Louis B. Gaskin v. State of Florida & Louis B. Gaskin v. Ricky D. Dixon, etc.

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2023-0415
____________
LOUIS B. GASKIN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC2023-0440
____________
LOUIS B. GASKIN,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICKY D. DIXON, etc.,
Respondent.
April 6, 2023
PER CURIAM.
Louis B. Gaskin, a prisoner under sentences of death and an
active death warrant, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his third
successive motion for postconviction relief. He also petitions this
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, moves for a stay of execution,
and requests oral argument. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. As we explain below, we affirm the
summary denial of Gaskin’s postconviction motion, and we deny his
habeas petition, motion for stay of execution, and request for oral
argument.
BACKGROUND
The following facts were set forth in this Court’s opinion on
direct appeal:
The convictions arise from events occurring on the
night of December 20, 1989, when Gaskin drove from
Bunnell to Palm Coast and spotted a light in the house of
the victims, Robert and Georgette Sturmfels. Gaskin
parked his car in the woods and, with a loaded gun,
approached the house. Through a window he saw the
Sturmfels[es] sitting in their den. After circling the house
a number of times, Gaskin shot Mr. Sturmfels twice
through the window. As Mrs. Sturmfels rose to leave the
room, Gaskin shot her and then shot Mr. Sturmfels a
third time. Mrs. Sturmfels crawled into the hallway, and
Gaskin pursued her around the house until he saw her
through the door and shot her again. Gaskin then pulled
out a screen, broke the window, and entered the home.
He fired one more bullet into each of the Sturmfels[es]’
heads and covered the bodies with blankets. Gaskin
then went through the house taking lamps, video
cassette recorders, some cash, and jewelry.
Gaskin then proceeded to the home of Joseph and
Mary Rector, whom he again spied through a window
sitting in their den. While Gaskin cut their phone lines,
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the Rectors went to bed and turned out the lights. In an
effort to roust Mr. Rector, Gaskin threw a log and some
rocks at the house. When Mr. Rector rose to investigate,
Gaskin shot him from outside the house. The Rectors
managed to get to their car and drive to the hospital in
spite of additional shots fired at their car as they sped
away. Gaskin then burglarized the house.
Gaskin’s involvement in the shootings was brought
to the attention of the authorities by Alfonso Golden,
cousin of Gaskin’s girlfriend. The night of the murders,
Gaskin had appeared at Golden’s home and asked to
leave some “Christmas presents.” Gaskin told Golden
that he had “jacked” the presents and left the victims
“stiff.” Golden learned of the robberies and murders after
watching the news and called the authorities to report
what he knew. The property that had been left with
Golden was subsequently identified as belonging to the
Sturmfels[es].
Gaskin was arrested on December 30, and a search
of Gaskin’s home produced more of the stolen items.
After signing a rights-waiver form, Gaskin confessed to
the crimes and directed the authorities to further
evidence of the crime in a nearby canal.
Gaskin v. State, 591 So. 2d 917, 918 (Fla. 1991).
After a jury trial, Gaskin was convicted of nine of the ten
counts for which he was indicted. As to Mr. and Mrs. Sturmfels,
Gaskin was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated
murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of armed robbery,
and one count of burglary. Id. As to Mr. and Mrs. Rector, Gaskin
was convicted of one count for the attempted first-degree murder of
Joseph Rector, one count of armed robbery, and one count of
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burglary. Id. The jury acquitted Gaskin of the attempted first-
degree murder of Mary Rector. Id.During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence in the
form of a ballistics demonstration, “firing various types of bullets
from the rifle used in the murders to demonstrate that the
ammunition Gaskin chose to use in the murders supports a finding
that the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Id. at 918-19.
The defense presented penalty phase testimony of “Janet Morris,
Gaskin’s cousin, who testified that she and Gaskin were raised by
their great-grandparents, who were very strict, and that Gaskin
never gave anyone any trouble during his formative years.” Id. at
919.
