Miguel Oyola v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC13-2048
____________
MIGUEL OYOLA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[February 19, 2015]
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court on appeal from the trial court’s Second Revised
Sentencing Order that sentenced Miguel Oyola to death for the first-degree murder
of Michael Lee Gerrard. In Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2012), this Court
affirmed Oyola’s convictions for first-degree murder, false imprisonment, armed
robbery with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. However, we
reversed and remanded the original sentencing order to the trial court on the basis
that it violated Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990). On remand, the trial
court again sentenced Oyola to death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1),
Fla. Const.
FACTS
Original Guilt and Penalty Phases
On the day he was murdered, Gerrard called Wakulla Bank with regard to
unusual transactions on the debit card used for his landscaping business. Oyola, 99
So. 3d at 435. Evidence established that Oyola, an employee of Gerrard’s
landscaping business who had been in possession of a debit card on the business
account, had recently used the card for purchases that totaled approximately $900
and withdrew an additional $900 in cash using the debit card. Later that day, a
truck driver in a remote area of Jefferson County saw two men later identified as
Oyola and Gerrard engaged in a bloody fight in a trailer attached to a truck. The
truck driver left to summon help, but by the time he returned, Gerrard was alone.
Oyola had left with the truck and attached trailer, which were later determined to
have belonged to Gerrard. The truck driver called 911, but Gerrard died before
police arrived. The medical examiner determined that Gerrard had been stabbed
several times with a knife and hit with a blunt, shovel-like object. Id. at 435-38.
Other evidence suggested that Oyola attempted to dispose of evidence of the
crime. His girlfriend testified that she saw him bathing in bleach; when she asked
about a trash bag with pants inside, he told her that if she knew what was inside,
she would be sick. Another witness found the trailer that had been attached to
Gerrard’s truck abandoned and on fire in Leon County. From the pattern of blood
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stains in the trailer, investigators deduced that someone had been locked inside and
attempted to force his way out. Id. at 436-37.
When suspicion fell on Oyola for the murder, he proclaimed his innocence.
He told officers that he had spoken to Gerrard on the phone that day, but had
otherwise mostly remained at home. He claimed that Gerrard had instructed him
to use the business debit card to purchase Christmas gifts. Oyola also proclaimed
his innocence to a family friend of Gerrard and asserted that Gerrard had left
money in Oyola’s mailbox on the day of the murder. However, after he was
arrested for murder, Oyola confessed to his cellmate that he had killed Gerrard,
stolen his truck and $375, and disposed of some of the evidence. He also told his
cellmate that he planned to plead insanity or self-defense during trial. Id. at 437-
38.
The jury found Oyola guilty of first-degree murder, false imprisonment,
armed robbery with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. During
the penalty phase, Oyola presented his brother, Manuel, and a forensic
psychologist, Dr. Thomas D’Errico, as witnesses. Manuel testified to the abuse he
and Oyola suffered as children at the hands of their parents, which Manuel
believed negatively affected his brother’s intellectual development and ability to
cope with stress. Id. at 439.
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Dr. D’Errico testified concerning Oyola’s mental condition, which included
a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, low test scores in school, and borderline
intellectual functioning.1 Oyola had also given Dr. D’Errico an inconsistent
account of his activities on the day of the murder and how he had killed Gerrard.
Because Oyola had not taken his medication when he murdered Gerrard, Dr.
D’Errico concluded that it was likely that Oyola overreacted to the perceived threat
of an angry Gerrard and was less able to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law. However, during cross-examination, Dr. D’Errico admitted that Oyola
attempted to destroy evidence and that Oyola told him a version of events that was
inconsistent with the evidence. The jury recommended a sentence of death for the
murder of Gerrard by a vote of nine to three. Id. at 439-42.
In the original sentencing order, the trial court found three aggravating
circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while Oyola was on felony
probation;2 (2) the murder was committed during a robbery,3 which merged with
the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain; and (3) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).4 The court assigned great weight to each
1. Oyola has a full-scale IQ score of 74.
2. § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007).
3. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat.
4. § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat.
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aggravating factor. The court rejected the mental health of Oyola as a statutory
mitigating circumstance, but did consider some factors in Oyola’s background as
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:
The Defendant prepared a sentencing memorandum suggesting
all non-statutory mitigation he believed had been presented to either
the jury or the Court at the separate sentencing hearing. The
defendant submitted a transcript of an interview of Manuel Oyola and
Leonardo Oyola,[5] for this Court’s consideration. Such transcripts
were reviewed and considered. Each suggestion of non-statutory
mitigation will be addressed in this order.
