Citation Numbers: 70 Fla. 450
Judges: Whitfield
Filed Date: 12/10/1915
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
An action was brought by Mullin against the carrier to recover damages for the loss of freight injured by a flood in transit. There was judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant took writ of error.
It appears by an agreed statement of facts that the goods were delivered to the defendant carrier at Ocala, Florida, on February 22nd, 1913, for transportation to Youngstown, Ohio, according to the terms and conditions of a bill of lading delivered to the shipper by the agent of the defendant; that the shipment was loaded on the same day and was by the defendant forwarded on the route towards its destination in the State of Ohio, arriving in Atlanta, Ga., on March 18, 1913, where it was delivered by the defendant at once to the next succeeding carrier for further transportation; that if said transportation by the defendant had been with due and reasonable speed and diligence said shipment would have arrived in Atlanta, Ga., and been delivered to the next succeeding carrier not later than February 28, 1913, instead of March 18, 1913; that on receipt of said shipment the next succeed
The liability of a common carrier of goods is that of an insurer; and in cases of loss of or injury to goods entrusted to it for transportation no excuse avails the carrier, except that such loss or injury was caused by the act of God, or by the public enemies of the State or by the sole fault of the shipper or his ag-ent. 1 Moore on Carriers 306. A common carrier of goods is an insurer against all risks of loss or injury, except those resulting directly from the act of God or the public enemy and without the interventon of human agency. Clyde Steamship Co. v. Burroughs, 36 Fla. 121, 18 South. Rep. 349.
The only acts of God that excuse common carriers from liability for loss of or injury to goods in transit are. those operations of the forces of nature that could not have been anticipated and provided against and that by
Where in the course of transportation goods are injured by an unprecedented flood 'and there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier in taking care of the goods or otherwise, the loss is attributable to the flood as an act of God and the carrier is not liable. Norris v. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co., 23 Fla. 182, 1 South. Rep. 475, 11 Am. St Rep. 355. But where the flood should have been anticipated in time to save the goods, or the carrier was negligent in not protecting the goods, or exposed the goods to the flood, or tortiously jwithheld the goods, or so deviated from the proper route as to amount to a conversion of the goods, or the negligence of the car-Tier contributes directfy to the injury, or the carrier fails to provide reasonably adequate and safe facilities which directly contributed to the injury, the carrier is liable. See National Rice Mill Co. v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 132 La. 615, 61 South. Rep. 708; Wabash R. Co. v. Sharpe, 76 Neb. 424, 107 N. W. Rep. 758; Michaels v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 30 N. Y. 564; Wolf v. American Express Co., 43 Mo. 421; New Brunswick Steamboat Co. v. Tiers, 24 N. J. L. 697; Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410; Henry v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 83 Kan. 104, 109 Pac. Rep. 1005; Davis v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 340, 1 S. W. Rep. 327; Pruitt v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. Co., 62 Mo. 527; Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Benson, 86 Ga. 203, 12 S. E. Rep. 357; 4 R. C. L. p. 718; Pinkerton v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 117 Mr. App. 288, 93 S. W. Rep. 849; Wabash
In Read v. Spaulding, 30 N. Y. 630; Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Co., 130 Iowa 123, 106 N. W. Rep. 498, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 822; Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 94 Minn. 269, 102 N. W. Rep. 709, 69 L. R. A. 509, no Am. St. Rep. 361; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Quarles & Couturie, 145 Ala. 436, 40 South. Rep. 120; Ward v. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 162 Ill. 545, 44 N. E. Rep. 888, and other somewhat similar cases, the courts hold that when there is a negligent delay by a common carrier in transporting goods, and subsequently before reaching destination the goods are injured by an act of God that could not reasonably -have been foreseen at the time of the negligent delay, the carrier is liable. 4 R. C. L. p. 722; Moore on Carriers, p. 371. Such holdings are presumably predicated upon the theory that the delay is a concurring and approximate xause of the loss or injury, or that because of the delay the law enlarges the liability of the common carrier by withdrawing the exemption
The United States Supreme Court and the courts of a number of the States hold that a delay in transportation which places the shipment in the track of an unprecedented flood, is a remote and not a proximate cause of an injury to the shipment by the flood, and the carrier is not liable merely because of the delay. Such courts base the exemption of the carrier from liability upon the ground that the delay was too remote and that the proximate cause of the injury, to-wit: the destructive act of God could not have been foreseen and provided against as a probable result of the negligent delay. In this view the carrier is held not liable even though the injury would not have occurred but for the previous delay in transportation which caused the shipment to be in the track of the flood. See Railroad Company v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 139 U. S. 223, text 237, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554; Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 135 Fed. Rep. 135; Scott v. Railway Co., 19 Fed. 56; Daniels v. Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532; Y. & M. V. Co. v. Millsaps, 76 Miss. 855, 71 Am. St. Rep. 543, 25 South. Rep. 672; Herring v. Railway Company, 101 Va. 778; Morrison v. Davis & Co., 20 Pa. St. 171, 57 Am. Dec. 695; Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 75 Kan. 222, 88 Pac. Rep. 885, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 658; Sauter v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 78 Kan. 331, 97 Pac. Rep. 434; Grier v. St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal R. Co., 108 Mo. App. 565, 84 S. W. Rep. 158; Armstrong, Byrd & Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 26 Okla. 352, 109 Pac. Rep. 216; Hunt v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, (Tex. Civ. App.) 74 S. W. Rep. 69; International & G. N. R.
