Rodrick D. Williams v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC17-506
____________
RODRICK D. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[February 22, 2018]
LABARGA, C.J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District
Court of Appeal in Williams v. State (Williams II), 211 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA
2017). In its decision, the Fifth District ruled upon the following question certified
to be of great public importance:
DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151,
186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE
TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER
SECTION 775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO
WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED,
INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE VICTIM?
Id. at 1073. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the
reasons explained below, we hold that Alleyne requires a jury to make the factual
finding, but conclude that Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review.
Where the error cannot be deemed harmless, the proper remedy is to resentence the
juvenile offender pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2016).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 19, 2013, a jury found Petitioner Rodrick D. Williams guilty
of first-degree murder and kidnapping. During the evening hours of April 26,
2010, and through the early morning hours of April 27, 2010, victim James
Vincent Brookins was beaten and bound with duct tape at a “trap house”1 in
Jacksonville, then transported in the trunk of a vehicle to a rural road in St. Johns
County, where he was shot twice. Two other individuals, Harry Henderson and
Sharina Parker, were also involved in the death of Brookins. Williams and Parker
were involved in a sexual relationship. Although Henderson and Parker were
adults at the time of the murder, Williams was sixteen years old. The firearm used
to commit the murder was never located.
The predominant evidence offered during trial to connect Williams to the
offenses included: (1) the police interrogation of Williams, during which his
1. During trial, a St. Johns County Sheriff’s Office detective explained that
the term “trap house” is “a slang term for a house, an apartment, a whatever,
residence where folks don’t actually live. They just go there to either sell drugs or
use drugs. It’s kind of just a vacant residence.”
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mother was present and Williams signed a Miranda2 waiver; (2) a text message
purportedly sent by Williams to Parker at 6:24 p.m. on April 26, in which Williams
stated, “Bae thx killah[3] i cant talk cuz im round 2 many people but jus chill bae
ima take care of yo problems jus give me the greenlight”; and (3) the testimony of
a jailhouse informant.
During the interrogation, Williams contended it was Henderson who shot
Brookins. According to Williams, Parker called him between 2 and 3 p.m. on
April 26—less than five hours before the text message was sent—and told him she
had been robbed of marijuana by a relative of Brookins during a drug transaction,
and Parker believed Brookins had “set her up.” Williams asserted that Parker and
Henderson brought Brookins to the trap house later that day in an attempt to force
him to give them money or disclose the location of his safe, where Parker believed
the stolen marijuana was stored. Parker subsequently picked up Williams and
drove him to the trap house, where, upon entering the house, Williams saw “blood
all over” and Brookins begging for his life. According to Williams, Henderson
beat Brookins with a gun, and Henderson and Parker bound his arms and legs and
covered his mouth with duct tape as Brookins screamed. Williams stated that
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Williams’s mother gave him the nickname “Killer.”
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while at the trap house, Parker told him she and Henderson planned to leave
Brookins alive in the trunk of the vehicle.4 Williams admitted he drove the vehicle
with Brookins in the trunk to the rural road while Henderson and Parker rode in a
separate vehicle. He stated that upon arriving, Henderson wiped down the vehicle
used to transport Brookins, opened the trunk, and shot Brookins. Williams
asserted that he only participated in the offenses because he feared he would be
harmed if he refused.
In contrast, during trial, the informant testified that while they were housed
together at the St. Johns County jail, Williams admitted that he brought a gun to
the trap house and shot Brookins. According to the informant, Williams stated he
was involved in the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house on the pretense of
having gold teeth created5 and then force him to disclose the location of his safe.
Coincidentally, prior to his interactions with Williams, the informant was housed
4. However, Williams also contradicted himself by implying he knew
Henderson and Parker planned to kill Brookins:
I was telling them, I’m, like, “I’m not going to be driving this man
around. Is y’all crazy? What if we get stopped? I’m gonna catch this
murder charge, not y’all.” You know what I’m saying? . . . [“]And
I’m not going to jail for y’all.”
(Emphasis added.)
5. According to the informant, Brookins possessed portable equipment for
creating gold teeth.
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with codefendant Henderson at the St. Johns County jail. The informant testified
on cross-examination that Henderson assisted him by filing a motion on his behalf
with respect to a drug-related charge and, as a result of Henderson’s assistance, the
charge was dropped. However, the informant testified that Henderson never spoke
with him about the Brookins homicide.
