Lamont Taylor v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC12-2318
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LAMONT TAYLOR,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[May 29, 2014]
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court for review of the Fifth District Court of
Appeal’s decision in Taylor v. State, 96 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), which
the Fifth District certified is in direct conflict with the decisions of the First District
Court of Appeal in Slocum v. State, 95 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and the
Second District Court of Appeal in Cooper v. State, 667 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2d DCA
1996). 1 The certified conflict issue presented in this case is whether an order
disposing of a postconviction motion which partially denies and partially grants
relief is a final order for purposes of appeal, when the relief granted requires
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
subsequent action in the underlying case, such as resentencing.2 For the reasons
explained below, we hold that an order which partially denies and partially grants
postconviction relief is a final order for purposes of appeal, even if the relief
granted requires subsequent action in the underlying case. Therefore, we quash the
Fifth District’s decision in Taylor and disapprove its decision in Cervino v. State,
785 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), to the extent it is inconsistent with this
opinion. We approve the Second District’s decision in Cooper and the First
District’s decision in Slocum to the extent these decisions are consistent with our
analysis and holding.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2003, Lamont Taylor was charged with: (1) trafficking in 400 grams or
more of cocaine; (2) possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver; (3)
delivery of cocaine; (4) possession of more than 20 grams of marijuana; and (5)
possession of drug paraphernalia. The State nolle prosequied the delivery of
cocaine charge, and Taylor pleaded no contest to the remaining charges. He was
sentenced to twenty-two years in prison, and the Fifth District affirmed his
convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Taylor v. State, 923 So. 2d 514 (Fla.
5th DCA 2006) (table).
2. This is a pure question of law subject to de novo review. See Keck v.
Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, 363 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that the standard of review
for pure questions of law is de novo).
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Subsequently, Taylor, acting pro se, filed a motion for postconviction relief
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 arguing, among other things, that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that his convictions for
trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. After an evidentiary hearing on this claim,
the trial court determined that relief was warranted in part because the State
admitted that it had inadvertently nolle prossed the wrong charge. Since this error
changed the minimum guideline sentence, the trial court concluded that Taylor
needed to be resentenced. Accordingly, on March 31, 2009, the trial court entered
an order partially granting relief on Taylor’s sentencing claim and denying relief as
to Taylor’s other postconviction claims.
Fifteen days later, Taylor filed a timely motion for rehearing challenging the
denial of his other postconviction claims. While this rehearing motion was
pending, the trial court proceeded with Taylor’s resentencing on April 21, 2009,
sentencing him to fifteen years in prison. Taylor, again acting pro se, filed a notice
of appeal from the resentencing on May 21, 2009. At this time, no ruling had ever
been issued with regard to the rehearing motion that he previously filed on April
15, concerning the denial of his other postconviction claims. On March 8, 2011,
the Fifth District issued a per curiam opinion affirming Taylor’s new sentence.
Taylor v. State, 56 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (table).
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Thereafter, on July 10, 2011, Taylor, acting pro se, filed an amended motion
for rehearing regarding the trial court’s March 2009 order denying his other
postconviction claims. The trial court initially denied this motion as untimely on
the ground that a rehearing motion had not been filed within 15 days of the order
disposing of Taylor’s postconviction motion. However, upon receiving Taylor’s
emergency motion for clarification, the trial court recognized its error and
acknowledged that Taylor had filed a timely motion for rehearing on April 15,
2009, which the trial court had never ruled upon. 3 Accordingly, the trial court
addressed the merits of the rehearing motion and denied relief. Taylor appealed.
The Fifth District dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, relying on its
prior decision in Cervino, 785 So. 2d at 632, which held that a trial court’s order
partially denying and partially granting postconviction relief by ordering
resentencing was not a final appealable order because the resentencing required
further judicial labor in the underlying case. Taylor, 96 So. 3d at 991-93. The
Fifth District explained that “Cervino appears to more faithfully follow the
supreme court’s rule of finality and policy [of] preventing piecemeal appeals,” and
3. We note that this type of delay will not occur in the future due to recent
amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 providing that “[t]he trial
court’s order disposing of the motion for rehearing shall be filed within 15 days of
the response but not later than 40 days from the date of the order of which
rehearing is sought. If no order is filed within 40 days, the motion is deemed
denied.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(j) (previously designated as Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.850(h)).
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therefore, “conclude[d] that the trial court’s March 31, 2009, order was not a final,
appealable order.” Id. at 993. Thus, the Fifth District determined that the trial
court’s order was not final until after Taylor’s resentencing was completed on
April 21, 2009, and Taylor should have raised any issues related to the disposition
of his other postconviction claims on appeal after resentencing. Id. In so holding,
the Fifth District certified that its decision conflicted with the First District’s
decision in Slocum and the Second District’s decision in Cooper, which held that
“[a]n order denying in part and granting in part relief . . . marks the end of the
judicial labor which is to be expended on the motion, and the order is final for
appellate purposes.” Id. at 991, 993 (quoting Cooper, 667 So. 2d at 933); see also
Slocum, 95 So. 3d at 913.
II. ANALYSIS
We agree with the Second District in Cooper and the First District in Slocum
that an order disposing of a postconviction motion which partially denies and
partially grants relief is a final order for purposes of appeal, even if the relief
granted requires subsequent action in the underlying case, such as resentencing.
As the Second District fully explained in Cooper, 667 So. 2d at 933,
[a]n order which denies a claim in a postconviction motion and grants
an evidentiary hearing on a different claim in the same motion is not
appealable until all issues raised have been ruled upon by the court. . .
. An order denying in part and granting in part relief, however, marks
the end of the judicial labor which is to be expended on the motion,
and the order is final for appellate purposes.
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This conclusion is consistent with our recent amendments to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850, effective July 1, 2013, which added subsection
(f)(8)(C), stating that “[t]he order issued after the evidentiary hearing shall resolve
all the claims raised in the motion and shall be considered the final order for
purposes of appeal.” In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure &
the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 132 So. 3d 734, 750 (Fla. 2013).
We disagree with the State’s contention that permitting a postconviction
appeal to proceed separately from a resentencing appeal will encourage piecemeal
litigation because, as we have previously explained in other cases, postconviction
proceedings and resentencing proceedings are separate, legally discrete
proceedings. See State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008) (“In both
capital and noncapital cases, we have held that resentencing is a new proceeding
[and] that ‘resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with
the full array of due process rights.’ ” (quoting Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362,
367-68 (Fla. 2002))). Thus, because resentencing is an entirely new, independent
proceeding, an appeal from the underlying postconviction proceeding does not
foster piecemeal litigation or waste judicial resources.
Accordingly, the trial court’s order partially denying and partially granting
Taylor postconviction relief was a final appealable order, even though resentencing
remained to be completed in the underlying case.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we quash the Fifth District’s decision in
Taylor and disapprove its decision in Cervino to the extent it is inconsistent with
this opinion. We further approve the Second District’s decision in Cooper and the
First District’s decision in Slocum to the extent these decisions are consistent with
our analysis and holding. Finally, we remand this case to the Fifth District for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA,
and PERRY, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District - Case No. 5D11-4179
(Orange County)
John R. Hamilton of Foley & Lardner LLP, Orlando, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Heidt, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
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