Judges: Browne, Conclusion, Conclusions, Ellis, Fully, Taylor, Views, West, Whitfield
Filed Date: 4/19/1919
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/7/2024
concurring. — I concur in the conclusion reached in the' opinion of Mr. Justice Whitfield, for the following reasons: The phrase “inalienable rights” and the words “acquiring,” “possession,” “protecting,” “property,” as used in the first section of the Declaration of Eights of the Constitntion of 1885, are not terms which express a single, definite, unqualified meaning. Their meaning is subject to certain qualifications. “Inalienable” for instance does not mean that which one cannot
An inalienable right as applied to life or liberty, may mean a power, privilege or .condition of existence to have or enjoy which one has a natural claim. Life and liberty may be a condition of existence which one may not lawfully give away or part with, but it is not such a condition of existence that he may not forfeit by an infraction of the rules of society; that he may not part with by an unlawful act. As applied to property, however, the word “right” can not with the same propriety be said to be a “condition of existence,” but rather it is a power or privilege to which one is entitled upon principles' of law — a just claim. The phrase “inalienable rights” therefore d( es not have the same meaning when applied to property as when applied to life and liberty. In the nature of things it cannot have the same meaning. In the one case the right is a natural claim, in the other a just claim resting upon principles of law. In the one case the right attaches as soon as one comes into existence; in the other it attaches when sanctioned, authorized, supported by law.
Now property in the sense of the thing acquired, has certain attributes. It may be legally acquired' by purchase, barter or exchange, or it may be manuf actured. Indeed as was said by the court of last resort in New York: “If any one can define 'property’ eliminated of its attributes, incapable of sale and place, without the protection of law, it were well that the attempt be made.” See Wymehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378.
The word as used in the constitution so far as it applies to anything made or manufactured by man, means something that may be manufactured, bought, sold, bartered or exchanged legally, that is to say within the protection of the law If it may not be legally be acquired by manufacture, purchase, barter or exchange, it cannot legally be possessed or defended. The claim therefore to the possession of anything that cannot be legally acquired is not a just claim. The word “acquire” as used in the Bill of Eights does out mean “to gain by any means” as defined in Webster’s International Dictionary, but it means lo gain by legal means; that is to say by a means recognized, sanctioned and approved by law. The inalienable right to acquire, possess and defend' property, therefore, means a just claim to anything that may be legally gained. But 36 gallons of alcoholic liquors could not legally acquired by one person on January 1, 1919. The constitution as amended at the election of November, 1918, forbade it. That amendment divested alcoholic liquors, a manufactured article, of the attributes of property. It could not be legally manufactured after a certain date; that is to say, it could not be legally brought
The argument of those who support the theory that the above mentioned Act of the legislature is unconstitutional as being in conflict with the first section of the Bill of Eights, rests upon the following syllogism:
Major: Every man has an inalienable right to acquire, possess and defend property.
Minor: 36 gallons of alcoholic liquor (quantity named in information) on the 1st day of January, 1919, was property.
Conclusion: Therefore on January 1, 1919, Marasso (a man) had an inalienable right to acquire, possess and defend 36 gallons of alcoholic liquors.
But the fallacy of the argument lies in the second premise.