The Florida Bar v. Kelsay Dayon Patterson

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC16-1438
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
KELSAY DAYON PATTERSON,
Respondent.
October 19, 2018
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that respondent,
Kelsay Dayon Patterson, be found guilty of professional misconduct in violation of
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules) and that he receive an
admonishment for his misconduct. The Florida Bar has petitioned for review,
challenging the referee’s recommendations as to guilt and the recommended
discipline. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. For the reasons
discussed below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation of
guilt as to Bar Rule 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct). However, we
disapprove the referee’s recommendations of no guilt as to Bar Rules 4-1.7
(Conflict of Interest; Current Clients), 4-8.2(a) (Judicial and Legal Officials;
Impugning Qualifications and Integrity of Judges or Other Officers), and 4-8.4(d)
(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice), and find Patterson guilty of violating
each of these rules. We also disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline as
far too lenient, and instead impose a one-year suspension from the practice of law.
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2016, The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Patterson alleging
that he violated several Bar Rules in his representation of Johanna Faddis in her
civil action against the City of Homestead and other defendants. The Bar’s
complaint was referred to a referee. The referee held a hearing on both guilt and
discipline, and submitted a report containing her findings and recommendations for
the Court’s review. The referee made the following findings and
recommendations.
Patterson represented Faddis in a civil action alleging invasion of privacy
against the City of Homestead, its individual council members, and an
investigative firm employed by the city. On November 14, 2012, the Circuit Court
of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit entered an order striking Faddis’s pleadings on the
grounds that she had committed perjury and awarding final judgment in favor of
the city and the other defendants. The circuit court found that Faddis’s testimony
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during a deposition in the case on the issue of whether she had been sexually
harassed, a material issue in the case, was inconsistent with deposition testimony
she gave on the same issue in a separate case involving the city. The circuit court
also found that Patterson represented Faddis at the deposition in the separate case
and that he should have been aware of the inconsistent testimony prior to filing the
complaint. The circuit court ultimately awarded attorney’s fees to the city and
imposed sanctions against Faddis and Patterson for acting in bad faith. The Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court’s order, finding Faddis’s
conduct was “undertaken with intent to deceive, constituted a deliberate scheme to
subvert the judicial process, and amounted to a fraud upon the court.” Faddis v.
City of Homestead, 121 So. 3d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).
While proceedings were ongoing in the circuit court, Patterson also pursued
a civil rights claim against the city and other defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983(2012) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. On
September 20, 2013, Patterson sent Judge Jose E. Martinez, the presiding judge in
the case, a letter detailing the history of Faddis’s circuit court case and expressing
his dissatisfaction with its outcome, comparing the alleged injustice suffered by
Faddis to the biblical story of Susanna. He expressed his belief that influential
members of the community had manipulated the outcome of the case and implied
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that a district court judge was biased in favor of opposing counsel. The letter was
also sent to judges in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit and Third District.
Patterson sent the September 20, 2013, letter based on advice he purportedly
received from Judge James Lawrence King, Sr. in 2002, and out of a belief that he
was denied the opportunity to present evidence prior to being sanctioned by the
circuit court that demonstrated his conduct was not fraudulent.
On December 18, 2013, the circuit court entered a final judgment awarding
in excess of $160,000 in attorney’s fees against Patterson and Faddis equally.
