Leighdon Henry v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC12-578
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LEIGHDON HENRY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[March 19, 2015]
PERRY, J.
We have for review the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Henry v.
State, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), holding that Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010), does not apply to term-of-years prison sentences because such
sentences do not constitute life imprisonment. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§ 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Because we find that Graham does apply and that the
sentence at issue will not provide a meaningful opportunity for release, we quash
the decision below and remand for resentencing consistent with our rationale
provided below.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
When he was seventeen years old, Leighdon Henry was tried as an adult and
convicted for committing multiple nonhomicide offenses, including three counts of
sexual battery while possessing a weapon, two counts of robbery, one count of
kidnapping, one count of carjacking, one count of burglary of a dwelling, and one
count of possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Henry to life for the
sexual battery offenses, plus an additional sixty years’ imprisonment for the
remaining offenses, to run consecutively. Henry was thus sentenced to life plus
sixty years’ imprisonment. Henry appealed.
During the pendency of Henry’s appeal, the United States Supreme Court
issued its Graham decision. Thereafter, Henry filed a motion pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) predicated on the Graham holding. The
trial court granted the rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, in part, and resentenced Henry to
concurrent thirty-year sentences for the sexual batteries; the remaining sentences
were to run consecutively. Henry was thus sentenced to ninety years’
imprisonment. The Fifth District affirmed Henry’s convictions and revised
sentences, concluding that “Henry’s aggregate term-of-years sentence is not
invalid under the Eighth Amendment . . . .” Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089.
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ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
The review of a decision of a district court of appeal construing a provision
of the state or federal constitution concerns a pure question of law that is subject to
de novo review. Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d
134, 139 (Fla. 2008) (citing Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.
2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005); Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 280 (Fla. 2004)).
Merits
In Graham, the Supreme Court conducted a thorough examination of the
constitutional requirements for states that subject juvenile nonhomicide offenders
to terms of life imprisonment as if these offenders had been adults when they
committed their offenses. After careful consideration of the overall issue, the
Graham Court concluded and repeatedly emphasized that because of their
immaturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, juveniles are more
vulnerable or negatively influenced by external forces than are adults. Graham,
560 U.S. at 67-68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). The Supreme
Court further determined that juveniles constitute a category of offenders that are
not as capable of engaging in conduct that is as “morally reprehensible” as adults
and, therefore, cannot be reliably “classified among the worst offenders.” Id. at 68
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835
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(1988) (plurality opinion)). In addition, the Supreme Court held that juveniles
possess a greater potential for change or positive character growth than adults. Id.
(citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
Building upon its prior precedent that explicitly emphasized the special
status of juvenile offenders for purposes of criminal punishment, in Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), the Supreme Court stated in no uncertain terms
that it is the offenders’ juvenile status that implicates the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (“To start with the first set
of cases: Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving
of the most severe punishments.’ ” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68)); Id. at 2465
(“Most fundamentally, Graham insists that youth matters in determining the
appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole. In
the circumstances there, juvenile status precluded a life-without-parole sentence,
even though an adult could receive it for a similar crime.”); Id. at 2469 (“By
making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest
prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment. . . . But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we
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think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible
penalty will be uncommon.”); Id. at 2466 (“But the mandatory penalty schemes at
issue here prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central
considerations. . . . That contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s) foundational
principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders
cannot proceed as though they were not children.”).
The Court concluded that the status of juvenile offenders warrants different
considerations by the states whenever such offenders face criminal punishment as
if they are adults. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (“Three general differences
between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot
with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. Juveniles’ susceptibility
to immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’ [Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835]. Their
own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate
surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for
failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment. See [Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brenan, J., dissenting), abrogated by Roper,
543 U.S. at 551]. The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity
means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. The Thompson plurality
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recognized the import of these characteristics with respect to juveniles under 16.
487 U.S. at 833-38. The same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders under 18.
Once juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident that neither of
the two penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence
of capital crimes by prospective offenders, e.g., [Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
319 (2002)]—provides adequate justification for imposing that penalty on
juveniles.”); Id. at 561 (“[T]he Thompson plurality stressed that ‘[t]he reasons why
juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also
explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult.’ Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.”).
Emphasizing the distinction between juveniles and adults, the Court
explained:
Roper established that because juveniles have lessened
culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.
543 U.S. at 569. As compared to adults, juveniles have a “ ‘lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’ ”; they “are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure”; and their characters are “not as
well formed.” Id. at 569-570. These salient characteristics mean that
“[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between
the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.” Id. at 573. Accordingly, “juvenile offenders
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” Id. at
569. A juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but
his transgression “is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”
Thompson, [487 U.S.] at 835 (plurality opinion).
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Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. Then, the Court stated that compared to the sentence of
death, a sentence of life without parole is “the second most severe penalty
permitted by law.” Id. at 69 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Therefore,
the Supreme Court emphasized that the status of the juvenile nonhomicide offender
and the nature of the offense committed must be considered when determining
whether life in prison without parole is a constitutionally permissible punishment.
Id.