The jury recommended that Gaskin be sentenced to death for
the Sturmfelses’ murders by votes of eight to four. Id. For
additional consideration in sentencing, the trial court also received
“a certified judgment and sentence for an unrelated burglary, a
copy of Gaskin’s statement, and a copy of a psychiatric report.” Id.The trial court found three aggravating factors as to both
murders: (1) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated,
without any pretense of moral or legal justification, (2) Gaskin was
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previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence (prior violent felony based on
the contemporaneous murders of the Sturmfelses and the other
felony convictions relating to the Sturmfelses and the Rectors), and
(3) the murders were committed while Gaskin was engaged in the
commission of a robbery or burglary. Id. A fourth aggravating
factor, that the murder was especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or
cruel, was found as to victim Georgette Sturmfels. Id.The trial court found as mitigating circumstances that (1) the
murders were committed while Gaskin was under extreme mental
or emotional disturbance, and (2) Gaskin suffered a deprived
childhood. Id.Gaskin challenged his convictions and sentences on direct
appeal. Because he was improperly convicted of and sentenced for
four counts of first-degree murder—premeditated and felony
murder as to each of the Sturmfelses—this Court affirmed two of
the first-degree murder convictions and sentences, remanded to the
trial court to vacate the other two, and affirmed the remaining
convictions and sentences. Id. at 922. Gaskin then successfully
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, which, due
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to the unconstitutionally vague jury instruction on the “especially
wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor, remanded the
case to this Court for reconsideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida,
505 U.S. 1079 (1992). See Gaskin v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1216 (1992).
Upon remand, this Court held that Gaskin did not preserve the
issue but that even if it had been preserved, the error was harmless
as to the murder of Georgette Sturmfels given the other aggravating
factors in the case. See Gaskin v. State, 615 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla.
1993).
Since that time, Gaskin has unsuccessfully challenged his
convictions and sentences in state and federal court. See Gaskin v.
State, 737 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1999) (initial postconviction appeal
affirming the denial of relief on certain claims and remanding for an
evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claims);
Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2002) (initial postconviction
appeal upon remand, affirming the denial of relief on Gaskin’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Gaskin v. State, 218 So. 3d
399 (Fla. 2017) (opinion affirming the denial of first successive
postconviction motion); Gaskin v. State, 237 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 2018)
(opinion affirming the denial of second successive postconviction
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motion); Gaskin v. State, 2020 WL 57987 (Fla. Jan. 6, 2020) (order
dismissing pro se all writs petition); Gaskin v. State, 2020 WL
2467112 (Fla. May 13, 2020) (order dismissing pro se all writs
petition); Gaskin v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 494 F.3d 997 (11th Cir.
2007) (opinion affirming the denial of federal habeas petition).
Governor Ron DeSantis signed Gaskin’s death warrant on
March 13, 2023. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.851, Gaskin filed a third successive motion for postconviction
relief and argued the following claims: (1) Gaskin’s death sentences
violate his constitutional rights because his jury was never
presented with mitigation that would have resulted in
recommendations of life imprisonment; (2) Gaskin’s constitutional
rights were violated because the jury was not unanimous in finding
applicable aggravating circumstances and in recommending death,
and this Court’s decision on the partial retroactivity of Hurst 1 was
arbitrary and capricious; (3) the delay between Gaskin’s clemency
proceedings and the denial of clemency without any updated
proceedings violated Gaskin’s constitutional rights; and (4) it is
1. Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016).
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unconstitutional to execute Gaskin after almost thirty-three years of
living on death row in near-total solitary confinement.
After holding a Huff 2 hearing, the circuit court summarily
denied relief on all four claims. Gaskin now appeals that denial and
raises three issues. He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas
corpus, moves for a stay of execution, and requests oral argument.
