Darryl Len Morgan v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC20-641
____________
DARRYL LEN MORGAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
November 3, 2022
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Morgan v. State, 293 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2020), in which the Second District Court of Appeal held that
an order granting a rule 3.800(a) 1 motion and determining that a
sentence was illegal was not a final order but remained subject to
reconsideration until a final order imposing a corrected sentence
was entered. We accepted jurisdiction based on the Second
District’s certification of conflict. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Based on the nature of proceedings to correct an illegal sentence
1. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a).
under rule 3.800(a), we agree with the conclusion reached by the
Second District.
I
In 1979, Darryl Len Morgan was convicted—based on a nolo
contendere plea—of second-degree murder for an offense committed
when he was a juvenile. He was sentenced to life in prison with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Morgan, 293 So. 3d at
1082. In September 2016, Morgan filed a rule 3.800(a) motion
claiming that this sentence was an illegal sentence. Id. His claim
relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012), and this Court’s interpretation of Miller in
Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016). Miller held “that
mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the
time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” 567 U.S. at 465. In Atwell,
this Court held that the imposition on a juvenile of a sentence of life
with the possibility of parole under “Florida’s existing parole
system” was “virtually indistinguishable from a sentence of life
without parole” and was “therefore unconstitutional.” 197 So. 3d at
1041. Based on this case law, in January 2017, the trial court
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entered an order granting Morgan’s motion, ruling that the life-
with-the-possibility-of-parole sentence was an illegal sentence.
Morgan, 293 So. 3d at 1082. This order did not purport to vacate
the sentence, but simply ordered that steps be taken to conduct a
resentencing hearing.
That resentencing hearing was—at the repeated request of
Morgan—delayed for an extended period until it was finally set to
take place on August 17, 2018. Id. But the landscape of Florida
law changed dramatically before the resentencing could occur. On
July 12, 2018, State v. Michel issued, receding from Atwell and
holding “that juvenile offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility
of parole after 25 years do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as delineated by the United States
Supreme Court.” State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3, 4 (Fla. 2018). Citing
Michel, the State filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a) motion. Ultimately, the State’s
motion was granted, the prior order granting the rule 3.800(a)
motion was vacated, and Morgan’s motion was denied. Morgan
then appealed to the Second District.
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II
In the Second District, Morgan contended that the order
entered in January 2017 determining his sentence to be an illegal
sentence was final and that the lower court was accordingly without
jurisdiction to reconsider that order. Morgan, 293 So. 3d at 1082.
Relying on its earlier decisions interpreting rule 3.800(a) in State v.
Rudolf, 821 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Stewart v. State,
647 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), the Second District rejected
Morgan’s argument. 293 So. 3d at 1083-84. The court also cited
the decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal in State v.
Huerta, 38 So. 3d 883, 884-85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), and the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in State v. Delvalle, 745 So. 2d 541, 542
(Fla. 4th DCA 1999), both of which held—like Rudolf and Stewart—
that rule 3.800(a) proceedings are not final until a resentencing
order is entered because prior to that point judicial labor is still
required. 293 So. 3d at 1084.
The Second District certified conflict with the decisions of the
First District Court of Appeal in Jordan v. State, 81 So. 3d 595 (Fla.
1st DCA 2012), and Simmons v. State, 274 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA
2019), the Fourth District in Jones v. State, 279 So. 3d 172 (Fla.
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4th DCA 2019), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Magill v.
State, 287 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), together with their
progeny. 293 So. 3d at 1086. Although all of these conflict cases
addressed the same question concerning finality in rule 3.800(a)
proceedings that is presented by the case now on review, they each
relied on precedent from this Court interpreting the application of
rule 3.850. Jordan relied on State v. White, 470 So. 2d 1377 (Fla.
1985), which recognized the right of the state to appeal an order
vacating a death sentence in proceedings under rule 3.850. Jordan,
81 So. 3d at 596. Simmons, Jones, and Magill all relied on Taylor v.
State, 140 So. 3d 526, 528 (Fla. 2014), which in interpreting rule
3.850 held that “an order disposing of a postconviction motion
which partially denies and partially grants relief is a final order for
purposes of appeal, even if the relief granted requires subsequent
action in the underlying case, such as resentencing.” See Magill,
287 So. 3d at 1262-63; Jones, 279 So. 3d at 173-74; Simmons, 274
So. 3d at 471-72.
