State of Florida v. Carl Lewis Burns

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC18-1208
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
CARL LEWIS BURNS,
Respondent.
June 2, 2022
CANADY, C.J.
We have for review Burns v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1569,
2018 WL 3371723 (Fla. 1st DCA July 11, 2018), in which the First
District cited Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 292 (Fla. 1990), for
the proposition that “[a] trial court cannot base a sentence on the
defendant’s choosing to maintain innocence” because “a trial court’s
use in sentencing of defendant’s assertion of innocence violates due
process rights.” Burns, 43 Fla. L. Weekly at D1570, 2018 WL
3371723, at *2. Despite the fact that Burns gave a sworn
confession to the crimes of which he was convicted, which he
retracted during his trial testimony, the district court felt
“constrained to reverse his sentence because the trial court
improperly relied on [his] subsequent claim of innocence” in
imposing his sentence. Id. The First District thus vacated Burns’s
aggregate 300-year sentence and remanded for resentencing but
certified the following question to be one of great public importance:
MAY A SENTENCING COURT RELY ON A DEFENDANT’S
LACK OF REMORSE AFTER THE DEFENDANT HAS
GIVEN A POST-MIRANDA, SWORN CONFESSION TO
THE CRIME AND HAS OBVIOUSLY LIED UNDER OATH
AT TRIAL ABOUT HIS GUILT?
Id., 2018 WL 3371723, at *3. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§ 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
We stayed the present case pending disposition of Davis v.
State, 332 So. 3d 970 (Fla. 2021), in which we addressed the
following similar rephrased certified question:
DOES A TRIAL COURT, WHEN IMPOSING A SENTENCE
ON A DEFENDANT WHO HAS VOLUNTARILY CHOSEN
TO ALLOCUTE AND MAINTAIN HIS INNOCENCE AT THE
SENTENCING HEARING, VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT’S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY CONSIDERING THE
DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
HIS ACTIONS?
Davis, 332 So. 3d at 973-74.
-2-
In answering the rephrased question in Davis in the negative,
we concluded that “Holton’s broad, unqualified statement that
‘using a protestation of innocence against a defendant’ ‘violates due
process’ ” “constitutes dicta that we expressly disapprove.” Id. at
975 (quoting Holton, 573 So. 3d at 292). We thus directed Burns in
the present case to show cause why we should not exercise our
jurisdiction, summarily quash the decision being reviewed, and
remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Davis. Upon
consideration of Burns’s response to the order to show cause and
the State’s reply thereto, we have determined to do just that.
Burns’s argument in his response that Davis is inapplicable to
the facts of Burns because Burns did not voluntarily choose to
allocute at his sentencing hearing is unpersuasive. Burns has read
Davis too narrowly.
In Davis, we “h[e]ld that when a defendant voluntarily chooses
to allocute at a sentencing hearing, the sentencing court is
permitted to consider the defendant’s freely offered statements,
including those indicating a failure to accept responsibility.” Id. at
978. While this holding was narrowly tailored to the facts
presented in Davis, our reliance on the United States Supreme
-3-
Court’s decision in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978),
confirms that the principles of Davis are not limited to statements
made only during an allocution.
In Grayson, the Court
reaffirm[ed] the authority of a sentencing judge to
evaluate carefully a defendant’s testimony on the stand,
determine—with a consciousness of the frailty of human
judgment—whether that testimony contained willful and
material falsehoods, and, if so, assess in light of all the
other knowledge gained about the defendant the meaning
of that conduct with respect to his prospects for
rehabilitation and restoration to a useful place in society.
438 U.S. at 55. Thus, under Grayson, a judge may evaluate
whether a defendant’s in-court statements contained falsehoods
and, if so, assess that fact along with all of the other sentencing
considerations.
We concluded our analysis in Davis with this sentence: “Just
as in Grayson, the sentencing judge here was entitled to consider
testimony that indicated the defendant’s unwillingness to accept the
truth and to take responsibility for his own conduct.” Davis, 332
So. 3d at 978. Thus, although the “freely offered statements” on
which the trial court relied in sentencing Burns were made during
trial rather than an allocution, the court was similarly under no
-4-
obligation to ignore them and was permitted to consider them in
imposing the sentence. See id.
We have already accepted jurisdiction by order. The decision
under review is quashed, and this matter is remanded to the First
District for reconsideration upon application of this Court’s decision
in Davis.
No motion for rehearing will be entertained by the Court.
It is so ordered.
LAWSON, MUÑIZ, and COURIEL, JJ., concur.
GROSSHANS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
POLSTON and LABARGA, JJ., dissent.
GROSSHANS, J., concurring in result only.
Because Burns’ response to our show cause order lacks merit,
I concur with the majority in quashing the First District’s decision
and remanding for reconsideration in light of Davis. However, the
majority’s opinion goes further. It addresses the scope of Davis,
discusses the effect of Grayson on Davis, and finds the sentencing
court’s consideration of Burns’ statements to be proper. Majority
op. at 4-5 (“Thus, although the ‘freely offered statements’ on which
the trial court relied in sentencing Burns were made during trial
rather than an allocution, the court was similarly under no
-5-
obligation to ignore them and was permitted to consider them in
imposing the sentence.” (citing Davis v. State, 332 So. 3d 970, 978
(Fla. 2021))). Yet, despite undertaking this analysis, the majority
ultimately remands for reconsideration under Davis. Consequently,
there is little left for the district court to do on remand other than
accept the majority’s suggested holding.
In my view, having previously accepted jurisdiction, it would
have been proper for us to either issue an opinion fully deciding the
case after supplemental briefing or summarily quash the decision
below and remand for reconsideration. Since the majority has not
chosen either course, I concur in result only.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Direct Conflict of Decisions/Certified Great Public Importance
First District – Case No. 1D16-5113
(Washington County)
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief,
Jason W. Rodriguez and Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant
Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and David A. Henson, Assistant
Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent
-6-