Jonathon Knight v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC13-564
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JONATHON KNIGHT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[March 10, 2016]
QUINCE, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District
Court of Appeal in Knight v. State, 107 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). The
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the
First District Court of Appeal in Evans v. State, 32 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA
2010), and Cook v. State, 571 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); the decisions of the
Second District Court of Appeal in P.M.M. v. State, 884 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA
2004), N.K.W., Jr. v. State, 788 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), and S.B. v.
State, 657 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); and the decision of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in E.H.A. v. State, 760 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The
conflict concerns the proper application of the circumstantial evidence standard of
review and whether the standard should continue to apply in Florida. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We decline to abandon use of the
standard but reject its use in Knight’s case because this is not a wholly
circumstantial case. We instead uphold Knight’s conviction as supported by
competent, substantial evidence.
FACTS
On November 21, 2010, Orange County Deputy Sheriff Donald Murphy
conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle being driven by Jonathon Knight, but owned
by Knight’s friend, Chaka Miller, who was riding in the front passenger seat of the
vehicle. Knight, 107 So. 3d at 451-52. Knight’s other friend, Chad Harris, was
sitting in the backseat. Id. at 452. Once Knight had pulled over and parked the car
in a convenience store parking lot, Deputy Murphy ordered him out and led him to
the front of the car, leaving the remaining passengers in place. Id. Minutes later,
as Deputy Murphy issued Knight a citation for a noise violation, a K-9 officer also
pulled into the same parking lot. Id. After Murphy released Knight, Knight
walked into the convenience store. Id. “At approximately the same time, the K-9
officer made an ‘impromptu’ decision to run his dog” around the car. Id. The dog
alerted to the passenger side door, and Murphy re-detained Knight as he exited the
store. Id. Murphy’s search of the vehicle recovered a small bag of cannabis,
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weighing 24.4 grams, which was found in a suitcase that had been sitting on the
backseat of the car. Id. The luggage tag on the suitcase identified Knight as the
owner of the suitcase. Id. Knight was charged with (1) possession with intent to
sell or deliver, and (2) possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis. Id. At trial,
after the State rested, Knight moved for a judgment of acquittal. Id. The trial court
denied the motion. Id.
Knight’s friend, Miller, testified as the first defense witness. Id. He
explained that he, Knight, and Harris were in Orlando the weekend of the arrest for
the “Florida Classic” football game. Id. Miller testified that the cannabis did not
belong to him, nor had he seen Knight with marijuana or heard him discuss it at all
during their trip. Id. Miller did not contradict the State’s evidence that Knight
owned the suitcase, but he did testify that Harris was left in the backseat next to the
suitcase after Deputy Murphy removed Knight from the car—“implying that Harris
could have placed the cannabis in the suitcase at that time.” Id.
Knight, testifying in his own defense, also reiterated that Harris was seated
in the backseat of the car until the search occurred. Id. at 453. Knight testified that
the cannabis was not his, and although he did not expressly admit ownership of the
suitcase, Knight did not contradict the State’s evidence that he owned it either. Id.
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at 452-53.1 “On cross-examination, the State immediately sought to have Knight
reiterate” what it viewed as “Knight’s admission that the suitcase was his,” but
Knight denied owning the suitcase or that the luggage tag identified him as the
owner. Id. at 453. When all the evidence was presented, Knight renewed his
motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court again denied. Id. The jury
deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty on count two only, for the crime of
possessing more than 20 grams of cannabis. Id. Knight appealed, arguing that the
trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 451.
Recognizing that Knight was convicted under a theory of constructive
possession, the Fifth District described the two elements of the crime as requiring
proof that the defendant had dominion and control over the contraband and
knowledge that the contraband was in his presence. Id. at 453.2 The district court
acknowledged that other district courts have applied the circumstantial evidence
1. “There was one exchange between Knight and his counsel during which
the jury could have understood Knight to be agreeing that the suitcase was his.
However, the question was poorly worded and could have been intended by Knight
as simply an acknowledgement that Deputy Murphy had identified the suitcase as
belonging to him.” Id. at 453 n.4.
2. Some older cases may describe constructive possession as having one
additional element—that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the contraband.
See, e.g., Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1983). However, as explained
by the Fifth District, the Legislature eliminated that element, effective May 13,
2002. Knight, 107 So. 3d at 453 n.5; see also, § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2002); Ch.
2002-258, § 1, at 1848, Laws of Fla.