The jury was instructed on both first-degree premeditated murder and first-
degree felony murder with robbery, attempted robbery, kidnapping, and attempted
kidnapping as the underlying felonies; however, the verdict form did not require
the jury to specify the theory upon which it found Williams guilty of first-degree
murder. Upon conviction, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole in twenty-five years for the murder. The court relied
upon Horsley v. State (Horsley I), 121 So. 3d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), quashed,
160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed
the implications of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), for Florida sentencing
law. See Williams v. State (Williams I), 171 So. 3d 143, 144-45 (Fla. 5th DCA
2015). Because Miller determined “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders,” 567 U.S. at 479, the Fifth District in Horsley I held that in Florida, the
only sentence available for a juvenile offender convicted of capital murder was life
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imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Williams I,
171 So. 3d at 144.
On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed Williams’s convictions but reversed
his sentence with respect to the murder conviction. Id. The district court
recognized that while the trial court properly relied on Horsley I when it imposed
the sentence, this Court subsequently granted review of Horsley I based upon a
certified question. Id. at 144-45. In Horsley v. State (Horsley II), 160 So. 3d 393
(Fla. 2015), we held the appropriate remedy for juveniles whose sentences are
unconstitutional under Miller is to resentence them in conformance with chapter
2014-220, Laws of Florida. See Williams I, 171 So. 3d at 144. Chapter 2014-220
was enacted to bring Florida juvenile sentencing law into compliance with United
States Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Horsley II, 160 So.
3d at 394. It amended section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, to provide, in pertinent
part:
(b)1. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or
attempted to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a
capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony,
which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall
be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing
hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the
court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the
court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such
person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40
years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph is entitled to
a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a).
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2. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt
to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital
felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which
was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be
punished by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years
equal to life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in
accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is
an appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or
her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).
Ch. 2014-220, § 1, Laws of Fla. The session law also created section 921.1402,
Florida Statutes (2017), which provides, in pertinent part:
(2)(a) A juvenile offender sentenced under s. 775.082(1)(b)1. is
entitled to a review of his or her sentence after 25 years [unless the
juvenile offender has been previously convicted of certain enumerated
offenses that were part of a separate criminal transaction or episode].
....
(c) A juvenile offender sentenced to a term of more than 15
years under s. 775.082(1)(b)2., s. 775.082(3)(a)5.b., or
s. 775.082(3)(b)2.b. is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after
15 years.
Ch. 2014-220, § 3, Laws of Fla.
The Fifth District in Williams I instructed the trial court as follows:
On remand, the trial court shall hold an individualized sentencing
hearing . . . to consider the enumerated and other pertinent factors
“relevant to the offense and [Williams’s] youth and attendant
circumstances.” Ch. 2014–220, § 2, Laws of Fla. Because the jury
did not find that Williams actually possessed and discharged a firearm
during the crime, the court must make a written finding as to whether
Williams killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
Ch. 2014–220, § 1, Laws of Fla. Based on that determination, after
holding the individualized hearing, the trial court may sentence
Williams to life imprisonment if it finds that life is an appropriate
sentence. Id. If the trial court determines that life is not an
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appropriate sentence, then it should sentence Williams to a term of at
least forty years’ imprisonment. Id. Either way, unless Williams has
a prior conviction of a felony enumerated in section three of chapter
2014–220, Laws of Florida, arising out of a separate criminal
transaction or episode, he will receive a judicial review of his sentence
after fifteen or twenty-five years, depending on the court’s
determination. See ch. 2014–220, § 3, Laws of Fla.
171 So. 3d at 145 (second alteration in original).
On September 30, 2015, Williams filed with the trial court a Motion to
Empanel Jury. Williams asserted that because the finding that a juvenile offender
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim leads to a minimum
forty-year sentence with a sentence review after twenty-five years—whereas a
finding that the offender did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the
victim results in there being no minimum sentence and a sentence review after
fifteen years—Alleyne requires that this factual determination be made by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that it
had been directed by the Fifth District to make the finding.
After a hearing, the trial court found that Williams both actually killed and
intended to kill Brookins. The court subsequently held a resentencing hearing on
the first-degree murder conviction pursuant to section 921.1401, Florida Statutes
(2016), and again sentenced Williams to life imprisonment, but with a sentence
review in twenty-five years, as required by section 921.1402(2)(a), Florida Statutes
(2016).
