Paul Thomas Kartsonis v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC20-1500
____________
PAUL THOMAS KARTSONIS,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
June 10, 2021
LAWSON, J.
Petitioner Paul Kartsonis seeks review of the decision of the
First District Court of Appeal in Kartsonis v. State, 302 So. 3d 508(Fla. 1st DCA 2020), arguing that we have jurisdiction because of
the decision’s “apparent conflict” with the Second District Court of
Appeal’s decision in Gay v. State, 898 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA
2005), and because the decision expressly affects a class of
constitutional or state officers, namely judges. We deny review on
the latter basis without comment, see art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.,
but briefly write to address Petitioner’s arguments regarding conflict
with Gay and explain why we lack jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS
The Florida Constitution provides that this Court “[m]ay review
any decision of a district court of appeal . . . that expressly and
directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal
or of the supreme court on the same question of law.” Art. V, §
3(b)(3), Fla. Const. “Express and direct conflict” is a strict standard
that requires either the announcement of a conflicting rule of law or
the application of a rule of law in a manner that results in a
conflicting outcome despite “substantially the same controlling
facts.” Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960).
Because the facts in the second situation “are of the upmost
importance,” there can be no conflict on this basis when the cases
are easily distinguishable. Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732, 733
(Fla. 1975).
In the decision under review, the First District held that it was
not error for a successor judge to deny Petitioner’s Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) motion when the original sentencing
judge is unavailable, rejecting the Petitioner’s suggestion below that
-2-
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(c)(1), which governs the
pronouncement of a new sentence by a successor judge in
noncapital cases, should apply to all sentencing related matters.
Kartsonis, 302 So. 3d at 508. In rejecting this suggestion, the First
District distinguished Gay—the primary decision relied on by
Petitioner below—on the grounds that “the defendant in Gay was
resentenced by a different judge.” Id. (emphasis added).
Petitioner does not disagree with the First District’s conclusion
that Gay is distinguishable but nonetheless argues that we should
exercise our discretion to grant jurisdiction because of “apparent
conflict” with Gay. Nevertheless, where the district court decisions
alleged to be in conflict are materially distinguishable, as they are
here, we have no discretion to review because we lack jurisdiction.
See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we deny the petition for
review.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
-3-
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
– Class of Constitutional Officers/Direct Conflict of Decisions
First District - Case No. 1D19-1172
(Duval County)
Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief,
and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent
-4-