Steven Richard Taylor v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC18-520
____________
STEVEN RICHARD TAYLOR,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
December 20, 2018
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a second
successive motion to vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a
sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the
order concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence
of death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of
the Florida Constitution.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Steven Richard Taylor was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary of a
dwelling, and sexual battery and was sentenced, among other sentences, to death.
Taylor v. State (Taylor I), 630 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. 1993). In affirming his
convictions and sentences on direct appeal, we set forth the pertinent facts
pertaining to Taylor’s case:
The record reflects that on September 15, 1990, at about 11:30
p.m., the victim, fifty-nine-year-old Alice Vest, returned to her mobile
home in Jacksonville after spending the evening with a friend. Earlier
that evening, the appellant, Steven Richard Taylor, and two friends
were out driving and listening to the radio. Around midnight, the
driver of the car dropped off Taylor and his friend, who was later to
become his accomplice, near the victim’s neighborhood.
Sometime in the early morning hours of September 16, a Ford
Ranchero was stolen from a residence near the place where Taylor
had been dropped off. At about 4:30 a.m., after the vehicle had been
stolen, a passing motorist noticed the Ford Ranchero parked in a
driveway next door to the mobile home where the victim lived. Later
that morning, the Ford Ranchero was found abandoned behind a used
car dealership only a few blocks from where Taylor lived at the time.
On the same morning, neighbors discovered the victim’s
battered body in the bedroom of her mobile home. The medical
examiner testified that the victim had been stabbed approximately
twenty times, strangled, and sexually assaulted. The medical
examiner further testified that most of the stab wounds were made
with a knife found at the scene of the crime, while the remaining stab
wounds were made with a pair of scissors that were also found at the
scene. The medical examiner stated that the victim was alive while
she was being stabbed, that she was strangled with an electrical cord,
and that the strangulation had occurred after the victim was stabbed.
The medical examiner also testified that the victim’s lower jaw
had multiple fractures and that she had received several blows to her
head. The examiner testified that the fractures of the victim’s jaw
could have resulted from being struck with a broken bottle found on
the bed next to the victim, and that contusions to the victim’s head
were consistent with being struck by a metal bar and candlestick also
found at the scene. Finally, the medical examiner testified that the
victim’s breasts were bruised, and that the bruises resulted from
“impacting, sucking, or squeezing” while she was alive. In the
medical examiner’s opinion, the victim was alive at most ten minutes
-2-
from the first stabbing to the strangulation. On cross-examination, the
examiner stated that he did not know whether the victim was
conscious during all or any part of the attack.
The testimony at trial also revealed that the phone line to the
mobile home had been cut, that the home had been burglarized, and
that various pieces of jewelry were missing.
In December of 1990, Taylor moved out of the duplex he had
been sharing with a friend. In January, 1991, while Taylor’s former
roommate was removing a fence behind the duplex, he discovered a
small plastic bag buried in the ground near the fence. The bag
contained the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim’s home during
the attack and burglary. The roommate turned the jewelry over to the
police and gave a statement. Later that month, Taylor visited the
duplex with some friends. The former roommate testified that, at
some point during the visit, Taylor went into the backyard and stared
at the place where the fence had stood. During the following month,
Taylor again returned to the duplex with friends. One of the
accompanying friends testified that Taylor went into the backyard and
returned a few minutes later with dirty hands. In response to the
friend’s inquiry as to what he was doing, Taylor allegedly responded
that he had left some things there and that they were gone.
On February 14, 1991, the Duval County sheriff’s office
executed a search warrant on Taylor which authorized the officers to
take blood, saliva, and hair samples from Taylor. Taylor was taken to
the nurses’ station at the county jail so that the samples could be
taken, but not before Taylor invoked his right to counsel. Later that
day, after the samples were taken, Taylor asked the investigating
officer how long it would take to get the results back. Instead of
directly responding to the question, the investigating officer asked
Taylor why he wanted to know. Taylor responded that he was just
wondering when they would be back out to pick him up. Taylor did
not have long to wait. Two days later, on February 16, Taylor was
arrested, and, on March 3, a grand jury returned a two-count
indictment against Taylor for first-degree murder and burglary. The
indictment was amended on September 12, 1991, to add a third count
for sexual battery.
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Timothy Cowart,
who had shared a cell with Taylor in the Duval County jail. Cowart
testified that, in a jailhouse conversation with Taylor in early April,
Taylor stated that he had been involved in a burglary and that it was a
-3-
messy job; that the lady surprised him inside the trailer; and that he
stabbed her and choked her and then strangled her with a cord to make
sure she was dead. Cowart also testified that Taylor said the State
could place him, but not his accomplice, at the scene of the crime, and
that the State could convict him with the evidence it had. Taylor
allegedly asked Cowart to hide a gun and handcuff key in the
bathroom at the hospital; Taylor would then feign an illness, get taken
to the hospital, and have a chance to escape.