-8-
On appeal, Williams challenged the trial court’s denial of his Motion to
Empanel Jury. Williams II, 211 So. 3d at 1071. The Fifth District held that the
trial court properly denied the motion, but noted that the Alleyne challenge
appeared to have merit on the basis that the finding “increases both the mandatory-
minimum from zero years to forty years—if the sentencing court determines that
life is not an appropriate sentence—and the time for a sentence review hearing
from fifteen years to twenty-five years.” Id. at 1072-73. However, the Fifth
District explained that in Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015), this Court
stated the trial court was to make the finding of whether the defendant actually
killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Id. at 1073.6 As a result, the
Fifth District certified the question now before this Court as one of great public
importance.
ANALYSIS
Alleyne v. United States
In Alleyne, the defendant (Alleyne) was charged with using or carrying a
firearm in relation to a crime of violence, as well as other federal offenses, arising
from the robbery of a store manager. 570 U.S. at 103. The applicable statute
provided that anyone who uses or carries a firearm in relation to a crime of
6. Our decision in Falcon did not address the applicability of Alleyne to
chapter 2014-220 because neither party raised the issue.
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violence shall be sentenced to a minimum of five years in prison. Id. However, if
the firearm is brandished, the statute mandated a minimum sentence of seven
years’ incarceration. Id. at 104. The jury convicted Alleyne and indicated on the
verdict form that he used or carried a firearm; however, the jury did not indicate a
finding that the firearm was brandished. Id. The trial court found that the evidence
supported a finding of brandishing and imposed a seven-year sentence on this
count. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id.
On certiorari review, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Fourth
Circuit’s judgment with respect to the sentence on the count of using or carrying a
firearm in relation to a crime of violence and remanded for resentencing. Id. at
117-18. The Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory
minimum sentence for an offense is an “element” which must be submitted to a
jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 108. In reaching this holding, the
Supreme Court relied upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in which
it held that any fact that increases the statutory maximum sentence is an “element”
of the offense to be found by a jury. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 106; see also Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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The Supreme Court explained that “Apprendi’s definition of ‘elements’
necessarily includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that
increase the floor. Both kinds of facts alter the prescribed range of sentences to
which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that aggravates the
punishment.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 108. The Court further stated:
[I]t is impossible to dispute that facts increasing the legally prescribed
floor aggravate the punishment. Elevating the low end of a
sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with the
crime: the defendant’s “expected punishment has increased as a result
of the narrowed range” and “the prosecution is empowered, by
invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a
higher punishment than he might wish.” Apprendi, supra, at 522, 120
S. Ct. 2348 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Why else would Congress link
an increased mandatory minimum to a particular aggravating fact
other than to heighten the consequences for that behavior? This
reality demonstrates that the core crime and the fact triggering the
mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated
crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury. [n.2]
[N.2.] Juries must find any facts that increase either the
statutory maximum or minimum because the Sixth
Amendment applies where a finding of fact both alters
the legally prescribed range and does so in a way that
aggravates the penalty. Importantly, this is distinct from
factfinding used to guide judicial discretion in selecting a
punishment “within limits fixed by law.” Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). While such
findings of fact may lead judges to select sentences that
are more severe than the ones they would have selected
without those facts, the Sixth Amendment does not
govern that element of sentencing.
Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court rejected the contention that, because the seven-year
sentence could have been imposed without the finding of brandishing, the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury was not violated:
[T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is whether a fact is an
element of the crime. When a finding of fact alters the legally
prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms
a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury.
It is no answer to say that the defendant could have received the same
sentence with or without that fact. It is obvious, for example, that a
defendant could not be convicted and sentenced for assault, if the jury
only finds the facts for larceny, even if the punishments prescribed for
each crime are identical. One reason is that each crime has different
elements and a defendant can be convicted only if the jury has found
each element of the crime of conviction.
Similarly, because the fact of brandishing aggravates the legally
prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a
separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury, regardless
of what sentence the defendant might have received if a different
range had been applicable.
Id. at 114-15.
Section 775.082(1)(b)
The relevant portion of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, provides:
(b)1. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or
attempted to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a
capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony,
which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall
be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing
hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the
court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the
court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such
person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40
years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph is entitled to
a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a).
