Judges: Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General Prepared by: Staff
Filed Date: 2/7/1977
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
QUESTIONS:
1. Can the House of Representatives, exercising its rulemaking power pursuant to s. 4(a), Art. III, State Const., authorize the Select Committee on Organized Crime to hold executive sessions for the purpose of considering information provided by law enforcement of a sensitive or confidential nature, the provisions of s.
2. Can the House of Representatives, exercising its rulemaking power pursuant to s. 4(a), Art. III, State Const., authorize the Select Committee on Organized Crime to withhold certain documents or records provided by law enforcement, which may be of a sensitive or confidential nature, from inspection, examination, or disclosure, the provisions of Ch. 119, F. S., notwithstanding?
SUMMARY:
Pending judicial clarification, since Florida's Government-in-the-Sunshine Law, s.
Assuming that documents and records of a confidential nature provided by law enforcement agencies to the select committee fall within the `police secrets' rule, such documents and records when in the possession of the committee are exempt from the mandatory inspection provision of s.
While your questions presume that Florida's Government-in-the-Sunshine Law, s.
In AGO 072-16, this office expressed the view that the Sunshine Law was applicable to legislators. Subsequently, in City of Safety Harbor v. City of Clearwater, No. 40,269, order filed May 14, 1974, a circuit judge ruled that, since the Sunshine Law imposed criminal sanctions, it was entitled to a strict construction and, therefore, the Legislature did not fall within the plain meaning of the statute. This statement, however, is in obvious conflict with Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran,
Statutes enacted for the public benefit should be interpreted most favorably to the public. The fact that the statute contains a penal provision does not make the entire statute penal so that it must be strictly construed.
Indeed, had the 1967 Legislature which enacted s.
While it is true that the Sunshine Law does not expressly mention the Legislature within its terms, it should also be recognized that the judiciary, in construing the Sunshine Law, has favorably construed the same in favor of government openness and accountability. For example, while the Sunshine Law does not specifically mention `public notice,' the courts have implied into the law such a requirement. Hough v. Stembridge,
In concluding that the Legislature is subject to the Sunshine Law, this office was guided primarily by the apparent intent of the 1967 Legislature which enacted the law, the illogic of requiring local boards to comply with s.
Regarding the applicability of Ch. 119, F. S., to the Legislature, the act itself clearly extends to all `state officers' which includes, but is not limited to, members of the Legislature. Section
AS TO QUESTION 1:
Section 4(a), Art. III, State Const., provides in pertinent part that `[e]ach house shall determine its rules of procedure.' This provision is substantially the same as s. 6, Art. III of the 1885 Constitution, which stated that `[e]ach house shall . . . determine the rules of its proceedings.'
It is well recognized that a legislative body possesses the authority to control its own proceedings. Bednar v. King,
This is true because section 6 of article 3 of the Constitution gives the Legislature full power to adopt and enforce its own rules of procedure. So long as the legislative rules are in harmony with the constitutional plan for making laws, proceedings had in conformity thereto are not invalid. . . .
Similarly, it was observed in State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis,
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,
The provision that each House `shall determine the rules of its proceedings' does not restrict the power given to the mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to the determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power in the transaction of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution. This, of course, includes authority, subject to the Constitution, to determine the rules of procedure to be observed in agreeing to proposed amendments to the Constitution, and embracing the right to determine the reconsideration of action taken, when no provision of the Constitution is thereby violated. [Crawford, supra, at 968. Also see State ex rel. Landis v. Thompson,
163 So. 270 ,281 (Fla. 1935).]
Thus, so long as no constitutional provision is violated, the Legislature has, pursuant to s. 4(a), Art. III, the unlimited right to regulate the conduct of its business. This presumably includes the authority to adopt by rule a procedure different from that required by statute. In Coggin v. Day,
However, in specific regard to the Sunshine Law, a serious question exists as to whether the act should be considered procedural as opposed to substantive. Generally, a matter is substantive if it creates, defines, adopts, and regulates rights.See, In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
AS TO QUESTION 2:
Florida Public Records Law, Ch. 119, F. S., states, generally, that all documents made or received by public officials in the course of conducting public business constitute public records which must be made available for public inspection and examination by any person. Section
This office has repeatedly recognized that an exception exists to Ch. 119, F. S., for certain records of law enforcement agencies.See Lee v. Beach Publishing Co.,
Assuming the documents referred to in question 2 of your inquiry fall within the `police secrets rule,' then such documents would be exempted from s.
Prepared by: Staff
Tayloe v. Davis , 212 Ala. 282 ( 1924 )
Board of Public Instruction of Broward Cty. v. Doran , 224 So. 2d 693 ( 1969 )
Johnson v. State , 336 So. 2d 93 ( 1976 )
City of Miami Beach v. Berns , 245 So. 2d 38 ( 1971 )
Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison , 296 So. 2d 473 ( 1974 )
State, Ex Rel. v. Thompson , 120 Fla. 860 ( 1935 )
Coggin v. Davey , 233 Ga. 407 ( 1975 )
Hough v. Stembridge , 278 So. 2d 288 ( 1973 )
Times Publishing Company v. Williams , 222 So. 2d 470 ( 1969 )
Gewertz v. Joint Legislative Committee , 132 N.J. Super. 435 ( 1975 )
Lee v. Beach Publishing Co. , 127 Fla. 600 ( 1937 )
State, Ex Rel. v. Lee , 122 Fla. 685 ( 1936 )
State v. Lyons , 293 So. 2d 391 ( 1974 )