A Florida Department of Law Enforcement lab analyst, who
was an expert in serology, testified that semen found on a bed
covering and on a vaginal swab taken from the victim could not be
tested. However, the analyst testified that semen found in the victim’s
blouse matched Taylor’s DNA profile.
In the guilt phase, Taylor presented only one witness, an agent
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The agent testified that certain
hairs found on the victim’s body and clothing matched the pubic hairs
of Taylor’s accomplice. On cross-examination, the agent conceded
that it is possible to commit a sexual battery and not leave any fibers
or hair. Taylor then rested his case and the jury found him guilty as
charged.
At the penalty phase proceeding, the State rested without
presenting any additional evidence. Taylor presented the testimony of
five witnesses. First, Taylor called Charles Miles, who lived next
door to Taylor during Taylor’s adolescence. Miles stated that Taylor
frequently played with Miles’ son and that Taylor was always very
polite and respectful. Miles testified that on one occasion he and
Taylor sat in Miles’ garage and talked at length about religion.
Taylor’s next witness was Lloyd King, his uncle. King testified that
Taylor had always been a polite person. The third witness, Judy
Rogers, was a friend of the family who testified that she thought
Taylor had a learning disability. Taylor’s next witness was another
uncle, Don King, who testified that, during fifth and sixth grades,
Taylor experienced difficulty in reading and that his reading
comprehension was poor. King also stated that Taylor was a very
passive person. As his last witness, Taylor called his adoptive mother,
Lenette Taylor, who testified that Taylor had experienced difficulty
concentrating in school and that she had tried unsuccessfully to get
him into special education classes. She testified that Taylor’s I.Q. had
been tested and found to be around 68 to 70, which, according to her,
is in the mildly retarded range. On cross-examination, she
-4-
acknowledged that, in 1979, when he was nine years old, Taylor had
tested in a normal intellectual range. The record further reflects that,
although defense counsel had Taylor examined by two mental health
experts, counsel found it to be in Taylor’s best interest not to present
the experts’ testimony at trial. As an additional mitigating factor,
Taylor offered evidence that he was only twenty years old at the time
of the murder.
The jury recommended the death sentence by a vote of ten to
two. In sentencing Taylor to death, the trial judge found the following
aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed during the course
of a burglary and/or sexual battery; (2) the murder was committed for
financial gain; and (3) the murder was committed in an especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. As the sole nonstatutory
mitigating factor, the trial judge found that Taylor was mildly
retarded. The trial judge sentenced Taylor to death for the first-degree
murder, to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the burglary, and to
twenty-seven years’ imprisonment for the sexual battery.
Id. at 1039-41. On October 3, 1994, the United States Supreme Court denied
Taylor’s petition for writ of certiorari. Taylor v. Florida, 513 U.S. 832 (1994).
Thus, Taylor’s conviction and sentence of death became final on that date.
We affirmed the denial of Taylor’s initial motion for postconviction relief
filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and denied his petition
for writ of habeas corpus. Taylor v. State (Taylor II), 62 So. 3d 1101, 1106 (Fla.
2011). After the release of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v.
State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), Taylor filed
his first successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.851, and we affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of
relief. Taylor v. State (Taylor III), 234 So. 3d 649, 650 (Fla. 2018).
-5-
Taylor then filed this second successive motion for postconviction relief
pursuant to rule 3.851, alleging newly discovered evidence in the form of an
exculpatory affidavit of a witness and new DNA evidence. Without conducting a
case management conference, the postconviction court denied Taylor’s motion.
This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
Taylor raises two claims in his appeal to this Court. First, Taylor asserts that
the postconviction court’s failure to hold a case management hearing, known as a
Huff 1 hearing, violated his due process rights. Second, Taylor contends that, on the
merits, the postconviction court erred in summarily denying his second successive
postconviction motion. All of these claims are addressed individually below.
I.
In his first claim, Taylor contends that the postconviction court violated his
due process rights by failing to hold a case management conference, pursuant to
Huff, before ruling on his second successive motion for postconviction relief. In
accordance with our extensive precedent on the failure to hold Huff hearings for
successive motions for postconviction relief, we conclude that any error here was
harmless.
1. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
-6-
In Huff, we stated:
Because of the severity of punishment at issue in a death
penalty postconviction case, we have determined that henceforth the
judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to appear before the
court and be heard on an initial 3.850 motion. This does not mean
that the judge must conduct an evidentiary hearing in all death penalty
postconviction cases. Instead, the hearing before the judge is for the
purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and
to hear legal argument relating to the motion.
