Gilbert Dudley, III v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC11-2292
____________
GILBERT DUDLEY, III,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[May 15, 2014]
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, in State v. Dudley, 64 So. 3d 746, 747 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2011), which reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal charges
against the defendant, Gilbert Dudley, III, for sexual battery on a person defined by
Florida statute as “mentally defective,” and ordered that the jury’s guilty verdicts
be reinstated. The Fifth District certified that its decision directly conflicts with
the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Mathis v. State, 682 So. 2d 175(Fla. 1st DCA 1996), as to the proper interpretation of the statutory term “mentally
defective.” 1 Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4),
Fla. Const.
For the reasons we explain, we agree with the Fifth District in Dudley that
the First District’s decision in Mathis improperly equated the term “mentally
defective” with the distinct concepts of legal insanity and competence to testify.
We also agree with the Fifth District that the statutory definition of “mentally
defective” does not, as the First District’s decision in Mathis suggests, require “a
total or complete lack of mental capacity or understanding.” Dudley, 64 So. 3d at
752. We therefore approve the Fifth District’s decision in Dudley, consistent with
the analysis we adopt in this opinion, and disapprove the First District’s statutory
interpretation in Mathis.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State charged Dudley in a two-count information with unlawful
commission of a sexual battery on a “mentally defective” person over the age of
twelve, in violation of section 794.011(4)(e), Florida Statutes (2007), which
provides as follows:
1. In its analysis, the Fifth District conflated the statutory term “mentally
defective” with the term “mentally deficient.” The term “mentally deficient,”
referenced by the Fifth District in its opinion, is not contained in the statute or in
Mathis. See § 794.011(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007); Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 751-52. The
Fifth District’s use of the incorrect term appears to have been inadvertent.
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(4) A person who commits sexual battery upon a person 12
years of age or older without that person’s consent, under any of the
following circumstances, commits a felony of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s.
794.0115:
....
(e) When the victim is mentally defective and the offender has
reason to believe this or has actual knowledge of this fact.
The term “mentally defective” is defined by section 794.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes
(2007), as “a mental disease or defect which renders a person temporarily or
permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct.”
During trial, the victim’s mother testified that she met Dudley while he was
an assistant minister at her church. Shortly after she separated from her husband,
the victim’s mother and Dudley began dating, and Dudley subsequently moved
into the mother’s home, where the victim, who was in her late teens, also resided.
Dudley watched after the victim, took her to medical appointments, and drove her
home from school. Both the victim and her mother testified that the victim viewed
Dudley as a father figure.
After Dudley had been living in the home for some time, the victim told her
mother that Dudley had been having sexual intercourse with her. The victim
testified that Dudley forced her to remove her clothes and threatened to punch her
if she refused to comply. She stated that Dudley had forced his “popsicle” into her
vagina and anus while he touched her breasts. She further testified that during
intercourse, Dudley asked her, “Do you want to have a boyfriend? Come on, baby,
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let me teach you how to do this.” The victim also recounted another episode in
which Dudley again placed his “popsicle” in her vagina and continued intercourse
to the point of ejaculation. When asked why she did not immediately inform her
mother of the conduct, the victim testified that Dudley had promised to take her to
the park if she kept these acts a secret.
In addition, the victim’s mother testified that, at the request of an
investigator, she met Dudley for dinner while wearing a recording device. During
dinner, Dudley admitted that he had engaged in intercourse with the victim twice,
but claimed that the victim had made the sexual advances toward him.
The State also presented a videotaped interview between an investigator and
Dudley. During the interview, Dudley’s recollection of the details of his sexual
encounters with the victim varied greatly from those described in the testimony of
the victim. In particular, he characterized the victim as the sexual aggressor, who
on multiple occasions attempted to perform oral sex on him either without his
consent or against his direction. On one occasion, Dudley claimed that he was
awakened by the victim performing oral sex on him in his bedroom. On another
occasion, he contended that while watching television in the living room, the
victim “all of the sudden . . . got on her knees and started pulling my pants back
and started [performing oral sex].” On this occasion, Dudley asserted that after he
stopped the victim from performing oral sex, she led him into her bedroom and
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forced him to engage in intercourse with her. Despite initially claiming that he
immediately removed his penis after inserting it into the victim’s vagina, Dudley
later admitted during the interview that he ejaculated inside both the victim’s
mouth and vagina.
