Judges: Cecil Davis Assistant Attorney General
Filed Date: 3/27/1979
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
James Yaeger Lee County Attorney Ft. Myers
QUESTIONS:
1. May a county use the tax revenues from the tourist development tax solely for the maintenance of existing publicly owned and operated facilities which meet the statutory designation of s.
2. If the answer to the above is in the negative, to what extent may a county use the tourist development tax revenues for maintenance of existing publicly owned and operated facilities which meet the statutory designation of a convention center, sports stadium, sports arena, coliseum, or auditorium as designated in s.
3. To what extent may a county use the tax revenues to acquire, construct, extend, enlarge, repair, improve, maintain, operate, or promote publicly owned and operated parks or beaches?
SUMMARY:
Lee County may use tax revenues from the tourist development tax solely for the maintenance of existing publicly owned and operated facilities meeting the requirements of the statutory designations set out in the Local Option Tourist Development Act. Expenditure of tourist development tax revenues is authorized for the maintenance of existing publicly owned and operated facilities, such as convention centers, sports stadiums, coliseums, or auditoriums within the boundaries of the county, and may not be used under existing law for publicly owned and operated parks or beaches or their promotion.
Your first question draws into account a change made by the Division of Statutory Revision. The local option tourist development tax was enacted as Ch. 77-209, Laws of Florida. In several subparagraphs of s. 5 of Ch. 77-209, the Legislature spelled out the authorized uses of tourist development tax revenues. Among such uses were those included in s. 5(1)(a) which provided:
To acquire, construct, extend, enlarge, remodel, repair, improve, maintain, operate, and promote, one or more publicly owned and operated convention centers, sports stadiums, sports arenas, coliseums or auditoriums within the boundaries of the county or subcounty special taxing district which approved the ordinance levying and imposing the tax by referendum pursuant to section 6 of this act; provided, however, these purposes may be implemented through service contracts and leases with persons who maintain and operate adequate existing facilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
In compiling the 1977 edition of the Florida Statutes, the Division of Statutory Revision placed the aforecited provision as part of s.
To acquire, construct, extend, enlarge, remodel, repair, improve, maintain, operate, [or] promote one or more publicly owned convention centers, sports stadiums, sports arenas, coliseums, or auditoriums within the boundaries of the county or subcounty special taxing district . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The Division of Statutory Revision is empowered by s.
Consequently, your first question draws into issue whether the Division of Statutory Revision's change of the term ``and' to ``or' in s.
The particular rule of statutory construction governing this matter is enunciated in Payne v. Payne,
Statutes must be so construed as to give effect to the evident legislative intent, even if the results seem contradictory to the rules of construction and the strict letter of the statute; particularly does this rule apply when a construction based upon the strict letter of the statute would lead to an unintended result that defeats the evident purpose of the legislature.
Applying this rule, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the use of the term ``and' in a statute should be read ``or,' holding:
It is manifest that the decision of the chancellor was the result of a misapprehension of the comprehensive and liberal purpose and intent of the statute. The use of the word ``and' in the statute is not intended to make the elements of proof conjunctive or interdependent.
In Pinellas County v. Woolley,
. . . have also acknowledged this rule of construction that the words ``or' and ``and' may be interchanged when it is required to effectuate the obvious intention of the legislature and to accomplish the purpose of the statute.
See also Pompano Horse Club v. State,
In light of the above rules of statutory construction, it is, therefore, necessary to determine the legislative intent relative to the authorized expenditures of tourist development tax revenues. Utilization of the term ``and' as it is found in s. 5(1)(a) of Ch. 77-209 would provide that the tourist development tax may be expended only to acquire, construct, extend, enlarge, remodel, repair, improve, maintain, operate, ``and' promote one or more publicly owned and operated convention centers, sports stadiums, sports arenas, coliseums, or auditoriums. That is, if the conjunctive ``and' is used, the tourist development tax revenues could only be expended where all of the purposes enunciated in s. 5(1)(a) of Ch. 77-209 are present. Since it is an evident impossibility to acquire, construct, extend, enlarge, remodel, repair, improve, maintain, operate, and promote publicly owned convention centers, etc., at the same time, utilization of the term ``and' in its conjunctive sense would lead to an irrational result totally at odds with the evident legislative intent.