ANALYSIS
Gaskin’s Third Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief
Gaskin argues that the circuit court erred in its summary
denial of his third successive motion for postconviction relief, and
he raises three issues in this appeal: (1) Gaskin’s death sentences
and execution are unconstitutional because the mitigating
circumstances in his case outweigh the aggravating factors,
exempting him from the class of persons subject to the death
penalty; (2) Gaskin’s death sentences and execution are
unconstitutional because his jury failed to make specific findings
regarding the aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances,
and the jury did not unanimously recommend that he be sentenced
2. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
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to death (Hurst claim); and (3) executing Gaskin after more than
thirty years on death row violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Standard of Review
Gaskin’s successive postconviction claims are governed by
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. In particular, a motion
for postconviction relief must set forth the type of relief the
defendant seeks, see rule 3.851(e)(1)(C), and it must include “a
detailed allegation of the factual basis for any claim for which an
evidentiary hearing is sought.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)(D).
Whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires
a factual determination, the movant is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. However, rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits the denial of a
successive postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing
“[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that
the movant is entitled to no relief.”
Because the circuit court denied Gaskin’s third successive
rule 3.851 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, this
Court reviews the circuit court’s decision de novo, “accepting the
movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are not
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refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the record
conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Pardo v.
State, 108 So. 3d 558, 561 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Gore v. State, 91 So.
3d 769, 774 (Fla. 2012)).
Mitigating Circumstances
Gaskin argues that his death sentences are unconstitutional
because the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating
factors in his case. In particular, he contends that the jury was not
presented with mitigating evidence that had it been presented,
would have resulted in sentences of life imprisonment for the
murders. Gaskin asserts that defense counsel failed to investigate
and present mental health mitigation in the form of expert and lay
testimony that would have more fully informed the jury of various
mental health challenges. Additionally, he contends that the
defense mental health expert, who was hired by defense counsel but
never called to testify at trial, was not provided the information
necessary to develop a full mental health profile. During the death
warrant proceedings in the circuit court, Gaskin sought an
evidentiary hearing to present mental health expert testimony, but
postconviction counsel acknowledged at the Huff hearing that the
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expert’s testimony would not have been offered as newly discovered
evidence.
The circuit court did not err in summarily denying this claim
because it is procedurally barred. Gaskin raised this claim in his
initial motion for postconviction relief, and it was fully considered
by the circuit court and this Court. Although the circuit court
summarily denied the claim at first, this Court remanded Gaskin’s
case for an evidentiary hearing to consider whether defense counsel
was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and present certain
mitigating evidence, (2) failing to provide information to defense
experts, and (3) failing to call certain witnesses to testify on his
behalf.3 Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied
Gaskin’s initial motion for postconviction relief, and this Court
affirmed.
Even if Gaskin’s claim was not procedurally barred, he still
would not be entitled to relief. In denying initial postconviction
relief, the circuit court concluded that defense counsel made
3. An additional claim, regarding counsel’s status as a deputy
sheriff, was also granted an evidentiary hearing, but Gaskin did not
later appeal the circuit court’s denial of that claim.
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reasonable strategic decisions not to present certain evidence and
the testimony of certain witnesses because that would have resulted
in the jury hearing highly negative information about Gaskin. This
Court explained:
In the order denying relief, the trial court addressed
Gaskin’s allegation that trial counsel should have called
mental health experts to testify at the penalty phase
about mental mitigation. The trial court noted that
Dr. Krop, one of the defense mental health experts at
trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he expressly
told counsel before trial that he would not be of much
help to the defense because he would have to testify
about Gaskin’s extensive history of past criminal
conduct, sexual deviancy, and lack of remorse. The trial
court also stated that trial counsel testified at the hearing
that he made a strategic decision not to present mental
health experts precisely because Gaskin’s background
contained many negatives (including Dr. Krop’s proposed
testimony).
Gaskin, 822 So. 2d at 1247-48. The trial court found that counsel
conducted a reasonable investigation before trial and “made a
reasonable, strategic decision not to present this information to the
jury and not to present Dr. Krop’s findings to the judge.” Id. at
1248.
