, 2023),17 Grimes attempts to show
excusable neglect, relying on Moore v. Long,18 by asserting that “[a]lthough the
Attorney General has not been served, the Attorney General is fully aware of the
pending suit.”19
12. In Moore, plaintiff contended that he was not required to comply with
Section 3103(c) because the defendant, a correctional officer, was an employee of
the State and not an “officer” of the State. The Court ruled that plaintiff was required
to comply with Section 3103(c). However, the Court granted plaintiff additional
time to effectuate service of process because his argument that he did not have to
comply Section 3103(c) was a reasonable legal position as there was conflicting
authority at the time the complaint was filed regarding service of process
requirements.20
13. Here, there was no dispute that Grimes was required to comply with
Section 3103(c) and thus, Moore does not help him. Because Grimes has not shown
good grounds for failing to complete service in the time required by Rule 4(j), his
petition must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(5).
17
D.I. 28.
18
2010 WL 1367754 (Del. Super. Mar. 31, 2010).
19
D.I. 28 at ¶¶ 1-2.
20
Moore, 2010 WL 1367754, at n.34.
6
Failure to State a Claim
14. Even if Grimes had shown good cause and the time for service was
extended, dismissal is still warranted because the petition fails to state a claim.
15. The Court may issue a writ of mandamus to a “public official or agency
to compel the performance of a duty to which the petitioner has established a clear
legal right.”21 “For the performance of a duty to be clearly owed to a petitioner, it
must be nondiscretionary or ministerial, meaning that it is ‘prescribed with such
precision and certainty that nothing is left to discretion or judgment.’”22
Additionally, a writ will not issue unless “the petitioner can establish that there is no
other adequate remedy available.”23
16. Here, Grimes argues that the DOC’s duty to return his Computer
derives from the Compact. He asserts that the Compact requires the DOC to protect
the rights Grimes enjoyed while in custody in Pennsylvania, i.e., possession of his
Computer. The Compact, however, does not entitle Grimes to any additional rights
he may have had while in Pennsylvania upon his return to Delaware. The Compact
ensures that a person’s rights in the sending state (Delaware) are protected while in
the receiving state (Pennsylvania).24 It does not protect any rights a Pennsylvania
21
Brittingham v. Town of Georgetown, 113 A.3d 519, 524 (Del. 2015) (citations omitted).
22
Id.23
Id.24
11 Del. C. § 6571, Art. II, ¶ (b), (c), (e) (a person “shall be treated equally with such similar
inmates of the receiving state [Pennsylvania] as may be confined to the same institution. The fact
of confinement in a receiving state [Pennsylvania] shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any
7
incarcerated person may have had but which are not provided in Delaware. Thus,
Grimes has not shown that he is owed a duty requiring the DOC to return the
Computer to him. Accordingly, he has not shown that he has a clear right to
performance of any duty.
17. As Grimes acknowledges, the DOC confiscated his Computer – along
with other inmates’ tablets upon their return to Delaware25 – because pursuant to
DOC policy, Delaware inmates do not have permission to possess such devices.26
Where a petitioner’s claim raises issue with prison policies, a court will not intervene
unless “an inmate’s statutory or constitutional rights are affected….”27 Grimes has
not raised a statutory or constitutional right.
18. Finally, Grimes also has not shown that he has no other remedy.
Indeed, he does not address this element of his claim.28
19. For these reasons, the petition fails to state a claim and must be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
legal rights which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of the
sending state [Delaware].”) (emphasis added). Grimes also misconstrues Art. II, subsection (h).
This subsection protects an inmate’s right to participate in certain Delaware (the sending state)
programs while in the custody of the receiving state (Pennsylvania). It does not provide for any
protections upon the person’s return to Delaware’s custody.
25
D.I. 1.
26
Id.; Walls v. Williams, 2006 WL 1133563, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 28, 2006) (a mandamus is not
an appropriate remedy to compel a discretionary act or to compel an official to exercise his
discretion).
27
Walls, 2006 WL 1133563, at *1.
28
Respondents contend that Grimes has an adequate remedy at law in the form of replevin. D.I.
23, ¶ 10. Because Grimes fails to satisfy the other elements for issuance of a writ of mandamus,
the Court does not address whether replevin is an adequate legal remedy.
8
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Standard of Review
20. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file … show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.”29 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
view the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.30
21. Because the petition is dismissed for insufficient service of process and
failure to state a claim, Grimes’ motion for summary judgment is denied as moot.
22. Even if the Court were to reach the merits of Grimes’ motion, it would
be denied because, among other things, Grimes has failed to show that he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56.
CONCLUSION
Because Grimes has failed to complete service of process under Superior
Court Civil Rule 4(f) and 10 Del. C. § 3103(c) in the time provided in Rule 4(j), and
he did not show good cause, his petition must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(5).
Additionally, because Grimes failed to show he has a clear legal right to compel
performance of a non-discretionary duty by Respondents, the petition must be
dismissed under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Finally, Grimes’ motion for
29
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
30
Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991).
9
summary judgment is denied as moot and because he cannot show that he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Kathleen M. Miller
Judge Kathleen M. Miller
10