622 So. 2d at 983. This Huff hearing requirement was later expanded to include
rule 3.851 motions. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).
Nevertheless, in Groover v. State, 703 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1997), we
elaborated that our holding in Huff was limited to initial death penalty
postconviction motions. Id. at 1038. We noted that although Huff hearings are
preferred in order to allow the parties to present their legal arguments, one was not
required in Groover’s case because his successive postconviction motion was
without merit. Id. “[E]ven if a Huff hearing had been required in [Groover], the
court’s failure to do so would be harmless as no evidentiary hearing was required
and relief was not warranted on the motion.” Id. Moreover, we have repeatedly
upheld our holding in Groover with regard to Huff hearings on legally insufficient
or meritless successive postconviction motions. See Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985,
999 (Fla. 2009) (holding that the failure to hold a Huff hearing on Marek’s fourth
successive postconviction motion that was legally insufficient on its face and
without merit was harmless and stating that “[t]he failure to hold a hearing on a
-7-
successive postconviction motion that is legally insufficient on its face is harmless
error” (citing Davis v. State, 736 So. 2d 1156, 1159 n.1 (Fla. 1999); Groover, 703
So. 2d at 1038)); Davis, 736 So. 2d at 1159 n.1 (“In view of the fact that the instant
motion is successive and legally insufficient on its face, we find this error
harmless.” (citing Groover, 703 So. 2d at 1038)); see also Mordenti v. State, 711
So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 1998) (holding a failure to hold a Huff hearing on Groover’s
fourth successive postconviction motion was harmless error whereas the same lack
of Huff hearing on Mordenti’s first motion for postconviction relief was not).
Therefore, we have repeatedly emphasized that the failure to hold a Huff hearing
on legally insufficient or meritless successive postconviction motions is harmless
error.
Here, the postconviction motion at issue is Taylor’s second successive
postconviction motion. Moreover, as discussed at length below, the postconviction
court below properly found that Taylor’s successive postconviction motion was
without merit. Therefore, although Huff hearings are preferred on all
postconviction motions, we conclude that the failure to hold a case management
hearing in the instant proceeding was harmless. See, e.g., Groover, 703 So. 2d at
1038. Thus, this claim of Taylor’s successive motion for postconviction relief
fails.
-8-
II.
Taylor next asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying
his newly discovered evidence claims. Taylor presents two items of newly
discovered evidence, both of which the postconviction court deemed to be
meritless: (1) an affidavit from James Dixon, and (2) new DNA evidence. Each
piece of newly discovered evidence is addressed individually below.
A. Standard of Review
We originally enunciated the standard of review governing claims of newly
discovered evidence in Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998). In sum,
[t]o obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a
defendant must meet two requirements. First, the evidence must not
have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of
trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could
not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the newly
discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably
produce an acquittal on retrial. See Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521. Newly
discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it
“weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a
reasonable doubt as to his culpability.” Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526(quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)). If the
defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires
that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe
sentence. See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991).
In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the
trial court must “consider all newly discovered evidence which would
be admissible” and must “evaluate the weight of both the newly
discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the
trial.” Id. at 916. This determination includes
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or
whether it constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial
-9-
court should also determine whether the evidence is
cumulative to other evidence in the case. The trial court
should further consider the materiality and relevance of
the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly
discovered evidence.
Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521 (citations omitted).
Preston v. State, 970 So. 2d 789, 797-98 (Fla. 2007) (alterations in original).
Furthermore, “[t]he summary denial of a newly discovered evidence claim will be
upheld if the motion is legally insufficient or its allegations are conclusively
refuted by the record.” Taylor v. State, 3 So. 3d 986, 999 (Fla. 2009) (citing McLin
v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 954 (Fla. 2002)). “To support a summary denial without
a hearing, a trial court must either state its rationale in its decision or attach those
specific parts of the record that refute each claim presented in the motion.”
Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1993). Where no evidentiary
hearing is held, this Court has delineated that it must accept the defendant’s factual
allegations, “to the extent they are not refuted by the record.” Foster v. State, 810
So. 2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla.
1999)).2 However, we have nonetheless stated that “there may be cases where,
from the face of the affidavit, it can be determined that the affidavit is ‘inherently
2. In addition, with regard to successive postconviction motions under rule
3.851(f)(5)(B), “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show
that the movant is entitled to no relief, the motion may be denied without an
evidentiary hearing.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).
- 10 -
incredible,’ ” which may ultimately warrant summary denial. McLin, 827 So. 2d at
955 (quoting Robinson v. State, 736 So. 2d 93, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
Moreover, we have also indicated that “there may be cases where the newly
discovered evidence is ‘obviously immaterial’ to the verdict,” which might also
warrant summary denial. Id. at 956 (quoting Robinson, 736 So. 2d at 93).