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standard of review in constructive possession cases. Id. at 454. However, the Fifth
District rejected that approach because the standard only applies in “wholly
circumstantial” cases, which it held are those in which all the elements of an
offense are proven by circumstantial evidence alone. Id. at 462. The Fifth District
noted that possession cases such as this one typically include direct evidence of
dominion and control in the form of testimony that contraband was found near the
defendant. Id. at 462-63. Because of the direct evidence of dominion and control,
the district court found that these cases cannot be deemed wholly circumstantial,
making application of the circumstantial evidence standard inappropriate. Id. The
court certified conflict with constructive possession cases in which it believed
other district courts had instead applied the circumstantial evidence standard where
only one element had been entirely demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Id.
at 451.
Nonetheless, the Fifth District applied the circumstantial evidence standard
to the instant case in the following manner:
Turning to this case, the two inferences that could logically be
drawn from the circumstantial evidence are that: (1) Knight knew that
the marijuana was in his suitcase (and is guilty); or, (2) Knight did not
know that the marijuana was in his suitcase because Chad Harris
placed it there without his knowledge after Deputy Murphy removed
Knight from the car (Knight’s hypothesis of innocence). This is
admittedly a close case. However, we believe that a reasonable fact-
finder could reject Knight’s hypothesis of innocence as unreasonable
based upon: (1) the very short window of opportunity Harris would
have had to move the marijuana from another hiding place to the
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suitcase (the K-9 deputy arrived within minutes of the stop); (2) the
fact that an inference could reasonably be drawn from [Chaka]
Miller’s testimony that Harris did not place the marijuana in Knight’s
suitcase (Miller was in a position to detect any attempt by Harris to
hide 24.4 grams of marijuana in Knight’s suitcase, but did not testify
to any facts indicating that Harris actually did so); and (3) the jury’s
unique ability to assess Knight’s demeanor on the witness stand
during the whole of his testimony.
Id. at 468. The court noted that the same outcome would result under what it
viewed as the appropriate standard of review:
If after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a
rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain
a conviction. Applying this general standard in no way changes the
fact that there are two possible inferences that could be drawn from
the evidence relating to the knowledge element in this case, or that a
conviction can only be sustained if a trier of fact could rationally find
guilt by rejecting the second inference as unreasonable, speculative,
imaginary or forced based upon the evidence.
Id. (internal citation omitted). The district court then affirmed Knight’s conviction.
Id. at 468-69. Knight now appeals.
ANALYSIS
This Court has described the circumstantial evidence standard as follows:
“[w]here the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the
evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence
is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Jaramillo v. State,
417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla. 1982). The standard applies upon appellate review, id.,
and when a trial judge rules on a motion for judgment of acquittal, State v. Law,
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559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1989). In the instant opinion, the Fifth District engaged
in a lengthy discussion about why this Court should reconsider use of this standard
in Florida. Knight, 107 So. 3d at 455-62. However, we find that discussion and
the rationale raised by the State to be unpersuasive. Accordingly, we uphold the
continued use of the standard in Florida. Having done so, we next address the
certified conflict issue by clarifying when the standard applies.
I. Certified Conflict
The Fifth District found that the circumstantial evidence standard should
apply only where both elements of constructive possession are proven solely by
circumstantial evidence. Knight, 107 So. 3d at 462. The court then certified
conflict with constructive possession cases from other district courts which seemed
to apply the circumstantial evidence standard where only one element had been
established by purely circumstantial evidence. Id. at 451 (certifying conflict with
Evans, P.M.M., N.K.W., E.H.A., S.B., and Cook).
While there is some confusion as to when the circumstantial evidence
standard applies, we agree with the Fifth District that it should not be applied based
on any particular element of a crime being itself proven entirely by circumstantial
evidence. As we stated in Jaramillo, the circumstantial evidence standard applies
“where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial.” 417 So. 2d at 257 (emphasis
added). Thus, in determining whether the circumstantial evidence standard
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applies, the relevant evidence is that which points to the defendant as the
perpetrator. Courts should ask whether the evidence of that particular defendant’s
guilt is entirely circumstantial, not whether all of the State’s evidence of the crime
is circumstantial. See Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1956) (stating that
“[e]vidence which furnishes nothing stronger than a suspicion, even though it
would tend to justify the suspicion that the defendant committed the crime, . . . is
not sufficient to sustain conviction” and that although “circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to suggest a probability of guilt, it is not thereby adequate to support a
conviction if it is likewise consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence”);
Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899, 904 (Fla. 1954) (“[E]vidence which leaves one with
nothing stronger than a suspicion that the defendant committed the crime is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction.”).