The Second District concluded that because it “addressed rule
3.850 collateral attacks . . . rather than only illegal sentences under
rule 3.800(a),” Taylor was not controlling. Morgan, 293 So. 3d at
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1085. The Second District pointed out that Taylor’s analysis relied
on the provision of rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), which states that the “order
issued after the evidentiary hearing shall resolve all the claims
raised in the motion and shall be considered the final order for
purposes of appeal,” to support its conclusion that a resentencing
proceeding after the granting of 3.850 relief was a new and separate
proceeding. 293 So. 3d at 1083 (quoting Taylor, 140 So. 3d at 529).
In distinguishing Taylor—as well as White—the court stated:
“Unlike rule 3.850, rule 3.800 does not state that an order resolving
‘all the claims raised in the motion’ shall be a final order.” Id. The
court also observed that unlike rule 3.850 proceedings, which
create a “new, separate proceeding” from the underlying criminal
case, a rule 3.800 motion is “filed in continuation of the original
criminal proceeding.” Id. (quoting Rudolf, 821 So. 2d at 386).
In support of its conclusion accepting the State’s argument
that reconsideration of the order granting Morgan’s motion was
proper, the Second District also relied on the provisions of Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c), which authorizes the State to
appeal orders “granting relief under Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure 3.801, 3.850, 3.851, or 3.853”—notably omitting any
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reference to rule 3.800. Morgan, 293 So. 3d at 1084 (quoting Fla.
R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(J)).
After the Second District decided Morgan, the en banc First
District in Rogers v. State, 296 So. 3d 500, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020),
held that orders granting relief under rule 3.800(a) are “not final or
appealable until resentencing has occurred”—thus aligning itself
with Morgan (as well as the Third District) and receding from
Jordan, Simmons and their progeny. But the law of the Fourth and
Fifth Districts has remained in conflict with Morgan.
III
In his challenge to the Second District’s decision, Morgan
argues that the trial court order granting his rule 3.800(a) motion
was a final order (even if not appealable) and was therefore not
subject to reconsideration. In support of this argument, he relies
primarily on our decision in Taylor, and contends that on the issue
of finality there is no relevant difference between rule 3.850 and
rule 3.800(a). Morgan emphasizes Taylor’s statement that
“postconviction proceedings and resentencing proceedings are
separate, legally discrete proceedings.” 140 So. 3d at 529. He
further reasons that judicial labor is complete once a court enters
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an order granting a motion under either rule 3.850 or rule 3.800(a),
and that under either rule a resentencing proceeding is a distinct
proceeding. Recognizing that rule 9.140(c)(1)(J) supports the
conclusion that an order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion is not
appealable by the State, Morgan nonetheless asserts that such
orders are final. Morgan cites as supplemental authority State v.
Jackson, 306 So. 3d 936, 945 (Fla. 2020), in which we held that an
order vacating a death sentence in a successive rule 3.851
proceeding was final and the sentence could not be “retroactively
reinstated” based on a change in the governing law that occurred
prior to resentencing. 2
The State contends that the order granting Morgan’s rule
3.800(a) motion was nonfinal and therefore was—as the Second
District ruled—subject to reconsideration. The State responds to
Morgan’s reliance on Taylor by arguing that because rule 3.800(a) is
“entirely different” from rule 3.850, Taylor’s application of rule
3.850 is not controlling here. In distinguishing Taylor, the State—
2. Morgan also makes a meritless argument based on Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.192, which we reject without further
comment.
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like the Morgan court—points to Taylor’s reliance on the rule of
finality in rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), and the State emphasizes the absence
of an analog in rule 3.800. Further explaining the relevant
differences between rule 3.800(a) and rule 3.850, the State argues
that rule 3.800(a) authorizes the court to correct an illegal
sentence—rather than to vacate such a sentence—and that the
“process of correction” is not complete until the corrected sentence
has been entered. The State also contends that rule 3.800(a) is not
properly described as a “postconviction rule,” and thus does not fall
within the sweep on Taylor’s teaching concerning the distinction
between postconviction proceedings and resentencing proceedings.
