Christian Cruz v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2021-1767
____________
CHRISTIAN CRUZ,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
July 6, 2023
PER CURIAM.
Christian Cruz appeals his sentence of death, which was
imposed by the trial court for the second time following this Court’s
reversal of his original death sentence “and remand for the limited
purpose of requiring the trial court to perform a new sentencing
evaluation and provide a new sentencing order.” See Cruz v. State,
320 So. 3d 695, 731-32 (Fla. 2021). We have jurisdiction. See art.
V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons we explain, we affirm
Cruz’s sentence of death.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2019, Cruz was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary,
robbery, and kidnapping and was sentenced to death for the
murder. Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 710, 716. This Court summarized the
relevant facts as follows:
In 2013, Christian Cruz and codefendant Justen
Charles were indicted for the first-degree murder of
Christopher Jemery, as well as burglary while armed,
robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping. Cruz and
Charles were tried separately but before the same trial
court. Charles’ trial occurred after Cruz’s trial but before
Cruz’s sentencing. The evidence presented at Cruz’s trial
showed that on April 26, 2013, Jemery was attacked in
his Deltona apartment. The evening before the attack,
both Cruz and Charles were together in an apartment in
the vicinity of Jemery’s apartment. Cruz and Charles
were aware that the former resident of the apartment
where Jemery was living sold drugs out of the apartment,
and Cruz and Charles discussed Jemery’s apartment the
day before the murder.
The evidence showed that both Cruz and Charles
forcefully entered Jemery’s apartment. The physical
evidence obtained from the apartment showed that there
was an assault and attack on Jemery. Blood throughout
the apartment demonstrated that Jemery was beaten
while inside the apartment. Bloody footprints matching
the shoes of Cruz and Charles were found inside the
apartment. One of the bedrooms appeared ransacked
and had additional blood, the kitchen cabinets had been
opened, and a television was taken from the apartment.
Cruz and Charles then placed Jemery in the trunk
of Jemery’s rental car, drove him to a remote location,
and shot him in the head. Jemery was found near the
Sanford airport in Seminole County, Florida. Workers at
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an industrial area saw what they thought was the body of
a person lying on the ground in a field adjacent to their
warehouse. Because the body lacked identification, the
person was given the name of John Doe. John Doe was
later identified as Christopher Jemery.
Upon first arrival at the field, emergency personnel
made a notation that Jemery was bound with wire and
duct tape on his arms and mouth, was alive but
nonresponsive, and his breathing was very shallow.
Medical examiner testimony would later reveal that
Jemery was shot in the head and also sustained a
number of injuries to his head, face, hands, and torso,
including cuts, bruises, lacerations, and defensive
wounds. His wrists showed what appeared to be tape
residue from being bound with duct tape. Jemery
initially survived the attack but succumbed to his
injuries in a hospital within a day.
Evidence showed that the duct tape recovered from
the area where Jemery was found matched the leftover
roll of duct tape found in Jemery’s apartment. A live .22
bullet was found on the floor of Jemery’s apartment,
which was the same caliber and manufacturer as the .22
shell casing found near Jemery’s body. Cruz’s fingerprint
was found on a piece of duct tape recovered from
Jemery’s body. Cruz’s DNA was found on a swab of
blood taken from the front right kick panel and the right
front door of Jemery’s rental car. Cruz’s fingerprint was
also found on the Air Jordan shoe box found at Jemery’s
apartment and on Jemery’s cell phone, which was
recovered from his rental car. Jemery’s rental car was
not at his apartment and was later found backed into
some bushes near a grocery store in Deltona. The
evidence also showed that the same night Jemery was
taken from his apartment, Cruz was seen on a bank’s
ATM surveillance camera using Jemery’s bank card and
personal identification number (PIN) to withdraw $440
cash from Jemery’s account.
Id. at 705-06.
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During the guilt phase of Cruz’s trial, the State
presented the testimony of 17 witnesses. The State did
not, however, present at Cruz’s trial 2 items of evidence
that it did introduce at the trial of Charles: first, the
testimony of Charles’ girlfriend that she had seen Cruz
with a .22 caliber firearm, and second, a stipulation
between the State and Charles’ trial counsel that Cruz
was the shooter.
Id. at 708.
To establish the prior violent felony aggravator, the State
presented evidence of a robbery of a Hungry Howie’s committed by
Cruz and Charles days after the murder in this case. At the
conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously
recommended that Cruz be sentenced to death. Id. at 710.