In addition, this Court has emphasized the need for a cumulative analysis
when determining the validity of a newly discovered evidence claim:
Based on the standard set forth in Jones[], the postconviction
court must consider the effect of the newly discovered evidence, in
addition to all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a
new trial. Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d 760, 775-76 (Fla. 2013). In
determining the impact of the newly discovered evidence, the court
must conduct a cumulative analysis of all the evidence so that there is
a “total picture” of the case and “all the circumstances of the case.”
Id. at 776 (quoting Lightbourne v. State, 742 So. 2d 238, 247 (Fla.
1999)). . . . As this Court held in Lightbourne, and more recently in
Swafford, a postconviction court must even consider testimony that
was previously excluded as procedurally barred or presented in
another postconviction proceeding in determining if there is a
probability of an acquittal. Swafford, 125 So. 3d at 775-76;
Lightbourne, 742 So. 2d at 247; see also Roberts v. State, 840 So. 2d
962, 972 (Fla. 2002) (holding that upon remand, if the trial court
determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim
was reliable, the trial court was required to review that new evidence,
as well as claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct.
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), that were previously rejected in a prior
postconviction motion, because the evidence was equally accessible to
the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of
the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed).
Hildwin v. State, 141 So. 3d 1178, 1184 (Fla. 2014).
- 11 -
B. Newly Discovered Affidavit Evidence
Taylor first asserts that an allegedly exculpatory affidavit by Dixon
constitutes newly discovered evidence that warrants relief. Dixon’s affidavit, in
full, states:
I, James Dixon worked for Walter Holton in the early 90’s
doing odd jobs. Holton sold large amounts of cocaine with a Cuban
Friend from Miami, who drove a Porsche. Both men were dangerous
if you crossed them and were known to put contract hits out on people
who crossed them. I was questioned by Police about a sailboat
necklace that was possibly connected to a homicide. I got the sailboat
necklace from Angela Smith, who was the girlfriend of Walter Holton
at the time. She told me that she got it from his Cuban friend, who
told her to “never get rid of it”. [sic] I did not tell the police where I
got the necklace from, because I was afraid of Walter Holton and his
Cuban friend. My DNA was collected by the police and I was cleared
of any involvement with the homicide case.
Taylor supplements the information contained within Dixon’s sworn affidavit with
a number of additional facts he claims to have obtained from Dixon himself. The
postconviction court below summarized these additional facts to the following:
Defendant claims Dixon knows Mr. Holton murdered Ms. Vest
because Dixon allegedly said “Mr. Holton admitted he murdered Ms.
Vest because she threatened him after one of her friends had a drug-
related conflict with Mr. Holton.” Defendant maintains Dixon’s
alleged conclusion that Holton, not Defendant, murdered Ms. Vest is
supported by Dixon’s alleged statements that (1) Angela Smith lied to
police when she provided an alibi for Holton when Dixon “was selling
cocaine for Mr. Holton that night and knew Holton was not with Ms.
Smith”; (2) he knows Holton’s [Ford Ranchero] was damaged after
hitting a mailbox “belonging to a house they robbed”; and (3) he gave
the sailboat necklace to someone “who later pawned it.” According to
Defendant, Dixon said he came forward at this time because Holton,
who had “put a hit out” on Dixon, has died.
- 12 -
(Citation omitted.)
In denying this claim of Taylor’s successive postconviction motion, the
postconviction court noted that Dixon’s affidavit relies on inferences stacked upon
inferences in order to establish the likelihood of acquittal on retrial. Additionally,
the postconviction court noted that there is no definitive statement within the
affidavit that anyone other than Taylor murdered Ms. Vest. Finally, the
postconviction court found that Taylor’s assertion that Dixon murdered Ms. Vest
or was present during the murder of Ms. Vest did not constitute newly discovered
evidence because this evidence was available at trial and defense counsel could
have found it through due diligence prior to trial.
The first prong of the Jones test requires that the evidence must not have
been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and the
defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence.
Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521. We agree with the postconviction court that evidence
indicating Dixon was a possible suspect in the murder of Ms. Vest was available to
the defense before trial, based on Dixon’s own assertion that his DNA was taken
during the police investigation and he was excluded as a possible suspect.
However, with regard to Holton’s possible involvement in the murder, we
conclude that this evidence was previously unavailable to Taylor, based on
Dixon’s previous unwillingness to testify.
- 13 -
The second prong of the Jones test requires that the newly discovered
evidence be of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.
Id. In assessing this prong, we consider “whether the evidence goes to the merits
of the case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence . . . whether the
evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the case . . . the materiality and
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly discovered
evidence.” Id. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Taylor’s claim
fails on the second prong of the Jones analysis because Dixon’s affidavit would
probably not produce an acquittal on retrial.