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2. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt
to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital
felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which
was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be
punished by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years
equal to life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in
accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is
an appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or
her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).
(Emphasis added.) Thus, a finding that a juvenile offender actually killed,
intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim results in a minimum sentence of
forty years’ imprisonment under subsection (1)(b)1. Without this finding, the trial
court is not required to impose a minimum sentence. See § 775.082(1)(b)2., Fla.
Stat. Further, under section 921.1402, a finding of actual killing, intent to kill, or
attempt to kill entitles a juvenile offender to a sentence review in twenty-five
years, whereas without the finding, the juvenile offender is entitled to a sentence
review in fifteen years (provided the trial court imposes a sentence greater than
fifteen years). § 921.1402(2)(a), (c), Fla. Stat. Because a finding of actual killing,
intent to kill, or attempt to kill “aggravates the legally prescribed range of
allowable sentences,” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 115, by increasing the sentencing floor
from zero to forty years and lengthening the time before which a juvenile offender
is entitled to a sentence review from fifteen to twenty-five years, this finding is an
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“element” of the offense, which Alleyne requires be submitted to a jury and found
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 108.7
The Verdict
In this case, the verdict form did not separate out the theories of first-degree
murder; therefore, it is unclear whether the jury found Williams guilty of
premeditated murder, felony murder, or both. Further, with respect to the offense
of first-degree murder, there was no interrogatory on the verdict form as to whether
Williams discharged a firearm.8 Based upon the jury instructions given, it cannot
be determined from the general verdict form whether the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill
Brookins.
First, with respect to actual killing, as part of the instruction on premeditated
first-degree murder, the jury received an instruction on principals, which allowed it
to find Williams guilty even if he did not actually shoot Brookins. The jury was
advised:
If the defendant helped another person or persons commit a
crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if he had
done all the things the other person or persons did if, one, the
defendant had a conscious intent that the criminal act be done; and,
7. We recede from Falcon to the extent it concludes this determination is to
be made by a trial court.
8. The lesser included offenses contained interrogatories.
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two, the defendant did some act or said some word which was
intended to and which did incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise
the other person or persons to commit—to actually commit the crime.
Moreover, as part of the felony-murder instruction, the jury was instructed based
both upon whether Williams was the actual killer or whether someone else shot
Brookins:
To prove the crime of first-degree felony murder, the State must
prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That James Vincent Brookins is dead.
2. The death occurred as a consequence of and while Rodrick
Williams was engaged in the commission of a robbery, an attempted
robbery, kidnapping, or an attempted kidnapping.
3. That Rodrick Williams was a person who actually killed James
Vincent Brookins, or James Vincent Brookins was killed by a person
other than Rodrick Williams but both Rodrick Williams and the
person who killed James Vincent Brookins were principals in the
commission of a robbery, an attempted robbery, kidnapping, or an
attempted kidnapping.
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, based upon the instructions given, the general guilty
verdict for first-degree murder fails to demonstrate the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Williams actually killed Brookins.
Whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams intended to
kill Brookins cannot be determined from the verdict either. The jury was
instructed under the premeditated theory of first-degree murder that “[k]illing with
premeditation is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be
present in the mind at the time of the killing.” Therefore, regardless of whether
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Williams actually killed Brookins, or was a principal, a finding of intent to kill
would have been inherent in a guilty verdict as to first-degree premeditated
murder. However, the general verdict form that was used is problematic because
the jury was instructed that “[i]n order to convict of first-degree felony murder, it is
not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or
intent to kill.”
The jury found Williams guilty of the underlying felony of kidnapping.
However, with respect to that offense, the jury was instructed as follows:
To prove the crime of kidnapping, the State must prove the
following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That Rodrick Williams forcibly or by threat confined or abducted
or imprisoned James Vincent Brookins against his will.
2. Rodrick Williams had no lawful authority.
3. Rodrick Williams acted with intent to commit or facilitate
commission of robbery or attempted robbery . . . .
4. Or inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another
person.
(Emphasis added.) Even if the jury found that Williams acted with the intent to
inflict bodily harm upon Brookins,9 this does not equate to an intent to kill.
9. During the interrogation, Williams admitted to hitting Brookins with his
hands. The jailhouse informant testified that Williams stated he struck Brookins
with a gun.