Patterson appealed the circuit court’s order on behalf of Faddis to the Third
District. The district court affirmed the circuit court’s order to the extent it applied
to Faddis, see Faddis v. City of Homestead, 160 So. 3d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
(table), but dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction to the extent Patterson
attempted to obtain review of the order as it applied to him, finding that Patterson
had failed to identify himself as an appealing party in the notice of appeal. The
Third District also directed Faddis and Patterson to show cause why attorney’s fees
should not be awarded to the city and other defendants for their prosecution of a
frivolous appeal. Patterson filed a response containing “incendiary and
disparaging comments,” such as “We cannot all be judges, politicians, wealthy
business men, or local big named law firms with tremendous influence who can
supersede all laws on the books.” In an opinion dated February 11, 2015, the Third
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District found that each of the three claims advanced by Patterson on appeal were
frivolous and ordered him alone to pay appellate attorney’s fees. Faddis v. City of
Homestead, 157 So. 3d 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), review dismissed, 163 So. 3d 508(Fla. 2015). Before ordering appellate attorney’s fees against Patterson, the district
court made the following observation:
Curiously, Patterson’s response to our order to show cause
makes no argument on behalf of his client. Rather, it is a screed
following hard upon his reply brief filed in this appeal, where he
insinuates that he is “being bullied” by the parties, their counsel, or
the court in this case, and that a “miscarriage of justice . . .
is knowingly being perpetrated upon him,” (emphasis added). He
likens “the story” of the case he filed on behalf of Faddis to “the story
of Fidel Castro’s suffocating grip of Cuba, the Holocaust, Jim Crow
laws, and Hillary Clinton.” According to him, the trial court
sanction—and probably, now this one as well—are part of some
political scheme to silence him and his client. Patterson is grossly
mistaken. This case is not about political connection, human
atrocities, bullies, or, as he would have it, the ability of “strong
minded individuals” to stand up for the powerless. This case is about
an officer of the court who proffered false evidence in violation of the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4–
3.3(a)(4). It is now probably also about an attorney who has
impugned the qualifications and integrity of the judges of this court,
the trial court, or other officers. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4–8.2(a).
Id. at 453 (footnote omitted).
On these facts, the referee recommended that Patterson be found guilty of
violating Bar Rule 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct) only. The referee
determined that the September 20, 2013, letter to Judge Martinez and the filings in
the Faddis case contained emotionally charged statements with conspiratorial
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overtones, but that there was no evidence Patterson knew sending the letter was
inappropriate or that he intended to have improper communications with a court.
She concluded that Patterson strongly believed that his actions were the
appropriate way to expose what he perceived as wrongdoing in Faddis’s case—i.e.,
that politics and undue influence controlled the outcome of the case—and that
Patterson’s belief, along with the ethical duty he owed Faddis, warranted a
recommendation of no guilt as to Bar Rules 4-8.2(a) (Judicial and Legal Officials;
Impugning Qualifications and Integrity of Judges or Other Officers) and 4-8.4(d)
(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice). The referee also rejected the Bar’s
contention that Patterson advanced his own interests instead of his client’s interests
in the appeal of the circuit court’s December 18, 2013, order, creating a conflict of
interest in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.7 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients). The
referee found Patterson’s explanation credible that his advocacy in the case was
aimed at the sanction as a whole, including Faddis.
In recommending discipline, the referee found two aggravating factors and
ten mitigating factors. Instead of exclusively relying on the factors listed in the
Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to make her findings in
aggravation and mitigation, see Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.22, 9.32, the
referee listed several factors she considered in recommending discipline. In
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aggravation, the referee found that Patterson refused to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of his conduct and that he filed for bankruptcy to avoid the consequences of
the sanctions imposed against him. As to mitigation, the referee found the
following: (1) the absence of a prior disciplinary record; (2) full cooperation with
the disciplinary board; (3) respectful and professional attitude; (4) Patterson’s
belief that sending a letter to a judge was the correct procedure; (5) Patterson’s
volunteer work with Big Brothers and Big Sisters; (6) the harshness of the order
and opinions issued in Faddis’s case; (7) the imposition of sanctions by the circuit
court; (8) Patterson’s passion for his clients and unselfish motive; (9) Patterson’s
devotion of significant time and resources to ensuring equal access to the judicial
system; and (10) Patterson’s existing financial problems that a suspension, as
opposed to a reformation program, would only exacerbate.
As a sanction, the referee recommended that Patterson receive an
admonishment and that he be placed on probation with various conditions for one
year. She also recommended that costs be awarded to the Bar in the amount of
$2,827.09.