IV
As the arguments of the parties suggest, the resolution of the
issue presented here turns on the scope of our holding in Taylor.
We reject the expansive reading of Taylor’s interpretation of rule
3.850 urged by Morgan and conclude that Taylor does not apply to
proceedings under rule 3.800(a). We agree with the State’s
argument that in rule 3.800(a) proceedings the process of sentence
correction is not complete until an order is entered imposing a
corrected sentence. Until that point, there is no final order.
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Judicial labor in the cause remains to be done, and an order
granting a rule 3.800(a) motion is subject to reconsideration. In
this respect, the structure of rule 3.800(a) is fundamentally
different from rule 3.850, under which resentencing proceedings are
separate and distinct from the prior proceedings that result in an
order vacating a sentence.
Taylor dealt with a question involving the finality of an order
addressing claims raised in a rule 3.850 motion. We framed the
specific question on review as “whether an order disposing of a
postconviction motion which partially denies and partially grants
relief is a final order for purposes of appeal, when the relief granted
requires subsequent action in the underlying case, such as
resentencing.” 140 So. 3d at 527. And we held that such an order
was indeed a final order. Id. In doing so, we rejected the view of
the Fifth District that such an order “was not a final appealable
order because the resentencing required further judicial labor in the
underlying case.” Id. at 528. Instead, we agreed with the reasoning
of the Second District in Cooper v. State, 667 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla.
2d DCA 1996): “An order denying in part and granting in part
relief . . . marks the end of the judicial labor which is to be
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expended on the motion, and the order is final for appellate
purposes.” 140 So. 3d at 528.
In Taylor, we relied on the then recently adopted provision of
rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), which states that an “order issued after the
evidentiary hearing shall resolve all the claims raised in the motion
and shall be considered the final order for purposes of appeal.” Id.
at 529 (quoting In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc. & Fla.
Rules of App. Proc., 132 So. 3d 734, 750 (Fla. 2013)). We rejected
the State’s argument that allowing an appeal before an ordered
resentencing would “encourage piecemeal litigation.” Id. We
concluded that “because resentencing is an entirely new,
independent proceeding, an appeal from the underlying
postconviction proceeding does not foster piecemeal litigation or
waste judicial resources.” Id.But proceedings under rule 3.800(a) are not equivalent to
proceedings under rule 3.850. Although both types of proceedings
can result in relief from final criminal sentences, the two different
rules are structured differently and therefore operate differently.
Admittedly, rule 3.800 proceedings are commonly referred to as
postconviction proceedings, but rule 3.800 is located in the portion
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of the rules—part XIV (Sentence)—governing the imposition of
sentences by sentencing judges, while rule 3.850 is in the part of
the rules—part XVII (Postconviction Relief)—relating to
postconviction proceedings. Rule 3.850 characterizes motions to
obtain relief from sentences as “motion[s] to vacate a sentence.”
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). There is no analogous provision in rule
3.800. Sentences are corrected under rule 3.800(a) as an extended
part of the sentencing process in the underlying criminal case.
Under rule 3.850, sentences are vacated and then—in a
subsequent, separate proceeding—a new sentence is imposed.
This understanding of the differences in the way the two rules
operate fits with the fact that there is no provision in rule 3.800
analogous to the finality provision of rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), a provision
which Taylor relied on to support its conclusion that a resentencing
proceeding after an order granting relief under rule 3.850 was a
separate and distinct proceeding. It is similarly consistent with rule
9.140(c)(1)(J), which authorizes state appeals of orders “granting
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relief under [rules] 3.801, 3.850, 3.851 or 3.853” but does not
authorize appeals of orders granting relief under rule 3.800(a).3
And our understanding of the difference between rule 3.850
and rule 3.800(a) also fits with what we have previously said about
rule 3.800(a). Although we have not previously directly decided the
question, we have relied on authority holding that an order granting
a rule 3.800 motion is not a final order. In State v. Gaines, 770 So.