In evaluating the relative harshness of life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles, the Supreme Court analyzed the cognizable penological justifications for
such prison sentences employed by the states and found that only a theory of
rehabilitation—which forms the basis for parole systems—is a valid constitutional
basis for sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Id. at 70-74. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the states from
sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to terms of imprisonment in which the
states pre-establish that these offenders “never will be fit to reenter society.” Id. at
75. Further, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[c]ategorical rules tend to be
imperfect, but one is necessary here.” Id. Consequently, it held that Florida law,
which permits juvenile nonhomicide offenders to be sentenced to life-without-
parole terms of imprisonment, violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 76.
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In so doing, the Supreme Court intended to ensure that the states would
provide all juvenile nonhomicide offenders who were sentenced to life terms of
imprisonment with meaningful future opportunities to demonstrate their maturity
and rehabilitation. Id. at 79 (noting that the “categorical rule gives all juvenile
nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”). Therefore,
the Supreme Court reversed our First District’s decision in Graham v. State, 982
So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), and remanded Graham’s case “for further
proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion.” Id. at 82.
In the time since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Graham, our
district courts of appeal have not agreed on how to decide if lengthy term-of-years
sentences of juvenile nonhomicide offenders should be evaluated for whether such
sentences violate Graham. Our Second, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of
Appeal have applied Graham literally and determined that the holding in Graham
should not be applied to aggregate term-of-years prison sentences for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders. See, e.g., Young v. State, 110 So. 3d 931, 932-33, 936
(Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (affirming concurrent thirty-year prison sentences for which
ten years of probation followed); Guzman v. State, 110 So. 3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2013) (affirming a sixty-year prison sentence for violation of probation);
Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089 (affirming aggregate prison sentences totaling ninety
years). Notably, our First and Third District Courts of Appeal have applied
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Graham on a case-by-case basis when addressing the sentences of juvenile
nonhomicide offenders. Compare Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA
2011) (affirming concurrent fifty-year sentences); Reynolds v. State, 116 So. 3d
558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (affirming concurrent prison sentences of fifty and thirty
years, respectively); with Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
(reversing consecutive forty-year sentences because there was no meaningful
opportunity for release required under Graham); Adams v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly
D1865 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 8, 2012) (reversing a sentence that required a juvenile
nonhomicide offender to serve at least fifty-eight and one-half years because the
sentence exceeded the offender’s life expectancy).
In response, we hold that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment under Graham is implicated when a juvenile nonhomicide
offender’s sentence does not afford any “meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
Graham requires a juvenile nonhomicide offender, such as Henry, to be afforded
such an opportunity during his or her natural life. Id. Because Henry’s aggregate
sentence, which totals ninety years and requires him to be imprisoned until he is at
least nearly ninety-five years old, does not afford him this opportunity, that
sentence is unconstitutional under Graham.
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We conclude that Graham prohibits the state trial courts from sentencing
juvenile nonhomicide offenders to prison terms that ensure these offenders will be
imprisoned without obtaining a meaningful opportunity to obtain future early
release during their natural lives based on their demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.
In light of the United States Supreme Court’s long-held and consistent view
that juveniles are different—with respect to prison sentences that are lawfully
imposable on adults convicted for the same criminal offenses—we conclude that,
when tried as an adult, the specific sentence that a juvenile nonhomicide offender
receives for committing a given offense is not dispositive as to whether the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is implicated. Thus, we believe
that the Graham Court had no intention of limiting its new categorical rule to
sentences denominated under the exclusive term of “life in prison.” Instead, we
have determined that Graham applies to ensure that juvenile nonhomicide
offenders will not be sentenced to terms of imprisonment without affording them a
meaningful opportunity for early release based on a demonstration of maturity and
rehabilitation. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
In light of Graham, and other Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that
the Eighth Amendment will not tolerate prison sentences that lack a review
mechanism for evaluating this special class of offenders for demonstrable maturity
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and reform in the future because any term of imprisonment for a juvenile is
qualitatively different than a comparable period of incarceration is for an adult.
See id. at 70-71 (“Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve
more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. . . .
This reality cannot be ignored.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (“Their own vulnerability
and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles
have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative
influences in their whole environment.” (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 395)).
Because we have determined that Henry’s sentence is unconstitutional under
Graham, we conclude that Henry should be resentenced in light of the new juvenile
sentencing legislation enacted by the Florida Legislature in 2014, ch. 2014-220,
Laws of Fla. See Horsley v. State, No. SC13-1938, slip op. at 3.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons that we set forth above, we hereby quash the Fifth District’s
decision. Furthermore, we remand Henry’s case to his sentencing court in order to
address its present sentencing order in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and
POLSTON, JJ., concur.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal –
Constitutional Construction
Fifth District - Case No. 5D08-3779 & 5D10-3021
(Orange County)
Peter D. Webster of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and David L. Luck,
and Christopher Bryan Corts of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Kellie Anne Nielan,
Assistant Attorney General, and Wesley Harold Heidt, Assistant Attorney General,
Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
Bryan Scott Gowdy of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and George
E. Schulz, Jr., of Holland & Knight, Jacksonville, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Juvenile Law Center
Angela Coin Vigil of Baker & McKenzie LLP, Miami, Florida,
for Amici Curiae Former Members of Judiciary, Former Prosecutors and Bar
Leaders
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