The Bar filed a notice of intent to seek review of the report of referee,
challenging the referee’s recommendations of no guilt as to Bar Rules 4-1.7, 4-
8.2(a), and 4-8.4(d), as well as the recommended discipline. Patterson did not file
an answer brief in this case. After reviewing the report of referee and the Bar’s
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brief, the Court directed Patterson to show cause why the referee’s recommended
discipline should not be disapproved and a more severe sanction be imposed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Findings of Fact and Recommendations of Guilt
The Bar challenges the referee’s recommendations of guilt as to Bar Rules
4-1.7, 4-8.2(a), and 4-8.4(d).1 To the extent the Bar challenges the referee’s
findings of fact for the rule violations, this Court’s review of such matters is
limited, and if a referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial
evidence in the record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its
judgment for that of the referee. Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla.
2000); see also Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998). To the
extent the Bar challenges the recommendations as to guilt, this Court has
repeatedly stated that the referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the
applicable rules to support the recommendations as to guilt. See Fla. Bar v.
Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005). Ultimately, the party challenging
the referee’s finding of fact and conclusion as to guilt has the burden to
1. We note that the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation of guilt as
to Bar Rule 3-4.3 are not challenged by either party. Accordingly, and having
reviewed the record, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation
of guilt as to Bar Rule 3-4.3 without further comment.
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demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to support those findings or that
the record evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions. Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957
So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007).
Bar Rule 4-1.7
Broadly speaking, Bar Rule 4-1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a
client if the representation creates a conflict of interest. The rule specifically
prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if there is a substantial risk that the
representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s own personal interests.
See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2). The comment to the rule explains that
“[l]oyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s
relationship to a client.” Id. cmt. Such loyalty may be “impaired when a lawyer
cannot consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action on behalf
of his or her client because of the lawyer’s other interests.” Fla. Bar v. Roberto, 59
So. 3d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 2011).
Here, the Bar claims that Patterson used the appellate rights of his client,
Faddis, to assert his own interests and seek relief from the circuit court’s December
18, 2013, order for himself. The circuit court’s order imposed in excess of
$160,000 in attorney’s fees against Patterson and Faddis equally, giving Patterson
a significant financial interest in the outcome of any subsequent appeals of the
order. Patterson acknowledged such in his formal hearing testimony, stating with
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respect to Faddis’s appeal of the order: “I’ve always argued that [Faddis] was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing and a due process hearing. And then I would be
entitled to the same too.” That interest created a clear and substantial risk of
materially limiting Patterson’s independent judgment and loyalty to Faddis, who
had an interest in reducing or eliminating her liability under the December 18,
2013, order, even if it was not to the benefit of Patterson. Given the existence of
such risk, Patterson was required under Bar Rule 4-1.7(b)(4) to obtain Faddis’s
informed consent, confirmed in writing, to his continued representation of her.
There is no documentation in the record indicating he obtained such consent.
Despite the foregoing, Patterson represented Faddis in her appeal of the
December 18, 2013, order. The filings submitted to the district court in the case
make clear that Patterson’s financial interest in the matter, as well as his personal
views on the legal system and the actions of the circuit court, ultimately supplanted
his independent judgment and the loyalty he owed to Faddis. Patterson used the
initial brief and other filings in the case to present argument on matters that were
either already considered by the district court—the dismissal of Faddis’s lawsuit—
or on his own behalf. His arguments largely focused on the alleged violation of his
due process rights, the perceived injustice in the circuit court’s actions, and his
views on the inequities of the legal system. Patterson devoted only part of the
initial brief to presenting argument on Faddis’s behalf—alleging that the circuit
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court awarded sanctions against her without express factual findings of bad faith, a
claim the district court found lacked any basis in reality. Faddis, 157 So. 3d at 45.
None of the filings expressly sought a reduction in the fees owed by Faddis, and
Patterson failed to advocate on Faddis’s behalf altogether in the response to the
district court’s show cause order, requesting instead that the court relieve just him
from the financial burdens of the circuit court’s order.