2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 2000), we held that an order suppressing
evidence during trial was not a final order. We readily applied the
traditional test of finality—that is, “whether the order in question
3. The dissent relies on section 924.066(2), Florida Statutes
(2017), a statutory provision that is not mentioned—much less
argued—by either Morgan or the State. Of course, we do not
overturn a decision on review on the basis of an argument that has
not been presented. In any event, the dissent’s assertion that
section 924.066(2) provides the requisite statutory “authority” for
an appeal in this case, dissenting op. at 21, apparently is based on
the dissent’s underlying assertion that the order at issue is “a final
order,” dissenting op. at 18. Because we instead conclude that the
order at issue is a nonfinal order, section 924.066(2) is not relevant.
See art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (establishing that review of
interlocutory orders by district courts is only available “to the extent
provided by rules adopted by the supreme court”); State v. Gaines,
770 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 2000) (“[A]rticle V, section 4(b)(1) . . .
vests exclusive power in this Court to authorize non-final
appeals . . . .”). We likewise reject the dissent’s reliance on Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(P), which addresses appeals
of certain “final orders.”
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constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause, and nothing
further remains to be done by the court to effectuate a termination
of the cause as between the parties directly affected.” Id. at 1223-
24 (quoting S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla.
1974)). In explaining our conclusion that “an order or ruling
suppressing evidence at trial is a non-final order because judicial
labor is still required to effectuate a termination of the case,” we
cited as analogous the decision of the Fourth District in Delvalle,
which we characterized as holding that “an order granting the
defendant’s rule 3.800(a) motion was not a final order where the
defendant had not been resentenced and judicial labor was still
required.” Id. at 1224. Morgan has presented nothing to show that
our reliance on Delvalle in Gaines was mistaken.
Finally, Morgan’s reliance on Jackson is misplaced. Indeed,
the reasoning in Jackson supports our understanding of the
difference between rule 3.800(a) proceedings and postconviction
proceedings in which resentencing takes place after the entry of an
order vacating a sentence.
In Jackson, as here, we dealt with circumstances in which the
relevant legal landscape had shifted. We addressed the question
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“whether a death sentence that was vacated by the postconviction
court can be ‘reinstated’ if the State never appealed the final order
granting relief, the resentencing has not yet taken place, and this
Court has since receded from the decisional law on which the
sentence was vacated.” 306 So. 3d at 937. In rejecting the State’s
argument for “reinstatement” of the sentence, we focused on the
fact that the sentence had been vacated by a final order. Our
analysis relied on the provisions of rule 3.851(f)(5)(F), which
contains a finality provision identical to the finality provision of rule
3.850(f)(8)(C). Id. at 940-41. Based on the finality of a rule 3.851
order vacating a death sentence, we thus held that “vacated death
sentences cannot be retroactively reinstated.” Id. at 945. We
rejected reliance on any analogy to rule 3.800 in interpreting rule
3.851, and noted also that “rule 3.800(a) differs considerably from
rule 3.850.” Id. at 943.
Unlike Jackson’s sentence, Morgan’s sentence was not
vacated. The order granting relief on Jackson’s rule 3.851 motion
and vacating his death sentence was a final order. The order
granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a) motion was not a final order but left
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his sentence in place until further action was taken by the
sentencing judge.
V
The trial court—based on a change in the governing law—
correctly reconsidered its initial nonfinal order granting Morgan’s
rule 3.800(a) motion. We therefore approve the decision of the
Second District to affirm the trial court, and we disapprove the
decisions in Jordan, Simmons, Jones, and Magill, together with their
progeny.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J.,
concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
POLSTON, J., dissenting.