The alleged non-statutory mitigation included serious drug
abuse, an abusive home life as a child, created a cycle of violence
[sic], and mental disorder. While the evidence did establish such
circumstances, the Court gives such circumstances slight weight in
weighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating
circumstances.
Neither the circumstances in the defendant’s character,
background or life, nor the circumstances of the offense mitigate
against the imposition of the death penalty.
Oyola’s first direct appeal proceeding followed this order that sentenced him
to death.
First Direct Appeal
Oyola presented several issues in his first direct appeal to this Court. He
asserted that: (1) the trial court improperly assigned great weight to the HAC
aggravating factor; (2) the trial court improperly rejected his mental health status
as both a statutory and a nonstatutory mitigating factor; (3) the sentencing order
5. Leonardo Oyola is Oyola’s father.
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violated Campbell; and (4) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional under
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 442. We held that
sufficient evidence existed to support the conviction for first-degree murder,
affirmed the assignment of great weight to the HAC aggravating circumstance, and
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave slight weight
to Oyola’s mental health status as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. Id. at
444-49. We also rejected the Ring claim. Id. at 449. However, we reversed and
remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing order that complied with the
procedures prescribed by Campbell.6 Id. at 447.
The Resentencing
This Court issued its opinion on September 20, 2012. Id. at 431. On
October 30, 2012, the trial court issued a Revised Sentencing Order that again
6. Campbell requires a trial court to (1) clearly consider every proposed
mitigating circumstance; (2) determine whether sufficient evidence supports a
finding of that circumstance; (3) decide whether that circumstance, if nonstatutory,
is truly mitigating; (4) assign weight to each established aggravating and mitigating
circumstance; and (5) detail this analysis in the sentencing order. 571 So. 2d at
419-420. When a sentencing order is remanded for a Campbell error, the trial
court must conduct a new Spencer hearing, at which both parties must have the
opportunity to submit argument and sentencing memoranda; however, a defendant
is not entitled to produce new evidence. Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156, 1160
(Fla. 2000) (citing Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993)). After the
new Spencer hearing, the trial court must write a new sentencing order and hold a
second hearing to announce the sentence before both parties. Id. at 1160-61.
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sentenced Oyola to death, but the trial court had not conducted a new Spencer7
hearing or a new sentencing hearing. After Oyola filed a Motion for
Reconsideration that asserted that he was entitled to a new Spencer hearing,8 the
court held both a Spencer hearing and a new sentencing hearing, at which both
parties were present.
The trial court issued a Second Revised Sentencing Order on April 29, 2013,
that again sentenced Oyola to death.9 The trial court found the same three
aggravating circumstances: Oyola was on probation for a felony (great weight); the
murder was committed during a robbery, merged with pecuniary gain (great
weight); and HAC (great weight). In the analysis of the aggravating factor that the
murder was committed during the course of a robbery, the trial court expressed
concern that Oyola was already sentenced to life imprisonment for the armed
robbery, which was previously affirmed by this Court:
A life sentence is a possible sentence for either an armed robbery or
first degree murder. If there is to be any additional consequence for
actually murdering the person who is the victim of an armed robbery,
the death penalty should be imposed. . . . If there is to be any
consequence for taking Gerrard’s life, after [Oyola] robbed him, or
during the robbery, while armed, the death penalty should be imposed.
7. Spencer, 615 So. 2d 688.
8. See Jackson, 767 So. 2d at 1160-61 (detailing the procedures for a
Campbell remand).
9. The Second Revised Sentencing Order from April 2013 substantially
mirrors the Revised Sentencing Order from October 2012.
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The trial court again found no statutory mitigating factors. The court also
found that the sole nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of general mental
condition merited only slight weight. In the conclusion of the analysis of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court wrote that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances:
This court does sentence the defendant to life imprisonment for the
armed robbery. The premeditated murder of the victim of the robbery
should result in some additional consequence. The imposition of a
life sentence for the murder, overriding the jury’s recommendation for
the death penalty, would result in no additional consequence for the
murder. The imposition of only a life sentence for the first degree
murder committed by Oyola would be a reward to him for his
elaborate scheme to use a mental health expert to thwart justice. A
life sentence for the first degree murder by Oyola would be contrary
to this court’s finding that the mitigating circumstances did not
outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
After the trial court issued its Second Revised Sentencing Order, the presiding
judge passed away. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Oyola contends that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because the Second
Revised Sentencing Order does not comport with Florida’s capital sentencing
statutory scheme. He asserts that the order reflects inappropriate considerations by
the trial judge. He also contends that the sentencing order improperly denigrated
his mental health mitigation evidence and that the order, like the initial sentencing
order, violates Campbell. Additionally, he seeks reconsideration of his Ring claim.