[T]he trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and
sentenced Cruz to death. The trial court found 5
aggravating factors: (1) Cruz was previously convicted of
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to another
person for the Hungry Howie’s robbery committed shortly
after murdering Jemery (great weight); (2) the first-degree
murder was committed while Cruz was engaged in a
robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, merged with the first-
degree murder was committed for financial gain (great
weight); (3) the first-degree murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding arrest (great weight); (4) the first-
degree murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
(great weight); and (5) the first-degree murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner (great weight). The trial court considered and
found as proven all 37 of Cruz’s proffered mitigators,
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assigning slight weight to 24, moderate weight to 11,
great weight to 1, and extraordinarily great weight to 1.
In its sentencing order, the trial court conducted an
Enmund[n.4]-Tison[n.5] analysis, finding as follows:
The jury found Mr. Cruz to be the
individual who shot and killed Mr. Jemery. In
Mr. Charles’s case, the State abandoned any
efforts to establish Mr. Charles as the shooter.
The jury in Mr. Charles’ case did not have to
make a determination as to who the shooter
was because of the State’s concession.
However, the jury in Mr. Charles’ case did find
him guilty of both, premeditated murder AND
felony murder.
Therefore, this court finds that Mr. Cruz
in fact killed Mr. Jemery and no further
analysis is needed.
[N.4] Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
[N.5] Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
In the sentencing order, the trial court explained
that he heard and considered evidence of the case in
Cruz’s and codefendant Charles’ trials.
Id. at 710-11 (footnote omitted).
On appeal, we agreed with Cruz’s argument that he was
improperly sentenced to death based on extrarecord facts:
In sentencing Cruz to death, the trial court relied on
evidence from Charles’ trial, specifically the testimony of
Charles’ girlfriend regarding seeing Cruz with a .22
caliber firearm, as well as the stipulation in Charles’ trial
that Cruz was the shooter. However, there is no
competent, substantial evidence presented in Cruz’s trial
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to support the jury’s finding that Cruz was the shooter.
We cannot determine what weight the trial judge gave to
the finding that Cruz was the shooter or what part the
nonrecord evidence from codefendant Charles’ trial
played in Cruz’s sentence. Here, this was error that
cannot be considered harmless.
Id. at 725. We thus overturned the death sentence “and remand[ed]
for the limited purpose of resentencing by the trial court and a new
sentencing order.” Id. at 723. At that time, we declined to address
Cruz’s argument that his sentence was “disproportionate in
comparison to other death sentences and Charles’ life sentence.”
Id. We explained that there was no need to address comparative
proportionality in light of our decision in Lawrence v. State, 308 So.
3d 544 (Fla. 2020), in which we receded from the judge-made
requirement to review the comparative proportionality of death
sentences as contrary to the conformity clause of article I, section
17 of the Florida Constitution. Because of the need for
resentencing caused by the error of reliance on facts not in
evidence, we also did not reach the issue of relative culpability in
light of Charles’s life sentence. Id.On remand in 2020, aside from a slight change in weight to
one aggravator and one mitigator—both of which were favorable to
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Cruz—the trial court found and assigned the same weight to each
aggravator and mitigator and again sentenced Cruz to death. The
trial court decreased the weight it assigned to the cold, calculated,
and premeditated aggravator from great to moderate and increased
the weight it assigned to the “minor participation” mitigator from
slight to moderate. This appeal follows.
II. ANALYSIS
Cruz’s sole challenge to his death sentence is that this Court’s
relative culpability review requires that the sentence be reduced to
life imprisonment because his equally culpable codefendant,
Charles, who was convicted of the same offenses and to whom the
same aggravating factors were proven applicable, was sentenced to
life imprisonment by the same judge. The State takes the position
that when this Court in Lawrence receded from its obligation to
conduct a comparative proportionality review, it also receded from
its obligation to conduct a relative culpability analysis, and
therefore Charles’s sentence is irrelevant to Cruz’s sentence. This
dispute thus presents the threshold question, Does relative
culpability review survive Lawrence?
This Court’s formerly mandatory comparative proportionality
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review that was eliminated in Lawrence involved consideration of
circumstances present in a capital case and a qualitative
comparison to other similar capital cases in order to determine
whether the case being reviewed fell under the category of most
aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders, see, e.g.,
Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 668 (Fla. 2008); Porter v. State, 564
So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990), “thereby assuring uniformity in the
application of the sentence,” Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 408
(Fla. 2003). And in capital cases involving multiple defendants, this
Court has performed an additional analysis—which has been
described as an “aspect” of its comparative proportionality review—
of a defendant’s culpability relative to his codefendant(s). See, e.g.,
Shere v. Moore, 830 So. 2d 56, 60-62 (Fla. 2002). Underlying this
relative culpability review has been “the principle that equally
culpable co-defendants should be treated alike in capital sentencing
and receive equal punishment.” Id. at 60.