As to the victim’s mental limitations, the Fifth District set forth the pertinent
testimony from trial as follows:
First, the State presented testimony from the victim. It is clear
from this testimony that the victim, who was twenty-one years old at
the time of trial, has a mental and developmental age far below her
physical age, and that her ability to appraise the nature of many things
is severely limited. For example, the victim repeatedly referred to
Dudley’s sexual organ as his “popsicle,” and testified to the times
when Dudley put his “popsicle” inside her. She explained that she did
not want to do this but that “he told me if I don’t do it, he was gonna
punch me.” When asked why she did not immediately tell her mother
about the incidents, she said that Dudley promised to take her to the
park if she did not tell her mother. The victim’s word choices and
phraseology throughout the testimony reflect the mental ability of a
young child.
Second, the victim’s special education teacher, Ms. Hook, had
worked with the victim for four or five years and also served as the
victim’s Special Olympics coach. Ms. Hook testified that the victim
was in a class for the mentally disabled who have IQs lower than
seventy. Ms. Hook testified that her students, including the victim,
need constant supervision as they are not capable of self-direction,
and have significant cognitive limitations. Ms. Hook recounted
specific instances of the victim’s limitations. For example, the victim
does not understand the concept of differing valuations of money or
the relative value of things. Ms. Hook explained that if the victim had
a $5 bill, the victim could not understand why she could not use the
bill to purchase a $13 CD. Similarly, Ms. Hook testified that the
victim does not understand abstract concepts such as “in a little while”
or “usual.” She further testified that the victim could not rationally
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process and express her emotions, but would simply cry or stomp her
feet if she did not like something.
Third, the victim’s mother testified that her daughter has mild
cerebral palsy, has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and was
simply “not like everyone else.” She explained that if the victim were
ill, she would not know to take medication even if a doctor had
provided her with it; that she cannot cook because she could burn the
house down; that if she observed someone ill and incapacitated, she
would not know to call “911” or otherwise seek help, but would
probably just watch the person lie there. The mother further described
her daughter’s mind as “very childlike,” explaining that she does not
know how to count money; does not understand the basics of personal
hygiene; is afraid of the dark; and, cannot be left alone for any
extended period of time because of her need for constant monitoring.
She explained that the victim will never be able to drive due to her
limited mental capacity, must generally be separated from other
children due to the concern that they would pick on her or persuade
her to do inappropriate things, and that she cannot take a bus by
herself. According to her mother, the victim is able to do laundry for
the family, but only after much assistance, and is able to keep her
room clean but needs prompting. The victim likes to watch Disney
videos; and, she likes to shop and dance. The victim’s room is
decorated in a Tinkerbell theme. The victim has never had a paying
job.
The mother put the victim on birth control in the form of Depo-
Provera shots. The mother began taking the victim to get these shots
after an incident with an emotionally handicapped young man which
caused the mother to worry about her daughter being taken advantage
of and getting pregnant. The victim has been committed to a mental
institution four times.
Finally, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Malcolm J.
Graham, III, a psychologist who does evaluations for a number of
different governmental agencies and who has been qualified as an
expert witness in court many times. He testified at length as to the
victim’s mental limitations; opined that the victim is mentally
retarded, in the moderate range; reported that the victim scored sixty-
one on her verbal IQ scale, fifty on her performance IQ, and fifty-one
on her full scale, putting her at less than one percentile. In other
words, at least ninety-nine percent of the people who take the test
scored at a higher intelligence level than the victim. Dr. Graham
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testified that the victim could not remember for five minutes even one
of four words that he asked her to remember during a conversation;
that she cannot name one single current event happening anywhere in
the world; and, that she cannot perform even the simplest arithmetic
calculations, such as 3 + 1. He opined that the victim will always
need to be in a highly structured environment where she will be cared
for, as she will never be able to function independently. Significantly,
Dr. Graham testified that in his professional opinion the victim suffers
from a mental defect that renders her “permanently incapable of
appraising the nature of her conduct” in the context of engaging in
sexual intercourse—the very definition of “mentally defective”
contained in the statute pursuant to which the State prosecuted
Dudley.