First, the postconviction court was correct in determining that Dixon’s
affidavit would not produce an acquittal for Taylor on retrial because the
information within the affidavit, even if true, presents a theory of the case—
namely, that another individual, not Taylor, murdered Ms. Vest—that is
cumulative to that already presented by the defense at trial. Specifically, Taylor’s
entire defense at trial was that his codefendant, Murray, committed the murder,
based upon the testimony of FBI Special Agent Joseph A. Dizinno, an expert in
hair and fiber analysis, which linked hairs found on the victim and at the scene of
the crime to Murray, but not Taylor. Because Agent Dizinno could not match any
of the hairs found on the victim or at the scene of the crime to Taylor, the defense
argued that he was not the perpetrator. As evidenced by the guilty convictions on
- 14 -
each of the charged crimes, the theory of an alternative murderer was rejected by
the jury. Thus, attempting to present up to three additional suspects (i.e., Walter
Holton, the “Cuban friend,” or Angela Smith) would have been cumulative and
would probably not produce an acquittal on retrial.
Second, the postconviction court was correct in finding that the Dixon
affidavit would not produce an acquittal on retrial based on the fact that the
evidence in the trial record clearly and directly refutes the claims made by Dixon
in his affidavit with regard to who the true perpetrator was, thus indicating the
inherent unreliability of the information contained within the affidavit. See Foster,
810 So. 2d at 914 (holding that the Court must accept the defendant’s factual
allegations “to the extent they are not refuted by the record” (emphasis added)
(citing Peede, 748 So. 2d at 257)). Specifically, the information Dixon now
presents is directly refuted by the following portions of the trial record: (1)
testimony from Dr. James M. Pollock, Jr. matching semen recovered from a blouse
found at the scene of the crime to Taylor’s DNA profile; (2) testimony from
Johnny Allen Taylor 3 and Jason Leister indicating that Taylor, on two different
occasions, went into the backyard of his old residence looking for items in the area
3. Johnny Allen Taylor is unrelated to the defendant in this case. Johnny
Taylor’s connection to the defendant is that he and the defendant lived together at
the time of the murder. In the interest of clarity, Johnny Taylor will be referred to
as such, and the defendant will be referred to as Taylor.
- 15 -
where Ms. Vest’s jewelry was found; (3) evidence and testimony from Detective
T. C. O’Steen that the sailboat necklace, along with multiple other pieces of
jewelry identified as belonging to the victim, was found buried in the backyard of
Taylor’s old residence; and (4) testimony from Detective John Robert Bogers and
Timothy Dale Cowart about inculpatory statements made by Taylor. Each of these
items will be individually addressed in more detail below.
1. Semen Match
Dr. Pollock, an expert in forensic serology and DNA analysis, testified at
trial that he received a number of items for testing in connection with this case: (1)
a stain from a bedspread; (2) a stain from a blouse; (3) a blood sample from Ms.
Vest; (4) a vaginal swab from Ms. Vest; and (5) a liquid blood sample from Taylor.
Dr. Pollock explained that the DNA samples from the bedspread and Ms. Vest’s
vaginal swab were too degraded to perform proper DNA analyses. Dr. Pollock
was, however, able to perform DNA testing on the stain from the blouse recovered
at the scene of the crime. Through this testing, Dr. Pollock found that the DNA
recovered from the blouse stain matched the DNA profile from Taylor’s blood
sample. In so finding, Dr. Pollock testified that the probability of selecting an
unrelated individual from the overall gene population having the same DNA
profile was one in six million, which he further narrowed down to a probability of
one in twenty-three million, when looking only at the Caucasian database.
- 16 -
We conclude that Dr. Pollock’s testimony matching DNA recovered from a
stained blouse found at the crime scene to that of Taylor’s DNA profile directly
refutes Taylor’s current claim that Dixon’s affidavit is so exculpatory that it would
produce an acquittal on retrial. Contrary to what Taylor now attempts to assert,
none of the information contained within Dixon’s affidavit refutes or explains the
scientific DNA evidence linking Taylor to the place where Ms. Vest was
murdered. Therefore, we conclude that the likelihood that Dixon’s affidavit would
produce an acquittal on retrial, in light of the DNA evidence linking Taylor to the
crime scene, is very slim.
2. The Sailboat Necklace
Taylor’s roommate during the time that Ms. Vest was murdered, Johnny
Taylor, testified that he and Taylor lived together in September of 1990, and that
Taylor moved out sometime before Christmas of 1990. Johnny Taylor further
testified that in January 1991, after Taylor moved out, he and his brother renovated
the fencing in the backyard of their split duplex. Approximately a week after
redoing the fence, Johnny Taylor testified that his dogs dug up a sandwich bag
containing jewelry from an area of the backyard bordering the duplex. 4 At trial,
4. Linda Engler, a longtime friend of Ms. Vest who saw her multiple times a
week, testified at trial that Ms. Vest regularly wore a gold coin on a chain, that Ms.
