State v. Daniels

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
)
v. ) ID No. 0107003610
)
JAMEL DANIELS, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: November 15, 2024
Decided: November 22, 2024
Upon Defendant Jamel Daniels’ Motion for Postconviction Relief,
DENIED.
Upon Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Patrick J. Collins, Esquire,
GRANTED.
ORDER
Andrew R. Fletcher, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington DE 19801, Attorney for the State
of Delaware.
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, COLLINS PRICE & WARNER, 8 East 13th Street,
Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the Defendant Jamel Daniels.
Jamel Daniels, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road,
Smyrna, DE 19971, Defendant.
WHARTON, J.
This 22nd day of November, 2024, upon consideration of Defendant Jamel
Daniels’ (“Daniels”) Motion for Postconviction Relief (“PCR Motion”),1 the
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Patrick J. Collins,2 Daniels’ Response to the
Motion to Withdraw,3 the State’s Response,4 and the record in this case, it appears
to the Court that:
1. Daniels was convicted of first degree murder and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony by a jury on June 8, 2003 and sentenced
to life in prison plus 20 years on both charges. His direct appeal was
unsuccessful.5 Daniels’ first PCR motion was filed through counsel on March 19,
20186 and supplemented on April 30, 2010.7 That motion was denied by the
Superior Court.8 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision.9 Daniels’
second PCR motion, filed pro se on September 1, 2013,10 was denied on August 1,
2014.11 That decision was affirmed as well.12
2. Daniels filed this PCR motion, his third, also pro se, alleging actual
1
PCR Mot., D.I. 143.
2
Mot. to Withdraw, D.I. 170.
3
Def.’s Resp., D.I. 173
4
State’s Resp., D.I. 175.
5
Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008 (Del. 2004).
6
D.I. 94.
7
D.I. 108.
8
D.I. 115.
9
Daniels v. State, 2011 WL 1900438 (Del. 2011).
10
D.I. 123.
11
D.I. 131.
12
Daniels v. State, 2014 WL 7010919 (Del. 2014).
2
innocence on March 24, 2023,13 along with two motions for appointment of
counsel.14 The Court granted those motions on June 23, 2023. On February 26,
2024, the Court was advised that Patrick J. Collins, Esquire would be representing
Daniels.15 That day, the Court entered a scheduling order.16 On September 20,
2024, Mr. Collins filed this Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and simultaneously
advised Daniels of his opportunity to submit a response within 30 days.17 Daniels
responded on October 11, 2024.18 The State responded on November 15th.19
3. In its Order on direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court set out the
following facts:
Daniels was part of a drug distribution ring led by Leon
Price which operated between New York City and West
Chester, Pennsylvania. In April 2001, New Castle
County police and paramedics found the body of
Kensworth Griffith on the side of a road in Christiana
Hundred. Griffith had been shot four times, twice from
behind with a .45 caliber weapon, once in the stomach
with a .25 caliber weapon, and once in the foot.
Following an investigation, Daniels and Price were
arrested for Griffith's murder. Price was separately tried
and convicted in April 2003. Daniels was tried and
convicted in June 2003.
At Daniels’ trial, witnesses testified that Griffith owed
13
D.I. 143.
14
D.I. 144, 152, .
15
D.I. 160.
16
D.I. 162.
17
Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel, D.I.
18
Def.’s Resp., D.I. 173.
19
State’s Resp., D.I. 175.
3
Price money for drugs he sold on Price's behalf and that
Price was very angry about being unpaid.
Another state witness familiar with Price
and Daniels through their drug activities testified
that Daniels was Price's “right-hand man.” He testified
that Daniels stayed with Price in his apartment for several
months in early 2001. Price owned two guns, a .45
caliber Glock and a .25 caliber Derringer. Both he
and Daniels had been seen in possession of these
weapons.
The State presented testimony from two of Price's
and Daniels’ associates who witnessed the killing, Jose
Martinez and Jamil Mosley. Martinez and Mosley were
also from New York and assisted Price in selling drugs.
On the day Griffith was killed, the two traveled
with Daniels and Price to a gas station in West Chester,
Pennsylvania, to pick up Griffith. According to Mosley,
Price offered Griffith an opportunity to discharge his debt
through additional drug sales. Griffith entered the
vehicle, and the five drove to Delaware, eventually
pulling off to the side of Adams Dam Road. Martinez and
Mosley testified that Daniels and Price exited the vehicle
and told Griffith to get out also. After he did, Price
and Daniels shot Griffith several times outside the car
and left his body on the side of the road.
The State introduced physical evidence consisting of a
bullet from Griffith's body and shell casings found at the
scene which had been fired from a .45 caliber Glock.
The State also introduced a fresh, partially-smoked
cigarette butt that was found near Griffith's body.