It was undisputed that Dudley was fully aware of the victim’s
mental condition. After becoming romantically involved with the
victim’s mother, Dudley moved in with the family and had become
“like a father figure” to the victim. At some point, Dudley lost his
job, and then became the primary caregiver for the victim when her
mother was at work. It was Dudley who had taken the victim to her
appointment with Dr. Graham for a disability benefits evaluation; and,
it was Dudley who initially gave Dr. Graham a full background and
factual explanation of the victim’s mental limitations, before Dr.
Graham began his own testing and evaluation. Dudley also admitted
to his two sexual encounters with the victim, although he testified that
the victim “came on to” him both times. He also testified that he
believes the victim can work and do some things for herself, and that
he believes the victim to be more intelligent than most others
recognize.
Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 748-49 (footnote omitted).
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts
of sexual battery on a person defined by statute as “mentally defective.” Shortly
thereafter, the trial court issued an order concluding that the State had not
presented “sufficient credible evidence” to satisfy its burden of proving that the
victim was “mentally defective” beyond a reasonable doubt, as defined by section
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794.011(1)(b). Specifically, the trial court explained that the Fifth District’s
decision in State v. Torresgrossa, 776 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), “applied
the statutory definition of mentally defective that this court believes is appropriate”
in a situation with similar facts to conclude that the alleged victim was not
“mentally defective.” Because the trial court held that the State had failed to prove
an essential element of the crimes charged under section 794.011(4)(e), the trial
court set aside the guilty verdicts and dismissed the charges.
On appeal, the Fifth District, en banc, unanimously reversed the trial court,
reinstated the guilty verdicts, and directed the trial court to proceed with
sentencing. Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 747. The Fifth District held that the evidence
presented by the State during trial was “clearly sufficient to support a jury finding
that the victim was mentally defective, as defined by the statute.” Id.After reviewing the trial testimony as to the victim’s mental limitations, the
Fifth District compared the facts of this case with five other Florida appellate cases
and determined that the facts of this case more closely resembled those in Hudson
v. State, 939 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Schimele v. State, 784 So. 2d 591(Fla. 4th DCA 2001); and Bowman v. State, 760 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000),
in which the mental defectiveness of the victims were held to be sufficiently
established. Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 750-51. The Fifth District found distinguishable
the facts in Torresgrossa, 776 So. 2d 1009, which was relied on by the trial court,
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and Mathis, 682 So. 2d 175, cases in which the Fifth and First Districts held that
the State had not provided sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim
was “mentally defective.” Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 751.
Moreover, the Fifth District rejected the First District’s interpretation of the
statutory term “mentally defective” in Mathis, explaining that “it suggests an
unreasonably narrow reading” of the term. Id. The Fifth District’s concern
stemmed from two aspects of the First District’s analysis in Mathis. See id. at 751-
52. First, the First District in Mathis found the similarities between the statutory
definition of “mentally defective” and the definition of “insanity” used in Florida
criminal proceedings to be “apparent.” 682 So. 2d at 180. Second, in holding that
the State had not presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim
was “mentally defective,” the First District in Mathis relied heavily on the trial
court’s finding that the victim was competent to testify. See id. at 180-81.
Specifically, the First District noted as follows in Mathis:
No evidence was offered as to the correlation, if any, between IQ and
“mental and developmental age,” and the ability to understand “the
nature” of one’s “conduct.” Children having a chronological age
younger than the alleged victim’s “mental and developmental age”
have been found to possess a sufficient understanding of the
difference between the truth and a lie, and the moral obligation to
relate the former rather than the latter, so as to be competent to testify
in court. In fact, in this case, the trial court concluded, we believe
correctly, that the alleged victim was competent to testify.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Fifth District interpreted the First District’s decision in Mathis as
suggesting that if the victim was determined to be competent to testify, a finding of
mental defectiveness was precluded as a matter of law. See Dudley, 64 So. 3d at
751-52. The Fifth District disagreed with this analysis, explaining that the
statutory definition of “mentally defective” cannot “reasonably be read to mean a
total lack of mental capacity, as the trial judge in our case seems to have concluded
based upon language in Mathis and Torresgrossa.” Id. at 752.