-8-
We agree with Oyola that the Second Revised Sentencing Order reflects a
misdirected analysis by the trial judge and denigrates mitigation evidence. We
therefore reverse and remand this case for a new penalty phase proceeding.10
Improper Consideration of Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors
Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, governs capital sentencing procedures.
After the jury issues an advisory sentence, the judge must independently weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances before a sentence is ordered. §
921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2007). The capital sentencing statute expressly constrains
the aggravating circumstances a trial judge may consider to fifteen enumerated
factors. § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. It also provides seven specific factors for a court
to consider as possible mitigating circumstances, along with an eighth “catch-all”
provision that expands the realm of mitigating circumstances to “any other factors
in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death
penalty.”11 § 921.141(6), Fla. Stat. Thus, while the statute governs both
10. Because we remand for a new penalty phase, we do not address Oyola’s
Campbell claim. As for the Ring claim, this Court has clearly and repeatedly
rejected the contention that Ring requires a unanimous jury to find the existence of
each proposed aggravating circumstance. See Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 449 (citing
Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 822-23 (Fla. 2007); Hernandez-Alberto v. State,
889 So. 2d 721, 733 (Fla. 2004)).
11. Although the aggravating factors that may be considered are limited by
statute, the weight assigned to established factors falls within the discretion of the
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aggravating and mitigating factors, the statutory scheme allows a court to consider
nonstatutory mitigating factors, but limits consideration of aggravating factors to
only those listed in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes.
A common challenge to an aggravating factor found by the trial court is that
it is not supported by the record or should have been merged with some other
similar factor. See, e.g., Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 117-18 (Fla. 2007); Crump
v. State, 622 So. 2d 963, 972 (Fla. 1993). When we conclude that an aggravating
factor is not supported by the evidence, we review the erroneous finding for
harmless error. See, e.g., Tanzi, 964 So. 2d at 117-18; Burns v. State, 609 So. 2d
600, 606-07 (Fla. 1992) (citing Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 535 (Fla. 1987)).
However, in the rare instance in which a sentencing order includes an invalid
nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, this Court has held that the error cannot be
harmless12 and has remanded for resentencing if there is any evidence that
mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty. See Riley v. State, 366 So.
2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978) (citing Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002-03 (Fla.
1977)).
trial court. See § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat.; Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 674 (Fla.
2004).
12. During oral argument, the State conceded that a harmless error analysis
was inapplicable under these circumstances.
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Improper language in a sentencing order does not always or automatically
amount to reliance on a nonstatutory aggravating factor. We have affirmed
sentencing orders when the inappropriate language is confined to a stray remark
that does not reflect an underlying improper sentencing rationale. See Singleton v.
State, 783 So. 2d 970, 979 (Fla. 2001) (affirming a death sentence, despite
improper biblical language in the conclusion, because the sentencing order
expressly stated that the court only considered two statutory aggravating factors);
see also Brown v. State, 473 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 1985) (trial judge’s oral
comment that defendant had “led a parasitic existence” did not indicate that the
judge improperly considered a nonstatutory aggravating factor in the sentencing
process).
However, nonstatutory aggravating circumstances are not permitted in the
sentencing evaluation process. This Court has consistently found harmful error
when the State introduces evidence that constitutes inadmissible nonstatutory
aggravation. See Poole v. State, 997 So. 2d 382, 392 (Fla. 2008) (citing Perry v.
State, 801 So. 2d 78, 89 (Fla. 2001); Kormondy v. State, 703 So. 2d 454, 463 (Fla.
1997); Geralds v. State, 601 So. 2d 1157, 1162-63 (Fla. 1992); Maggard v. State,
399 So. 2d 973, 977 (Fla. 1981)). Cf. Scull v. State, 533 So. 2d 1137, 1143 n.*
(Fla. 1988) (finding no sentencing error when the trial judge was aware of, but did
not consider, inadmissible victim impact evidence). Such comments, when heard
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by the jury, are not harmless because they create a serious risk that the
inadmissible statements affected the advisory sentence. See, e.g., Poole, 997 So.
2d at 392.