Accordingly, the record in this case clearly reflects that Patterson had a
significant personal and financial interest in the outcome of Faddis’s appeal; that
he failed to inform Faddis of such interests and obtain her informed consent for his
continued representation of her; and that Patterson’s personal and financial
interests ultimately became the focus of Faddis’s appeal, despite the loyalty he
owed her. Patterson’s actions not only hindered Faddis’s ability to obtain a more
favorable outcome in her appeal, but nearly resulted in the district court imposing
additional sanctions against her for pursuing a frivolous appeal. We therefore
disapprove the referee’s recommendation and find Patterson guilty of violating Bar
Rule 4-1.7.
Bar Rule 4-8.2(a)
Bar Rule 4-8.2(a), in relevant part, states that a “lawyer shall not make a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth
or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge.” The applicable
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standard under the rule is not whether the statement is false, but whether the lawyer
had an objectively reasonable factual basis for making the statement. Fla. Bar v.
Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 558-59 (Fla. 2001). The burden is on the lawyer who made
the statement to produce a factual basis to support the statement. Id. at 558 n.3.
The Bar claims that several statements contained in Patterson’s September
20, 2013, letter to Judge Martinez and in the filings for Faddis’s appeal of the
December 18, 2013, order violated Bar Rule 4-8.2(a). The record reflects that
there is no dispute as to whether Patterson sent the September 20, 2013, letter, or
as to whether he prepared and submitted the filings in Faddis’s appeal. In both the
letter and court filings, Patterson either disparaged opposing counsel or expounded
upon the alleged bias of judges and the shortcomings of the legal system. For
example, during the appeal of the December 18, 2013, order, Patterson stated the
following in the reply brief:
Here is the funny thing: Law is not science or math. It does not
depend on true holdings and reasons that will allow you to
successfully chart a path to Mars or create a molecule of water. Law
is whatever the judge or judges that day say it is.
Additionally, in the letter to Judge Martinez, Patterson repeatedly suggested
that judges favor one class of influential citizens over all others, referred to
opposing counsel as the “elders,” and cautioned Judge Martinez that “[j]udges
must recognize that in deciding to elevate people like these elders to a status of
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being above the laws they are complicit in further corroding any remaining sense
of justice and fair play left within these elders.” He also stated the following:
The undersigned cannot accept that judges who have presided over
complex cases, raised children, who have read holy scripts/manuals,
and receive the highest levels of diversified education are unable to
see any of this from the perspective of [Faddis].
Significantly, Patterson stated the following in his letter with respect to
Judge Emas:
Curiously, the author of the 3rd DCA’s opinion, Judge Kevin Emas,
commented in the oral argument that he was uncertain as to whether
[Faddis] had been sexually harassed or not. After being uncertain
about whether she was sexually harassed, the opinion issued 2 weeks
later gives a rather flinty opinion that she repeatedly lied throughout
her litigation, created a fraudulent plan, and set about to achieve an
illegal and fraudulent end. . . . To then see these same elders from
Weiss Serota . . . pictured with Judge Emas at his investiture
ceremony, one can only wonder if Mr. Gredes’ burden at oral
argument . . . was lighter than it should have been.
The referee did not make any specific findings as to whether Patterson had
an objectively reasonable factual basis for his statement questioning Judge Emas’s
integrity, or for any of his other statements. She found only that Patterson’s
reasoning for sending the letter was “flawed.” During the formal hearing,
Patterson explained that he sent the September 20, 2013, letter after viewing a
photograph on the district court’s website of Judge Emas with opposing counsel.
According to his testimony, Patterson believed that an injustice had occurred in
Faddis’s case, and that the influence allegedly wielded by opposing counsel and his
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firm in the community was the cause of that injustice. Patterson’s testimony falls
well short of establishing an objectively reasonable factual basis for any of his
statements, especially those questioning Judge Emas’s integrity, and there is no
other evidence in the record that would otherwise establish such a basis. We
therefore conclude that Patterson’s statements were made with a reckless disregard
to their truth or falsity in violation of Bar Rule 4-8.2(a).