Forensic analyst Teri Lawton testified to the results of
DNA testing she performed on the cigarette butt. She
testified:
The DNA profiles of the evidentiary
samples ... are consistent with being
mixtures of the known DNA profiles of the
reference samples. Therefore, Jamel Daniels
4
and Lou Price are not excluded as DNA
contributors…
When asked to explain this finding, Lawton responded
that “[e]ssentially, it means that both of Jamel
Daniels and Lou Price's DNA profiles were present in
the mixture.” Lawton further stated that no other DNA
profiles were found in the sample taken from the
scene.20
4. Daniels’ pro se PCR motion alleges he is actually innocent based on
purportedly newly discovered evidence so as to overcome the procedural bars of
Rule 61.21 That newly discovered evidence takes the form of: (1) proposed
testimony of Leon Price (“Price”) stemming from a “newly found belief in justice
and a desire to do the correct thing” exculpating Daniels and incriminating Jose
Martinez (“Martinez”);22 and (2) Daniels’ medical records demonstrating that, due
to injuries he sustained in a prior shooting, he was physically unable to perform the
movements he was described as performing at trial.23 In support of the former
claim, Daniels attached to his PCR Motion an affidavit from Price stating that he
was coerced by “cartel-backed killers who lived in his neighborhood, who knew
where [his] then wife and three children lived, to put the killing on Jamel
Daniels.”24 In fact, according to the affidavit, the second shooter was Martinez.25
20
Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d at 1009-1010.
21
Pro Se Brief in Support of PCR Mot., D.I. 145.
22
Id. at 11-13.
23
Id. at 29.
24
Id. at Ex. B.
5
In support of the latter, Daniels wrote that his medical records were attached to his
PCR Motion, but, in fact, they were not.26
5. In his Motion to Withdraw, Mr. Collins presents a thorough
recapitulation of the evidence presented at trial as well as the procedural history of
the case.27 He also carefully assesses Daniels’ two claims of actual innocence based
on newly discovered evidence. With respect to Price’s new version of events
recanting his previous version, Mr. Collins finds Price’s admission that he was a
shooter credible and his claim that he was reluctant to implicate Martinez because of
Martinez’ cartel-backed family plausible.28 But, he finds Price’s description of
Daniels as not part of his crew and only in town for a few days to party
demonstrably false.29 Witnesses identified Daniels as being Price’s right-hand man
and in the Delaware area much longer than a few days.30 Additionally, Daniels was
a longtime associate of Price and a member of Price’s drug-dealing crew. In his
statement to Mr. Collins’ postconviction investigator, Price included Daniels as part
of his crew that were always together.31 Daniels also made contradictory statements
25
Id.
26
Id. at Ex. C.
27
Mot. to Withdraw, D.I. ***
28
Id. at 33.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
6
about where Daniels was at the time of the shooting.32 In his first of three
interviews with Mr. Collins’ postconviction investigator, Price said Daniels was at a
hotel.33 In his second statement he said that Daniels was in the front passenger seat
at the time of the murder, but did not get out of the car.34 In his third statement,
Price reverted to a version where Daniels was at the hotel.35 As to Daniels’ medical
records, Mr. Collins found them in the file, having been sent to the Public
Defender’s Office by Bellevue Hospital in 2002 prior to trial, thereby negating any
argument that they constitute newly discovered evidence.36
6. In his response, Daniels alleges: (1) Mr. Collins is not representing him
effectively because he failed to communicate with him and investigate his case; (2)
Mr. Collins did not discuss his decision to move to withdraw indicating “a conflict
of interest or abandonment;” and (3) he has been deprived of his right to competent
counsel.37 He asks the Court to deny the Motion to Withdraw pending further
investigation, appoint new counsel, and hold a hearing to address the “issues
surrounding my attorney withdrawal.”38 Daniels has little to say regarding Mr.
Collins’ substantive conclusions on the two issues he raised in his pro se PCR
32
Id. at 34.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 35.
37
Def.’s Resp. at 3, D.I. 173.
38
Id.
7
motion. With regard to Price’s inconsistent statements, he only notes that Price’s
first statement to the investigator was consistent with his affidavit, he was “a little
confused on a few things” in his second statement, but was “back on track” in his
third.39 He accuses Mr. Collins of failing to take into account Price’s “mental state
and whatever else he was going through.”40 He expressed surprise the Mr. Collins
was able to locate his medical records “out of the blue.”41
7. The State concurs with Mr. Collins assessment of Daniels two actual
innocence claims.42 In addition to the general suspicion that is warranted in
considering recantations offered by inmate witnesses, the State also highlights the
obvious inconsistencies and apparent falsities in Price’s various statements. 43
Regarding Daniels’ medical records, the State notes they were available at trial, and
thus not newly discovered, but given Daniels testimony that he was in a car riding
around on the day of the murder and not immobilized, the records would have little
probative effect.44
8. The State also addresses Daniels’ response to Mr. Collins’ motion. It
observes that “other than asserting that Price was confused during the interview with
the investigator, Daniels does not appear to dispute any specific factual or legal
39
Id. at 3.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
State’s Resp., D.I. 175.