Similarly, the reliance on improper nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
by a judge when he or she conducts the required independent analysis of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances is harmful. Just as a jury should not be
exposed to evidence of impermissible aggravating factors, a judge should not be
permitted to consider them as part of the evaluation process. It is clear that capital
sentencing must proceed in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes.
As we have repeatedly stressed, a trial judge’s weighing of statutory
aggravating factors and statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances is the essential ingredient in the constitutionality of our
death penalty statute. [Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 839 (Fla.
1988)]. It is for this very reason that we have found it essential for
trial judges to adequately set forth their weighing analyses in detailed
written orders. Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 318-19 (Fla. 1997);
Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990).
Porter v. State, 723 So. 2d 191, 196 (Fla. 1998). Indeed, the purpose of the
statutory scheme in which a jury provides an advisory sentence contemplates that
the judge, with his or her familiarity with the law and its practice, will bring a
perspective to the capital sentencing process that lay jurors lack. See Cooper v.
State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1140 (Fla. 1976).
The language used in this case is far more than a conclusory, insignificant
remark; instead, it demonstrates that the analysis of the trial court was rooted in the
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consideration of an improper nonstatutory aggravating factor. Troubling language
permeates the sentencing order. In the section that explains the weight assigned to
each aggravating factor, the trial court twice states that “the death penalty should
be imposed” if “there is to be any [additional] consequence” for the murder,
beyond the life imprisonment imposed for the armed robbery. In the conclusion,
the trial court again emphasizes that a sentence of life imprisonment would be
insufficient:
This court does sentence the defendant to life imprisonment for the
armed robbery. The premeditated murder of the victim of the robbery
should result in some additional consequence. The imposition of a
life sentence for the murder, overriding the jury’s recommendation for
the death penalty, would result in no additional consequence for the
murder. The imposition of only a life sentence for the first-degree
murder committed by Oyola would be a reward to him for his
elaborate scheme to use a mental health expert to thwart justice.
(Emphasis supplied.) This concern pervades the sentencing order and is not
confined to a stray comment in the conclusion. The language used here could be
interpreted as calling for a death sentence in every case that also involves a
robbery.
The language in this case exceeds that found in either Singleton or Brown.
The comments rest on the mistaken principle that in cases that involve not only a
murder, but an additional crime that carries a life sentence, the defendant must be
“adequately” punished for each individual crime. Such logic would automatically
impose the death penalty any time a defendant was convicted of a felony and
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subject to life imprisonment for the underlying felony. This analytical process is
inconsistent with Florida’s death penalty statute and our jurisprudence. See
Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 903 (Fla. 2000) (citing Provence v. State, 337 So.
2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976)); see also Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 820 (Fla.
1996) (“[O]ne who commits a capital crime in the course of a burglary will not
automatically begin with two aggravating circumstances.”).
Moreover, we are not convinced by the position of the State that this revised
sentencing order can be affirmed under Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2004).
The defendant in Globe was incarcerated pursuant to a life sentence when he
murdered his cellmate. Id. at 666. After the trial court found as an aggravating
circumstance that Globe had been previously convicted of a prior violent felony, it
wrote that “[w]ithout the death penalty, there is no deterrence. Without the death
penalty, there is no punishment. This aggravating circumstance is accorded great
weight.” Id. at 675. We rejected Globe’s claim that this statement reflected
reliance on a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance and held that the trial court
did not include additional nonstatutory aggravating factors, but simply explained
the weight assigned to the found factor. Id. at 676 (citing Kilgore v. State, 688 So.
2d 895 (Fla. 1996)).
Similarly, the defendant in Kilgore claimed that language in the sentencing
order demonstrated that he had been denied an individualized sentence. 688 So. 2d
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at 899. He had previously been sentenced to two consecutive life sentences for
first-degree murder and kidnapping when he murdered his lover in prison. Id. at
896. The trial court in its sentencing order wrote the following:
Under certain circumstances the state not only has the right, but the
obligation, to take the life of convicted murderers in order to prevent
them from murdering again. This is one of those cases. To sentence
Mr. Kilgore to anything but death would be tantamount to giving him
a license to kill.
Id. at 899. We determined that, within the context of the facts of that case, the
judge independently evaluated the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors
and provided Kilgore an individualized sentence. Id. at 900. Therefore, we
concluded that the trial court did not rely on any nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances and affirmed the sentence. Id.