Interstate shipments of freight are subject to the paramount regulations of Congress. One of the regulations prescribed by an Act of Congress is “that any common carrier, railroad or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass.” Within the meaning of the cpioted Act of Congress, was the injury to the goods “caused by” any of the railroad companies to which 'they were intrusted en route ?
Treating the interstate shipment under the Federal law or otherwise as involving only one transportation from the point of origin to destination, though different carriers severally covered portions of the entire route, the liability of the defendant initial carrier is no greater than it would be if it transported over the entire route.
Whether a common carrier is liable for injury to goods, where, after being negligently delayed in transit, the goods, while still in transit, are injured by an act of God, such as an unprecedented flood, depends upon
At common law, in the absence of a binding" contract otherwise fixing liability, a common carrier is, with certain exceptions, liable as an insurer to a shipper for losses of or injuries to goods being transported. If the dosses or injuries are caused by an act.of God that could not have been foreseen and from which the carrier could not by the exercise of due care protect the goods, the carrier is not liable. But if prior to a loss of or injury to goods in transit the conduct of the carrier constitutes in fact or in law a tortious conversion of the goods, the carrier is liable as for the unlawful conversion, even though the goods are subsequently injured or destroyed by an unforeseen and overpowering act of God. And if negligence or fault of the carrier contributed proximately to an injury or loss that was directly caused by an act of God, the carrier is liable if the loss or injury followed in ordinary natural sequence from, or was a natural and probable result of, the carrier’s negligence or fault. In the latter class of cases, the liability of the carrier is for a negligent breach of contract or legal duty; and the rig-hts of the parties are determined by the rules of law relative to actionable negligence.
Actionable negligence exists when a loss or injury to one without fault results directly from another’s mere negligence, or when the loss or injury sustained by one is such as results in ordinary natural sequence from the negligence, or such as naturally and ordinarily should have been regarded as a probable not as a merely possible result of the simple negligence of another. Conversely when the loss or injury is not a direct result of the mere
A merely negligent delay in transporting goods, which delay causes the goods to be at a point in transit where they are injured or destroyed by an unprecedented flood that could not have been foreseen at the time of the delay, does not render the carrier liable for the direct conse
The rule in this State is that damages may not be recovered for all the injurious consequences that might be shown to have resulted from mere negligence in performing a stipulated or legal duty or service. But where there is negligence, damages may be recovered for such injurious consequences as follow in ordinary natural sequence from the negligence, or such as reasonably should have been contemplated as an ordinary, natural and probable result of the negligence had proper attention been given to the subject. The particular injury sustained need not have been anticipated. Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 55 Fla. 514, 46 South. Rep. 732; Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 735, 48 South. Rep. 209; Hildreth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 56 Fla. 387, 47 South. Rep. 820; Western Union Tel. Co., v. Milton, 53 Fla. 484, 43 South. Rep. 495; Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Peninsular Land, Transp. & Manufacturing Co., 27 Fla. 1, 9 South. Rep. 661; Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 323. See also Moore v. Lanier, 52 Fla. 353; Janes v. City of Tampa, 52 Fla. 292.
In determining the liability of common carriers for goods injured or lost in transit by an act of God the true rule is that in order to relieve the carrier from lia
The Interstate Commerce Act does not render carriers liable for injuries to shipments that are caused by an act of God. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hayes, — Ind.—,104 N. E. Rep. 581. The delay in transportation prior to the injury was “caused by” the defendant, but the injury to the goods was “caused by” an unprecedented flood — an act of God — the preceding negligence of the carrier in delaying the shipment having merely a casual relation and not a causal relation to the act of God and the injury.
Taylor, C. J., and Shackleford and Ellis, JJ., concur.
Cockrell, J., absent on account of sickness.