State v. Brathwaite

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) ID No. 2105012268
)
CARLYLE BRATHWAITE, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
On this 12th day of November, 2024, upon consideration of Defendant Carlyle
Brathwaite’s (“Defendant”) pro se Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence (the
“Motion”) made pursuant to Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 35
(a), 1 the sentence imposed upon Defendant, and the record in this case, it appears to
the Court that:
1. On July 29, 2022, Defendant pled guilty to Manslaughter. 2 On August
10, 2022, the Court sentenced him to twenty years of Level V supervision, suspended
after eight years for six months of Level IV supervision, followed by one year of
Level III supervision. 3
2. On September 26, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for sentence
reduction pursuant to Rule 35(b), in which he asked this Court to order his immediate
1
D.I. 27 (the Motion).
2
D.I. 21 (Plea Agreement).
3
D.I. 22 (Sentence Order).
release from incarceration to Level IV or Level III supervision. 4 On January 2, 2024,
this Court denied that motion because (1) it was procedurally barred as untimely; (2)
no extraordinary circumstances were present that would justify waiving the 90-day
filing deadline; and (3) immediate release was inconsistent with Defendant’s
minimum mandatory sentence for Manslaughter.5
3. On April 24, 2024, Defendant filed a Rule 59(e) motion for
reconsideration, in which he asked the Court to reconsider its January 2, 2024 denial
of his motion for sentence reduction.6 In support, Defendant asserted that he asked
his attorney to file a motion for sentence reduction within the ninety-day window
after he was sentenced, but his attorney allowed the filing deadline to pass. 7
Accordingly, Defendant contended that because he is not personally at fault for his
late filing of the motion for sentence reduction, the Court should have considered
that motion as timely. 8 On July 8, this Court denied that motion because (1) it was
procedurally barred as untimely; (2) Defendant failed to provide factual support for
his contention; and (3) Defendant failed to address other grounds upon which the
4
D.I. 23 (Mot. Sentence Modification). Defendant did not specifically cite to Rule 35(b), but he
asked the Court to reduce the duration of his sentence.
5
State v. Brathwaite, 2024 WL 32887, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 3, 2024).
6
D.I. 25 (Def.’s Mot. Reconsideration). Defendant did not specifically cite to Rule 59(e) in the
motion, but he asked the Court to reconsider its denial of his motion for sentence reduction.
7
Id.8
Id.2
Court denied his sentence modification request, such as the statutory minimum
mandatory sentence.9
4. On August 13, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion to yet again challenge
his sentence, on two grounds. First, Defendant contends that the Court committed
“plain error” under Rule 52(b) by not informing him of the 90-day limitation for
filing a Rule 35(b) motion. Second, Defendant claims that his counsel was
ineffective in the representation by failing to file a motion for sentence reduction
within the Rule 35(b) 90-day window. Defendant contends that he was prejudiced
as a result because “the Court would have most likely granted a
reduction/modification.” 10 Accordingly, Defendant requests the Court to appoint a
new counsel and allow a reduction or modification of his sentence. 11
5. Rule 35(a) provides that the Court “may correct an illegal sentence at
any time.” 12 Rule 35(a) is limited to situations where the sentence imposed exceeds
statutorily-authorized limits, violates double jeopardy, “is ambiguous with respect
to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits
a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a
sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.” 13 The function of Rule
9
D.I. 26 (Order Denying Def.’s Mot. Reconsideration)
10
D.I. 27.
11
Id.12
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).
13
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
3
35(a) is limited to correction of an illegal sentence. 14 A proceeding under Rule 35(a)
“presupposes a valid conviction” and does not re-examine errors that occurred prior
to the imposition of sentence. 15
6. Defendant first argues that a new sentence is required due to “plain
error.”16 This argument is unavailing. When a “plain error” at trial was “so clearly
prejudicial to [a defendant’s] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and
integrity of the trial,” 17 a new trial or a reversal of the defendant’s conviction is
warranted. 18 “The doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are
apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their
character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which
clearly show manifest injustice.”19
7. Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the Court is not obligated to inform
him of the 90-day limitation of Rule 35(b), especially when he was represented by
counsel, nor does the failure to do so constitute “plain error.” The Court is not
required to re-sentence Defendant simply because his request for sentence
modification was barred, among other reasons, because of the 90-day limitation.
14
Id. (internal citation omitted).
15
Id. (internal citations omitted).
16
See D.I. 27.
17
Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982) (emphasis added).
18
See State v. Freeman, 2023 WL 6299437, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 27, 2023) (new trial); Baker
v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del. 2006) (reversal of conviction).
19
See Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982); Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del.
2006) (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)).
4
Defendant’s argument also does not claim that the sentence is in any way illegal
based on his conviction. Accordingly, this argument fails under Rule 35(a).
8. Defendant’s second argument is also inappropriate for consideration
under Rule 35(a). The proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and to request appointment of counsel is a postconviction
motion under Rule 61. 20
9. Even if considered as a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Rule 61, the Motion is still unavailing. For one, it is time-barred because it was filed
almost two years after the judgment of conviction became final. 21 Defendant’s
argument that he was prejudiced when his counsel failed to move for sentence
reduction within the 90-day window is also without merit. The Court sentenced
Defendant after reviewing all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the
crime and Defendant’s background. In reviewing Defendant’s Rule 35(b) motion
for sentence reduction and Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, the Court
considered the grounds Defendant raised in support of the motions.22 The Court saw
20
Cochran v. State, 935 A.2d 255 (Del. 2007) (Table).
21
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
22
See State v. Brathwaite, 2024 WL 32887, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 3, 2024); D.I. 25. In his Rule
35(b) motion, Defendant stated that (1) he has participated in programs and obtained his GED
while incarcerated; (2) his criminal conduct was performed in self-defense; (3) he plans to leave
the geographic area and its influences to go work with his father; and (4) he plans to continue
participating in counseling to become a productive member of society. See 2024 WL 32887, at *1
(Del. Super. Jan. 3, 2024). Those factors do not provide a valid basis to reduce his sentence. See
State v. Weidow, 2015 WL 1142583, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 11, 2015) (“However, remorse and
positive behavior while incarcerated are not bas[es] to modify or reduce a sentence that was
5
no reason to modify his sentence back then, and it sees no reason to do so now.
Defendant’s sentence is appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of
sentencing. Moreover, as the Court repeatedly stated, Defendant’s request for
sentence reduction could not succeed because it would illegally abrogate the
minimum mandatory sentence imposed upon him.23 Therefore, even assuming
arguendo that Defendant’s counsel was ineffective, Defendant’s ineffective
assistance claim fails because he suffered no prejudice.24
10. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Correction of Illegal
Sentence is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sheldon K. Rennie, Judge
Original to Prothonotary
Cc: Carlyle Brathwaite (SBI#00656653)
appropriate at the time of sentencing.”); State v. Baker, 2020 WL 3060577, at *3 (Del. Super. June
9, 2020) (“Education, maturation, and insight are not grounds for release.”).
23
11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2).
24
See Brown v. State, 599 A.2d 411 (Del. 1991) (Table); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163
(2012).
6