The facts of Globe and Kilgore distinguish those cases from this case. Both
Globe and Kilgore involved defendants who had been sentenced to life
imprisonment for prior crimes when they committed capital murder. The trial
courts in Globe and Kilgore gave great weight to the aggravating circumstance that
both defendants had been convicted of prior violent felonies, an aggravating
circumstance not found here. Globe, 877 So. 2d at 668 n.3; Kilgore, 688 So. 2d at
897 & n.2.13 Those courts did not rely on a nonstatutory aggravating factor, but
13. The trial courts in Globe and Kilgore found as aggravating factors both
sections 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes, that the capital felony was committed by a
prior felon and imprisoned, placed on community control, or on felony probation,
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used strong language only to describe the weight assigned to this factor. By
contrast, Oyola was not in custody at the time he murdered Gerrard,14 and the life
sentence was imposed for a robbery committed in connection with that murder.15
Were we to affirm the Second Revised Sentencing Order under Globe or Kilgore,
we would approve an analysis that would impose the death penalty any time a
defendant is also sentenced to life imprisonment under circumstances such as these
to ensure “adequate” punishment. This is a position we have long been unwilling
to support. See Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 903; Provence, 337 So. 2d at 786.
Moreover, the problematic language in this sentencing order is far more
pervasive than the language challenged in either Globe or Kilgore. Given that the
statement “[i]f there is to be any additional consequence” for the murder, then “the
death penalty should be imposed,” is repeated nearly verbatim in the analysis and
then echoed in the conclusion of the sentencing order, we have more than mere
colorful language by the trial court. These statements, when read together, reflect
and 921.141(5)(b), the capital felony was committed by a person convicted of a
prior violent felony. See Globe, 877 So. 2d at 668 n.3; Kilgore, 688 So. 2d at 897
nn.1-2. This trial court did not find section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, as an
aggravating circumstance.
14. Oyola was on probation for theft crimes when he murdered Gerrard.
Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 439 n.1.
15. This Court previously found sufficient evidence supported the murder
conviction on the theories of both first-degree premeditated and felony murder.
Oyola, 99 So. 2d at 448.
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the mindset of a judge who was concerned with aggravating circumstances beyond
those allowed by statute. Unlike other cases that involve a stray inarticulate
remark, or a comment that explains the weight ascribed to a statutory aggravating
factor, we cannot be satisfied that a different sentence would not have been
imposed but for the invalid aggravating consideration here because there was some
mitigating evidence in this case. See Burns, 609 So. 2d at 607; Elledge, 346 So. 2d
at 1003; cf. Riley v. Wainwright, 517 So. 2d 656, 659-60 (Fla. 1987) (concluding
that under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the defendant was entitled to a
new penalty phase because neither the jury nor the judge considered relevant
nonstatutory mitigating evidence). Therefore, we hold that this error is not
harmless.
Improper Denigration
We also conclude that the trial court improperly denigrated mental health
mitigation offered by Oyola and impugned defense counsel in the statement that a
life sentence “would be a reward” for Oyola’s “elaborate scheme to use a mental
health expert to thwart justice.” Although the statement here occurred in the
sentencing order, the extensive case law with respect to inappropriate statements
by prosecutors provides a useful comparison. We have made it clear that a
prosecutor may neither denigrate mitigating evidence nor undermine the credibility
of defense counsel. Prosecutors who claim in closing statements that defendants’
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mitigating evidence are “excuses,” “make-believe,” “flimsy,” or “phantom” have
been rebuked by this Court. See Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134, 167-68 (Fla.
2012); Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 98 (Fla. 2011); Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 904;
see also Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 421 (Fla. 1998) (noting that the prosecutor
improperly called a defense witness the “mistress of excuses”). Likewise, this
Court has shown little patience for comments that impugn the integrity of defense
counsel. See, e.g., Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 853-54 (Fla. 2012) (“Verbal
attacks . . . on the manner in which counsel conducted the defense are improper . . .
.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 275 (2013); Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 98 (citing Brooks,
762 So. 2d at 904-05 (finding an abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling
an objection to a personal attack on counsel)). Whether by a prosecutor or by a
trial court, such remarks are improper.
Denigrating comments by a prosecutor or a judge are reviewed for harmless
error. See, e.g., Singleton, 783 So. 2d at 979 (concluding that an improper biblical
reference in the sentencing order was harmless because the jury did not hear it).