Utilization of the disjunctive ``or,' on the contrary, would lead to a rational result clearly in keeping with legislative intent which would authorize the county or subcounty special taxing district to expend tourist development tax revenues for any one or more of the purposes enunciated in s. 5(1)(a) of Ch. 77-209 (s.
It, therefore, would clearly appear that the utilization of the term ``or' in s.
Because of the affirmative answer to question 1, question 2 posed at the outset of this opinion is rendered moot.
Your third question inquires as to what extent the county may use tourist development tax revenues to acquire, construct, extend, enlarge, repair, improve, maintain, operate, or promote publicly owned and operated parks or beaches. The resolution of this question in turn depends upon a construction of s.
(5) AUTHORIZED USES OF REVENUE. —
(a) All tax revenues received pursuant to this section by a county imposing the tourist development tax shall be used by that county for the following purposes only:
1. To acquire, construct, extend, enlarge, remodel, repair, improve, maintain, operate, [or] promote one or more publicly owned and operated convention centers, sports stadiums, sports arenas, coliseums, or auditoriums within the boundaries of the county or subcounty special taxing district which approved the ordinance levying and imposing the tax by referendum pursuant to subsection (6). However, these purposes may be implemented through service contracts and leases with persons who maintain and operate adequate existing facilities;
2. To promote and advertise tourism in the state of Florida and nationally and internationally; or
3. To fund convention bureaus, tourist bureaus, tourist information centers, and news bureaus as county agencies or by contract with the chambers of commerce or similar associations in the county.
(b) In any county in which the electors of the county or the electors of the subcounty special tax district have approved by referendum the ordinance levying and imposing the tourist development tax, the revenues to be derived from the tourist development tax may be pledged to secure and liquidate revenue bonds issued by the county for the purposes set forth in paragraph (1)(a). (Emphasis supplied.)
While two of the subparagraphs of s.
In Brooks v. Anastasia Mosquito Control District,
In statutory construction it has been consistently held that statutes must be given their plain and obvious meaning. It must be assumed that the legislature of this state must know the plain and ordinary meaning of the words . . . .
In Thayer v. State,
The law clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because the statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted. Van Pelt v. Hilliard,
75 Fla. 792 ,78 So. 693 (1918); Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co.,118 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960). The reason for this rule is that the Legislature must be assumed to know the meaning of words and to have expressed its intent by the use of the words found in the statute.It is, of course, a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Hence, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned.
See also Ideal Farms Drainage District, et al. v. Certain Lands,
Application of these principles of statutory construction leads to the conclusion that publicly owned and operated parks or beaches are not a lawful and proper subject for expenditure of tourist development tax revenues under the provisions of s.
Pursuant to s.
Under s.
Under s.
In summary, therefore, it is my conclusion that tourist development tax revenues may be used solely for the maintenance of existing publicly owned and operated facilities expressly mentioned under s.
Prepared by:
Cecil Davis Assistant Attorney General
Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel , 1952 Fla. LEXIS 989 ( 1952 )
Vocelle v. Knight Brothers Paper Company , 118 So. 2d 664 ( 1960 )
Shuman v. State , 358 So. 2d 1333 ( 1978 )
Dotty v. State , 197 So. 2d 315 ( 1967 )
Thayer v. State , 335 So. 2d 815 ( 1976 )
Ideal Farms Drainage District v. Certain Lands , 154 Fla. 554 ( 1944 )
Pinellas County v. Woolley , 189 So. 2d 217 ( 1966 )
Brooks v. Anastasia Mosquito Control District , 148 So. 2d 64 ( 1963 )