As to Gaskin’s argument that counsel should have presented
the testimony of additional lay witnesses, the trial court observed
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that the testimony of such witnesses, offered at the evidentiary
hearing, produced the following:
[T]here was testimony regarding the Defendant sexually
forcing himself on a six-year-old boy, the Defendant’s
consensual, incestuous relationships and sexual
deviancy, including bestiality, the Defendant’s violent
attempt to sexually force himself on his former girlfriend,
the Defendant’s admission that he loved to kill and that
he killed cats and snakes, and his history of stealing at
school and from his great-grandparents.
Id. The trial court concluded that counsel reasonably decided not
to present testimony relating to Gaskin’s violent past and criminal
conduct because the jury may have considered it additional
aggravation. Id.This Court affirmed, concluding that counsel’s strategy
regarding mitigating evidence was reasonable: “It is apparent from
the record that the witnesses who Gaskin alleges should have
testified on his behalf were subject to being cross-examined about
disturbing information about Gaskin, which would have defeated
trial counsel’s strategy.” Id. at 1249.
Gaskin concedes in his initial brief that this issue is
procedurally barred but argues that constitutional infirmities afflict
his case and are sufficient to overcome a procedural bar. However,
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we reject this argument and conclude that Gaskin’s constitutional
arguments are insufficient to overcome the procedural bar. The
circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on this
claim, which was previously raised and considered, and is
conclusively refuted by the record.
Hurst
Gaskin next argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to
Hurst v. Florida and section 921.141, Florida Statutes. He
maintains that he was unconstitutionally denied a jury
determination, proof of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt, unanimity as to aggravating factors, and unanimous jury
recommendations of death. He argues that this amounts to a
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and his right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This issue is procedurally barred, as it was raised and
addressed in Gaskin’s first and second successive motions for
postconviction relief. Gaskin first sought postconviction relief
following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v.
Florida, and again following this Court’s decision in Hurst v. State,
202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Appealing the circuit court’s denial of
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both successive motions, this Court affirmed on the grounds that
Hurst is not retroactive to Gaskin’s sentences, which became final
before Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), was decided. See
Gaskin, 218 So. 3d at 401 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 471
(2017); Gaskin, 237 So. 3d at 929 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 327 (2018).
This Court has repeatedly rejected similar arguments relating
to the retroactivity of Hurst. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d
216, 217 (Fla. 2017); Lambrix v. State, 227 So. 3d 112, 113 (Fla.
2017); Bogle v. State, 213 So. 3d 833, 855 (Fla. 2017); Asay v.
State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla. 2016).
Moreover, in State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 504-05 (Fla.
2020), this Court held that unanimous jury recommendations of
death are not required. Rather, what is required is the finding of
one or more aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
at 502-03 (“Under longstanding Florida law, there is only one
eligibility finding required: the existence of one or more statutory
aggravating circumstances.”). The jury found Gaskin guilty of the
contemporaneous murders of the Sturmfelses, in addition to
multiple other felonies including armed robbery and burglary.
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These unanimous findings by the jury establish the existence of two
aggravating factors: prior violent felony and murder committed
while engaged in the commission of a robbery or burglary. Thus,
these findings satisfy the requirements in Poole.
Additionally, Gaskin’s equal protection argument is a further
attempt to challenge this Court’s consistent holding on Hurst
retroactivity. This argument is also procedurally barred and has
previously been rejected by this Court. See Lambrix, 227 So. 3d at
113. The circuit court’s summary denial of Gaskin’s Hurst claim
was proper.
Length of Time on Death Row
Gaskin also argues that executing him after he has spent more
than three decades on death row, and most of that time in what he
deems solitary confinement, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
However, this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that
a lengthy stay on death row amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment. Gaskin concedes that recently, this Court observed
that “[n]o federal or state court has accepted the argument that a
prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual
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punishment.” Dillbeck v. State, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S32 (Fla. Feb. 16,
2023) (quoting Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007)).