Where we find multiple errors, we also review the errors cumulatively to determine
whether the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial or penalty phase. See, e.g.,
Poole, 997 So. 2d at 394. We have reversed sentences where we have found that
inappropriate—but not fundamentally erroneous—comments, together with
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inadmissible nonstatutory aggravating evidence, cumulatively deprived a
defendant of his right to a fair penalty phase. See id.
This statement inappropriately denigrates the mental health mitigation
presented by Oyola as an “excuse.” The statement also impugns Oyola’s defense
because it implies that counsel concocted a “scheme” to present mental health as a
nonstatutory mitigating factor.16 Even if there is evidence in the record to suggest
that Oyola himself wished to raise mental health in his defense, this comment
remains problematic, especially given the reliance on the inappropriate aggravating
consideration. A sentence of death or life imprisonment is neither a punishment
nor a reward for trial strategy. Individually, this statement, albeit improper, is
harmless;17 however, when viewed cumulatively with the error of nonstatutory
aggravation, this order must be reversed. See id.
CONCLUSION
16. Such a comment also contradicts the court’s earlier praise of the
performance by defense counsel: “The defendant was represented at trial by two of
the best and most experienced criminal defense lawyers in this circuit. . . . They
each conducted themselves in an exemplary fashion during trial and did nothing to
distract from the jury’s fair consideration of all evidence.”
17. See Singleton, 783 So. 2d at 979; Hitchcock, 755 So. 2d at 643.
However, we note that such denigrating comments from judges—who are
supposed to be neutral—are more troublesome than those from a prosecutor who is
charged with zealous advocacy, even if a jury does not hear them.
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We reverse and remand the Second Revised Sentencing Order, which
impermissibly relied on a nonstatutory aggravating factor and contained
cumulative errors. Because the judge in this case has since passed away, we
reverse and remand this case for a new penalty phase. See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.700(c)(2) (“In any capital case in which it is necessary that sentence be
pronounced by a judge other than the judge who presided at the capital trial, the
sentencing judge shall conduct a new sentencing proceeding before a jury prior to
passing sentence.”). As such, we do not comment on the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances found in the Second Revised Sentencing Order, nor do we address
the additional claims raised by Oyola. We do note that this is the second time we
have reversed and remanded a sentencing order regarding Mr. Oyola for
procedural deficiencies. We urge trial judges to be circumspect when they prepare
an order that sentences a defendant to death and to conform to the procedures
dictated by statute and our jurisprudence.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY,
JJ., concur.
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
POLSTON, J., dissenting.
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I would affirm. Although the trial court’s order used extraneous language in
a couple of instances regarding Oyola’s life sentence for robbery, it does not
warrant reversal because it does not indicate that the trial court relied upon non-
statutory aggravation. Instead, based on the entirety of the fifteen-page sentencing
order, it is clear that the trial court only imposed a death sentence after properly
considering and weighing statutory aggravators and proposed mitigation and
concluding that the three statutory aggravators outweighed the mitigation.
The language at issue in this case is most similar to the language involved in
Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2004), a case this Court affirmed on appeal.
Specifically, in Globe, 877 So. 2d at 675, the sentencing order contained the
colorful statements that “[w]ithout the death penalty, there is no deterrence.
Without the death penalty, there is no punishment.” But unlike the majority in this
case, this Court in Globe rejected the claim that these statements evidenced that the
trial court had considered improper non-statutory aggravators. Id. at 676. This
Court in Globe, 877 So. 2d at 676, concluded that the trial court “was not detailing
additional aggravators but was merely evaluating the facts of this case and
providing support for the amount of weight given to the statutory aggravating
factor.” See also Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1996) (affirming even
though the sentencing order included the language that “[t]o sentence Mr. Kilgore
to anything but death would be tantamount to giving him a license to kill”);
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Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 979 (Fla. 2001) (holding that trial court
considered only the stated statutory aggravators even though the sentencing order
included the extraneous statements that the crime was “an unprovoked senseless
killing of the mother of two children without cause, provocation, or justification”
and an indication “that we are living in times worse than Sodom and Gomorrah”);
Brown v. State, 473 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 1985) (concluding that trial judge’s
oral comment that defendant “led a parasitic existence” was “not necessarily a
finding of a non-statutory aggravating circumstance”).
Accordingly, because our precedent does not require reversal when
extraneous language is used and because the sentencing order as a whole reveals
that the trial court relied only upon statutory aggravators, I respectfully dissent.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Jefferson County,
Louie Ralph Smith, Jr., Judge - Case No. 332008CF000128CFAXMX
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and William Carl McLain, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Patrick M. Delaney, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
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