Vest was wearing gold earrings the day before she was murdered, and that Ms.
Vest often wore a “ship pendant.” Further, Engler identified photographs depicting
the gold coin, ship pendant, gold earring, and gold chains as those belonging to
- 17 -
Johnny Taylor testified that the sandwich bag contained two necklaces, a coin, and
an earring.5 Johnny Taylor turned these items over to Detective O’Steen and gave
a sworn statement. Johnny Taylor testified that, approximately two days after he
gave his sworn statement, Taylor came over with two other individuals. While the
others sat at the kitchen table drinking beers, Taylor went into the backyard for a
minute or two and then returned to the table, where he explained that he was
looking at the new fence. Taylor and the two other individuals left shortly
thereafter.
Next, Jason Leister testified that, around February 1991, he went to Johnny
Taylor’s house with Taylor and another individual. While there, Leister testified
that Taylor went out to the backyard and returned with dirty hands that he
proceeded to wash. Leister testified that, when asked what he was doing, Taylor
responded “that he left some things over there and they were gone.”
Ms. Vest. In addition, Engler identified items of evidence as the gold coin, the
ship pendant, the earring, and two gold chains that she had previously identified as
belonging to Ms. Vest.
5. Johnny Taylor identified the same items of evidence previously described
by Engler to be those belonging to Ms. Vest as being the items he found contained
within the sandwich bag in his backyard. Specifically, the items of evidence
Johnny Taylor identified were a coin, an earring, a ship pendant, and two gold
chains.
- 18 -
Finally, Detective O’Steen testified that, in February 1991, he visited Johnny
Taylor’s duplex, where he recovered a gold coin, a sailboat pendant, a gold earring,
and two gold chains. Detective O’Steen identified each of the five pieces of
jewelry admitted into evidence as those he recovered from Johnny Taylor. In
addition, Detective O’Steen testified that he obtained all five pieces of jewelry
from Johnny Taylor and his brother.
We conclude that the information within the Dixon affidavit concerning the
ship pendant is directly contradicted by the testimony presented at trial.
Specifically, Detective O’Steen’s testimony that he recovered the sailboat pendant
directly from Johnny Taylor and his brother contradicts Dixon’s statement that he
had possession of the sailboat necklace, which he obtained from Angela Smith and
later gave to another individual to pawn. See Foster, 810 So. 2d at 914 (holding
that the Court must accept the defendant’s factual allegations “to the extent they
are not refuted by the record” (emphasis added) (citing Peede, 748 So. 2d at 257)).
The trial record directly refutes Dixon’s affidavit, thus indicating its inherent
incredibility. Therefore, we conclude that the postconviction court was correct in
summarily denying this newly discovered evidence claim because “the motion,
files, and records . . . conclusively show that [Taylor] is entitled to no relief” on
their face. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). Furthermore, the statements contained
within the affidavit would not produce an acquittal on retrial.
- 19 -
3. Taylor’s Inculpatory Statements
Detective John Robert Bogers testified at trial that in the course of taking
Taylor’s blood, saliva, and hair samples pursuant to a search warrant, Taylor asked
how long it would take for the results of the samples to come back. When
Detective Bogers asked why, Taylor “stated he was just wondering when we would
be back out to pick him up.”
Timothy Dale Cowart, Taylor’s cellmate in jail, testified that Taylor made
statements to him about the case. 6 Specifically, Taylor told Cowart that he and a
partner were committing a burglary and “[t]hat it was a messy job, that the lady
surprised him inside the trailer, and he stabbed her and then choked her and then
had to strangle her with a cord to make sure she was dead.” Cowart testified that
Taylor stated that the State had taken hair and body samples and had done a rape
test on him that could put him at the crime scene, but not his partner. Further,
Taylor stated that his tissue and hair alone could convict him, and that the State
also had recovered property removed from the home that could place him at the
6. Cowart testified to having at least five felony convictions in other states
and “[f]our or five maybe six” misdemeanor convictions in Florida involving
dishonesty. Cowart further indicated that, in exchange for his sworn statement in
Taylor’s case, he received a sixty-day sentence and probation on the petit theft case
he was in jail for at the time of Taylor’s alleged statements.
- 20 -
scene. Cowart also indicated that Taylor had asked him to obtain a gun and a
handcuff key and place it in a hospital bathroom so that Taylor could escape.