In 1979, Darryl Morgan was sentenced as a juvenile offender
to life with the possibility of parole after 25 years on a second-
degree murder conviction. In 2016, Morgan filed a postconviction
motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), arguing that he was entitled to
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resentencing according to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),
and Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 2016) (“We
conclude that Florida’s existing parole system, as set forth by
statute, does not provide for individualized consideration of [the
defendant]’s juvenile status at the time of the murder, as required
by Miller, and that his sentence [of life with the possibility of parole
after 25 years], which is virtually indistinguishable from a sentence
of life without parole, is therefore unconstitutional.”). In 2017, the
postconviction court granted Morgan’s motion and ordered
resentencing. The State “filed a notice of appeal but voluntarily
dismissed the appeal before it was perfected.” Morgan v. State, 293
So. 3d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). Over a year and a half later,
and before resentencing occurred, the State filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a) motion
based on this Court’s decision in State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3, 4
(Fla. 2018), which receded from Atwell and held “that juvenile
offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility of parole after 25
years do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution [and] [t]herefore, such juvenile offenders are not
entitled to resentencing.” The postconviction court granted the
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State’s motion, vacated its previous order, and denied Morgan’s rule
3.800(a) motion.
I agree on the merits that, pursuant to Michel, Morgan’s initial
sentence was not illegal. However, I dissent from the majority’s
decision that gives a postconviction court unlimited time to
reconsider its ruling on a rule 3.800(a) motion granting
resentencing. Because the postconviction court’s order granting
resentencing was a final order for purposes of appeal, and the State
did not timely pursue rehearing and voluntarily dismissed its
appeal, I would conclude that the postconviction court lacked
authority to vacate its initial order granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a)
motion.
In determining the finality of an order, we examine “whether
the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the
cause.” State v. Gaines, 770 So. 2d 1221, 1223-24 (Fla. 2000)
(quoting S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla.
1974)). Morgan was initially sentenced in 1979. More than 35
years later, Morgan filed a postconviction rule 3.800(a) motion to
correct an illegal sentence, and the trial court entered an order
granting Morgan’s resentencing. Because this case arises in the
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collateral context, the difference between a postconviction
proceeding and a resentencing is critical. This Court has made
clear that when ordered in the postconviction context, “resentencing
is an entirely new, independent proceeding.” Taylor v. State, 140
So. 3d 526, 529 (Fla. 2014); see also State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d
985, 988 (Fla. 2008) (“[R]esentencing is a de novo proceeding . . . .”).
We have further elaborated on the distinction between
“resentencing” and “postconviction proceedings”:
If a postconviction proceeding is not a step in a
criminal prosecution, and if a resentencing proceeding is
legally distinct from a postconviction proceeding, then a
postconviction court’s final order granting a resentencing
cannot be analogized to a nonfinal, interlocutory order.
Rather, that final order, absent rehearing or appeal,
brings an end to the postconviction proceeding and thus
“should be treated as a final judgment.”
State v. Jackson, 306 So. 3d 936, 942 (Fla. 2020) (quoting
Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79
(Fla. 1976)). To summarize, because a postconviction proceeding
and a resentencing are legally distinct, judicial labor is complete
once a postconviction court enters an order granting resentencing,
and the right to challenge that order expires absent a timely and
authorized motion for rehearing or appeal.
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Here, the postconviction court’s initial order granting
resentencing became final when the State failed to timely seek
rehearing and voluntarily dismissed its appeal. See Jones v. State,
279 So. 3d 172, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“The order granting
resentencing became final when neither party moved for rehearing
or appealed that order.”); Magill v. State, 287 So. 3d 1262, 1262
(Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“We find that the postconviction court lacked
authority to vacate its initial order granting Magill’s [rule 3.800(a)]
motion because that order became final when neither party moved
for rehearing or appealed.”). The State did not timely seek
rehearing. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B) (“A party may file a
motion for rehearing of any signed, written order . . . within 15 days
of the date of service of the order or within 15 days of the expiration
of the time period for filing an order if no order is filed.”).
As to the State’s ability to appeal, the majority refers to the
absence of an express finality provision in rule 3.800 and Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(J), which authorizes the
State to appeal orders “granting relief under [rules] 3.801, 3.850,
3.851 or 3.853” and not under rule 3.800(a). See majority op. at
12-13. “The State’s right to appeal in a criminal case must be
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‘expressly conferred by statute.’ ” State v. McMahon, 94 So. 3d 468,
472 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla.