43
Id. at 9-11.
44
Id. at 11.
8
basis for Postconviction Counsel’s opinion that Daniels’ postconviction claim of
actual innocence is wholly without merit.”45 The State finds Daniels’ claims about
Mr. Collins’ representation either unsupported by any facts or based on a
misapprehension of postconviction counsel’s role.46
9. Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion
for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions,
procedural default, or former adjudication.47 A motion exceeds time limitations if it
is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final, or, if it asserts a
retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of
conviction is final, more than one year after the right was first recognized by the
Supreme Court of Delaware or the United States Supreme Court.48 A second or
subsequent motion is considered successive and therefore barred and subject to
summary dismissal unless the movant was convicted after a trial and “pleads with
particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant
is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was
convicted” or “pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court
or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the
45
Id. at 13.
46
Id. at 13-16.
47
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
48
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
9
conviction ... invalid.”49 Grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading
to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the
movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation.”50 Grounds
for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal
habeas corpus hearing” are barred.51 The bars to relief do not apply either to a claim
that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that pleads with particularity that new
evidence exists that creates a strong inference of actual innocence,52
10. To prove a claim that newly discovered evidence exists that creates a
strong inference of actual innocence, a petitioner must show “the evidence (a) will
probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (b) was discovered since the trial
and could not have been discovered before by the exercise of due diligence; and (c)
is not merely cumulative or impeaching.”53 Satisfying the actual innocence test is a
heavy burden and such claims are rare.54 Furthermore, to prove “[i]nnocence of the
‘acts underlying the charges’ requires ‘more than innocence of intent; it requires
49
Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
50
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
51
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
52
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
53
Taylor v. State, 180 A.3d 41 (Del. 2018) (citing Downes v. State, 771 A.2d 289,
291 (Del. 2001).
54
Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1100 (Del. 2021).
10
new evidence that a person other than the petitioner committed the crime.’” 55 The
Delaware Supreme Court also held in Purnell v. State that “a body of new evidence
that goes only to the weight or credibility of that which was presented to the jury is
almost never adequate to meet the demanding bar for being granted a new trial.”56
Attacking a witness’s credibility in general will not be sufficient to satisfy the
actual innocence standard.57
11. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction
relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal
Rule 61(i).58 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of
the postconviction claim.59
12. Since this motion is Daniels’ third motion for postconviction relief filed
many years after his conviction became final, it is barred as repetitive and untimely
unless he can overcome those bars to relief. Daniels attempts to do just that by
pleading that newly discovered evidence exists that creates a strong inference that
he is innocent in fact of the charges. Of the two grounds for relief advanced in
Daniels pro se PCR Motion only one claim need be considered on the merits. That
claim relates to Price’s new version of events. The second claim that his medical
55
Id. at 1095 (citing State v. Taylor, 2018 WL 3199537, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. June
28, 2018), aff'd, 206 A.3d 825 (Del. 2019)).
56
Id. at 1098.
57
Id.58
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
59
Id.11
records constitute newly discovered evidence fails because the records are not
newly discovered, having been in his attorneys file before trial. Further, the
records themselves would have been insufficient, if introduced at trial, to have
probably altered the outcome of the trial. The Court finds this claim is barred.
13. The Court turns then to the only remaining claim. It finds that Daniels
has failed to meet his heavy burden to satisfy the actual innocence test. The
testimony of Leon Price most assuredly would not change the result of a new trial
if one were granted. Not only are Price’s recent statements inconsistent with his
original version of events in 2001, but they are inconsistent with each other with
respect to his relationship with Daniels and Daniels’ location at the time of the
murder. They also are contradicted by other witnesses who place Daniels at the
scene of the murder using a Glock handgun to shoot the victim. Those witnesses
are corroborated by the physical evidence of a freshly smoked cigarette with both
Price’s and Daniels’ DNA on it.
14. Finally, Daniels’ response to the Motion to Withdraw fails to contest
Mr. Collins conclusions regarding his claims in any meaningful way. Nor does he
support his allegations that Mr. Collins was ineffective and/or conflicted with any
specific arguments that Mr. Collins should have made on his behalf or facts
supporting his allegations of a conflict of interest.
15. Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record itself, the Court
12
concurs with Mr. Collins that Daniels postconviction claims are wholly without
merit such that he could not ethically advocate them. It also declines Daniels’
invitation to appoint new postconviction counsel as that request is similarly
without merit.
THEREFORE, the reasons stated above Jamel Daniels’ Motion for
Postconviction Relief is DENIED. Patrick J. Collins’ Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
13