In Lawrence, we held “that the conformity clause of article I,
section 17 of the Florida Constitution 1 forbids this Court from
1. The conformity clause of article I, section 17 provides that
“[t]he prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the
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analyzing death sentences for comparative proportionality in the
absence of a statute establishing that review.” Lawrence, 308 So.
3d at 545. Lawrence thus receded from precedent that required
death sentences to be reviewed “for comparative proportionality.”
Id. at 552. And Lawrence “eliminate[d] comparative proportionality
review from the scope of [this Court’s] appellate review set forth in
[Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure] 9.142(a)(5).” Id.
Cruz presents several points of argument in favor of his
position. He asserts that our relative culpability review survived
Lawrence because Lawrence dealt exclusively with the imposition of
comparative proportionality review and did not address relative
culpability review. But nearly every time this Court has addressed
relative culpability review, it has either described it as a part of its
formerly mandatory comparative proportionality review or
addressed it as such. E.g., Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167, 1186
(Fla. 2022) (describing, post-Lawrence, a relative culpability claim
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be
construed in conformity with decisions of the United States
Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.
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as a “proportionality claim” and “claim of relative proportionality”);
Bargo v. State, 331 So. 3d 653, 665 (Fla. 2021) (discussing
proportionality and relative culpability under the joint heading
“Proportionality – Relative Culpability”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 193
(2022); Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 509-11 (Fla. 2017)
(discussing the relative culpability analysis as related to a
“proportionality claim” and under the heading “Proportionality”);
Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 959 (Fla. 2017) (addressing
relative culpability as part of this Court’s then-mandatory
comparative proportionality review despite the fact that defendant
did not raise a relative culpability or comparative proportionality
claim); Jeffries v. State, 222 So. 3d 538, 547 (Fla. 2017) (conducting
a relative culpability analysis under the heading “Proportionality”
and stating that this Court “may also consider relative culpability
as part of our mandatory proportionality review”); McCloud v. State,
208 So. 3d 668, 688 (Fla. 2016) (describing “a full proportionality
review” as “including a relative culpability analysis”); Cannon v.
State, 180 So. 3d 1023, 1041 (Fla. 2015) (analyzing a relative
culpability claim under the heading “Proportionality,” addressing it
as a claim that defendant’s sentence is “disproportionate,” and
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referring to it in terms of “comparing the case to other capital cases
with similar mitigating and aggravating circumstances”); Fletcher v.
State, 168 So. 3d 186, 221 (Fla. 2015) (conducting a relative
culpability analysis under the heading of “Proportionality” and in
conjunction with a traditional comparative proportionality analysis);
Brooks v. State, 175 So. 3d 204, 235 (Fla. 2015) (addressing a
relative culpability claim under the heading “Proportionality”); Carr
v. State, 156 So. 3d 1052, 1070 n.13 (Fla. 2015) (noting under the
heading “Proportionality” that defendant also raised a relative
culpability claim); Martin v. State, 151 So. 3d 1184, 1198 (Fla.
2014) (addressing relative culpability as part of traditional
comparative proportionality review); Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277,
305 (Fla. 2009) (“[P]roportionality review requires us to consider the
codefendant’s sentence.”); Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642, 671
(Fla. 2009) (addressing relative culpability claim under the
“Proportionality” heading); Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 210
(Fla. 2005) (same); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 47 (Fla. 2003)
(stating that an analysis of comparative proportionality, “of
necessity, includes the relative culpability of each codefendant”);
Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 117-19 (Fla. 2003) (addressing relative
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culpability claim under the “Proportionality” heading and as part of
traditional comparative proportionality review); Shere, 830 So. 2d at
62 (noting that “relative culpability” is an “aspect of
proportionality”); Hertz v. State, 803 So. 2d 629, 652 (Fla. 2001)
(addressing relative culpability under the “Proportionality” heading);
Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 282 (Fla. 1998) (same); Henyard v.
State, 689 So. 2d 239, 254 (Fla. 1996) (“[T]hus, an equally or more
culpable codefendant’s sentence is relevant to a proportionality
analysis.” (citing Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1994))); see
also McCloud, 208 So. 3d at 693 n.6 (Canady J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (describing relative culpability as “an aspect
of [this Court’s] comparative proportionality review”); Shere, 830 So.