We conclude that the Dixon affidavit would not produce an acquittal on
retrial because it does not present any information disputing or explaining the
statements made by Taylor as to the murder. Instead, Taylor’s statements to
Detective Bogers and Cowart link him to the crimes for which he was convicted,
and Dixon’s suggestion that another individual might have committed the murder
does not eradicate these statements. Moreover, when considered alongside
evidence presented at trial matching Taylor’s DNA profile to the DNA recovered
from a stained blouse found at the scene and the evidence and testimony presented
with regard to the recovery of the sailboat pendant, Dixon’s affidavit has little to
no effect on the probability of acquittal on retrial.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Dixon’s affidavit fails the
Jones test when considered alongside the evidence and testimony in the trial
record, because the information it contains is refuted by the record and thus would
not produce an acquittal on retrial. Therefore, we hold that the postconviction
court did not err in summarily denying this claim of Taylor’s successive motion for
postconviction relief.
- 21 -
C. Newly Discovered DNA Evidence
Taylor next asserts that two pieces of newly discovered DNA evidence
entitle him to relief: (1) disagreement between the procedures used by Dr. Pollock
in matching Taylor’s DNA to semen found on the victim’s blouse and the opinion
of Shirley Zeigler, another DNA analyst, on more appropriate testing procedures,
and (2) new developments in Taylor’s codefendant’s case challenging the DNA
testing of hair fibers found at the crime scene. As discussed below, we hold that
neither of the two alleged pieces of newly discovered evidence constitute newly
discovered evidence that would entitle Taylor to relief.
First, with regard to the alleged disagreement between Dr. Pollock and
Zeigler as to the appropriate DNA testing procedures to be used, we conclude that
the postconviction court was correct in summarily denying this claim, finding that
it is not newly discovered evidence, because the claim was previously raised—and
denied by this Court—in Taylor’s initial postconviction motion. Taylor II, 62 So.
3d at 1111, 1115-17. Additionally, even if this evidence were newly discovered,
we conclude that it would not produce an acquittal on retrial because, as we stated
in Taylor II, “although Zeigler testified during postconviction proceedings that
there were differences between her report and that of Dr. Pollock, she did not
disagree with Dr. Pollock’s ultimate findings.” Id. at 1112 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Zeigler’s testimony, if introduced on retrial, would not controvert Dr.
- 22 -
Pollock’s ultimate finding matching Taylor’s DNA to the semen found on the
victim’s blouse and thus would not produce an acquittal on retrial. Therefore, we
hold that the postconviction court did not err in denying this portion of Taylor’s
newly discovered DNA evidence claim.
Second, with regard to the hair samples that were matched to Murray, we
again conclude that the postconviction court was correct in summarily denying this
claim because it is neither newly discovered nor would it produce an acquittal on
retrial. In essence, Taylor argues that Murray’s challenge to the hair fibers found
at the crime scene entitles him to relief because it indicates that he was not the
perpetrator. This claim is meritless. As an initial matter, the hair fibers are not
newly discovered, as they were presented at Taylor’s initial trial in 1991.
Furthermore, as explained above, the defense presented Agent Dizinno’s testimony
matching Murray’s hair sample, not Taylor’s, to the hair fibers recovered at the
scene, in order to present a theory of the case that someone other than Taylor
murdered Ms. Vest. Although Murray now challenges the testing procedures used
in matching his hair to those recovered from the scene, this has no bearing on
Taylor’s guilt or innocence. Taylor is linked to the crime scene through a DNA
match of semen recovered from a blouse in Ms. Vest’s trailer. Presenting further
evidence that the hair recovered from the scene does not match Taylor’s would not
produce an acquittal on retrial. Instead, this evidence would be cumulative
- 23 -
evidence attempting to show that someone other than Taylor committed the
murder, a proposition that was already presented to—and rejected by—the jury at
trial. Thus, the “new” evidence relating to hair fibers from the crime scene would
not produce an acquittal on retrial. Therefore, we conclude that the postconviction
court did not err in summarily denying this claim of Taylor’s successive
postconviction motion.
D. Cumulative Analysis
Although not explicitly conducted by the postconviction court below, this
Court has emphasized the need to conduct a cumulative analysis in newly
discovered evidence claims. Hildwin, 141 So. 3d at 1184. For this cumulative
analysis, we have explained the need to consider all of the evidence of the case,
including testimony that was previously excluded as procedurally barred or
presented in another postconviction proceeding in determining the probability of
acquittal on retrial. Id. Accordingly, below we conduct a cumulative analysis in
order to comprehensively assess the probability of acquittal on retrial.
When examining the newly discovered evidence presented, in addition to the
evidence previously presented at trial and in prior postconviction claims, such as
Zeigler’s disagreement with Dr. Pollock’s DNA testing procedures, we conclude
that the postconviction court was correct in denying Taylor’s successive
postconviction motion because none of the new or previously presented evidence
- 24 -
would likely produce an acquittal on retrial. The newly discovered evidence and
claims Taylor raised in his prior postconviction motion do not refute the evidence
linking him to the murder of Ms. Vest.