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Based upon the foregoing, and because of the general verdict form with
respect to the charge of first-degree murder, there is no clear jury finding that
Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill Brookins. Therefore,
an Alleyne violation occurred.
Harmless Error
Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed
whether Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review. We conclude such
violations can be harmless. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held “[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004), the Supreme Court explained:
[T]he “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the
relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may
impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts
punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has
not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the
punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted) (quoting 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Criminal
Procedure § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)). In Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212,
215 (2006), the Supreme Court held that Blakely violations are subject to harmless
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error review. See also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 522-23 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]o
the extent some of our pre-Apprendi decisions may suggest that the failure to
submit factual issues to the jury is not subject to harmless error analysis, Recuenco
has superseded them.”). Because Blakely derived from Apprendi, and Blakely
errors are subject to harmless error review, we conclude that Alleyne violations can
be harmless as well.
In Galindez, after concluding that Apprendi violations are subject to
harmless error review, this Court delineated the applicable consideration under the
facts of that case:
Count I charged that “on various occasions” in a four-month period,
Galindez “committed an act defined as sexual battery” on a child “by
placing his penis in union with . . . and/or penetrating the vagina of
A.M. (a minor) with his penis.” Galindez claims that because the
charge was made in the alternative (and therefore the jury did not
specifically find that penetration was involved), the trial court could
assess only 40 points for victim injury. . . . [F]or purposes of our
harmless error analysis the issue is whether the failure to have the
jury make the victim injury finding as to Count I contributed to the
conviction or sentence—in other words, whether the record
demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would
have found penetration.
At trial the young victim, then pregnant by Galindez, testified
that she and Galindez engaged in sexual intercourse on multiple
occasions over a period of several months. Galindez’s confession
confirming these facts, including his admission that they repeatedly
had sexual intercourse, was admitted at trial. Finally, Galindez’s
defense at trial was that the twelve-year-old victim consented. Thus,
Galindez did not dispute the facts of the sexual relationship at trial,
and he did not contest them at resentencing, either.
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955 So. 2d at 523-24 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). We concluded that “[i]n light of the clear and uncontested record
evidence of penetration,” the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
524.
Based upon Galindez, the applicable question in evaluating whether an
Alleyne violation is harmful with respect to section 775.082(1)(b) is whether the
failure to have the jury make the finding as to whether a juvenile offender actually
killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim contributed to his sentence—
stated differently, whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that
a rational jury would have found the juvenile offender actually killed, intended to
kill, or attempted to kill the victim. See Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 523.
Application
Based upon our review of the record in this case, the Alleyne violation
cannot be deemed harmless. Unlike the defendant in Galindez, who did not
dispute during trial that he and the victim engaged in sexual intercourse, Williams
disputed both that he killed Brookins and that he was a willing participant in the
murder. There was sharply conflicting evidence in the form of Williams’s
statements during his interrogation that he hoped Brookins would live, and the
testimony of the jailhouse informant who painted Williams as both an active
participant in the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house and the actual killer.
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In the light least favorable to Williams, the evidence reflects that (1) Parker
called Williams and informed him that she had been robbed, and she believed
Brookins “set her up”; (2) within a few hours of that call, Williams sent Parker a
text message stating, “i cant talk cuz im round 2 many people but jus chill bae ima
take care of yo problems jus give me the greenlight”; and (3) according to the
informant, Williams helped devise the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house on
the pretense of having gold teeth created and actively participated in the crimes
against Brookins. This included striking Brookins with a firearm that Williams
brought to the house; demanding the location of the safe while Brookins pleaded,
“It doesn’t have to be like this. I thought we was better than this”; sending Parker
to purchase duct tape; binding Brookins with the tape; waiting until the early
morning hours to move Brookins to avoid being seen; placing Brookins in the
trunk of a vehicle, bound and beaten but still alive; driving the vehicle to St. Johns
County with Henderson in the passenger seat while Parker followed in a separate
vehicle; wiping down the vehicle; and shooting Brookins twice.