2d at 64 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“As a corollary to this analysis of comparing the circumstances of a
case in which death had been imposed to others with a similar
sentence, the Court also performs an additional analysis of relative
culpability in cases where more than one defendant was involved in
the commission of the killing.”). But see Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d
857, 867, 879 (Fla. 2010) (considering defendant’s relative
culpability claim prior to and separate from traditional, comparative
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proportionality); Cole v. State, 36 So. 3d 597, 610 (Fla. 2010)
(same); Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 662-63 (Fla. 2003)
(same).
Cruz cites Palmes v. Wainwright, 460 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla.
1984), for the proposition that this Court views comparative
proportionality review and relative culpability review as entirely
separate matters, relying on the following statement in the opinion:
“Proportionality review compares the sentence of death with other
cases in which a sentence of death was approved or disapproved.
Disparate treatment of accomplices which may be a ground of
mitigation is an entirely separate matter.” But when read in
context, it is clear that this statement cannot be interpreted literally
to mean that relative culpability review does not fall under the
umbrella of proportionality review.
In his habeas petition, Palmes asserted that this Court failed
to conduct a proportionality review in his direct appeal affirming his
death sentence. 460 So. 2d at 364. Palmes “argue[d] that the
state’s chief witness against him was equally as guilty of the murder
as he was and that her immunization from prosecution constituted
such a disparity of treatment of equally guilty accomplices as to
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violate the principle of proportionality.” Id. This Court rejected
Palmes’s argument on the ground that it was procedurally barred,
having been raised in his direct appeal and previous postconviction
motion, and noted that “the original affirmance of the sentence of
death implicitly found the sentence appropriate to the crime under
proportionality principles.” Id. Only then did the Court make the
statement that “[d]isparate treatment of accomplices which may be
a ground of mitigation is an entirely separate matter.” When taken
in context, this statement cannot support Cruz’s position, because
before the statement was made, the Court had already confirmed
that Palmes’s claim of disparate sentencing based on relative
culpability was previously resolved, implicitly and “under
proportionality principles.” It would be illogical to conclude that
relative culpability is an entirely separate matter from
proportionality yet able to be implicitly resolved by a determination
that a death sentence is proportional.
This Court’s lengthy history of overwhelmingly referring to and
treating relative culpability as a part of, “a corollary of,” or
intertwined with its traditional comparative proportionality review
as well as its explicit identification of a relative culpability analysis
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as a necessary component of comparative proportionality in multi-
defendant capital cases, e.g., McCloud, 208 So. 3d at 688;
Kormondy, 845 So. 2d at 47, makes it clear that relative culpability
review was indeed a part of its comparative proportionality review.
Consequently, this Court’s elimination of comparative
proportionality review in Lawrence also resulted in the elimination
of its relative culpability review. Here, that means that Charles’s
life sentence is irrelevant to and has no bearing on Cruz’s death
sentence.
Cruz argues that the conformity clause in article I, section 17
does not prohibit this Court from conducting a relative culpability
review because Lawrence was exclusively premised on Pulley v.
Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), which held that comparative
proportionality review is not constitutionally required but did not
address relative culpability, and there is no direct United States
Supreme Court opinion prohibiting relative culpability review under
the Eighth Amendment. This argument fails for the same reason as
the previous argument: our relative culpability review is a corollary
of our obsolete comparative proportionality review. Under Pulley, as
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a component of comparative proportionality review, a relative
culpability review is not constitutionally required.
Cruz also argues that his death sentence violates his right to
equal protection under the United States and Florida Constitutions,
in light of Charles’s life sentence. But “co-defendants have no
enforceable right to have sentences that are precisely congruent
with one another.” United States v. Haehle, 227 F.3d 857, 860 (7th
Cir. 2000). And it has been recognized that “[a] criminal sentence
violates the Equal Protection Clause only if it reflects disparate
treatment of similarly situated defendants lacking any rational
basis.” Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832, 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
(quoting United States v. Pierce, 409 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2005)).
One potential “rational basis” for imposing different sentences
on codefendants who appear to share equal culpability is the
mitigation, or the lack thereof, applicable to each codefendant.
Mitigation is “a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976). “[T]he sentencer in capital cases must be
permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor,” Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982), “may not refuse to consider
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any mitigating evidence,” Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 831 (Fla.
2003), and “must expressly evaluate each statutory and
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant,”
Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 186 (Fla. 2010). Because a capital
sentencing court is required to give due consideration to each
mitigating circumstance that exists relative to each individual
defendant, there can be no constitutional requirement that capital
codefendants who appear equally culpable on the facts of a case
receive the same sentence. This individualized consideration of
mitigation has been described as “[t]he core substantive ingredient”
of a capital defendant’s right to individualized sentencing. Puiatti v.