For example, in a first-degree murder case, the victim’s body is direct
evidence of the first element of the crime—that the victim is dead. However, it is
not direct evidence of any particular defendant’s involvement in the murder in the
way that the other elements—premeditation and an act of the defendant causing the
victim’s death—are. Therefore, where those other elements are supported by
circumstantial evidence alone, the special standard of review would apply. This
explains why there are first-degree murder cases in which a body has been found
that still have been characterized as wholly circumstantial. See, e.g., Dausch v.
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State, 141 So. 3d 513, 515, 517 (Fla. 2014) (finding that “the State relied solely on
circumstantial evidence to obtain its conviction,” even though dead body was
direct evidence of victim’s death). We now expressly hold that the circumstantial
evidence standard of review applies only where all of the evidence of a defendant’s
guilt—i.e., the evidence tending to show that the defendant committed or
participated in the crime—is circumstantial, not where any particular element of a
crime is demonstrated exclusively by circumstantial evidence.
While the Fifth District has certified conflict with six cases, the opinions in
three of those cases can be read to be in agreement with the Fifth District and our
holding here. For example, in Evans, officers executing a search warrant on the
defendant’s home discovered a glass smoking device and a pain reliever bottle
containing miscellaneous controlled substances in pill form. 32 So. 3d at 189. The
items were found inside a toiletry bag located within a duffel bag that was sitting
on the bed in the master bedroom. Id. The duffel bag also contained the
defendant’s passport and a memo book. Id. While the bedroom was identified as
the defendant’s, the owner of the duffel bag was unknown. Id. In reversing the
defendant’s convictions for constructive possession, the First District stated:
The presence of appellant’s passport in the duffel bag suggests he
could have placed the passport there. Such an inference, however,
provides no time frame with regard to when the contraband came to
reside in the bag, nor any help as to appellant’s present dominion over
the contraband. Without more, the mere presence of the passport is no
better proof of appellant’s knowledge of, and dominion over, the
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contraband than S.B.’s acknowledgment of ownership of the grocery
bag or N.K.W.’s admission of ownership of the wallet where officers
found the drugs [in two other similar cases].
Id. at 191 (emphasis added). As is clear from the above passage, the First District,
in fact, discussed the circumstantial evidence as to both elements of the crime, not
only one.
Likewise, in Cook, the defendant was convicted of constructive possession
of a crack pipe, and its residue, found in her open purse during a raid of the bar
where she worked as a dancer. 571 So. 2d at 531. The defendant testified that she
had left her purse on the bar during one of her performances. Id. The raid
occurred while she was on stage. Id. The First District concluded that “no direct
evidence connected the defendant to the contraband [(dominion and control)], and
the evidence suggesting that appellant knew of the presence of the crack pipe
within her purse [(knowledge)] was entirely circumstantial.” Id. at 531-32
(emphasis added). Again, the First District discussed the circumstantial evidence
as to both elements of constructive possession. The district court even described
the special standard in reference to the entire crime: “When constructive
possession is shown by circumstantial evidence, as here, the evidence must be
inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of innocence.” Id. at 531 (emphasis
added). Thus, the First District recognized that the standard applies where both
elements of constructive possession are proven solely by circumstantial evidence.
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In that same way, the Fourth District characterized E.H.A. as “a
circumstantial evidence case” and analyzed it in terms of both elements of the
crime. 760 So. 2d at 1119. The court explained that “[t]he only evidence
presented by the State was the fact that the contraband was found in a backpack
and wallet owned by E.H.A.; E.H.A. was not in proximity to the contraband when
it was discovered [(dominion and control)] and there was no independent evidence
that he was aware of the contraband’s presence in his backpack [(knowledge)].”
Id. As the courts in those three cases have actually applied the circumstantial
evidence standard in the manner we find proper, we hereby approve Evans, Cook,
and E.H.A.