However, the jury could have rejected the informant’s testimony on the basis
that he was a jailhouse informant who received a reduced sentence in exchange for
his testimony, because certain aspects of his testimony did not make sense,10 or
10. The informant testified that Henderson, Parker, and Williams acquired
approximately $300,000 from Brookins’s safe and divided it equally. According to
the informant, Williams used a portion of his third of the money to purchase a
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because the informant had been previously housed with codefendant Henderson,
who, according to the informant, assisted him with having a criminal charge
dropped. Nonetheless, Williams’s interrogation still paints an incriminating
picture. Williams admitted the following: (1) when he arrived at the trap house,
Henderson gave him a firearm; (2) once he saw Brookins, who was unconscious
from being beaten, he stepped outside and covered a portion of his face with a
shirt;11 (3) he told Brookins, “Just cooperate, bro, and . . . you won’t die”; (4) he
struck Brookins with his hands; (5) while at the trap house, and after Brookins had
been severely beaten and duct-taped, he smoked marijuana that had been removed
from Brookins’s pocket; (6) he rode with Parker to the location where Brookins
had parked a vehicle and then drove that vehicle back to the trap house; (7) he
removed a scooter from the trunk of that vehicle to make room for Brookins;
(8) for approximately forty-five minutes, he drove the vehicle with Brookins in the
trunk to the rural road in St. Johns County while Parker and Henderson rode in a
separate vehicle; and (9) upon arrival, he could hear Brookins in the trunk
screaming.
house for his mother and a vehicle. However, the informant testified immediately
afterwards that Williams’s mother was evicted from the house for “falling behind
in rent.”
11. When the detective suggested that Williams did this because he and
Brookins knew each other and he “felt bad,” Williams agreed.
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It can be argued that a juvenile who admits to participating in a kidnapping
and homicide to this extent intended for the victim to be killed. The jury found
Williams guilty of kidnapping Brookins; however, as previously discussed, intent
to kidnap does not equal intent to kill, and the jury was instructed that to find
Williams guilty of felony murder, the State need not prove Williams had a
premeditated design or intent to kill. The jury could have believed that Williams
intended to kidnap Brookins in an attempt to recover money or the drugs that had
been stolen from Parker, a woman with whom he was having a sexual relationship,
but that he neither shot Brookins nor intended for him to die. A review of the
interrogation recording reflects that Williams stated he hoped and believed
Brookins would live.12 Further, during closing statements, defense counsel argued
that the fact that Williams placed a shirt over a portion of his face after seeing
Brookins at the trap house demonstrated he believed Brookins would not be killed:
Well, if he knows that Mr. Brookins is going to be murdered,
why would you cover your face? He’s the only person there that
could say anything about [Williams] being involved. You don’t cover
12. Williams made statements such as “[H]onestly, I was hoping that he
would live,” “The plan was that . . . they was going to leave him alive,” “They
telling me now at this point that they going to drop him off and leave him in the
trunk . . . . [There’s] so much relief just going off in my body. I’m, like, okay, so
he’s gonna live . . . . But little do we found out, when we get there [Henderson]
kills him,” and “I was getting out of the car, and I heard [Brookins] still screaming
or whatever. And I was, like, okay, he’s still living. So I was happy at that point .
. . that he wasn’t dead.”
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your face if you know somebody’s going to be murdered. That
doesn’t make sense.
Because the record fails to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a
rational jury would have found that Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or
attempted to kill Brookins, the Alleyne violation here was not harmless.
Remedy
Williams suggests two alternative remedies for the Alleyne violation that
occurred: empanel a new jury to make the requisite finding or resentence him
pursuant section 775.082(1)(b)2., the applicable provision where there is a finding
that the juvenile offender did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the
victim. Our precedent in the context of Apprendi/Blakely violations demonstrates
the latter is the appropriate remedy. In Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 95 (Fla.
2014), the circuit court during resentencing imposed upward departure sentences
without a jury determining the applicable factual basis for the departure, in
violation of Apprendi and Blakely. We described the remedy as follows:
We remand to the district court for the application of a harmless error
analysis under Galindez, and, if it is determined not to be harmless, to
remand the case for resentencing.
Id. (emphasis added).13
13. On remand, the Second District determined the error was harmless. See
Plott v. State, 165 So. 3d 33, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
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Because Alleyne derives from Apprendi, and resentencing is the proper
remedy where a harmful Apprendi/Blakely violation has occurred, see Plott, 148
So. 3d at 95, we hold resentencing is the appropriate remedy for an Alleyne
violation that is not harmless. Here, because the record fails to demonstrate
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Williams actually
killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill Brookins, he is entitled to be
resentenced under section 775.082(1)(b)2.