Explaining that the statutory definition of “mentally defective,” which
includes the key phrase “incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct,” 2
indicates “significantly diminished judgment, but not a complete and total lack of
mental awareness,” the Fifth District disagreed with, and then certified conflict
with, Mathis “to the extent that Mathis can be read as equating ‘mental deficiency’
[sic] with competence to testify, or to mean a total or complete lack of mental
capacity or understanding.” Id. The Fifth District also receded from its earlier
panel decision in Torresgrossa to the extent that it had positively relied on Mathis.
Id.ANALYSIS
2. Despite using the term “mentally deficient,” the Fifth District accurately
recognized the operative phrase “incapable of appraising the nature of his or her
conduct” that is part of the statutory definition of “mentally defective” provided in
section 794.011(1)(b).
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The conflict presented to the Court in this case concerns a matter of statutory
interpretation, which is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. See
Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So. 3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013). “A
court’s purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which
is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction.” Larimore v. State, 2
So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008). “When considering the meaning of terms used in a
statute, this Court looks first to the terms’ ordinary definitions[, which] . . . may be
derived from dictionaries.” Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 121 So. 3d 433,
439 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Metro Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tepper, 2 So. 3d 209, 214 (Fla.
2009)).
Originally enacted in 1974, section 794.011 is Florida’s sexual battery
statute. In this case, Dudley was convicted by a jury of violating subsection (4)(e)
of the sexual battery statute, which provides as follows:
(4) A person who commits sexual battery upon a person 12
years of age or older without that person’s consent, under any of the
following circumstances, commits a felony of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s.
794.0115:
....
(e) When the victim is mentally defective and the offender has
reason to believe this or has actual knowledge of this fact.
§ 794.011, Fla. Stat. The term “mentally defective,” which is the focal point of our
analysis, is defined by section 794.011(1)(b) as “a mental disease or defect which
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renders a person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of
his or her conduct.” § 794.011(1)(b), Fla. Stat.
In its decision below, the Fifth District rejected the First District’s prior
interpretation of the term “mentally defective,” which equated the term with “legal
insanity” and further suggested that anyone with a sufficient mental capacity to
competently testify in a court cannot be found “mentally defective.” Dudley, 64
So. 3d at 751. Specifically, in Mathis, 682 So. 2d at 180, the First District
explained that the “similarity” between the statutory definition of “mentally
defective” and the definition of legal insanity used in Florida criminal proceedings
is “apparent.” The First District further stated, in analyzing the legal sufficiency of
the evidence of whether the victim in Mathis was “mentally defective,” that
children having a “chronological age younger than the alleged victim’s ‘mental and
developmental age’ have been found to possess a sufficient understanding of the
difference between the truth and a lie, and the moral obligation to relate the former
rather than the latter, so as to be competent to testify in court.” Id. at 181.
The Fifth District certified conflict with Mathis on two interrelated issues
concerning the proper interpretation of the statutory term “mentally defective.”
See Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752. First, the Fifth District certified conflict “to the
extent that Mathis can be read as equating ‘mental deficiency’ [sic] with
competence to testify.” Id. Second, the Fifth District certified conflict “to the
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extent that Mathis can be read . . . to mean a total or complete lack of mental
capacity or understanding” is necessary for a finding that the victim was “mentally
defective.” Id. We address each conflict issue in turn.
I. Equating “Mentally Defective” with Competence to Testify
The first conflict issue concerns the First District’s statutory interpretation in
Mathis, which equated the term “mentally defective” in the sexual battery statute
with the concept of competence to testify. We agree with the Fifth District in
Dudley that the First District’s statutory interpretation of this term was flawed.
In Mathis, 682 So. 2d at 181, the First District held that “the evidence
presented was legally insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that the
alleged victim was ‘mentally defective’ on the date of the alleged sexual battery.”
In reaching this conclusion, the First District applied the facts of Mathis to a test
for competence to testify, stating as follows:
On appeal, the state argues that a reasonable juror might infer, from
the alleged victim’s IQ and “mental and developmental age” some
fifteen months before the date of the alleged sexual battery, that the
alleged victim was “mentally defective” on the date of the alleged
sexual battery. We disagree. No evidence was offered as to the
correlation, if any, between IQ and “mental and developmental age,”
and the ability to understand “the nature” of one’s “conduct.”