Although the remaining three certified conflict cases can possibly be read in
agreement with our holding today, the language within the opinions is not as clear
and could just as easily be read as applying the standard where only one element is
supported entirely by circumstantial evidence. S.B., 657 So. 2d at 1253 (reversing
conviction for constructive possession, stating “Beyond the mere location of the
marijuana, the [S]tate relies upon S.B.’s admission that he owned the grocery bag
to establish constructive possession. Unfortunately, the officer never asked if S.B.
owned the container, did not inventory the contents of the bag, and did not obtain
fingerprints from the container. There is only circumstantial evidence to find that
S.B. knew that the container was in his presence and that it contained a small
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quantity of marijuana.”); N.K.W., 788 So. 2d at 1038 (relying on S.B and stating
“Although N.K.W. acknowledged ownership of his wallet, he was never asked if
he owned the plastic bag contained within the wallet, and no fingerprints were
obtained from that bag. He testified that he did not purchase the LSD contained
within the bag and denied that anyone had given him the LSD [directly]. No direct
evidence was introduced to establish that N.K.W. knew that the bag was in his
presence or that it contained contraband.”); P.M.M., 884 So. 2d at 420
(characterizing N.K.W. and S.B. as being reversed “because the State’s
circumstantial evidence, necessary to prove that the juvenile knew his bag
contained marijuana, was not inconsistent with the juvenile’s theory” and “because
there was no direct evidence that the juvenile knew the drugs were in his wallet,”
then reaching same result in P.M.M.’s case). Because the language in S.B.,
N.K.W., and P.M.M. is not as clear as in the other three conflict cases, we hereby
disapprove S.B., N.K.W., and P.M.M. only to the extent that the courts in those
cases applied the circumstantial evidence standard upon finding that only one
element of constructive possession was proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.
II. This Case
Because Knight’s conviction is based on a theory of constructive possession,
the State was required to prove two elements: that Knight had (1) dominion and
control over the contraband and (2) knowledge that the contraband was within his
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presence. Knight, 107 So. 3d at 453. In discussing the evidence, the Fifth District
deemed Deputy Murphy’s testimony about the location of the cannabis to be direct
evidence of dominion and control. Id. at 462-63. Whether this Court agrees with
that finding or not, defense counsel conceded at oral argument that such testimony
was direct evidence as to dominion and control. We proceed with our analysis
based on that concession.
With direct evidence of dominion and control, Knight’s case cannot be
considered wholly circumstantial—despite the circumstantial evidence of the
knowledge element. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence standard of review
does not apply. Instead, we review the trial court’s denial of Knight’s motion for
judgment of acquittal de novo, reversing only where the conviction is not
supported by competent, substantial evidence. Greenwade v. State, 124 So. 3d
215, 220 (Fla. 2013). The conviction is supported by sufficient evidence where a
rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State. Id. That burden is met in this case.
The State demonstrated Knight’s dominion and control over the cannabis by
introducing evidence that Knight owned the suitcase containing it. Although
Knight did not testify that he owned the luggage, the jury could have instead
accepted Deputy Murphy’s testimony that the suitcase contained a luggage tag
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identifying Knight as its owner. As to the knowledge element, the jury could have
also rejected Knight’s testimony about his friend Chad Harris having the
opportunity to place the drugs into the suitcase. Knight’s case may present a close
call as to the elements of constructive possession being established, but this Court
is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence. That is the jury’s role, and here, the State
has produced sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, that a rational jury could find these two elements established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we approve the Fifth District’s decision in Knight
and uphold his conviction for constructive possession. We also approve the First
District’s decisions in Evans and Cook and the Fourth District’s decision in E.H.A.
However, we disapprove the Second District’s decisions in P.M.M., N.K.W., and
S.B.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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CANADY, J., concurring in result.
I agree with the majority that the Fifth District was correct in affirming
Knight’s conviction. But I disagree with the majority’s decision to retain the
reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence special standard of review.
As Judge Lawson cogently explains, the special standard of review is both
confusing and misleading. See Knight v. State, 107 So. 3d 449, 456-61 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2013). It is a striking and inexplicable anomaly that we have rejected the
reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence jury instruction but have nonetheless retained
the special standard of review. I agree with Judge Lawson that this anomaly in our
jurisprudence should be corrected by eliminating the special standard of review.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District - Case No. 5D11-2875
(Orange County)
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Robert Earl Wildridge, Assistant Public
Defender, and Edward J. Weiss, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial
Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Harold Heidt,
Bureau Chief, and Kristen Lynn Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
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