The dissent questions whether this remedy is necessary or appropriate, and
suggests that nothing precludes the empaneling of a jury to make the factual
determination. We are, however, hesitant to wade into “a thicket of potential and
thorny double jeopardy issues.” United States v. Pena, 742 F.3d 508, 518 (1st Cir.
2014). In Pena, a case that involved guilty pleas to drug offenses, the United
States conceded an Alleyne error occurred that was not harmless, but requested that
a “sentencing” jury be empaneled to make a factual determination as to an element
that, if found beyond a reasonable doubt, would authorize an enhanced mandatory
minimum sentence. Id. at 509, 514.14 In declining this request, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit first noted:
14. The element was death or serious bodily injury resulting from use of the
drugs. Id. at 509. The defendant in Pena entered “a straight guilty plea to drug
dealing but not to ‘death resulting.’ ” Id.
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Decisions of the Courts of Appeals after Alleyne have remanded
for resentencing by the court. We are not aware of any court that has
been confronted with facts analogous to those here. But in at least
nine circuit court cases that have found reversible Alleyne error, the
sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing by the district
judge. We are aware of no case, and the parties have cited none,
remanding for use of a sentencing jury after a reversible Alleyne error.
Id. at 517-18 (footnote omitted). Further, with respect to double jeopardy
concerns, the First Circuit stated:
If this conviction were final, the constraint of double jeopardy would
be clearer. It is also true that those double jeopardy safeguards do not
usually apply to resentencing. But the effect of Alleyne and its
predecessors is to preclude certain sentences from being imposed
unless the elements supporting them have been proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has not yet dealt with
the double jeopardy issues in this context, much less in these
transition cases where what was once thought to be a sentencing issue
has been recognized instead to be an element of a crime.
....
The prosecution’s proposed course of action here seeks to . . .
obtain the benefit of the plea’s admissions to the essential elements of
the two drug crimes, which are also among the essential elements . . .
of the aggravated “death resulting” crime. Indeed, the prosecution’s
brief is explicit that the sentencing jury would take the admissions of
guilt from the plea for the other elements and then decide only the
“death resulting” issue. Under the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, we do not decide the double jeopardy issues associated
with the government’s request, but note them and avoid them.
Id. at 518-19 (citation omitted). In light of the constitutional concerns presented by
the Pena court with respect to empaneling a jury where a harmful Alleyne error has
occurred, we conclude that resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. is the
more prudent course.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we answer the certified question by holding that
Alleyne requires the jury to make the factual finding under section 775.082(1)(b) as
to whether a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill
the victim. Although we conclude that Alleyne violations are subject to harmless
error review, the violation here cannot be deemed harmless. Therefore, Williams
is entitled to resentencing under section 775.082(1)(b)2. We quash the decision of
the Fifth District in Williams II and remand to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99
(2013), the factual findings provided for in section 775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes
(2016), must be made by the jury and that the absence of such jury findings in this
case requires reversal of the sentence imposed under section 775.082(1)(b)1. and
resentencing in the trial court. But I dissent from the majority’s direction
regarding the remand, which requires imposition of the less severe sanction
- 26 -
available under the statute. Because the issue of the remedy on remand has not
been briefed in this case, I would simply direct remand for resentencing rather than
preclude jury proceedings that might result in imposition of the more severe
sentence under the statute.
Although we have not had the benefit of briefing on this issue, I am deeply
skeptical that the direction given by the majority precluding jury proceedings is
either necessary or appropriate. As the majority opinion reflects, Williams’s
counsel earlier suggested impaneling a jury to make the factual determination
provided for in section 775.082(1)(b). And the majority has pointed to no basis in
our law establishing that suggestion to be inconsistent with any legal requirement.
The majority’s reliance on Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2014), is entirely
unwarranted. In Plott, we simply directed that the district court remand for
resentencing if it determined that the Apprendi/Blakely error was not harmless.
148 So. 3d at 95. Our opinion is silent concerning whether a jury should be
impaneled to consider the factual determinations necessary to support an upward
departure sentence on remand.