Children having a chronological age younger than the alleged victim’s
“mental and developmental age” have been found to possess a
sufficient understanding of the difference between the truth and a lie,
and the moral obligation to relate the former rather than the latter, so
as to be competent to testify in court. In fact, in this case, the trial
court concluded, we believe correctly, that the alleged victim was
competent to testify.
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Id. at 180-81 (citations omitted).
Competence to testify is an entirely different legal concept than the term
“mentally defective,” as defined in the sexual battery statute. In Florida, a person
is disqualified to testify as a witness when the court determines that the person is
“[i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter in such a
manner as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who
can understand him or her,” or “[i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness
to tell the truth.” § 90.603, Fla. Stat. (2013).
As recognized by the Fourth District in Bowman, 760 So. 2d at 1055,
competence to testify and mental defectiveness are distinct concepts that are not
properly equated. In concluding that a finding that the victim was competent to
testify was not inconsistent with a finding of the victim being “mentally defective,”
the Fourth District stated as follows:
We do not see a problem, as the Mathis court may have, with a
victim being found able to understand the moral obligation to testify
truthfully, and still being mentally defective under the statutory
definition. It is not unusual for a child who is actually or mentally
five years old to sufficiently understand the moral obligation to tell
the truth so as to be competent to testify. Telling the truth is a basic
value of our society which is drummed into the heads of children as
soon as they are able to reason. The fact that such a child is
competent to testify, however, is not inconsistent with being mentally
defective under section 794.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Unlike telling
the truth, the inappropriateness of the type of sexual activity occurring
in Mathis or this case is not necessarily something which is normally
discussed with a person who is mentally only five years old.
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Id. We agree with the Fourth District in Bowman, which was cited affirmatively
by the Fifth District in its decision below, and conclude that the First District in
Mathis erred in relying on the concept of competence to testify in analyzing
whether a victim falls within the statutory definition of “mentally defective.” We
therefore disapprove the First District’s statutory interpretation in Mathis on this
issue.
We turn next to the second conflict issue certified by the Fifth District.
II. An “Unreasonably Narrow Reading” of the Statutory Term
“Mentally Defective”
In addition to disagreeing with the First District’s decision in Mathis on the
basis that the First District improperly equated the statutory term “mentally
defective” with competence to testify, the Fifth District also disagreed with the
First District’s interpretation of the term “mentally defective” to “mean a total or
complete lack of mental capacity or understanding.” Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752.
This conflict issue is premised on the Fifth District’s holding that the First
District’s comparison in Mathis between “mentally defective” and the concept of
“legal insanity” suggested an “unreasonably narrow reading of the term.” Id. at
751.
The relevant criminal statute defining legal insanity in Florida provides as
follows:
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(1) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—All persons are presumed to
be sane. It is an affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution that, at
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
defendant was insane. Insanity is established when:
(a) The defendant had a mental infirmity, disease, or defect;
and
(b) Because of this condition, the defendant:
1. Did not know what he or she was doing or its
consequences; or
2. Although the defendant knew what he or she
was doing and its consequences, the defendant did not
know that what he or she was doing was wrong.
Mental infirmity, disease, or defect does not constitute a
defense of insanity except as provided in this subsection.
§ 775.027, Fla. Stat. (2013). By contrast, the term “mentally defective” in the
sexual battery statute is defined as “a mental disease or defect which renders a
person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her
conduct.” § 794.011(1)(b), Fla. Stat.
Other than both statutory definitions including the words “mental,”
“disease,” and “defect,” the definitions are noticeably different. For example, the
definition of “insanity” set forth in section 775.027 uses the verb “know” to
describe the requisite mental state, whereas the definition of “mentally defective”
uses the verb “appraise.” Those different verbs also modify different objects—
“what [the defendant] was doing or its consequences” for insanity, versus “the
nature of [the victim’s] conduct” for mentally defective.
Moreover, not only are the two statutory definitions textually dissimilar, but
the statutes also differ greatly in application. “Insanity” is an affirmative defense
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asserted by a defendant to avoid criminal responsibility, with the burden on the
defendant to prove the defense by clear and convincing evidence. § 775.027(2),
Fla. Stat. On the other hand, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as
an element of the offense, that the victim was “mentally defective” to impose
criminal responsibility on a defendant for sexual battery on such a person.