Namely, if Zeigler were presented to testify on retrial, her testimony would
reflect that she ultimately agreed with Dr. Pollock’s conclusion that the semen
found on Ms. Vest’s blouse was a direct match to Taylor’s DNA profile. This
direct evidence linking Taylor to the scene of the crime would not be refuted by the
presentation of Zeigler as an additional witness and thus would not produce an
acquittal on retrial.
Similarly, as discussed at length above, neither the presentation of Dixon as
an additional witness to testify as to Holton’s alleged involvement in Ms. Vest’s
murder nor the presentation of additional evidence on the hair samples from
Murray’s case would refute the evidence in the record matching Taylor’s DNA
profile to the semen recovered at the crime scene. Additionally, this new evidence
would not undercut the fact that Ms. Vest’s jewelry was found at Taylor’s old
residence and multiple witnesses testified that he returned to the residence
seemingly in an attempt to recover the jewelry. Ultimately, even with the
presentation of the newly discovered evidence and testimony from Taylor’s prior
postconviction claims, the evidence in the record against Taylor is abundant and
essentially unrefuted. Therefore, we conclude that, even in conducting a
- 25 -
cumulative analysis, the evidence in question would not produce an acquittal on
retrial. See id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial
of Taylor’s second successive motion for postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON,
JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED
ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 27, 2018. A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION
FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED ON OR BEFORE
JANUARY 2, 2019. NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD EXPIRES TO
FILE A REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF FILED,
DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.
I concur in result regarding the newly discovered evidence claims. As to the
Hurst 7 claim, I write separately to emphasize how Steven Taylor’s case
demonstrates precisely why this Court’s cut-off for Hurst retroactivity results in
unconstitutional arbitrariness. Taylor’s conviction became final in 1994. Taylor v.
State, 630 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1993) (direct appeal), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 8327. Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
- 26 -
(1994). On the other hand, because Gerald Murray, Taylor’s accomplice who was
convicted for the same 1990 murder as Taylor, received three retrials, his
conviction did not become final until 2009. Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1113
& n.2 (Fla.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 949 (2009).8 And, even though both
defendants received nonunanimous recommendations for death—Taylor received a
ten to two jury recommendation for death and Murray received an eleven to one
jury recommendation—Murray will receive a new penalty phase because of the
procedural history of his case, but Taylor will not. See Taylor v. State, 234 So. 3d
649 (Fla. 2018).
Therefore, Taylor’s case is a clear example of the unconstitutional
arbitrariness caused by the bright line this Court created for Hurst retroactivity—
that Hurst does not apply retroactively to sentences of death that became final
before Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 9 In my concurring in part and
dissenting in part opinion in Asay V, I explained:
I conclude that Hurst should apply to all defendants who were
sentenced to death under Florida’s prior, unconstitutional capital
sentencing scheme. The majority’s conclusion results in an
8. Murray v. State, 838 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2002) (reversing Murray’s
convictions and vacating sentences on direct appeal after first retrial); Murray v.
State, 692 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1997) (reversing Murray’s convictions and vacating
sentences on direct appeal after original trial).
9. Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513(2017); Asay v. State (Asay V), 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41(2017).
- 27 -
unintended arbitrariness as to who receives relief depending on when
the defendant was sentenced or, in some cases, resentenced. For
example, many defendants whose crimes were committed before 2002
will receive the benefit of Hurst because they were previously granted
a resentencing on other grounds and their newest death sentence was
not final when Ring was decided. To avoid such arbitrariness and to
ensure uniformity and fundamental fairness in Florida’s capital
sentencing, our opinion in Hurst should be applied retroactively to all
death sentences.
210 So. 3d at 36 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted). Indeed, I have continuously expressed this view, including in this
Court’s recent opinion denying Taylor Hurst relief under Hitchcock. Taylor, 234
So. 3d at 650 (Pariente, J., concurring in result).
Taylor’s case is the textbook example of the “unintended arbitrariness” I
pointed out in Asay V. 210 So. 3d at 36 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Taylor and Murray were both convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to death after nonunanimous jury recommendations for death for the
murder of Alice Vest in September 1990. Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1113 & n.2; Taylor,
630 So. 2d at 1039. Yet, only one will receive a new penalty phase. Clearly, the
Court’s line-drawing for the retroactivity of Hurst creates unconstitutional results
for defendants like Taylor.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
Russell L. Healey, Judge - Case No. 161991CF002456AXXXMA
Michael P. Reiter, Ocala, Florida,
for Appellant
- 28 -
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Donahue, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
- 29 -