The referee based her recommendation of no guilt as to Bar Rule 4-8.2(a) in
part on Patterson’s ethical duty to his client and his strong belief that sending the
September 20, 2013, letter was the appropriate way to expose the perceived
wrongdoing in his client’s case. Such factors, however, do not relieve Patterson of
his guilt and are relevant only in mitigating the discipline imposed. The referee
also based her recommendation on the fact that Patterson did not know sending the
September 20, 2013, letter was wrong and that there was no evidence he intended
to have improper communications with a court. The issue, however, is not whether
Patterson sought to have improper communications with a judge about an ongoing
case —a violation of Bar Rule 4-3.5 (Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal)—
but whether an objectively reasonable factual basis existed for his statements
assailing the qualifications and integrity of judges. See Ray, 797 So. 2d at 560(stating that an attorney is not prohibited from communicating with or criticizing a
judge as long as the attorney complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct).
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Accordingly, the record in this matter clearly contradicts the referee’s
recommendation as to Bar Rule 4-8.2(a). We therefore disapprove the referee’s
recommendation and find Patterson guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-8.2(a).
Bar Rule 4-8.4(d)
Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct in connection
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Our
review of the record reveals that Patterson engaged in such conduct by pursuing his
own interests in Faddis’s appeal, hindering her ability to obtain a more favorable
outcome, and nearly resulting in the imposition of additional sanctions against her.
He also engaged in such conduct by making inappropriate and disparaging
statements in court filings and in a letter distributed to other members of the
judiciary about opposing counsel and judges that presided in Faddis’s case,
contributing to the general lack of civility and professionalism this Court is striving
to curb in the legal profession. See Fla. Bar v. Norkin, 132 So. 3d 77, 89 (Fla.
2013) (“The Court and the Bar share the ‘overarching objective of increasing the
professionalism aspirations of all lawyers in Florida and ensuring that the practice
of law remains a high calling with lawyers invested in not only the service of
individual clients but also service to the public good as well.’ ”).
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The record clearly contradicts the referee’s recommendation as to Bar Rule
4-8.4(d). We therefore disapprove the referee’s recommendation and find
Patterson guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(d).
B. Discipline
Lastly, we address the referee’s recommended discipline of an
admonishment with one year of probation. In reviewing a referee’s recommended
discipline, this Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the
referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to
order the appropriate sanction. See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854
(Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. This Court will generally not second-
guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. See
Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).
Here, our review of the record reveals that Patterson’s conduct constitutes
far more than mere careless neglect deserving of an admonishment. He
deliberately disregarded the loyalty he owed his client and placed his personal and
financial interests at the forefront of her appeal; he submitted filings to the district
court containing unprofessional statements disparaging those involved in his
client’s case; and he knowingly sent a letter to Judge Martinez and others in the
judiciary that disparaged opposing counsel and accused Judge Emas of conduct
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unbecoming a judge. His conduct violated multiple Bar Rules and he has yet to
fully acknowledge the wrongfulness of his actions and accept responsibility for
them, even after this Court ordered him to show cause why a more severe sanction
should not be imposed.
Furthermore, this Court is greatly troubled by the general lack of respect and
professionalism Patterson displayed toward judges and other professionals in court
filings and in his letter to Judge Martinez. Such conduct, while an inconvenience
or a mere slight to those initially confronted by it, ultimately emboldens others to
engage in similar unprofessional or disrespectful acts, the net effect of which is the
gradual erosion of public confidence in the courts and the decisions rendered by
them. Like all lawyers in Florida, Patterson took the Oath of Admission to The
Florida Bar prior to his admission, wherein he affirmatively committed to
“maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers.” This
commitment is not extraneous to, but coextensive with the obligations set out in
the Bar Rules. The Court expects all lawyers to conduct themselves in a respectful
and professional manner when accessing the courts or appearing before a judicial
officer, regardless of the form or capacity in which the appearance occurs. See
Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, Standards of Professionalism
(prohibiting members of the Bar from engaging in unprofessional conduct and
defining such conduct as “substantial or repeated violations of the Oath of
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Admission to The Florida Bar, The Florida Bar Creed of Professionalism, The
Florida Bar Professionalism Expectations, The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar,
or the decisions of The Florida Supreme Court”).