§ 794.011, Fla. Stat.
We agree with the Fifth District’s conclusion that the term “mentally
defective” cannot be equated with the definition of insanity, and that it “cannot
reasonably be read to mean a total lack of mental capacity, as the trial judge in
[this] case seems to have concluded based upon language in Mathis and [the Fifth
District’s prior panel decision in] Torresgrossa,” which cited Mathis for the
proposition that the definition of “mentally defective” is similar to the definition of
insanity. 3 Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752; Torresgrossa, 776 So. 2d at 1011. The word
“defective” is defined as “a person who is subnormal physically or mentally”;
“imperfect in form or function”; or “falling below the norm in structure or in
mental or physical function.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 302 (10th
ed. 1999). As stated by the Fifth District, the statutory definition of “mentally
3. We note, once again, that the Fifth District inadvertently referenced the
incorrect term “mentally deficient” in its analysis. However, while the court
utilized the wrong term, we nevertheless embrace the Fifth District’s underlying
and well-reasoned conclusion on this issue.
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defective”—that is, “incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct”—
thus “connotes significantly diminished judgment, but not a complete and total
lack of mental awareness.” Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752.
Accordingly, we hold that the First District in Mathis erred to the extent it
suggested that, in order to conclude that a victim was “mentally defective” under
the sexual battery statute, the victim must display “a total or complete lack of
mental capacity or understanding.” Id. To the contrary, we conclude that the Fifth
District in Dudley properly construed the sexual battery statute to determine that
the evidence in this case was “clearly sufficient to support a jury finding that the
victim was mentally defective, as defined by the statute.” Id. at 747.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we approve the Fifth District’s decision in
Dudley, consistent with the analysis we adopt in this opinion, and disapprove the
First District’s statutory interpretation in Mathis.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
POLSTON, C.J., concurs in result.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only, with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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LEWIS, J., concurring in result only.
I concur in result only because while I do agree with the result of the district
court of appeal below, I cannot agree with the entirety of its reasoning. In a similar
fashion, I agree with the result of the majority, but not entirely with its reasoning or
analysis. In my view, the Legislature intended the applicable statutory provision to
establish broad protections for victims of abuse in this area. Yet, the words of
limitation from the district court below and the limitations in the discussion of the
protections afforded by the statute here do not provide a scope of protection to
victims as established by the statutory provision.
Instead of providing clarity to this area of law by specifically articulating the
wide scope of protections afforded by the statute, the majority focuses its opinion
on reaching the rather obvious conclusion that the term “mentally defective,”
defined by section 794.011, Florida Statutes (2007), to mean that a “mental disease
or defect which renders a person temporarily or permanently incapable of
appraising the nature of his or her conduct,” does not equate to the legal definitions
of either insanity or competency. Furthermore, I cannot agree with the majority’s
reliance on what the majority describes as the “well-reasoned conclusion” of the
Fifth District that the term “mentally defective” means “significantly diminished
judgment, but not a complete and total lack of mental awareness.” See Majority
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Op. at 17 n.3, 18; State v. Dudley, 64 So. 3d 746, 752 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). That
is far too limited.
In fact, neither the majority nor the Fifth District has attempted to actually
discuss the parameters of the statutory definition of “mentally defective.” Both
courts have skirted the issue, utilizing the dictionary definitions of the words
“defective” or “deficient” to define a phrase that has already been defined by
section 794.011(1)(b) to mean “incapable of appraising the nature of his or her
conduct.” Quite simply, by failing to even attempt to provide a field of operation
for the statutory definition of “mentally defective” as it was articulated by the
Legislature, the majority has emasculated the legislative design that was clearly
intended to broadly protect certain persons from being taken advantage of and
sexually abused.
Accordingly, because I cannot ascribe to the majority’s limited interpretation
of the statutorily defined term “mentally defective,” I concur in result only.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District – Case No. 5D10-2863
(Volusia County)
Clyde M. Taylor, III of Taylor & Taylor, PA, St. Augustine, Florida,
for Petitioner
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Heidt, Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Pamela Jane Koller, Assistant Attorney General,
Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
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