The majority’s direction restricting the proceedings on remand is
inconsistent with the general rule “that a resentencing must proceed ‘as an entirely
new proceeding,’ and that a ‘resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues
bearing on the proper sentence.’ ” State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008)
- 27 -
(citation omitted) (quoting Wike v. State, 698 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1997), and
Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1986)). It necessarily follows from
that rule that if a jury determination is required regarding facts bearing on the
sentence in a resentencing proceeding, the State should have the opportunity to
prove those facts to a jury.
Notably, the majority’s decision on this point seems irreconcilable with the
manner in which we are treating the death cases that have been reversed based on
the majority’s decision in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). In Hurst, we “remand[ed] for a new penalty phase
proceeding.” 202 So. 3d at 69. And we have summarily rejected as “without
merit” claims based “on double jeopardy and due process grounds” that the State
“is precluded from seeking the death penalty” in Hurst resentencing proceedings.
Hurst v. State, No. SC17-302, 2017 WL 1023762, at *1 (Fla. Mar. 16, 2017)
(unpublished). Although we did not explain our conclusion, the Arizona Supreme
Court has provided an extensive constitutional analysis for its holding that double
jeopardy did not bar death sentence proceedings after reversal of death sentences
for Ring errors. See State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 928-32 (Ariz. 2003), on remand
from Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Affording the State an opportunity to
obtain death sentences in new jury proceedings in the death cases is inconsistent
- 28 -
with the majority’s decision here denying the State an opportunity to obtain the
more severe sentence available under section 775.082(1)(b).
Unable to identify any support for its position in our jurisprudence, the
majority cites the decision of the First Circuit in United States v. Pena, 742 F.3d
508 (1st Cir. 2014), and relies on the invocation—more aptly, incantation—in that
decision of “the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.” Majority op. at 25 (quoting
Pena, 742 F.3d at 519). The majority announces that it is “hesitant to wade into ‘a
thicket of potential and thorny double jeopardy issues.’ ” Id. at 24 (emphasis
added) (quoting Pena, 742 F.3d at 518). Without deciding that double jeopardy
doctrine actually requires that the less severe sentence be imposed on remand, the
majority mandates imposition of that less severe sanction because it asserts there
might be a double jeopardy problem with the more severe sentence.
But this use of the constitutional avoidance doctrine is not consistent with
how we have understood and applied that doctrine. Under the doctrine, hesitancy
and doubt alone are not a ground for decision. In the absence of a legal basis that
otherwise resolves the point at issue, the Court must confront and decide the
constitutional question—assuming that issue has been properly presented for
decision. Yet here the majority does not base its decision on an alternative ground
that avoids the constitutional issue. See Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 552
(Fla. 1975) (relying on “the settled principle of constitutional law that courts
- 29 -
should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the
question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds”). Nor does the
majority avoid a potential constitutional problem by adopting a statutory
interpretation that presents no constitutional issue rather than another interpretation
that is constitutionally problematic. See State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 518
(Fla. 2004) (recognizing “the canons of statutory construction requiring us to
interpret the statutes in a way as to avoid any potential constitutional quandaries”).
Instead, the majority’s decision is planted firmly in the air.
The constitutional avoidance doctrine is “a principle of judicial restraint.” In
re Holder, 945 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 2006); see also Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and
longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”). The
doctrine recognizes that the judicial branch should only invalidate legislation—
thereby thwarting the action of a coordinate branch of government—when no other
course of action is properly available. But the majority here has turned the
doctrine on its head. Rather than avoiding judicial action that thwarts legislative
action, the majority has deployed the doctrine to preclude the opportunity to carry
out the legislative purpose embodied in section 775.082(1)(b).
- 30 -
In applying this misshaped version of the constitutional avoidance doctrine,
the majority strains to find doubt and simply ignores the elephant in the room. It
fails to explain how summary rejection of double jeopardy claims in the Hurst
context was appropriate if this case now presents “a thicket of potential and thorny
double jeopardy issues.” No basis is stated by the majority—and no basis is
apparent—for distinguishing the double jeopardy implications of a resentencing
following reversal for an Alleyne error from the implications following reversal for
an Apprendi, Blakely, Ring, or Hurst error—all of which involve failing to present
an issue to the jury that must be decided by the jury.
POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified
Great Public Importance
Fifth District - Case No. 5D16-1348
(St. Johns County)
Valarie Linnen, Atlantic Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Wesley Heidt, Bureau
Chief, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
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