2004)). The State’s authority in this case is set forth in rule 9.140
and section 924.066, Florida Statutes (2017).
Specifically, rule 9.140(c)(1)(P) allows the State to appeal an
order “as otherwise provided by general law for final orders.”
Further, the Florida Legislature, in chapter 924, titled Criminal
Appeals and Collateral Review, has specifically provided for an
appeal by the State in this instance. The plain language of section
924.066(2) provides: “Either the state or a prisoner in custody may
obtain review in the next higher state court of a trial court’s adverse
ruling granting or denying collateral relief. The state may obtain
review of any trial court ruling that fails to enforce a procedural
bar.” (Emphasis added.); see also Cramer v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
461 F.3d 1380, 1382 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing section 924.066(2)
for the proposition that the defendant “had thirty days in which to
file an appeal from the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief
under Rule 3.800(a)”). Indeed, the State did file a notice of appeal
of the initial order granting resentencing but voluntarily dismissed
the appeal before it was perfected. Accordingly, once the appeal
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was voluntarily dismissed, the order granting resentencing became
final, and the postconviction court lacked the authority to enter a
second order rescinding the initial order and denying resentencing.
The majority’s decision that gives a postconviction court
unlimited time to reconsider its ruling on a rule 3.800(a) motion
granting resentencing is not in accordance with Florida law as set
forth above or with policy expressed by the Legislature and in the
Florida Constitution. See § 924.051(8), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“It is the
intent of the Legislature that all terms and conditions of direct
appeal and collateral review be strictly enforced, including the
application of procedural bars, to ensure that all claims of error are
raised and resolved at the first opportunity. It is also the
Legislature’s intent that all procedural bars to direct appeal and
collateral review be fully enforced by the courts of this state.”); art.
I, § 16(b)(10), Fla. Const. (providing victims the right to prompt and
final resolution including collateral attacks).
The majority attempts to distinguish and isolate our precedent
by correlating the finality of an order granting resentencing with
whether a motion is filed pursuant to rule 3.800 or rule 3.850. See
majority op. at 9-16. The majority states that its decision is
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“[b]ased on the nature of proceedings to correct an illegal sentence
under rule 3.800(a)” and that “[s]entences are corrected under rule
3.800(a) as an extended part of the sentencing process in the
underlying criminal case.” Majority op. at 1-2, 12. However, the
majority fails to acknowledge that the facts of this case involve a
collateral postconviction proceeding, not a continuation of the
underlying criminal proceeding. Finality is based on whether the
order brings an end to judicial labor, and in a postconviction
proceeding, under either rule 3.800(a) or rule 3.850, judicial labor
is complete once a court enters an order granting resentencing, and
the right to challenge that order expires absent a timely and
authorized motion for rehearing or appeal. To conclude otherwise
misapprehends the origination and nature of postconviction
collateral proceedings. See Jackson, 306 So. 3d at 939 (“[T]he State
erroneously assumes that a postconviction proceeding is a step in
the criminal prosecution and that a resentencing proceeding is a
continuation of a postconviction proceeding. Our caselaw says
otherwise.”); see also State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla.
1988) (explaining that postconviction motions are collateral attacks
on the underlying judgments that were traditionally addressed by
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writs of habeas corpus, and the postconviction rule “is a procedural
vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of
habeas corpus [and] was designed to simplify the process of
collateral review and prescribe both a fact-finding function in the
lower courts and a uniform method of appellate review”).
For the reasons above, because the postconviction court’s
initial order granting resentencing was a final order that marked an
end of judicial labor as to the question of Morgan’s entitlement to
resentencing, and because that order was not subject to a timely
motion for rehearing and the State voluntarily dismissed its appeal,
I would conclude that the court had no authority to enter a second
order vacating the initial order and denying resentencing.
I respectfully dissent.
LABARGA, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions
Second District – Case No. 2D18-4940
(Pinellas County)
Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen E.
Surber, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow,
Florida,
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for Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General,
Tallahassee, Florida, Carla Suzanne Bechard, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, and Allison C. Heim, Assistant Attorney General,
Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent
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