Gaskin has argued no grounds for departing from this precedent.
We also reject Gaskin’s arguments regarding what he
characterizes as solitary confinement on death row. In fact, noting
the similarities to the recent Dillbeck death warrant case, Gaskin
further concedes: “Mr. Gaskin recognizes that his conditions were
similar, if not identical, to Mr. Dillbeck’s, up to and including the
length of their stays on death row, however, he asserted this claim
to exhaust for further review.” The circuit court properly summarily
denied relief.
Habeas Claim
In his habeas petition, Gaskin argues that he is entitled to
relief because during the penalty phase, the jury was
unconstitutionally instructed that it may consider whether “the
crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was especially
wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel.” The trial court found the
existence of the aggravating factor as to Georgette Sturmfels but
rejected it as to Robert Sturmfels.
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After the United States Supreme Court remanded Gaskin’s
case for reconsideration in light of Espinosa, this Court concluded
that the issue was not preserved. This Court further concluded
that even if the issue had been preserved, any error in finding the
aggravating factor as to the murder of Georgette Sturmfels was
harmless.
Presently, Gaskin challenges this Court’s conclusion that he
did not properly preserve the jury instruction issue and contends
that he did argue the unconstitutionality of the aggravating factor
in a pretrial motion. He also argues that this Court’s conclusion
that he did not object at trial cannot be conclusively determined
because relevant discussions may be missing from the record.
Gaskin maintains that the jury improperly considered the
unconstitutionally vague instruction as to both murders, and that
he is entitled to relief.
Habeas corpus is not to be used to litigate or relitigate issues
which could have been, should have been, or were previously
raised. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla.
1992).
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Where this Court has previously ruled that the Espinosa error
as to Georgette Sturmfels was harmless, see Gaskin, 615 So. 2d at
680, we do not revisit that ruling.
However, we recognize that this Court did not address the
Espinosa error as to Robert Sturmfels, even though the following
argument was made by appellate counsel in the initial brief on
remand from the United States Supreme Court:
The fact that the trial court did not find HAC
present in one of the murders does not render the error
harmless as to that sentence. Even though the trial
court did not find it, the jury returned a death
recommendation (eight to four on both murders) after
hearing the unconstitutional Espinosa instruction.
Sochor, supra. Likewise, after hearing the trial court’s
“blanket” statement that he would impose the death
penalty even if this aggravating circumstance were
stricken, means absolutely nothing.
We must presume that this Court rejected this argument. However,
because the jury was given the unconstitutional instruction as to
both murders, we will explain the harmless error analysis implicit
in this Court’s earlier decision.
Although the jury was erroneously instructed on the
“especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor, the
error is also harmless as to Robert Sturmfels. Affirmance of
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Gaskin’s sentence is required if “there is no reasonable possibility
that the error contributed to the” death sentence. State v. DiGuilio,
491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986).
We conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the
error contributed to the death sentence for the murder of Robert
Sturmfels in light of the substantial aggravation in this case: the
extremely weighty (1) prior violent felony, and (2) cold, calculated,
and premeditated factors, see Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 215
(Fla. 2020), and (3) the murder occurred during the commission of a
robbery or burglary factor.
As such, we deny Gaskin’s habeas petition.
Motion for Stay of Execution
Gaskin argues that more time is needed to resolve the complex
issues he raises in his appeal and habeas petition. However, we
disagree. Because Gaskin has failed to raise substantial grounds
upon which relief might be granted, a stay is not appropriate here.
See Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941, 952 (Fla. 1998) (denying
motion for stay of execution where movant failed to establish
“substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted”).
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Gaskin’s third
successive motion for postconviction relief. We also deny his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his motion for a stay of
execution. We also deny his request for oral argument.
No rehearing will be entertained by this Court, and the
mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County,
Terence R. Perkins, Judge
Case No. 181990CF000001AXXXXX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Tracy M. Henry
and Cortney L. Hackett, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Doris
Meacham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach,
Florida, and Patrick Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
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