Given the severity of Patterson’s misconduct, we conclude that the referee’s
recommended discipline is not supported and that a suspension is the appropriate
sanction in this case. See Fla. Stds. for Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.32 (“Suspension is
appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully
disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential
injury to a client.”); 6.32 (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer engages in
communication with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows that
such communication is improper, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or
causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal
proceeding.”); 7.2 (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages
in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”).
In The Florida Bar v. Abramson, 3 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 2009), this Court
imposed a ninety-one-day suspension on a respondent who engaged in
discourteous and disrespectful behavior towards a judge during jury selection in a
criminal proceeding. He interrupted the judge, demanded to be heard on a pretrial
motion, and asked jurors to weigh in on who they thought was at fault in a
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disagreement he had with the judge. Id. at 965. The respondent in Abramson, like
Patterson, was found to have violated Bar Rules 4-8.2(a) and 4-8.4(d), as well as
two other Bar Rules. Id. at 966. Patterson’s misconduct, in contrast to that of the
respondent in Abramson, is far more egregious in that he deliberately placed his
personal and financial interests ahead of his client’s interests and did not limit his
misconduct to a single proceeding or filing. Furthermore, this Court has become
increasingly concerned by the lack of respect and professionalism exhibited by
many Florida lawyers during judicial proceedings and would in all likelihood
impose a much lengthier suspension on the respondent in Abramson were he to
appear before us today. Norkin, 132 So. 3d at 89-92 (imposing a two-year
suspension on a lawyer who engaged in pattern of disrespectful and unprofessional
conduct toward judges and opposing counsel).
In addition, this Court generally imposes a lengthy suspension in cases
where a lawyer’s personal interests create a conflict of interest. See e.g., Roberto,
59 So. 3d at 1106 (suspending the respondent for one year where the lawyer’s
personal interests created a conflict of interest); Fla. Bar v. Herman, 8 So. 3d 1100,
1106-09 (Fla. 2009) (suspending respondent for eighteen months where he
represented a client at the same time he represented his own company, which was
the client’s competitor, without obtaining the client’s consent); Fla. Bar v. Vining,
721 So. 2d 1164, 1169-70 (Fla. 1998) (suspending the respondent for six months
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where the lawyer represented a client individually while his professional
association was engaged in litigation with the client).
We conclude, based on a review of relevant case law, and the aggravating
and mitigating factors found by the referee, that a one-year suspension is the
appropriate sanction in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation
of guilt as to Bar Rule 3-4.3. The referee’s recommendations of no guilt as to Bar
Rules 4-1.7, 4-8.2(a), and 4-8.4(d) are hereby disapproved, and we find Patterson
guilty of violating each of those rules. The referee’s recommended discipline is
also disapproved and Patterson is hereby suspended from the practice of law for
one year. Patterson’s suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this
opinion so that he can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing
clients. If Patterson notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing
and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an
order making the suspension effective immediately. Patterson shall fully comply
with Bar Rule 3-5.1(h). Further, Patterson shall accept no new business from the
date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated.
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Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Kelsay Dayon
Patterson in the amount of $2,827.09, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and
LAWSON, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J. concurs in result.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Tallahassee, Florida, Matthew Ian Flicker,
Bar Counsel, Tampa, Florida, and Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel, The Florida
Bar, Sunrise, Florida,
for Complainant
Russell S. Prince of Palma & Prince, P.A., Valrico, Florida,
for Respondent
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