Chadwick Willacy v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC20-1261
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CHADWICK WILLACY,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
April 1, 2021
PER CURIAM.
Chadwick Willacy appeals an order denying his successive
motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.851.1 We affirm the denial of relief.
Willacy filed a successive postconviction motion claiming that
he is entitled to relief under the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019), based on
the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of juror Payne for allegedly racial
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
reasons. On August 12, 2020, the postconviction court entered an
order denying Willacy’s successive postconviction motion.
Specifically, the postconviction court found that Willacy’s motion
was procedurally barred, untimely, and without merit.
We agree with the postconviction court and affirm the denial of
relief. Prior challenges to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of
juror Payne for allegedly racial reasons were litigated during
Willacy’s direct appeal and successive postconviction proceedings
and resolved against Willacy. See Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d
1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior
postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred from being
relitigated in a successive motion.”); Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d
1055, 1067 (Fla. 2000) (“This claim was raised on direct appeal;
therefore, it is procedurally barred and was properly summarily
denied.”).
Further, Willacy’s successive motion is untimely. See Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) (“Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction
and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within 1 year
after the judgment and sentence become final.”); Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.851(d)(2) (providing an exception to the one-year time limit for
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motions alleging “the fundamental constitutional right asserted was
not established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1)
and has been held to apply retroactively”). Flowers did not
establish a new constitutional right that has been held to apply
retroactively. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235, 2251 (“[W]e break no
new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson [v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)] by applying it to the extraordinary
facts of this case.”).
Accordingly, Willacy is not entitled to relief based on Flowers,
and we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Willacy’s
successive postconviction motion.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ,
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,
Robin C. Lemonidis, Judge –
Case No. 051990CF016062AXXXXX
Eric C. Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Michael Hope,
Ann Marie Mirialakis, and Adriana Corso, Assistant Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace,
Florida,
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for Appellant
Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa-
Marie Lerner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida,
for Appellee
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