McNeil, 626 F.3d 1283, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The core substantive
ingredient in the constitutional right to an ‘individualized
sentencing’ is mitigation evidence relevant to the capital defendant
as an individual or unique person . . . .”).
Like mitigation, aggravation may provide a “rational basis” for
imposing different sentences on codefendants who appear to be
equally culpable on the facts of a murder. But this Court’s relative
culpability review never required consideration of the aggravating
factors or mitigating circumstances applicable to each codefendant.
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Even where codefendants had equal roles in a murder, it would be a
farce to consider them equally culpable if, for example, only a single
aggravator were applicable to one codefendant but numerous
aggravators were proven as to the other. Yet this Court has almost
exclusively declined to consider any fact in its relative culpability
analyses aside from a defendant’s degree of participation in the
murder.
The fact that this Court’s relative culpability review failed to
require consideration of “constitutionally indispensable” mitigation
or aggravation—also a “constitutionally indispensable” part of
capital sentencing, see, e.g., Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S.
101, 111 (2003)—further supports our conclusion that relative
culpability review is neither constitutionally required nor consistent
with ensuring that a constitutional capital sentence was rendered.
Cruz also attempts to invoke the Due Process Clause, arguing
that “the unequal treatment of equally culpable defendants in a
capital case violates due process,” Initial Brief of Appellant at 69,
“because the entire purpose of the Due Process Clause is to prevent
arbitrary deprivations of liberty or property,” id. at 70. But this
argument makes no sense if disparate sentences are imposed based
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on incongruent mitigation or aggravation or both. The imposition of
a lesser sentence upon a defendant with more mitigation or less
aggravation than his codefendant(s) certainly cannot be considered
“arbitrary.” And there is no merit to Cruz’s assertion that the
conformity clause in article I, section 17 does not prevent this Court
from continuing to conduct its relative culpability review because
there is no corresponding conformity clause for due process in the
Florida Constitution.
It is no more tenable to skirt the conformity clause
by proclaiming that comparative proportionality review is
required by the due process clause rather than by the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Under
the federal Constitution, “the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause [is] made applicable to
the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53
(2010)]. The prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments thus is a particular aspect of due process.
And the conformity clause expressly limits the authority
of this Court with respect to that aspect of due process.
To conclude otherwise is to treat the conformity clause as
meaningless for all practical purposes.
Yacob v. State, 136 So. 3d 539, 562 (Fla. 2014) (Canady, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (first alteration in
original).
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Cruz’s other arguments—e.g., that relative culpability review is
part of this Court’s obligatory sufficiency of the evidence review in
capital cases, and that the State’s argument that relative culpability
had been abandoned was not properly preserved for review—are
without merit and do not warrant further discussion.
III. CONCLUSION
This Court’s relative culpability review was a corollary of its
comparative proportionality review, which was determined in
Lawrence to be violative of the Florida Constitution. As an
integrated part of comparative proportionality review, relative
culpability review was rendered obsolete by the Lawrence decision,
and it cannot now provide a basis for vacating Cruz’s death
sentence, which we hereby affirm.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
SASSO, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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LABARGA, J., dissenting.
In 2020, during a series of significant changes by this Court to
Florida’s death penalty jurisprudence, I strenuously dissented to
the elimination of comparative proportionality review—which I
described as “the most consequential step yet in dismantling the
reasonable safeguards contained within Florida’s death penalty
jurisprudence.” Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 552-53 (Fla.
2020) (Labarga, J., dissenting).
Today, I reiterate my dissent as the majority expressly
eliminates relative proportionality review as “a corollary of our
obsolete comparative proportionality review.” Majority op. at 15. I
fundamentally disagree with the majority’s view that the conformity
clause prohibits this Court from conducting proportionality review
as a part of its review of death penalty cases. Indeed, I view
proportionality review as being consistent with the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of arbitrary death sentences.
Surely, in a state that leads the nation with thirty
exonerations of individuals from death row, every reasonable
safeguard should be retained in this Court’s toolkit when reviewing
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death sentences to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the
most aggravated and least mitigated of murders. 2
I respectfully dissent.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,
Raul A. Zambrano, Judge – 642013CF102943XXXADL
J. Rafael Rodriguez of Law Offices of J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami,
Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick
Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
2. See Death Penalty Information Center,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-
state/florida (last visited June 14, 2023).
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